Innocenty Maria Bocheński expounded his interpretation of Theophrastus’ logic chiefly in his book La logique de Théophraste (1947). In Bocheński’s reconstruction, Theophrastus worked on the last insights of Aristotle’s syllogistic and systematized it, thereby opening the door to later (Stoic) developments in the history of logic. A closer look at Bocheński’s interpretation of Theophrastus’ logic can lead us to reassess the originality of the contribution of the philosopher of Eresus. As more recent studies have convincingly shown, Aristotle’s modal system is grounded on the theory of predication expounded in the Topics. The validity of Barbara LX-L rests on the essential predications that the major premise and the conclusion are descriptive. According to Bocheński, Theophrastus had an extensional understanding of logic, as is clear from his proof for the rules of conversion of categorical universal propositions. Bocheński also stresses that Theophrastus consistently avoids Aristotle’s two-sided possibility and this might also be read as an attempt to develop a self-contained logical system that is not merely seen as the deductive system of a theoretical discipline. Bocheński’s overall assessment of Theophrastus’ logic might be in need of revision, inasmuch as our understanding of Aristotle’s logical enterprise has radically changed in the last decades, but the minutiae of Bocheński’s reading of Theophrastus are compelling and can stimulate new studies on the successor of the Stagirite.

According to Józef M. Bocheński, philosophers should analyze and not moralize. Bocheński also wrote that the philosophers’ aim is to battle with superstitions. The present paper concerns the question of how philosophical analysis may serve this aim. In the first part of the paper, the kinds and tools of philosophical analysis are presented. In particular, the objects of philosophical analysis (concepts and statements) as well as logical “instruments” of analysis are discussed. In the second part, the concept of superstition (or prejudice) is analyzed. Taking Bocheński’s definition as the point of departure, some essential distinctions involved in this concept are explained, for instance the distinction between truthfulness of a statement and somebody’s acceptance of a statement, and the distinction between a false statement and an obviously false statement. Next, the mechanism of fighting against superstitions by means of analysis is shown using examples taken from Bocheński’s book Sto zabobonów [One Hundred Superstitions] (1987). Superstitions connected with authority, patriotism, and tolerance are analyzed.

Józef Maria Bocheński is widely known as a promoter of the application of logic to theology and the philosophy of God. His analysis of St Thomas Aquinas’s quinque viae has become a traditional benchmark for numerous formal analyses of the arguments for the existence of God. Thus, we can say that he was a precursor of formal natural theology, which nowadays is undergoing dynamic developments. Bocheński used formal methods to analyze not only arguments for the existence of God, but also their counterarguments. Conducting those two types of analyses is postulated in his programme of studies on God. In this paper, I will discuss Bocheński’s only available case of the second type of analysis mentioned above, in which he considers Immanuel Kant’s objections to the cosmological argument.

This paper will focus on J.M. Bocheński’s inclination towards seeing the world and its logical structure from the point of view of ontology. Accordingly, on the basis of Bocheński’s selected utterances we will present and discuss the perception of the world proposed by the scholar, and then we will deal with questions pertaining to the logical structure of the world and examine a formal framework of this structure.

Edward Nieznański developed two logical systems to deal with the problem of evil and to refute religious determinism. However, when formalized in first-order modal logic, two axioms of each system contradict one another, revealing that there is an underlying minimal set of axioms enough to settle the questions. In this article, we develop this minimal system, called N3, which is based on Nieznański’s contribution. The purpose of N3 is to solve the logical problem of evil through the defeat of a version of religious determinism. On the one hand, these questions are also addressed by Nieznański’s systems, but, on the other hand, they are obtained in N3 with fewer assumptions. Our approach can be considered a case of logic of religion, that is, of logic applied to religious discourse, as proposed by Józef Maria Bocheński; in this particular case, it is a discourse in theodicy, which is situated in the context of the philosophy of religion.

Since antiquity, defining the concept of beauty has been a struggle for philosophers. Many raised questions related to the objectivity/subjectivity of beauty, which then became fundamental to the understanding of issues in philosophical aesthetics. In this context, our paper provides a logical analysis of the concept of beauty, which includes both universalistic and relativistic perspectives. Based on a methodology inspired by Józef Maria Bocheński’s logical analyses of the concepts of authority and free society, we intend to present some unexpected results derived from popular beliefs and to propose solutions concerning this issue.

An analysis of positions for and against the principle of ex falso sequitur quodlibet is essential to the history of a paraconsistent approach in scholastic logic and in Western thought. In this paper we analyze the role that the Dialectica of Gerland of Besançon played in initiating the discussion about the ex falso in the 12th century, and we interpret his position as contrary to the acceptance of the principle. We consider Gerland one of the earliest authors to prepare the path and examine properly the role of the ex falso sequitur quodlibet principle, making it central in the philosophical context of the time. We adopt the thesis of Józef Maria Bocheński, according to which the formal aspects of logical theory are essential, decisive, and indispensable to a good historiography of logic.