St. Thomas Aquinas had brilliant ideas, which contributed to both theology and philosophy. However, an important part of his success as a theologian and philosopher which can be easily overlooked was his effective planning. In order to gain truth and present it to the readers or listeners (according to the Dominican motto: contemplata aliis tradere), it is essential to know how to do that. Aquinas’s investigations and presentations are always ordered according to certain patterns and governed by ideas, which he often explains. They also follow clear methodological frameworks.
In our volume, we have focused on strategies he adopts in different types of his production and methods he applies both as a theologian and as a philosopher. We have examined the importance and the consequences of such choices, as well as their motivations and inspirations. We have included both those strategies and methods which are explicitly mentioned by Thomas and those which can be traced back. This enabled us to create a picture of Aquinas as a scholar who cared about the correct ways of thinking and scientific procedures.
Pedagogical strategies always need to be adapted to specific communities. This study surveys the evolution of thinking about theologia from the time of Alexander of Hales to Thomas Aquinas. The vast Summa Halensis, of which Books I and III were entrusted by Alexander to John of La Rochelle, draws on ideas developed from a wide range of authorities, including De spiritu et anima, circulated as by Augustine, but in fact a Cistercian treatise which sought to combine Augustinian and Boethian ideas. Although notoriously prolix, the Summa Halensis introduces some key ideas about reason and human nature, subsequently picked up by Thomas, such as that grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it. Thomas would also expand upon its opening disccussion of doctrina theologiae as a science or kind of knowledge. By 1259, Thomas was no longer having to prove himself to Parisian theologians. In the Summa contra Gentiles, he experimented with a Boethian pedagogical strategy, based more on reason than authority, avoiding the term theologia. It was of limited practical value, however. By 1265, Thomas decided to combine these different strategies in a final Summa. Although described by William of Tocco in 1317 as a Summa theologiae, this work was more often referred to simply as Thomas’s Summa. Here, it is argued that he defines sacra doctrina not as a set of propositions, but as the sacred teaching transmitted by both the Old and New Testaments. Thomas connects the Dionysian notion of theologia, as discourse about God, to sacred teaching understood as a science or form of knowledge that has both speculative and practical dimensions. By referring to teaching as sacred, he offered a more expansive understanding of what Augustine had called doctrina Christiana, one that could be pursued through reason, Scripture, and the Fathers and concerned God, humanity, and the world.
In this paper, I discuss the issue of how to account for scientific diversity and how to do so scientifically, in particular methodically and discursively, by revisiting Thomas Aquinas’s notion of wisdom (sapientia) as a science (scientia), with reference to two texts, namely: article 2 of question 57 of the Prima Secundae (dealing with the speculative intellectual virtues), on the one hand, and the second lecture of Thomas’s commentary on book A of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (notably nos. 41–51), on the other. I aim to clarify how the _Doctor Communis _views the diversity of – different types of – sciences, especially higher and lower order forms of knowledge, that is to say, how he argues for the scientific need to bring them into an ordered unity or unifying order. Thus I reappraise some of Aquinas’s metaphysical arguments in support of the thesis that accounting for scientific diversity requires ordering at an ultimate level, the sapiential level, including a science adequate to meet this requirement.
In Contra impugnantes, Thomas Aquinas describes creatures as becoming “distant” from God (ab eo distare incepit) according to their diverse essences; in fact, it falls to the rational creature to reconnect (religio, re-ligare) with God. This language reflects Aquinas’s use of the metaphor of distance applied to exemplary, efficient, and final causality. While the metaphor is valuable for expressing the Creator–creature relation, its semantic entailments of proximity and conjunction also illuminate Aquinas’s account of ontological intermediaries and the hierarchical ordering of causality. In exemplary causality, beings closer to God have a greater participation in the transcendental perfections. In efficient causality, creation is a certain distancing of the creature, since its idea, considered in itself, is initially “one” with God. In final causality, creaturely operation is understood as an approximation (appropinquare) towards ordered ends, culminating in God. The distance metaphor entails the requirement of mediums for the transmission of causal force. On the one hand, the metaphor implies the convenientia of intermediaries to bridge ontological “gaps” and a stepwise causal applicatio of lower ontological orders by higher ones, in such a way that inferior levels attain perfection by the action (usus) of the superior level. Properly understood, ontological distance does not signify metaphysical evil but participated causality. In particular, the distance of intelligent beings becomes a sharing in God’s free and intelligent operation.
The aim of this article is to show that Thomas Aquinas’s dialectical method is not merely a tool for organizing theological and philosophical discourse but a strategic mechanism for reducing epistemic uncertainty. By systematically structuring his arguments, Aquinas progressively narrows the range of possible answers, eliminating ambiguity and strengthening the epistemic foundation of his conclusions. To support this claim, I examine three key aspects of his methodology: (1) the quaestio structure as a mechanism of epistemic selection, where the careful organization of objections and responses enables the systematic filtration of competing claims; (2) the role of negative dialectics and falsification in refining arguments through systematic refutation; and (3) his strategies for managing indeterminacy in metaphysical and theological reasoning. These elements reveal a deliberate epistemic strategy aimed at securing intellectual certainty within a structured methodological framework. I also argue that Aquinas’s approach, while firmly rooted in the scholastic tradition, exhibits structural similarities to certain contemporary discussions in epistemology and argumentation theory. This reassessment highlights the enduring philosophical significance of his methodological rigour for contemporary philosophical discourse.
Aquinas’s Five Ways are probably the most popular arguments for the existence of God in history. The first three, however, have frequently been accused of being prone to a quantifier-shift fallacy. A person who commits the error of shifting quantifiers reverses the order of two quantifiers and fallaciously argues that, since every x has a related_ y_, there is some y related to every x. The aim of my paper is to evaluate whether Aquinas’s first, second and third ways might rightly be charged with the quantifier-shift fallacy. After briefly explaining what the logical error of shifting quantifiers amounts to, I jointly consider the first and second ways in the first part of the paper due to their structural similarities. I briefly outline both arguments and show why critics might accuse Aquinas of committing a quantifier-shift fallacy. I then argue that a careful reading of Aquinas’s arguments does not entitle us to make such an accusation. This conclusion is supported by Jan Salamucha’s famous formalization of Aquinas’s argument from motion. In the second part of my paper, I present Aquinas’s third way and describe four possible methods of defending Aquinas against the quantifier-shift fallacy objection. These methods consist in: (1) supplying, (2) formalizing, (3) reinterpreting, and (4) replacing the crucial part of the third way. I conclude by showing that none of these methods should be deemed successful.