

Ingarden's Criticism of Twardowski's Philosophical Programme and the Reception of Phenomenology in the Lvov-Warsaw School*

Aleksandra Gomułczak

(Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań)

Abstract: This paper examines Roman Ingarden's criticism of Kazimierz Twardowski's philosophical programme. According to Ingarden, the style of philosophizing cultivated by Twardowski prevented his students from engaging in complex philosophical problems. Ingarden's writings suggest that, as a result, they ignored phenomenology. The paper argues that Ingarden's criticism is not entirely accurate. Members of the Lvov-Warsaw School were familiar with Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, and although they often criticized it, they recognized its value. Moreover, it can be demonstrated that Husserl's ideas influenced several of Twardowski's students.

Key words: Twardowski's philosophical programme, philosophical styles, phenomenology vs analytic philosophy, philosophical education, philosophical methods, Kazimierz Twardowski, Roman Ingarden

1. Introduction

The Lvov-Warsaw School (henceforth: LWS) is widely recognized as the Polish school of analytic philosophy.¹ This is because the most significant accomplishments of this school pertain to the fields of mathematical logic and philosophy of language. The style in which the LWS members conducted their research – em-

* This paper is part of the research project no. 2020/37/N/HS1/02292, funded by the National Science Centre, Poland. The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments, which helped improve the previous version of the paper.

¹ H. Skolimowski, *Polish Analytical Philosophy: A Survey and a Comparison with British Analytical Philosophy*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1967; J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1989; J. Jadacki, *Polish Analytical Philosophy*, Semper, Warszawa 2009; A. Brożek et al., *Anti-Irrationalism: Philosophical Methods in the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Semper, Warszawa 2020.

phasizing clarity of speech and justification of statements – also contributed to the school’s recognition. However, this style of philosophizing did not originate from the source of the analytic tradition, which is English philosophy. Its roots lie in Austrian philosophy, specifically the School of Brentano, of which Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the LWS, was a member. Twardowski was so impressed by Brentano’s way of teaching that he set himself the goal of disseminating the “Brentanian style” of philosophizing among the Poles.²

Another significant aspect of the Brentano School is relevant in this context. Namely, Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, like Twardowski, was Brentano’s student. Hence, the LWS and the phenomenological movement share the same roots. The periods of Twardowski’s and Husserl’s studies in Vienna overlap to some extent, and their acquaintance resulted in mutual interest in each other’s work.³ This connection enabled several of Twardowski’s students to visit Husserl in Göttingen and Freiburg im Breisgau.⁴ One of those students was Roman Ingarden, who initially studied at the University of Lvov (now Lviv, Ukraine).⁵ In Göttingen, Ingarden became acquainted with phenomenology and decided to work on his doctoral dissertation under Husserl’s supervision.⁶ Ingarden was a passionate opponent of the style and genre of philosophy cultivated by Twardowski’s students.⁷ At the same time, up until 1939, he stayed close to the environment of the LWS.

² K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. J.L. Brandl, J. Woleński, Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta 1999, p. 28.

³ See E. Husserl, *Besprechung von: K. Twardowski “Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine Psychologische Untersuchung”*, in: E. Husserl, *Aufsätze und Rezensionen 1890–1910. Husserliana*, Vol. 22, ed. B. Rang, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague-Boston-London 1979, pp. 349–358; E. Husserl, *Intentional Objects*, in: R.D. Rollinger, *Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano*, Springer, Dordrecht 1999, pp. 251–284. According to Karl Schuhmann, those discussions led Husserl to formulate his theory of intentionality. See K. Schuhmann, *Husserl and Twardowski*, in: *Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School*, eds. F. Conglione, R. Poli, J. Woleński, Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta 1993, pp. 41–58.

⁴ The list of Twardowski’s students who studied under Husserl includes Stefan Błachowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Henryk Mehlberg, and Leopold Blaustein. See W. Płotka, *Early Phenomenology in Poland (1895–1945): Origins, Development, and Breakdown*, “Studies in Eastern European Thought” 2017, Vol. 69, pp. 79–91.

⁵ The Polish name of the city is Lwów.

⁶ R. Ingarden, *Moje wspomnienia o Edmundzie Husserlu*, “Studia Filozoficzne” 1981, Vol. 2, p. 9. For the original German version of the text, see R. Ingarden, *Meine Erinnerungen an Edmund Husserl*, in: E. Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden. Mit Erläuterungen und Erinnerungen an Husserl*, ed. R. Ingarden, Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag 1968, pp. 106–135.

⁷ On Ingarden’s relationship with the LWS, see A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, eds., *Intuition and Analysis: Roman Ingarden and the School of Kazimierz Twardowski*, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2022.

This paper sets two goals. First, it examines Ingarden's standpoint in relation to Twardowski's philosophical programme. Second, it assesses whether this programme impacted the reception of phenomenology by the LWS. Ingarden argues that the style of philosophizing cultivated by Twardowski and his students prevented them from engaging in complex philosophical inquiries. He seems to hold an implicit view that this programme led them to ignore phenomenology. However, I argue that it did not force LWS members to such extremes. I suggest instead that Twardowski's programme may have influenced how they engaged with Husserl's philosophy. A separate, extensive study would be required to describe and analyse in detail the various ways in which Twardowski's students responded to Husserl's philosophy and phenomenology in general. In this paper, I will only highlight the main figures, their key viewpoints and the areas in which they made use of Husserl's philosophy.

The paper is divided into three sections. First, I briefly sketch the fundamental elements of Twardowski's philosophical programme. Second, I present Ingarden's criticism of this programme and justify my view that Ingarden implicitly believes that it contributes to the LWS's reluctance towards phenomenology. Third, I argue that this criticism is too radical by showing diverse attempts made by Twardowski's students to tackle Husserl's philosophy.

2. The Essentials of Twardowski's Philosophical Programme

Twardowski provides the characteristics of his philosophical programme in various papers and speeches,⁸ and he admits it is inspired by Brentano's

⁸ K. Twardowski, *On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products*, op. cit., pp. 257–260; K. Twardowski, *Opening Lecture at the Lvov University*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Prejudices, Judgements and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, Rodopi, Amsterdam–New York, 2015, pp. 35–44; K. Twardowski, *Address at the Inauguration of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Prejudices, Judgements*, op. cit., pp. 45–50; K. Twardowski, *Psychology vs. Physiology and Philosophy*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products*, op. cit., pp. 41–64; K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., pp. 26–29. Numerous studies explore the LWS's philosophical style and methodology, e.g., M. Rzewuska, *O języku, stylu i polszczyźnie filozofów szkoły Twardowskiego*, in: *Rozprawy filozoficzne*, ed. L. Gumański, Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu, Toruń 1969, pp. 313–333; J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy*, op. cit.; A. Brożek et al., *Anti-Irrationalism*, op. cit.; R. Kleszcz, *Metoda i wartości. Metafilozofia Kazimierza Twardowskiego*, Semper, Warszawa 2013; M. Będkowski, *„Jasnościowcy”. O stylu naukowym Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej z perspektywy idei prostego języka (rekonesans)*, „Oblicza Komunikacji” 2019, Vol. 11, pp. 87–104.

approach.⁹ Overall, Twardowski's philosophical programme consists of three elements: (1) the concept of philosophy, (2) the philosophical style, and (3) the programme of philosophical education.

2.1. The Concept of Philosophy

There are five main components of Twardowski's concept of philosophy. First, Twardowski regarded philosophy as a science based on experience, including internal (psychic) and external (sensory) perception.¹⁰ Second, he argues that philosophy is the name of a set of "philosophical sciences" that includes the theory of knowledge, psychology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, philosophy of history, and philosophy of natural sciences.¹¹ Third, Twardowski initially considers psychology to be the basis of other philosophical disciplines since they all require internal perception or both internal and external perception.¹² However, around 1902, he changed some of his views in response to Husserl's arguments against psychologism.¹³ Fourth, according to Twardowski, philosophy and the natural sciences differ neither in subject nor method.¹⁴ Initially, he considered metaphysics to be the bridge between these two kinds of sciences, but he later started to doubt whether scientific metaphysics was possible.¹⁵ Finally, Twardowski believed that truth is the foremost aim of philosophy.¹⁶

A number of Twardowski's students adopted such a concept of philosophy.¹⁷ They developed and applied various methods (analysis of concepts, paraphras-

⁹ K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., p. 20.

¹⁰ K. Twardowski, *Opening Lecture*, op. cit., pp. 36–37.

¹¹ K. Twardowski, *Psychology vs. Physiology*, op. cit., p. 60. It should be noted that Twardowski excludes the history of philosophy from this set. K. Twardowski, *On Scientific Preparation for Philosophy*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Prejudices, Judgements*, op. cit., p. 58.

¹² K. Twardowski, *On Psychology vs. Physiology*, op. cit., p. 60.

¹³ K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., p. 31. Jan Woleński distinguishes between ontological and methodological psychologism in Twardowski's philosophy. Because of Husserl's argument, Twardowski rejected ontological psychologism (objects studied by philosophy are mental), but he sustained methodological psychologism (inner perception is the basis of philosophical inquiry). J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 41.

¹⁴ K. Twardowski, *Opening Lecture*, op. cit., pp. 37–39.

¹⁵ K. Twardowski, *Address at the 25th Anniversary Session of the Polish Philosophical Society*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products*, op. cit., pp. 271–272.

¹⁶ K. Twardowski, *Opening Lecture*, op. cit., p. 43. Moreover, Twardowski defended the absoluteness of truth against relativism. See K. Twardowski, *On So-Called Relative Truths*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products*, op. cit., p. 148.

¹⁷ See A. Brożek et al., *Anti-Irrationalism*, op. cit., pp. 40, 51, 64, 71, 74–75.

ing, axiomatization, and formalization) across all philosophical disciplines.¹⁸ One should also note that a lot of LWS members did not accept the distinguishing of psychology and were adherents of anti-psychologism in logic.¹⁹

2.2. The Philosophical Style

I adopt Leon Koj's concept of "philosophical style," which includes the subject matter, point of departure, type of argumentation, scope of philosophical theories (maximalism vs minimalism), attitude towards history, literary form, accepted assumptions, and value system.²⁰ In this vein, Twardowski's idea of philosophical style consists of four primary components: (1) clarity of speech, (2) justification of statements, (3) minimalistic scope of inquiry, and (4) value system. All of them are certain prescriptions or postulates.

(1) The postulate of clarity of speech is so essential for the LWS members that they are sometimes called "clarity-makers."²¹ Basically, Twardowski argued that even the most complex philosophical problems can be formulated and expressed clearly if one is clear with oneself.²² If one thinks clearly, one writes clearly; hence, obscure philosophical writing is a sign of obscure thought. He does not accept the excuse made by some philosophers that the complexity of philosophical problems is the reason for obscure writing.²³ Moreover, Twardowski makes a somewhat controversial claim: if philosophical work is unclear, one should not strain to understand it.²⁴

(2) The second component of Twardowski's philosophical style emphasizes the proper justification of statements and exact thinking.²⁵ Reliable justification stands above adherence to any philosophical school or attachment to a philosophical system.²⁶ According to Twardowski, the problem with philosophical systems, schools, or any "-isms" is that they are often built upon theses accepted

¹⁸ Those methods are discussed in detail in A. Brożek et al., *Anti-Irrationalism*, op. cit.

¹⁹ J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 83.

²⁰ L. Koj, *O stylach w filozofii*, "Edukacja Filozoficzna" 1991, Vol. 12, pp. 85–86. See A. Brożek, *O stylach filozoficznych i dylematach metodologicznych*, "Analiza i Egzystencja" 2009, Vol. 10, pp. 77–89.

²¹ See M. Będkowski, *"Jasnościowcy"*, op. cit., p. 104.

²² K. Twardowski, *On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style*, op. cit., p. 257.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 257–258.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 258–259.

²⁵ K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., p. 28.

²⁶ K. Twardowski, *Opening Lecture*, op. cit., p. 42.

without proper justification. As a result, thinkers who adhere to one school or system “in principle” condemn those who adhere to another.²⁷ However, if philosophers were only concerned about facts, justification, and truth – like scientists – they would not have such diverse philosophical systems since “there is only one truth in every subject.”²⁸

(3) Next, Twardowski proposes a “minimalistic” way of conducting philosophical investigations. Namely, instead of constructing whole philosophical systems by means of speculation, he prefers to examine specific issues and systematically gather detailed knowledge.²⁹ He considers philosophy to be a science created by a joint effort of many, not a result of the work of one genius.³⁰

(4) Last but not least, Twardowski demands philosophers cultivate the values of criticism, anti-dogmatism, and independence. Those values are developed through a constant exchange of ideas during discussions and debates, which are much more essential to philosophy than to other sciences.³¹ According to Twardowski, the philosophical sciences exist in “far-ranging abstraction and deal with questions which are invariably connected [...] with man’s spiritual life, easily exposing the issue to numerous mistakes.”³² Hence, philosophers tend to overlook certain facts and interpret them falsely. Therefore, mutual peer control is indispensable since co-workers who see the problems from different angles can prevent one-sidedness.³³ Another virtue nurtured by Twardowski is independent thinking; he argues that “next to the correct method and pure love for truth, independence of thought has always seemed to me to offer the most secure warrant for succeeding in scientific work.”³⁴ By independence of thought, Twardowski means that one should free oneself from the influence of those factors that muddy one’s thinking; independent thought is only concerned with whether a given opinion is true and logically valid.³⁵

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 43.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 41.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 43.

³¹ K. Twardowski, *Address at the Inauguration*, op. cit., p. 47.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., p. 48.

³⁴ K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., p. 27.

³⁵ K. Twardowski, *Independence of Thinking*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Prejudices, Judgements*, op. cit., p. 89.

2.3. Philosophical Education

To enable his students to meet the demands described above, Twardowski created a programme of philosophical education and institutions devoted to philosophy, like the Polish Philosophical Society and a journal called "Ruch Filozoficzny" [Philosophical Movement].³⁶ His educational programme is well conceived and has two primary objectives. First, to enable students "to become acquainted with the most important branches of philosophy, the respective problems and methods of dealing with them, and the most characteristic attempts at their solution."³⁷ Second, to show students the proper path and allow them to seek out the goal by themselves. Even if their goal differs from Twardowski's.³⁸ To achieve those objectives, Twardowski created a set of "core courses" that emphasized a methodical approach but did not neglect the history of philosophy. However, since he believed lectures were not the most effective means to "steer young people in those directions," he inaugurated a philosophical seminar at the University of Lvov.³⁹ This allowed students to participate in regular, systematic exercises and discussions, which Twardowski considered indispensable to philosophical education.

This general overview of Twardowski's educational programme is incomplete without several details. Namely, the ideal he created requires students to become acquainted with scientific disciplines outside philosophy, including mathematics, one natural science, and one of the humanities.⁴⁰ Equally important is education in both the history of philosophy and recent philosophy.⁴¹ Finally, it is essential to read classical philosophical works in the original. Hence, the knowledge of Greek and Latin is indispensable.⁴²

Let's emphasize that all of the elements of this philosophical programme, especially the postulates of clarity of speech, justification, criticism, anti-dogmatism, and high expectations for philosophical education, are certain ideals that philosophers should strive for. Whether and how the LWS members applied

³⁶ K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., p. 28.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 27.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ K. Twardowski, *On Scientific Preparation*, op. cit., p. 57.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 58. Woleński emphasizes that "the knowledge of, and importance attached to, the role of history of philosophy can be treated as a specific characteristic of the Lvov-Warsaw School, which singles it out among other philosophical schools, especially those inclined to an analytic interpretation of philosophy." J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 25.

⁴² K. Twardowski, *On Scientific Preparation*, op. cit., p. 59.

those postulates is a separate topic that warrants a comprehensive study beyond the scope of this paper.⁴³

3. Ingarden on Twardowski's Philosophical Programme

Since the beginning of his studies, Ingarden was critical of Twardowski's teachings and the philosophical developments of his school.⁴⁴ Already in 1911, Ingarden viewed the University of Lvov as dominated by "the positivistic atmosphere" since some of Twardowski's students were under the influence of Bertrand Russell and Ernst Mach. Others practised Brentanian descriptive psychology, and in general, "few people believed in philosophy."⁴⁵ Ingarden was thus happy to travel abroad; however, the primary reason was to study mathematics. Twardowski advised him to go to Göttingen, Marburg, or Berlin, and Ingarden chose the first.⁴⁶ He attended Husserl's lectures and seminars and was "thrilled" when he learned that "one can still ask philosophical questions about the essence."⁴⁷ Ultimately, Ingarden decided to work on his doctoral dissertation with Husserl, spent several years in Göttingen, and followed him to Freiburg im Breisgau. When Ingarden obtained his doctorate in 1918, he returned to Poland. After his habilitation in 1924 – which was supervised by Twardowski – he moved back to Lvov and worked as a *Privatdozent* and mathematics teacher until 1933, when he was appointed to the chair of philosophy. Thus, Ingarden remained in an environment dominated by the LWS members for many years. At the same time, he was their passionate critic, engaged co-worker, and, to some of them, a teacher.⁴⁸

⁴³ Scholars provide numerous examples to support the claim that the LWS members generally adhered to these postulates. See M. Rzewuska, *O języku, stylu i polszczyźnie*, op. cit., pp. 319–327; M. Będkowski, *"Jasnościowcy"*, op. cit., pp. 95–96, 99–101; A. Brożek et al., *Anti-Irrationalism*, op. cit., pp. 209–236, 248–287, 293–314.

⁴⁴ According to Anna Brożek and Jacek Jadacki, Ingarden considered Twardowski's lectures to be too elementary. He was also dissatisfied with Twardowski's academic "regime," which precluded beginners from participation in advanced courses. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, *Interpersonal and Intertextual Relations between Roman Ingarden and the Members of the Lvov-Warsaw School*, in: *Intuition and Analysis*, op. cit., p. 17.

⁴⁵ R. Ingarden, *Moje wspomnienia*, op. cit., p. 9. Unless stated otherwise, all translations are my own.

⁴⁶ R. Ingarden, *Wspomnienia z Getyngi*, "Przegląd Artystyczno-Literacki" 1998, Vols. 5–6, p. 12.

⁴⁷ R. Ingarden, *Moje wspomnienia*, op. cit., p. 9.

⁴⁸ See especially Ingarden's polemics with Kotarbiński. T. Kotarbiński, *O potrzebie zaniechania wyrazów "filozofia", "filozof", "filozoficzny" itp.*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1921, Vol. 6, pp. 81–86;

Overall, the atmosphere of Göttingen and Husserl's teaching style greatly influenced Ingarden. This influence is discernible in some of his criticisms of Twardowski's philosophical programme. I distinguish two targets of this criticism: the postulate of clarity of speech (1) and a minimalistic approach to philosophical investigations (2). I argue that Ingarden holds an implicit view that adherence to those postulates led the LWS members to ignore phenomenology (3).

3.1. Criticism of the Postulate of Clarity of Speech

Ingarden essentially agrees with Twardowski's thesis that philosophical works should be clearly written and that the lack of clarity in thinking results in obscure writing.⁴⁹ However, he attacks Twardowski's conclusion that the lack of clarity in a philosophical work is an excuse not to read it. Ingarden interprets this statement as an admission of the absoluteness of clarity. He argues that establishing criteria for the clarity of philosophical writings is problematic. He assumes that a writing style is clear if it enables the reader to think about the same things and in the same way as the author. Defined this way, clarity is relative, since it depends on the aptitude of the reader.⁵⁰ For example, a philosophical work may seem obscure

T. Kotarbiński, *O istocie doświadczenia wewnętrznego*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1922, Vol. 25, pp. 84–196; T. Kotarbiński, *Odpowiedź*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1922, Vol. 25, pp. 535–540; R. Ingarden, *Spór o istotę filozofii*, "Przegląd Warszawski" 1922, Vol. 2, No. 14, pp. 161–172; R. Ingarden, *W sprawie "Istoty doświadczenia wewnętrznego"*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1922, Vol. 25, pp. 512–534. See also S. Richard, *Are There Ideal Objects? The Controversy between Kotarbiński and Ingarden*, in: *Franz Brentano's Philosophy after One Hundred Years: From History of Philosophy to Reism*, eds. D. Fisette, G. Fréchette, H. Janoušek, Springer, Dordrecht 2021, pp. 149–165. In the Polish Philosophical Society, Ingarden directed the Section on the Theory of Cognition and the Section on Aesthetics. He contributed to Twardowski's "Ruch Filozoficzny" by writing reports on the leading phenomenological publication, "Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung," established by Husserl in 1912. In 1932, Ingarden founded the journal "Studia Philosophica," which aimed to promote Polish philosophy in foreign languages. He invited Twardowski and Ajdukiewicz to join the editorial board. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, *Interpersonal and Intertextual Relations*, op. cit., p. 24. Finally, he was a teacher of the youngest generation of Twardowski's students, including Leopold Blaustein, Eugenia Blaustein (née Ginsberg), Zofia Lissa, and Walter Auerbach.

⁴⁹ R. Ingarden, *O jasnym i niejasnym stylu filozoficznym*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1919, Vol. 5, p. 45. Wojciech Rechlewicz points out that Ingarden agreed that the obscurity of thinking entails the obscurity of the work but not the other way around. The work style may be clear, but the work itself may be obscure. W. Rechlewicz, *Ingarden's Position in the Polemic around Twardowski's Article "On Clear and Unclear Style"*, in: *Intuition and Analysis*, op. cit., p. 213.

⁵⁰ R. Ingarden, *O jasnym i niejasnym stylu*, op. cit., p. 45.

to a reader who is a novice, lacks specific – analytical or interpretative – skills, is accustomed to certain philosophical language (conceptual framework), or, finally, is an adherent of a different philosophical school (his philosophical views are not aligned with those presented in the work).⁵¹

Twardowski responded to this criticism in his letters to Ingarden.⁵² He agrees with Ingarden's standpoint that clarity is relative and asks him to point out the fragments of his work that suggest otherwise. Moreover, Twardowski admits that if one were to conclude from his paper that clarity is absolute, it is possible that he expressed himself "obscurly."⁵³

3.2. Criticism of the Postulate of Minimalism

Ingarden delivers the harshest criticism of Twardowski's programme and the LWS in the paper entitled *The Main Currents of Polish Philosophy* and in his private writings.⁵⁴ On the one hand, Ingarden holds Twardowski in high esteem and appreciates his role in creating philosophical education in Poland.⁵⁵ On the other hand, he is dissatisfied with the direction taken by his school, in which adopting Twardowski's philosophical programme played a major role.

According to Ingarden, Twardowski's activity initiated a new period of Polish philosophy by imposing a new style of philosophizing.⁵⁶ Instead of constructing extensive philosophical systems, Twardowski recommended that students work

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 46–47.

⁵² R. Kuliniak, D. Leszczyna, M. Pandura, eds., *Korespondencja Romana Witolda Ingardena z Kazimierzem Twardowskim*, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2016, pp. 179–183.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 179–180.

⁵⁴ R. Ingarden, *Główne kierunki polskiej filozofii*, "Studia Filozoficzne" 1973, No. 1 (86), pp. 3–15. Originally written in German, this lecture intended to inform the international community about the developments in Polish philosophy. To my knowledge, the original German version of this paper was not published. See R. Ingarden, *Dzieje mojej kariery uniwersyteckiej*, "Kwartalnik Filozoficzny" 1999, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 183–201; R. Ingarden, *Letter to Henryk Skolimowski written 06.11.1967*, in: *The Roman Ingarden Digital Archive*, URL: <http://ingarden.archive.uj.edu.pl/en/archiwum/letter-to-henryk-skolimowski-written-06-11-1967>.

⁵⁵ Ingarden praised Twardowski not only for his role in the development of Polish philosophy but also for his philosophical achievements. According to Ingarden, Twardowski was a pioneer in the following fields: the introduction of a distinction between act, object, and content of presentation, analysis of the formal structure of objects, and an attempt to overcome psychologism without falling into idealism. R. Ingarden, *Główne kierunki*, op. cit., p. 8. See also R. Ingarden, *The Scientific Activity of Kazimierz Twardowski*, "Studia Philosophica" 1948, Vol. 3, pp. 17–30.

⁵⁶ R. Ingarden, *Główne kierunki*, op. cit., p. 7.

on narrow, precisely defined issues, avoiding those that are hard to embrace. The precision of inquiry and scientific responsibility for "each formulation, each thesis" were of primary importance.⁵⁷ Ingarden recognized the significant merits of this programme. Twardowski taught students to precisely define concepts and introduce subtle linguistic and material distinctions, emphasizing the importance of unambiguity in proposed statements and their strict justification. Ingarden also admitted that such principles are similar to those applied by the phenomenological method of "distinction."⁵⁸

However, Ingarden argued that Twardowski's programme also had substantial drawbacks. His students started to avoid any theories and concepts that were not clear enough and to exclude all problems that seemed unsolvable. Twardowski's postulates resulted in rejecting metaphysics, brushing traditional theoretical and cognitive issues aside, and narrowing philosophical inquiry down to detailed descriptive-psychological, logical, and formal-ontological questions. Hence, the rule of "absolute clarity" and the method of analysis of isolated problems led Twardowski's students to abandon more complex and challenging issues.⁵⁹

Ingarden's criticism goes even further. Namely, he argues that Twardowski's philosophical programme failed because Twardowski did not create a community of researchers who understand each other. According to Ingarden, he was unable to lead such a community, embrace vast connections of problems, and conduct systematic work on those problems.⁶⁰ Twardowski's methodological rules are at fault here: if one only works on isolated problems, one loses sight of any connections between them. This, in turn, leads to oversimplification and fruitless work on falsely posed issues, whereas the meaning of authentic and deep problems unfolds only in connection with other problems.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 7–8.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 8.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 8–9. Ingarden argues that adherence to Twardowski's programme resulted in stagnation, causing some outstanding students to break away under the leadership of Jan Łukasiewicz. This group formed the Warsaw branch of the LWS. In Ingarden's opinion, members of this group radicalized Twardowski's principles, which led them to scepticism, mere analysis of words, denial of the unity of philosophy, truth-relativism, and so-called "anti-irrationalism," which consists of the rejection of intuition and the belief in the omnipotence of contemporary methods of mathematical-logical research. R. Ingarden, *Główne kierunki*, op. cit., pp. 9–10. Ingarden identifies the philosophy of the Warsaw branch with neo-positivism. See R. Ingarden, *Próba przebudowy filozofii przez neopozytywistów*, in: R. Ingarden, *Z badań nad filozofią współczesną*, PWN, Warszawa 1963, pp. 655–662; also T. Szubka, *Roman Ingarden o filozofii analitycznej*,

Ingarden's criticism is pretty harsh and even radical, for it leads to the conclusion that the LWS has failed as a philosophical school. To anyone who is familiar with the achievements and influence of Twardowski's school, such criticism seems inaccurate.⁶² However, it is important to note that when Ingarden describes this ideal of a "community of researchers," he has something specific in mind. This is where the influence of Husserl's Göttingen Circle comes into play.

In his recollections, Ingarden describes the style of Husserl's teaching and the environment he created in Göttingen. First, Husserl was a great teacher "who understood his students and was always able to find a clear answer to the questions they posed."⁶³ Second, his lectures – except the lecture on the history of philosophy – took the form of "enquiring meditations," which Husserl used to develop his own theories.⁶⁴ Third, although Husserl's seminars consisted of discussing classical philosophical works, their main goal was not to analyse and interpret the text. Husserl treated those works as a point of departure for his own inquiries about their main problems and possible ways to solve them. Ingarden admits that, although it was illuminating, it did not help students follow philosophers' thoughts and understand their work.⁶⁵ This is why Husserl's seminars were difficult for students who were unfamiliar with phenomenology. Participation in those seminars consisted of active co-thinking (*Mitdenken*) and engaging in discussions arranged by Husserl with reference to significant parts of the texts.⁶⁶ Fourth, after the publication of Husserl's *Ideen zu einer Reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (henceforth: *Ideen I*) in 1913,⁶⁷ it became the main subject of study during his seminars.⁶⁸ Fifth, Ingarden complains that, after the First World War and relocation to Freiburg im Breisgau, Husserl lost connection with most of the people from the Göttingen Circle and, to be able to

"Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria" 2020, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 123–129. On anti-irrationalism, see K. Ajdukiewicz, *Logistyczny antyirracjonalizm w Polsce*, in: *Fenomen Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*, eds. A. Brożek, A. Chybińska, Academicon, Lublin 2016, pp. 145–156.

⁶² See J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy*, op. cit.; A. Brożek, F. Stadler, J. Woleński, eds., *The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in European Culture*, Springer, Cham 2017; A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, eds., *At the Sources of the Twentieth Century Analytical Movement: Kazimierz Twardowski and His Position in European Philosophy*, Brill, Leiden 2022.

⁶³ R. Ingarden, *Wspomnienia z Getyngi*, op. cit., p. 17.

⁶⁴ R. Ingarden, *Moje wspomnienia*, op. cit., p. 6.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ See E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Vol. 1, trans. F. Kersten, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1982.

⁶⁸ R. Ingarden, *Moje wspomnienia*, op. cit., p. 8.

work, he was forced to create a new “phenomenological environment.”⁶⁹ In this sense, Husserl's teaching activity seems mainly directed at developing phenomenology with the help of his students.⁷⁰

Given the above description, I think it seems reasonable to assume that Ingarden's ideal of a community of researchers working on vast interconnected problems under the leadership of one philosopher was based on his experience in Göttingen. He likely wanted Twardowski to guide his students in a specific direction, offering them a defined vision of philosophical research that would foster some sort of philosophical movement. However, Ingarden claims that Twardowski's principles made this impossible.

I agree that Twardowski did not create a philosophical movement in this sense. However, whether he wanted to do so – as stated by Ingarden – is doubtful.⁷¹ First, Twardowski admits that he never expected his students to follow in his steps in terms of philosophical interests.⁷² Second, he considers the main value of his school to be in the methodical sphere, for he clearly states that

the fundamental feature that characterizes this School [the LWS] lies in the domain of formal methodology, namely in the quest for the greatest possible precision and exactness in thinking and in the expression of what is thought, as well as in the most exhaustive substantiation possible of what has been thus brought forth, and in the utmost rigour in the conduct of proofs.⁷³

Third, although the LWS was not a philosophical movement in the same vein as phenomenology, it became a movement in terms of its influence on the devel-

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 13.

⁷⁰ This is also confirmed by Leopold Blaustein, Twardowski's and Ingarden's student who attended Husserl's lectures and seminars in 1925. He provides a valuable comparison between Twardowski's and Husserl's styles of teaching and points to several substantial similarities and differences. One of them is that Husserl “tends to raise himself co-workers in phenomenology. And, by his own declaration, he is willing to show interest only in those students who adopt this standpoint.” L. Blaustein, *Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia*, in: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia*, eds. D. Bęben, M. Ples-Bęben, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2013, p. 231.

⁷¹ R. Ingarden, *Główne kierunki*, op. cit., p. 8.

⁷² K. Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Część I. 1915–1927*, ed. R. Jadczyk, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Warszawa-Toruń 2002, p. 160. He was satisfied with both Łukasiewicz and Witwicki, who evolved in completely different directions. Twardowski had never imposed any particular doctrine on his students, which is shown by the richness of the topics of doctoral dissertations written under his supervision. See J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 8–13.

⁷³ K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., p. 28.

opment of Polish philosophy. The methodical principles cultivated by Twardowski and his students have been passed down through generations of Polish philosophers and continue to be evident today.⁷⁴

Let's point out that not only Twardowski but also other LWS members were satisfied with the results of the adoption of his programme. For example, Izydora Dąmbska argues that, unlike a Neo-Kantian or phenomenological school, the LWS was not determined by any philosophical doctrine shared by all members but by the style of philosophizing and common scientific language.⁷⁵ She stresses that even those of Twardowski's students who had different views on the very concept and method of philosophizing, embraced his emphasis on scientific philosophy. As a result, the philosophy of the LWS encompassed a variety of standpoints, including spiritualism, materialism, nominalism, and realism, represented by logicians, psychologists, philosophers of science, and theoreticians of art.⁷⁶ In this regard, the LWS was a pretty diversified school in terms of accepted doctrines.⁷⁷

3.3. The Alleged Disinterest in Phenomenology

Now, I believe Ingarden's general objection against Twardowski's programme, namely, that it prevented his students from inquiring into complex issues, implicitly suggests that this programme led them to ignore phenomenology. There are several reasons for this. First, Husserl's and Ingarden's works were often perceived by the LWS members as unclear.⁷⁸ Thus, those for whom clarity is a philosophical work's

⁷⁴ On the development of the tradition of the LWS, see J. Jadacki, *Polish Analytical Philosophy*, Semper, Warszawa 2009; Á. Garrido, U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, eds., *The Lvov-Warsaw School: Past and Present*, Birkhäuser, Cham 2018; A. Brożek, *The Lvov-Warsaw School after 1950*, "Edukacja Filozoficzna" 2022, Vol. 74, pp. 141–160.

⁷⁵ I. Dąmbska, *Czterdzieści lat filozofii we Lwowie 1898–1938*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1948, Vol. 44, p. 17.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ For the justification of why the LWS is considered a unified philosophical school despite its doctrinal variety, see J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 302–304; P. Polak, K. Trombik, *The Kraków School of Philosophy in Science: Profiting from Two Traditions*, "Edukacja Filozoficzna" 2022, Vol. 73, pp. 211–213.

⁷⁸ K. Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Część II. 1928–1936*, ed. R. Jadczyk, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Warszawa-Toruń 2002, p. 76; W. Tatarkiewicz, *Szkoła fenomenologów*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1913, Vol. 3, No. 10, p. 257; H. Mehlberg, *Edmund Husserl. Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1930–1931, Vol. 12, pp. 28a–28b; L. Blaustein, *Edmund Husserl*, op. cit., pp. 224–225; J. Łukasiewicz, *Pamiętnik*, ed. J. Jadacki, Semper, Warszawa 2013, pp. 65–66.

principal value may have been sceptical about phenomenology. Second, on many occasions, Ingarden complained that Polish philosophers ignored his research and, by extension, phenomenology. He expressed this mostly in private writings. For example, Ingarden stated that when he returned to Poland in 1918, he realized that

[e]verything I've learned abroad – especially with Husserl – is conceived here as misleading, obscure chatter. Generally, all the problems I learned about during my studies are foreign to our philosophers. And vice versa, my colleagues in Warsaw and elsewhere preached – sometimes with utmost cheek and pretension to excellent scholarship – what I perceived as unbelievably backward, banal, avoidance of problems, and most of all, something far away from essential philosophical issues.⁷⁹

For this reason, Ingarden wanted to disseminate phenomenology in Poland.⁸⁰ He worked hard to achieve this by engaging in the activities of the Polish Philosophical Society, lecturing, and publishing.⁸¹

Still, he was disappointed with Twardowski's students' response to phenomenology. Ingarden writes bitterly about his Lvovian years, saying that "he was treated with total disrespect" and "as *quantite négligeable*."⁸² Those harsh words result from Ingarden's difficult situation at the time. He was convinced that, after obtaining his habilitation in 1924, he would soon be awarded the chair of philosophy at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov.⁸³ This was not the case, and he had to wait until 1933 while working as a teacher at a junior high school. For these circumstances, Ingarden blamed Twardowski.⁸⁴ First, he believed that Twardowski supported Ajdukiewicz in securing the position, and second, because of

⁷⁹ R. Ingarden, *Dzieje mojej kariery*, op. cit., pp. 184–185.

⁸⁰ This goal was stated in his first introduction to phenomenology. R. Ingarden, *Dążenia fenomenologów (I)*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1919–1920, Vol. 22, No. 3, p. 118.

⁸¹ Ingarden offered courses on Husserl's *Ideas* (1926/1927), *Logical Investigations* (1927/1928), and *Cartesian Meditations* (1932/1933), and lectured on *Introduction to Phenomenology* (1937/1938). R. Ingarden, *Wykłady, ćwiczenia i seminaria uniwersyteckie według "Spisu wykładów"*, *Uniwersytet im. Jana Kazimierza we Lwowie*, in: *Roman Ingarden (1893–1970). Fenomenolog ze szkoły Edmunda Husserla*, eds. K. Ingarden, R. Kuliniak, M. Pandura, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2023, pp. 246–248. Ingarden's *Collected Works* consists of 14 volumes.

⁸² R. Ingarden, *Dzieje mojej kariery*, op. cit., p. 194.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 193–196. See R. Jadczyk, *Koleje starań o profesurę dla Romana Ingardena we Lwowie*, "Kwartalnik Filozoficzny" 1999, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 229–242. On the relationship between Twardowski and Ingarden, see A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, *Interpersonal and Intertextual Relations*, op. cit., pp. 20–29.

Twardowski's alleged resistance to phenomenology.⁸⁵ There is some truth to this. In his *Dzienniki* [Journals], Twardowski recalls his desire to bring Ajdukiewicz back to Lvov in 1927, and in 1931, he expresses concerns over Ingarden's nomination for the chair of philosophy. However, the reason for this is Twardowski's belief that Ingarden would not be a good teacher and he would "scare students away."⁸⁶ Moreover, in his letter to Husserl, who had intervened on Ingarden's behalf, Twardowski admits that there are not enough philosophy chairs in Poland, and that giving one to a representative of such a "special philosophical direction" as phenomenology is unlikely.⁸⁷

4. The Reception of Phenomenology in the LWS

Above, I tried to show that Ingarden suggested that the LWS members ignored phenomenology. His view is not entirely accurate.⁸⁸ The list of Twardowski's students who, at least at some point, refer to phenomenology is considerable. First, they discuss phenomenology in general. Second, they analyse and make use of various concepts developed by Husserl. In this sense, they were, more or less, under his influence.

4.1. Phenomenology in the Eyes of the Lvov-Warsaw School

The LWS's response to Husserl's philosophy and his movement occurred relatively early. In his 1913 paper, Władysław Tatarkiewicz describes the main features and representatives of the "school of phenomenologists."⁸⁹ He emphasizes the

⁸⁵ R. Ingarden, *Dzieje mojej kariery*, op. cit., pp. 193–194.

⁸⁶ K. Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Cz. I*, op. cit., p. 309; K. Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Cz. II*, op. cit., p. 181.

⁸⁷ E. Schuhmann, K. Schuhmann, eds., *Edmund Husserl. Briefwechsel. Band I. Die Brentanoschule*, Springer, Dordrecht 1994, pp. 182–183.

⁸⁸ On the reception of phenomenology by Polish philosophers, including LWS members, see G. Küng, *Phenomenology and Polish Scientific Philosophy*, in: *Polish Scientific Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 59–68; W. Plotka, *Early Phenomenology in Poland*, op. cit. See also the anthology of early phenomenology in Poland, which includes numerous works by Twardowski and his students: D. Bęben, M. Ples-Bęben, eds., *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2013.

⁸⁹ W. Tatarkiewicz, *Szkoła fenomenologów*, op. cit. By comparison, except for some reviews of Husserl's books, it seems that the first paper discussing phenomenology in English was published in 1925 by William Boyce Gibson. See W.B. Gibson, *The Problem of Real and Ideal in the Phenom-*

significance of Husserl's argument against psychologism and describes phenomenology as a presuppositionless, eidetic *a priori* science of essence that is not to be identified with descriptive psychology.⁹⁰ Phenomenology applies the so-called method of distinction that consists of "distinguishing the essences and creating a typology of essences, meanings, contents, acts, and beings."⁹¹ According to Tatarkiewicz, this method is not new, but phenomenologists prioritize it. In this respect, they reflect the general tendencies of the time, for the method of distinction bears significant similarities to the method applied by Twardowski and his school. Because Twardowski and Husserl share the same roots (Brentano), their respective schools represent "one big philosophical group."⁹² Tatarkiewicz highly values Husserl's *Logical Investigations* but considers *Ideen I* obscure in terms of the arrangement of content, terminology, and articulation. In his opinion, works by younger scholars provide a better introduction to the phenomenological workshop.⁹³

Phenomenology also interested Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, who visited Göttingen during the academic year 1913/1914. According to Ajdukiewicz, the main task of phenomenology is to provide an intuition of the essence (*Wesensschau*), and he makes an interesting remark that "what phenomenologists call the intuition of essences may also be called careful scrutiny of the meaning of words."⁹⁴ He argues that phenomenological inquiries contributed "to clarifying basic scientific concepts by eliminating ambiguity and introducing subtle 'almost scholastic' distinctions."⁹⁵ As an example, Ajdukiewicz points to Ingarden's *The Literary Work of Art*.⁹⁶ He also considers Ingarden "one of the most outstanding of Husserl's students."⁹⁷ However, it should be noted that in his opening address at the International Congress of Scientific Philosophy in Sorbonne in 1935, Ajdukiewicz

enology of Husserl, "Mind" 1925, Vol. 34, pp. 311–333.

⁹⁰ W. Tatarkiewicz, *Szkoła fenomenologów*, op. cit., pp. 256–261.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 260.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 257.

⁹⁴ K. Ajdukiewicz, *Problems and Theories in Philosophy*, trans. H. Skolimowski, A. Quinton, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1973, pp. 44–45.

⁹⁵ K. Ajdukiewicz, *Kierunki i prądy filozofii współczesnej*, in: K. Ajdukiewicz, *Język i poznanie*, Vol. 1, PWN, Warszawa 2006, p. 254.

⁹⁶ See R. Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, trans. G.G. Grabowicz, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973.

⁹⁷ K. Ajdukiewicz, *Kierunki i prądy*, op. cit., p. 254.

wicz expressed scepticism about applying methods such as Husserl's *Wesensschau*. He argued that they cannot be considered scientific until their results are intersubjectively communicable and controllable.⁹⁸

The phenomenological method is also discussed by Tadeusz Czeżowski, who, unlike Ajdukiewicz, considers intuition – be it Husserlian, Bergsonian, or existentialistic – as a valid philosophical method encompassed by an extended notion of empirical knowledge. Such intuitionistic methods examine the objects of human sciences, moral and aesthetic values, and the world as such. However, they are not yet as developed as the methods of natural sciences.⁹⁹

The greatest interest in phenomenology among the LWS members was displayed by Leopold Blaustein, the author of the first monograph discussing Husserl's philosophy in Polish, which he submitted as his doctoral dissertation.¹⁰⁰ In his works, Blaustein discusses Husserl's theory of act, content, and object of presentation, as well as phenomenology in general. First, Blaustein comments on the problems with the reception of phenomenology in Poland. He argues that the Poles consider Husserl insufficiently clear and exact. Moreover, phenomenologists often use concepts and methods explained in Husserl's unpublished works. This contributes to various interpretative problems.¹⁰¹ Second, Blaustein distinguishes between narrow and wide concepts of phenomenology. He defines the

⁹⁸ K. Ajdukiewicz, *Przemówienie powitalne delegacji polskiej na Międzynarodowym Kongresie Filozofii naukowej w Sorbonie w roku 1935*, in: *Fenomen Szkoły*, op. cit., p. 158. According to Ajdukiewicz, "scientific cognition is first such and only such content of thought as can be communicated to others in words understood literally, that is without metaphors [and] analogies [...]. Secondly, only those assertions can pretend to the title of scientific cognition whose correctness can be decided in principle by anybody who finds himself in the appropriate external conditions. In a word, scientific cognition is that which is intersubjectively communicable and controllable." K. Ajdukiewicz, *Problems and Theories*, op. cit., p. 46.

⁹⁹ T. Czeżowski, *Zagadnienie istnienia świata w świetle przemian metodologicznych*, in: T. Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne*, PWN, Toruń 1969, p. 27. See also T. Czeżowski, *O metafizyce, jej kierunkach i zagadnieniach*, Wydawnictwo Antyk, Kęty 2004, pp. 59–66.

¹⁰⁰ L. Blaustein, *Husserłowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, Nakładem Towarzystwa Naukowego, Lwów 1928. Blaustein's primary philosophical interests were descriptive psychology, aesthetics and pedagogy. On Blaustein's work, see the extensive research by Witold Płotka. W. Płotka, *A Critical Analysis of Blaustein's Polemic against Husserl's Method*, "Husserl Studies" 2021, Vol. 37, pp. 249–270; W. Płotka, *Approaching the Variety of Lived Experiences: On the Psychological Motives in Leopold Blaustein's Method*, "Gestalt Theory" 2020, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 181–194; W. Płotka, *Beyond Ontology: On Blaustein's Reconsideration of Ingarden's Aesthetics*, "Horizon" 2020, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 552–278.

¹⁰¹ L. Blaustein, *Edmund Husserl*, op. cit., pp. 224–225.

former as a “descriptive science of ideal essences which are given in lived experiences of pure consciousness and examined after performing phenomenological *epoché*.”¹⁰² The latter can be defined as the “entirety of eidetic ontologies *a priori*, which apply the method of seeing the ideal essences (*Wesensschau*).”¹⁰³ Those ontologies constitute the basis for other sciences.

Blaustein delivers various arguments against both concepts of phenomenology. For example, he argues that it is hard to determine whether essences – which he identifies with general objects – exist. It is permissible to presume their existence but just hypothetically in order to explain specific facts. Moreover, although he admits that *Wesensschau* may correctly indicate the essential features of a given object, it does not have any probative value.¹⁰⁴ He argues that general objects can be treated as types of “lowest genera.” Such types are examined in perception, which knowingly ignores certain features of individual objects. And since *Wesensschau* is not a perception, it cannot provide such an analysis.¹⁰⁵ According to Witold Plotka, Blaustein's criticism has significant limitations and is actually targeted against Ingarden's concept of essence.¹⁰⁶ Blaustein concludes that “phenomenology is only possible as an empirical, descriptive science of types (lowest genera) of experiences of pure consciousness, and not as an *a priori* science of higher essences being ideal objects.”¹⁰⁷ Plotka points out that Blaustein restates phenomenology as empirical descriptive psychology that analyses types of lived experiences, which is “related but not equivalent to” Husserl's project presented in the first edition of *Logische Untersuchungen* and his project of phenomenological psychology presented in his 1925 lectures, which Blaustein attended.¹⁰⁸

Finally, significant interest in phenomenology was displayed by Józef M. Bocheński, who actually considered Ingarden “perhaps the greatest Polish thinker of all time.”¹⁰⁹ He argued that Ingarden was the only phenomenologist who took analytic philosophers seriously and believed Ingarden's criticisms were thought-

¹⁰² L. Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii*, “Ruch Filozoficzny” 1928–1929, Vol. 11, pp. 164b–166b.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 165b.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 164b–165a.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 165a.

¹⁰⁶ W. Plotka, *A Critical Analysis*, op. cit., pp. 257–258.

¹⁰⁷ L. Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny*, op. cit., p. 165b.

¹⁰⁸ W. Plotka, *A Critical Analysis*, op. cit., pp. 261–265.

¹⁰⁹ J.M. Bocheński, J. Parys, *Miedzy logiką a wiarą*, Les Éditions Noir sur Blanc, Thise-Besançon 1994, p. 46.

fully considered in Poland.¹¹⁰ According to Bocheński, analytic philosophy is superior to phenomenology because the latter fails to appreciate the analysis of language, puts too much emphasis on intuition, and rejects axiomatization.¹¹¹ He provides exceptionally clear descriptions of the phenomenological method and its essential conceptual framework.¹¹² Bocheński held Max Scheler and Husserl in high regard, the latter being a “model of precision as a philosophical writer and reminds one of Aristotle in this respect.”¹¹³ Bocheński argued that phenomenologists paved the way for recognizing two fundamental standpoints: the objectivity of knowledge and the “human spirit’s true nature” as genuine *intellectus* capable of grasping the essences, while also possessing an “emotional” side.¹¹⁴ In this respect, phenomenology became one of the “great liberating forces of contemporary thought.”¹¹⁵ Like Tatarkiewicz, Bocheński contended that although phenomenologists applied a method that was not new, they endowed it with “remarkable refinement and purity and [...] employed it as *the* essential procedure.”¹¹⁶ However, since phenomenology remains the philosophy of essence, it lacks the capacity to grasp concrete, authentic being, which seems to be its significant flaw.¹¹⁷

We can see that although the LWS members were not uncritical towards phenomenology, they recognized its value and certainly did not ignore it. However, they likely did not view it as a tradition within which they wanted to work. Despite this, a number of Twardowski’s students were – to varying degrees – influenced by some of Husserl’s ideas.

4.2. Overview of the Reception of Husserl’s Theories in the LWS

Husserl’s influence on the LWS members may be seen in the following areas: (1) anti-psychologism, (2) the concept of semantic category, (3) theory of signs,

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 67.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 79.

¹¹² See J.M. Bocheński, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, trans. D. Nicholl, K. Schenbrenner, University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1956, pp. 127–153; J.M. Bocheński, *The Methods of Contemporary Thought*, trans. P. Caws, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht 1965, pp. 15–29.

¹¹³ J.M. Bocheński, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 131.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 152.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 153.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

expressions and meanings, (4) theory of wholes and parts, (5) theory of acts, contents and objects of presentations.

(1) I have already pointed out that Twardowski admitted that Husserl had significantly influenced his view on psychologism in logic.¹¹⁸ One of Twardowski's oldest students and the pioneer of logical research in the LWS, Jan Łukasiewicz, also discussed Husserl's arguments in his early papers and found them convincing.¹¹⁹ According to Woleński, Husserl's influence in Poland in this regard was of "fundamental importance."¹²⁰

(2) The concept of semantic category introduced by Husserl in the *Fourth Logical Investigation* was developed and formalized by Stanisław Leśniewski and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz.¹²¹ The former also wanted to translate *Logical Investigations* into Polish but abandoned the idea for unknown reasons.¹²²

(3) Husserl's theory of signs, expressions, and meaning presented in the *First Logical Investigation* was discussed and developed in various directions by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Maria Ossowska, Stanisław Ossowski, and Janina Kotarbińska.¹²³

¹¹⁸ K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., p. 31.

¹¹⁹ J. Łukasiewicz, *Teza Husserla o stosunku logiki do psychologii*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1904, Vol. 7, pp. 476–477; J. Łukasiewicz, *Logika a psychologia*, in: J. Łukasiewicz, *Z zagadnień logiki i filozofii. Pisma wybrane*, ed. J. Śłupecki, PWN, Warszawa 1961, pp. 63–65. However, later Łukasiewicz changed his standpoint and claimed that it had been Frege who influenced him through Husserl. J. Łukasiewicz, *Pamiętnik*, op. cit., p. 66.

¹²⁰ J. Woleński, *Husserl and the Development of Formal Semantics*, "Philosophia Scientiæ" 1997, Vol. 2, No. 4, p. 156.

¹²¹ S. Leśniewski, *Grundzüge eines neues Systems der Grundlagen der Mathematik*, "Fundamenta Mathematicae" 1929, Vol. 14, p. 14; K. Ajdukiewicz, *Syntactic Connection*, in: *The Scientific World-Perspective and Other Essays, 1931–1963*, trans. J. Giedymin, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Boston 1978, pp. 118–139. According to Woleński, the LWS members adopted a certain intuitive understanding of language as "a system of items directed to the world *via* meanings." Husserl's contribution lies in the "philosophical climate" in which such a concept of language was adopted. See J. Woleński, *Husserl and the Development*, op. cit., p. 157.

¹²² See C. Głombik, *O niedoszłych polskich przekładach "Logische Untersuchungen"*, in: *Polska filozofia analityczna. W kręgu Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*, eds. E. Tyburski, R. Wiśniewski, Scholar, Toruń 1999, pp. 89–106.

¹²³ See K. Ajdukiewicz, *On the Meaning of Expressions*, in: K. Ajdukiewicz, *The Scientific World-Perspective*, op. cit., pp. 35–68. See also A. Olech, *Some Remarks on Husserl's and Ajdukiewicz's Approaches to Meaning*, in: *The Heritage of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz*, eds. J. Woleński, V. Sinsi, Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta 1995, pp. 221–225; M. Ossowska, *Słowa i myśli*, in: M. Ossowska, *O człowieku, moralności i nauce*, PWN, Warszawa 1983, pp. 183–225; S. Ossowski, *Analiza pojęcia znaku*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1926, pp. 29–56; J. Kotarbińska, *Pojęcie znaku*, "Studia Logica" 1957, Vol. 6, pp. 57–143.

(4) Husserl's theory of wholes and parts was the subject of an analysis conducted by Eugenia Blaustein (née Ginsberg), who earned her doctorate based on this research.¹²⁴ According to Peter Simons, she was one of the first philosophers ever to analyse Husserl's theory.¹²⁵

(5) Husserl's theory of acts, contents and objects of presentations presented in the *Fifth Logical Investigation* sparked interest in Bronisław Bandrowski, Leopold Blaustein, Walter Auerbach and Tadeusz Witwicki. They incorporated Husserl's ideas into their analyses of various types of presentations, though never uncritically.¹²⁶ It is worth noting that Blaustein's use of Husserl's ideas in his theory of aesthetic experience led some scholars to classify him as an "analytic phenomenologist."¹²⁷ However, this view is contested by Płotka, who argues that Blaustein was influenced by various traditions, including Twardowski's and Carl Stumpf's descriptive psychologies, *Gestalt* psychology and Husserl's and Ingarden's phenomenology. According to Płotka, Blaustein's descriptive psychology was *phenomenologically* oriented. Although Blaustein did not use *epoché* or *Wesensschau*, "he followed the basic intuition that analysis should be focused on an object as it is presented or manifested in experience."¹²⁸

Finally, it must be noted that despite his criticism of the LWS, Ingarden admits that the last generation of Twardowski's direct students was partly under his influence.¹²⁹ This group, referred to by Woleński and Płotka as "the Lvov Circle of phenomenologists,"¹³⁰ includes Walter Auerbach, Leopold Blaustein, Zofia

¹²⁴ E. Ginsberg, *Zur Husserlschen Lehre von den Ganzen und Teilen*, "Archiv für systematische Philosophie und Soziologie" 1929, Vol. 32, pp. 108–120; E. Ginsberg, *On the Concepts of Existential Dependence and Independence*, in: *Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology*, ed. B. Smith, Philosophia Verlag, Munich-Vienna 1982, pp. 265–287.

¹²⁵ P. Simons, *Editorial Note*, in: *Parts and Moments*, op. cit., p. 262.

¹²⁶ B. Bandrowski, *Psychologiczna analiza zjawiska myślenia*, in: *Polska fenomenologia*, op. cit., pp. 37–48; L. Blaustein, *Imaginary Representations: A Study on the Border of Psychology and Aesthetics*, trans. M. Bokinić, "Estetika" 2011, Vol. 2, pp. 209–234; W. Auerbach, *O wątpliwym*, in: *Polska fenomenologia*, op. cit., pp. 307–324; T. Witwicki, *O stosunku treści do przedmiotu przedstawienia*, in: *Polska fenomenologia*, op. cit., pp. 325–339.

¹²⁷ See W. Miskiewicz, *Leopold Blaustein's Analytic Phenomenology*, in: *The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy: Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophical Legacy*, eds. S. Lapointe, J. Woleński, M. Mathieu, W. Miskiewicz, Springer, Dordrecht 2009, pp. 181–190.

¹²⁸ W. Płotka, *A Critical Analysis*, op. cit., p. 265.

¹²⁹ R. Ingarden, *Główne kierunki*, op. cit., p. 14.

¹³⁰ J. Woleński, *Ingarden and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, in: *Intuition and Analysis*, op. cit., p. 77; W. Płotka, *Early Phenomenology in Poland*, op. cit., p. 85. Unfortunately, most of them did not survive the Second World War.

Lissa, Tadeusz Witwicki (son of Władysław Witwicki), and Eugenia Blaustein (née Ginsberg). However, whether there are any significant features that unify this group remains to be investigated. Above all, one must ask whether there is something specific in how they engage with phenomenology. It is necessary to trace the various influences that shaped those philosophers. They were taught by Twardowski (Brentanian), Ajdukiewicz (analytic philosopher) and Ingarden (phenomenologist). Some of them studied abroad, where other philosophers may have influenced them. It remains to be determined to what extent they applied methods characteristic of the LWS. Initially, it seems that their primary method was the analysis of concepts combined with a descriptive-psychological approach. It is also worth pointing out that – with the exception of Ginsberg – they generally did not make use of logical tools.

5. Conclusions

Ingarden accused Twardowski's philosophical programme of imposing a style that prevented the LWS from examining complex philosophical issues, leading to the ignorance of phenomenology. Contrary to this view, I have argued that the LWS members' response to phenomenology was significant. However, Twardowski's programme may have indeed influenced how they approached it. While this issue requires a comprehensive study beyond the scope of a single paper, I would like to offer the following suggestions. First, Twardowski's preference for philosophical minimalism is reflected in his students' interest in specific, individual elements of Husserl's philosophy, which they then developed in various directions. Second, for many of them, the starting point was Brentanian descriptive psychology, through which they interpreted Husserl's ideas. Third, they valued the phenomenological method of distinction, which resembles the analysis of concepts practised by Twardowski; however, they generally – with the exception of Czeżowski – regarded the method of eidetic intuition as unreliable.

This paper has provided only an overview of the issues surrounding the relationship between the LWS, Ingarden, and phenomenology. Future research should involve more in-depth examinations of the content and methods applied by those members of the LWS who developed an interest in phenomenological

philosophy.¹³¹ In particular, the study of the so-called “Lvov Circle of phenomenologists” would be of great interest. It would be valuable to explore this issue in the broader context of the analytic–continental divide to see how the formation of those divisions manifested in Polish philosophy.

Bibliography

- Ajdukiewicz K., *Kierunki i prądy filozofii współczesnej*, in: K. Ajdukiewicz, *Język i poznanie*, Vol. 1, PWN, Warszawa 2006, pp. 249–263.
- Ajdukiewicz K., *Logistyczny antyirracjonalizm w Polsce*, in: *Fenomen Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*, eds. A. Brożek, A. Chybińska, Academicon, Lublin 2016, pp. 145–156.
- Ajdukiewicz K., *On the Meaning of Expressions*, in: K. Ajdukiewicz, *The Scientific World-Perspective and Other Essays, 1931–1963*, trans. J. Giedymin, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Boston 1978, pp. 1–34.
- Ajdukiewicz K., *Problems and Theories in Philosophy*, trans. H. Skolimowski, A. Quinton, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1973.
- Ajdukiewicz K., *Przemówienie powitalne delegacji polskiej na Międzynarodowym Kongresie Filozofii Naukowej w Sorbonie w roku 1935*, in: *Fenomen Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*, eds. A. Brożek, A. Chybińska, Academicon, Lublin 2016, pp. 157–159.
- Ajdukiewicz K., *Syntactic Connection*, in: *The Scientific World-Perspective and Other Essays, 1931–1963*, trans. J. Giedymin, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Boston 1978, pp. 118–139.
- Auerbach W., *O wątpieniu*, in: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia*, eds. D. Bęben, M. Ples-Bęben, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2013, pp. 307–324.

¹³¹ Significant studies have already been devoted to the relationship between the LWS and Brentano, which may serve as a valuable point of departure for further research. See J. Woleński, *Brentanian Motives in Twardowski and His Students*, in: *The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School*, op. cit., pp. 47–64; D. Łukasiewicz, *Polish Metaphysics and the Brentanian Tradition*, in: *The Golden Age*, op. cit., pp. 19–32; A. Brożek, *Franz Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, in: *Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy*, eds. D. Fisette, G. Fréchette, F. Stadler, Springer, Dordrecht 2020, pp. 197–234.

- Bandrowski B., *Psychologiczna analiza zjawiska myślenia*, in: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia*, eds. D. Bęben, M. Ples-Bęben, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2013, pp. 37–48.
- Bęben D., Ples-Bęben M., eds., *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2013.
- Będkowski M., “Jasnościowcy”. O stylu naukowym Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej z perspektywy idei prostego języka (rekonesans), “Oblicza Komunikacji” 2019, Vol. 11, pp. 87–104.
- Blaustein L., *Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia*, in: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia*, eds. D. Bęben, M. Ples-Bęben, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2013, pp. 223–233.
- Blaustein L., *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, Nakładem Towarzystwa Naukowego, Lwów 1928.
- Blaustein L., *Imaginary Representations: A Study on the Border of Psychology and Aesthetics*, trans. M. Bokiniec, “Estetika” 2011, Vol. 2, pp. 209–234.
- Blaustein L., *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii*, “Ruch Filozoficzny” 1928–1929, Vol. 11, pp. 164b–166b.
- Bocheński J.M., *Contemporary European Philosophy*, trans. D. Nicholl, K. Aschenbrenner, University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1956.
- Bocheński J.M., *The Methods of Contemporary Thought*, trans. P. Caws, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht 1965.
- Bocheński J.M., Parys J., *Między logiką a wiarą*, Les Éditions Noir sur Blanc, Thise-Besançon 1994.
- Brożek A., *Franz Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, in: *Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy*, eds. D. Fisette, G. Fréchette, F. Stadler, Springer, Dordrecht 2020, pp. 197–234.
- Brożek A., *The Lvov-Warsaw School after 1950*, “Edukacja Filozoficzna” 2022, Vol. 74, pp. 141–160.
- Brożek A., *O stylach filozoficznych i dylematach metodologicznych*, “Analiza i Egzystencja” 2009, Vol. 10, pp. 77–89.
- Brożek A., Będkowski M., Chybińska A., Ivanyk S., Traczykowski D., *Anti-Irrationalism: Philosophical Methods in the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Semper, Warszawa 2020.
- Brożek A., Jadacki J., *Interpersonal and Intertextual Relations between Roman Ingarden and the Members of the Lvov-Warsaw School*, in: *Intuition and Analy-*

- sis. *Roman Ingarden and the School of Kazimierz Twardowski*, eds. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2022, pp. 13–72.
- Brożek A., Jadacki J., eds., *At the Sources of the Twentieth-Century Analytical Movement: Kazimierz Twardowski and His Position in European Philosophy*, Brill, Leiden 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004511934>.
- Brożek A., Jadacki J., eds., *Intuition and Analysis: Roman Ingarden and the School of Kazimierz Twardowski*, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2022.
- Brożek A., Stadler F., Woleński J., eds., *The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in European Culture*, Springer, Cham 2017.
- Czeżowski T., *O metafizyce, jej kierunkach i zagadnieniach*, Daimonion, Kęty 2004.
- Czeżowski T., *Zagadnienie istnienia świata w świetle przemian metodologicznych*, in: T. Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne*, PWN, Poznań 1969, pp. 23–29.
- Dąmbska I., *Czterdzieści lat filozofii we Lwowie 1898–1938*, “Przegląd Filozoficzny” 1948, Vol. 44, pp. 14–25.
- Garrido Á., Wybraniec-Skardowska U., eds., *The Lvov-Warsaw School: Past and Present*, Birkhäuser, Cham 2018.
- Gibson W.B., *The Problem of Real and Ideal in the Phenomenology of Husserl*, “Mind” 1925, Vol. 34, pp. 311–333.
- Ginsberg E., *On the Concepts of Existential Dependence and Independence*, in: *Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology*, ed. B. Smith, Philosophia Verlag, Munich-Vienna 1982, pp. 265–287.
- Ginsberg E., *Zur Husserlschen Lehre von den Ganzen und Teilen*, “Archiv für systematische Philosophie und Soziologie” 1929, Vol. 32, pp. 108–120.
- Głombik C., *O niedoszłych polskich przekładach “Logische Untersuchungen”*, in: *Polska filozofia analityczna. W kręgu Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*, eds. E. Tyburski, R. Wiśniewski, Scholar, Toruń 1999, pp. 89–106.
- Husserl E., *Besprechung von: K. Twardowski “Zur Lehre vom Ingalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine Psychologische Untersuchung”*, in: E. Husserl, *Aufsätze und Rezensionen 1890–1910. Husserliana*, Vol. 22, ed. B. Rang, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague-Boston-London 1979, pp. 349–358.
- Husserl E., *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Vol. 1, trans. F. Kersten, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1982.

- Husserl E., *Intentional Objects*, in: R.D. Rollinger, *Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano*, Springer, Dordrecht 1999, pp. 251–284, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1808-0>.
- Ingarden R., *Dążenia fenomenologów (I)*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1919–1920, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 118–156.
- Ingarden R., *Dzieje mojej kariery uniwersyteckiej*, "Kwartalnik Filozoficzny" 1999, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 183–201.
- Ingarden R., *Główne kierunki polskiej filozofii*, "Studia Filozoficzne" 1973, No. 1 (86), pp. 3–15.
- Ingarden R., *Letter to Henryk Skolimowski Written 06.11.1967*, in: *The Roman Ingarden Digital Archive*, URL: <http://ingarden.archive.uj.edu.pl/en/archiwum/letter-to-henryk-skolimowski-written-06-11-1967>.
- Ingarden R., *The Literary Work of Art*, trans. G.G. Grabowicz, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973.
- Ingarden R., *Meine Erinnerungen an Edmund Husserl*, in: E. Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden. Mit Erläuterungen und Erinnerungen an Husserl*, ed. R. Ingarden, Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag 1968, pp. 106–135.
- Ingarden R., *Moje wspomnienia o Edmundzie Husserlu*, "Studia Filozoficzne" 1981, Vol. 2, pp. 3–24.
- Ingarden R., *O istocie doświadczenia wewnętrznego*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1922, Vol. 15, pp. 512–534.
- Ingarden R., *O jasnym i niejasnym stylu filozoficznym*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1919, Vol. 5, pp. 45–48.
- Ingarden R., *Próba przebudowy filozofii przez neopozytywistów*, in: R. Ingarden, *Z badań nad filozofią współczesną*, PWN, Warszawa 1963, pp. 655–662.
- Ingarden R., *The Scientific Activity of Kazimierz Twardowski*, "Studia Philosophica" 1948, Vol. 3, pp. 17–30.
- Ingarden R., *Spór o istotę filozofii*, "Przegląd Warszawski" 1922, Vol. 2, No. 14, pp. 161–172.
- Ingarden R., *W sprawie istnienia przedmiotów idealnych*, in: R. Ingarden, *Z teorii języka i filozoficznych podstaw logiki*, PWN, Warszawa 1972, pp. 483–507.
- Ingarden R., *W sprawie "Istoty doświadczenia wewnętrznego"*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1922, Vol. 25, pp. 512–534.
- Ingarden R., *Wspomnienia z Getyngi*, "Przegląd Artystyczno-Literacki" 1998, Vols. 5–6, pp. 11–18.

- Ingarden R., *Wykłady, ćwiczenia i seminaria uniwersyteckie według "Spisu wykładów"*, Uniwersytet im. Jana Kazimierza we Lwowie, in: *Roman Ingarden (1893–1970). Fenomenolog ze szkoły Edmunda Husserla*, eds. K. Ingarden, R. Kuliniak, M. Pandura, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2023, pp. 246–248.
- Jadacki J., *Polish Analytical Philosophy*, Semper, Warszawa 2009.
- Jadcza R., *Koleje starań o profesurę dla Romana Ingardena we Lwowie*, "Kwartalnik Filozoficzny" 1999, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 229–242.
- Kleszcz R., *Metoda i wartości. Metafilozofia Kazimierza Twardowskiego*, Semper, Warszawa 2013.
- Koj L., *O stylach w filozofii*, "Edukacja Filozoficzna" 1991, Vol. 12, pp. 84–89.
- Kotarbińska J., *Pojęcie znaku*, "Studia Logica" 1957, Vol. 6, pp. 57–143.
- Kotarbiński T., *O istocie doświadczenia wewnętrznego*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1922, Vol. 25, pp. 184–196.
- Kotarbiński T., *O potrzebie zaniechania wyrazów "filozofia", "filozof", "filozoficzny" itp.*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1921, Vol. 6, pp. 81–86.
- Kotarbiński T., *Odpowiedź*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1922, Vol. 25, pp. 535–540.
- Kuliniak R., Leszczyna D., Pandura M., eds., *Korespondencja Romana Witolda Ingardena z Kazimierzem Twardowskim*, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2016.
- Küng G., *Phenomenology and Polish Scientific Philosophy*, in: *Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School*, eds. F. Coniglione, R. Poli, J. Woleński, Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta 1993, pp. 59–68.
- Leśniewski S., *Grundzüge eines neues Systems der Grundlagen der Mathematik*, "Fundamenta Mathematicae" 1929, Vol. 14, pp. 1–81.
- Łukasiewicz D., *Polish Metaphysics and the Brentanian Tradition*, in: *The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy: Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophical Legacy*, eds. S. Lapointe, J. Woleński, M. Mathieu, W. Miskiewicz, Springer, Dordrecht 2009, pp. 19–32.
- Łukasiewicz J., *Logika a psychologia*, in: J. Łukasiewicz, *Z zagadnień logiki i filozofii. Pisma wybrane*, ed. J. Śłupecki, PWN, Warszawa 1961, pp. 63–65.
- Łukasiewicz J., *Pamiętnik*, ed. J. Jadacki, Semper, Warszawa 2013.
- Łukasiewicz J., *Teza Husserla o stosunku logiki do psychologii*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1904, Vol. 7, pp. 476–477.

- Mehlberg H., *Edmund Husserl. Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1930–1931, Vol. 12, pp. 25a–29b.
- Miskiewicz W., *Leopold Blaustein's Analytic Phenomenology*, in: *The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy: Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophical Legacy*, eds. S. Lapointe, J. Woleński, M. Mathieu, W. Miskiewicz, Springer, Dordrecht 2009, pp. 181–190.
- Olech A., *Some Remarks on Ajdukiewicz's and Husserl's Approaches to Meaning*, in: *The Heritage of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz*, eds. J. Woleński, V. Sinsi, Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta 1995, pp. 221–225, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004457393_017.
- Ossowska M., *Słowa i myśli*, in: M. Ossowska, *O człowieku, moralności i nauce*, PWN, Warszawa 1983, pp. 183–225.
- Ossowski S., *Analiza pojęcia znaku*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1926, Vol. 29, pp. 29–56.
- Płotka W., *Approaching the Variety of Lived Experiences: On the Psychological Motives in Leopold Blaustein's Method*, "Gestalt Theory" 2020, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 181–194, <https://doi.org/10.2478/gth-2020-0015>.
- Płotka W., *Beyond Ontology: On Blaustein's Reconsideration of Ingarden's Aesthetics*, "Horizon" 2020, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 552–578, <https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2020-9-2-552-578>.
- Płotka W., *A Critical Analysis of Blaustein's Polemic against Husserl's Method*, "Husserl Studies" 2021, Vol. 37, pp. 249–270, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-021-09292-z>.
- Płotka W., *Early Phenomenology in Poland (1895–1945): Origins, Development, and Breakdown*, "Studies in Eastern European Thought" 2017, Vol. 69, pp. 79–91, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-017-9274-0>.
- Polak P., Trombik K., *The Kraków School of Philosophy in Science: Profiting from Two Traditions*, "Edukacja Filozoficzna" 2022, Vol. 73, pp. 205–229, <https://doi.org/10.14394/edufil.2022.0023>.
- Rechlewicz W., *Ingarden's Position in the Polemic around Twardowski's Article "On Clear and Unclear Style"*, in: *Intuition and Analysis: Roman Ingarden and the School of Kazimierz Twardowski*, eds. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2022, pp. 209–217.
- Richard S., *Are There Ideal Objects? The Controversy between Kotarbiński and Ingarden*, in: *Franz Brentano's Philosophy after One Hundred Years: From Histo-*

- ry of Philosophy to Reism*, eds. D. Fisette, G. Fréchette, H. Janoušek, Springer, Dordrecht 2021, pp. 149–165, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48563-4_9.
- Rzewuska M., *O języku, stylu i polszczyźnie filozofów szkoły Twardowskiego*, in: *Rozprawy filozoficzne*, ed. L. Gumański, Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu, Toruń 1969, pp. 313–333.
- Schuhmann E., Schuhmann K., eds., *Edmund Husserl. Briefwechsel. Band I. Die Brentanoschule*, Springer, Dordrecht 1994.
- Schuhmann K., *Husserl and Twardowski*, in: *Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School*, eds. F. Conglione, R. Poli, J. Woleński, Rodopi, Amsterdam–Atlanta 1993, pp. 41–58.
- Simons P., *Editorial Note*, in: *Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology*, ed. B. Smith, Philosophia Verlag, Munich-Vienna 1982, pp. 261–264.
- Skolimowski H., *Polish Analytical Philosophy: A Survey and a Comparison with British Analytical Philosophy*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1967.
- Szubka T., *Roman Ingarden o filozofii analitycznej*, “Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria” 2020, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 123–129, <https://doi.org/10.24425/pfns.2020.135065>.
- Tatarkiewicz W., *Szkoła fenomenologów*, “Ruch Filozoficzny” 1913, Vol. 3, No. 10, pp. 257–263.
- Twardowski K., *Address at the 25th Anniversary Session of the Polish Philosophical Society*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. J.L. Brandl, J. Woleński, Brill, Leiden 1999, pp. 271–276.
- Twardowski K., *Address at the Inauguration of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Prejudices, Judgements and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, Rodopi, Amsterdam-New York 2015, pp. 45–50.
- Twardowski K., *Dzienniki. Część I. 1915–1927*, ed. R. Jadczak, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Warszawa-Toruń 2002.
- Twardowski K., *Dzienniki. Część II. 1928–1936*, ed. R. Jadczak, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Warszawa-Toruń 2002.
- Twardowski K., *Independence of Thinking*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Prejudices, Judgements and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, Rodopi, Amsterdam-New York 2015, pp. 81–90.
- Twardowski K., *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. J.L. Brandl, J. Woleński, Brill, Leiden 1999, <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004457676>.

- Twardowski K., *On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. J.L. Brandl, J. Woleński, Brill, Leiden 1999, pp. 257–260.
- Twardowski K., *On Prejudices, Judgements and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, Rodopi, Amsterdam-New York 2015, <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789401212045>.
- Twardowski K., *On Scientific Preparation for Philosophy*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Prejudices, Judgements and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, Rodopi, Amsterdam-New York 2015, pp. 73–80.
- Twardowski K., *On So-Called Relative Truths*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. J.L. Brandl, J. Woleński, Brill, Leiden 1999, pp. 147–169.
- Twardowski K., *Opening Lecture at the Lvov University*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Prejudices, Judgements and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, Rodopi, Amsterdam-New York 2015, pp. 35–44.
- Twardowski K., *Psychology vs. Physiology and Philosophy*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. J.L. Brandl, J. Woleński, Brill, Leiden 1999, pp. 41–64.
- Twardowski K., *Self-Portrait*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. J.L. Brandl, J. Woleński, Brill, Leiden 1999, pp. 17–31.
- Witwicki T., *O stosunku treści do przedmiotu przedstawienia*, in: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia*, eds. D. Bęben, M. Ples-Bęben, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2013, pp. 325–339.
- Woleński J., *Brentanian Motives in Twardowski and His Students*, in: *The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in European Culture*, eds. A. Brożek, F. Stadler, J. Woleński, Springer, Cham 2017, pp. 47–64.
- Woleński J., *Husserl and the Development of Semantics*, “*Philosophia Scientiae*” 1997, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 151–158.
- Woleński J., *Ingarden and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, in: *Intuition and Analysis: Roman Ingarden and the School of Kazimierz Twardowski*, eds. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2022, pp. 75–96.
- Woleński J., *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1989.