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Philosophical Education in the Lvov-Warsaw School

Edited by Anna Brożek, Ewelina Grądzka and Krzysztof Nowicki

- Anna Brożek, Ewelina Grądzka, Krzysztof Nowicki: *Methods and Principles of Philosophical Education in the Lvov-Warsaw School: Introduction to the Special Issue*
- Ryszard Kleszcz: *Kazimierz Twardowski on Teaching Philosophy and Philosophical Education*
- Ewelina Grądzka, Paweł Polak: *The Historical, Pedagogical, and Philosophical Background of Kazimierz Twardowski's Project of Teaching Philosophical Propaedeutics*
- Wojciech Rechlewicz: *Basic Concepts and Principles of Didactics according to Kazimierz Twardowski*
- Anna Drabarek: *Moral Aspects of Instruction and Education in the Lvov-Warsaw School*
- Aleksandra Gomułczak: *Ingarden's Criticism of Twardowski's Philosophical Programme and the Reception of Phenomenology in the Lvov-Warsaw School*
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- Archival materials and reminiscences
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Methods and Principles of Philosophical Education in the Lvov-Warsaw School: Introduction to the Special Issue

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There are several reasons why the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS)¹ is a unique component of the early analytic philosophy movement. Firstly, it was founded in Central-Eastern Europe, whereas the analytic movement is commonly stereotyped as an Anglo-Saxon endeavour (with a small continental “breach” in the form of the Vienna Circle). Secondly, the LWS used almost exclusively the Polish language

¹ The city that was the cradle of the school has had an extraordinarily turbulent history over the past 120 years. In 1900, it was a multiethnic capital of a part of the Eastern province of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Galicia). The Polish majority in the city called it “Lwów,” the Ukrainian minority “Lviv,” the Austrian administration referred to it as “Lemberg,” and the Latin-rooted name “Leopolis” was also in use. During World War I, the city was occupied by the Russians, returned to Austria a year later, and in the years 1918–1919 became the site of tragic fratricidal fighting between Poles and Ukrainians. From 1919 to 1939, it was part of the independent Republic of Poland. At the beginning of World War II, the city was occupied by Soviet Russia, in 1941 it was taken over by Germans, and in 1944, recaptured by the Red Army. As a result of the Yalta Conference, it became part of the USSR. Since 1991, it has been part of independent Ukraine. In this introduction, we use the term “Lvov-Warsaw School” as it is established in the scholarly literature. When referring to the city during the period 1895–1939, we use the Polish name “Lwów.” The authors of individual articles employ various conventions regarding spelling, which we have not altered.

in its publications and philosophical discussions, even though English is considered the standard tool of the analytic tradition. Thirdly, thanks to its position of moderate reconstructionism – granting not radical but solid and universally respected criteria of scientific rigour – the LWS maintained a golden mean between two extremes: the scientism of logical empiricism and the traps of descriptivism in philosophy.

Another factor that distinguishes the LWS from other branches of the analytic movement is its nature as a structured *school* rather than a circle or a loose group of scholars. This didactic character is evident in the commonly accepted criterion for being considered a member: the school encompasses its founder, Kazimierz Twardowski, his students, and the students of his students. The defining interpersonal relationship among the members is that of teacher (mentor, master) and student.

Unlike traditional philosophical schools, members of the LWS were not bound by shared substantive views (metaphysical, ethical, political, etc.). The unifying factor between Twardowski and his students was methodological cohesion. Rather than providing his students with a ready-made set of views, Twardowski presented them with problems and methods through which these issues could be analysed and addressed. This methodological foundation is encapsulated in the slogan of “anti-irrationalism”: adherence to the principles of clear expression of thought and rigorous justification of views. Contrary to appearances, this approach proved to be a strong unifying force, clearly distinguishing members of the School from obscure and speculative philosophy. However, the LWS imposed no restrictions on research topics and did not pre-emptively dismiss any problems as meaningless.

The LWS, understood as the realization of the didactic principles of its founder, Kazimierz Twardowski, was a great success. It produced dozens of outstanding scholars and provided hundreds of people with a “school of clear thinking.” For this reason alone, the foundations of this school are worth reconstructing.

Philosophical education in the LWS, particularly its approach to the didactics of philosophy, has not yet been the subject of separate studies. This volume aims to partially fill this gap. The concept of “philosophical education in the LWS” may encompass several aspects. First, it may refer to how philosophical education was practised. Second, it may pertain to the implementation of practical educational methods. Additionally, it may involve explicit facts or directives expressed

by the School or implicit principles embedded in its activities. Furthermore, it can encompass the development of programmes for propaedeutics of philosophy, including textbooks and teacher training, which directly influenced precollege education and Polish culture. This volume will explore all these perspectives to some extent.

The School and Its Branches

A crucial factor enabling the formation of a philosophical school, understood as a system structured around the teacher–student relationship, is the existence of appropriate institutions where such relationships can develop. Let us thus recall some historical facts about the LWS.

Its origins date back to 1895, when the young philosopher Kazimierz Twardowski, recently habilitated at the University of Vienna, assumed the chair of philosophy in Lwów. Soon after, Twardowski began lecturing on all fundamental philosophical disciplines, as well as the philosophical organon, which he regarded as descriptive psychology and logic. He established the Institute (Seminar) of Philosophy in Lwów to train his more advanced students. Furthermore, Twardowski was instrumental in founding extramural philosophical institutions. In 1904, he established the Polish Philosophical Society as a forum for the exchange of philosophical ideas and discussions. Two periodicals, “Przegląd Filozoficzny” and “Ruch Filozoficzny,” were also launched.

Twardowski worked in Lwów for 35 years, educating two generations of students. During this time, he supervised nearly 50 doctoral dissertations, a third of which were authored by women. Thousands of students attended his lectures, many of whom were talented philosophers who pursued academic research after earning their doctorates. Thanks to their excellent methodological training, they were well equipped to advance Twardowski’s efforts in philosophy and related disciplines.

It is important to remember that Twardowski’s early years in Lwów coincided with the period of partitions in Poland. At that time, universities with Polish as the language of instruction existed only in Lwów and Kraków. Thus, when the University of Warsaw was re-established in 1915, there arose a pressing need to revive philosophical research and studies. Twardowski’s students were prepared

to take on this challenge. Jan Łukasiewicz was the first to assume a chair, followed by Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Stanisław Leśniewski, and Władysław Witwicki. The Warsaw branch of the philosophical school became exceptionally strong and maintained close ties with its Lwów counterpart. Twardowski's students also secured academic positions in other philosophical centres, including Poznań and Wilno, and after World War II, in Kraków, Toruń, Wrocław, and Lublin, as well as abroad (many members of the School were forced to emigrate). These developments contributed to the formation of several geographical branches of the LWS.

It is also worth noting that Twardowski's educational programme was interdisciplinary and extended beyond what is now strictly considered "philosophy." He incorporated psychology (both descriptive and experimental) within the scope of philosophical study, and his inquiries covered topics that today would be associated with cognitive science. Twardowski was also convinced that addressing any major philosophical problem required considering findings from non-philosophical research fields. He is rightly regarded not only as the father of contemporary Polish philosophy but also as a founding figure of several other disciplines that were emerging as independent fields at the time. Notably, he laid the groundwork for the Lwów School of Psychology and the renowned Polish School of Mathematical Logic.

In the case of psychology, it was Twardowski who instilled methodological rigour (opposing mere "testomania"), conceptual precision, and a humanistic approach. As for mathematical logic, while Twardowski himself did not practise it – focusing instead on philosophical logic – he lectured on the subject as early as 1899. This exposure inspired Jan Łukasiewicz, the discipline's true founder, to pursue this line of research.

The interdisciplinary nature of research and teaching in Twardowski's school enabled his students to develop his programme in various directions. This diversity serves as the basis for categorizing members of the LWS according to their respective disciplines. Furthermore, philosophy as such was practised in distinct ways despite the general methodological unity: logical, psychological, and semi-otic branches emerged within the framework of LWS philosophy. Last but not least, let us emphasize that the LWS was a substantial phenomenon, comprising over 150 members within just its first two generations.

Twardowski as a Didactic Genius

Twardowski was undoubtedly a pedagogical genius, willing to devote himself entirely to teaching, even at the expense of his own academic career. He was a “soul hunter,” adept at attracting – and more importantly, converting to philosophy – the most talented young minds.

The effectiveness of this “soul hunting” in the early years of Twardowski’s career is evidenced by recollections of the Philosophical Circle. As a young professor, he began attending the Circle’s meetings regularly and soon became its central figure. From this platform, he inspired others to engage with philosophy, including Łukasiewicz. However, attracting young talent was only the beginning. Every raw diamond needs polishing, and in Twardowski’s school, refining young philosophy students was a long and painstaking process.

Twardowski sought to recognize his students’ intellectual abilities and guide them in the right (from the methodological point of view) direction. Equally important in his educational approach was cultivating diligence, a passion for research, independent thinking, and determination to undertake tasks – both set by others and by oneself. He also aimed to instil in his students confidence in their abilities and the conviction that they could pursue philosophy without the stigma of provincialism. Finally, he emphasized the principles of rigorous scholarly work, both in conducting research and in evaluating the work of others.

This approach was particularly remarkable given Twardowski’s strict discipline in his lectures, avoidance of popular topics, and consistently serious demeanour. He approached his lectures with exceptional dedication, meticulously preparing and refining them as if they were intended for publication. The first of Twardowski’s manuscripts were edited and published by Izydora Dąmbska, while others have recently been made available by the continuators of the LWS tradition. Many of Twardowski’s preserved lecture notes have been digitized, with the majority also published in the series “Inedita.”² Though these notes were not prepared by the author with publication in mind and are written using numerous abbreviations, they offer valuable insights into his lecturing style. He began with precise definitions of basic terms, systematically distinguishing various meanings and examining problems from multiple perspectives. When discussing theses, he carefully formulated them and presented arguments both for and against different versions.

² K. Twardowski, “Inedita,” 9 vols., Academicon, Lublin 2023–2024.

Following Franz Brentano's model, Twardowski sought to gather a close-knit group of students within his seminar. His seminar quickly gained renown, attracting more candidates than he could accommodate. To address this, he introduced a "proseminar," or introductory seminar, to select the most promising students. In this proseminar, participants were required to prepare and submit summaries of classical philosophical texts. These summaries had to be faithful to the original and written as clearly as possible. Selected summaries were read aloud and discussed during meetings. Admission to the main seminar depended on maintaining an excellent attendance record and punctuality, as well as preparing high-quality summaries and a preliminary paper. Twardowski personally read and corrected all summaries, closely monitoring each student's progress. The scale of this effort is evident when considering that the proseminar sometimes had nearly 100 participants. Students recalled that this rigorous training in comprehending philosophical issues and writing philosophical texts had numerous benefits. Firstly, it helped Twardowski identify those with the best understanding and writing skills. Secondly, it prepared students for participation in philosophical societies, particularly for work on the journal "Ruch Filozoficzny," and for careers as philosophy teachers.

Twardowski regarded the role of a philosophy teacher, not only at the academic level, as highly important and serious. He showed a keen interest in secondary-level philosophical education, contributing to the development of programmes for philosophical propaedeutics in Polish gymnasia. He advocated for the important role of philosophy in precollege education as a discipline which integrates and analyses the content of various disciplines, introduces the scientific method, fosters critical thinking, and promotes precision in reasoning. Moreover, he believed philosophy could influence the development of the so-called worldview, making it an essential component of the general education of any intellectual.

Twardowski understood that philosophy needed not only groundbreaking thinkers and brilliant innovators but also editors of philosophical journals, high school teachers, and individuals who could promote philosophical thinking within society. While he did discover a few geniuses, this was not his sole objective.

Members of Twardowski's advanced seminar could consider themselves "chosen." Participation came with both responsibilities and privileges: students had access to a reading room from 7 a.m. to 10 p.m., each entrusted with their own key. This room featured individual desks and housed a collection of books donated by Twardowski from his private library, which had grown to 8,000 volumes by

1930. Twardowski devoted eight to nine hours each day to the seminar, frequently visiting the reading room and engaging with students. A designated consultation hour between noon and 1 p.m. ensured that every seminar participant had direct access to him.

Twardowski educated his students not only through intellectual rigour but also through discipline and willpower. A key instrument of this discipline was the strict set of seminar regulations, which he enforced meticulously. For instance, removing a book from the seminar building was strictly forbidden, and even the slightest delay in submitting a paper was not tolerated. According to an anecdote, seminar participants once pleaded on behalf of a student whom Twardowski had expelled for violating the rules. Twardowski reportedly replied that there were only two possibilities: either the student had not understood the rules, in which case he lacked the necessary intellectual qualifications, or he had understood them and deliberately violated them, which indicated a lack of moral integrity. In either case, the student was unfit to be a philosopher.

The most frequently praised characteristic of Twardowski as a teacher was his fairness. He treated all students equally, regardless of their social or national background or gender. His open-minded approach was a hallmark of his didactic genius. Another defining feature of Twardowski's teaching was his tolerance for differing viewpoints. While it is often noted that he followed Brentano's example – something Twardowski himself frequently acknowledged – there was a crucial distinction between them. Brentano could not tolerate dissenting views, especially when his own ideas were challenged by his students. Twardowski, by contrast, welcomed criticism, provided it was clear and well reasoned. In this respect, he demonstrated far greater intellectual humility than his Viennese mentor. However, his tolerance had its limits: he had no patience for incoherent rambling or baseless speculation.

Didactic Tradition

Twardowski's pedagogical success was made possible by his extraordinary talents and determination, but also because he had the opportunity to teach philosophy in a centre he had built from scratch over nearly 35 years (with only one extended break during World War I, when he still sought to continue his didactic work in

Vienna while also serving as the rector of the Lwów University in exile). These internal and external conditions enabled the emergence of the LWS.

Did Twardowski's students have similar conditions? When it comes to pedagogical abilities and the willingness to dedicate themselves to teaching, the situation varied. Many outstanding educators emerged from Twardowski's school, including Jan Łukasiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, and Izydora Dąmbska. In their academic centres, they sought to create environments similar to what Twardowski had established in Lwów. However, not all of Twardowski's students – despite being excellent scholars – had the necessary didactic skills or were willing to commit to teaching.

Even those who possessed teaching abilities and motivation similar to Twardowski did not always work in favourable external conditions. The years of the LWS activity coincided with turbulent times: two world wars, border changes, and ideological oppression. Such circumstances were not conducive to a stable academic environment. For instance, Ajdukiewicz worked in each of his academic centres for about a decade. When he was appointed to the philosophy chair in Lwów in 1928, remaining there until 1939, the prospects for the development of Lwów philosophy were excellent. However, the Soviet invasion, the closure of Jan Kazimierz University, and the establishment of an ideological parody of an academic institution meant the end of philosophy in Lwów for many decades. After the war, Ajdukiewicz worked for ten years in Poznań, significantly contributing to the development of logical and philosophical research. After a decade, he moved to Warsaw, where his intensive academic and didactic activity was cut short by his premature death.

Even more tragic was the fate of Izydora Dąmbska, for whom teaching philosophy was a life mission. Her habilitation was prepared in 1939 but postponed because of the war. She finally gained the right to lecture in 1946, only to be removed from the university twice – first in the 1950s and then in 1967 – accused by the communist party apparatus of “corrupting students.” She was a university professor for only a few years in total, though she continued to hold private seminars for her closest students until the end of her life.

Despite these adversities, the tradition of teaching philosophy (and, let us add, logic) in Twardowski's spirit remains very much alive. Its influence endures in Polish academic centres, where his ideas have been passed down from generation to generation.

The value of the educators from the LWS is also evident in the textbooks they wrote. It is worth remembering that the first book Twardowski wrote in Polish (shortly after arriving in Lwów) was a textbook – *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki i logiki* [Basic Concepts of Didactics and Logic] (1901) – intended for elementary school teachers. Later, he also wrote a textbook on medieval philosophy. Many of Twardowski's students eagerly and successfully wrote textbooks as well. Ajdukiewicz authored several logic textbooks, as well as an excellent introduction to philosophy (*Zagadnienia i kierunki filozofii* published in English in 1975 as *Problems and Theories of Philosophy*), and a collection of philosophical readings. Kotarbiński is known as the author of *Elementy teorii poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk* (1929, translated into English as *Gnosiology: The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge*, 1965) which influenced hundreds of young students of philosophy and the humanities. Unquestionably masterful are Władysław Tatarkiewicz's *Historia filozofii* [History of Philosophy], in three volumes, and *Historia estetyki* [History of Aesthetics], also in three volumes. Numerous examples of such contributions can be found across all generations of the LWS. Twardowski was also the author of the philosophy propaedeutics programme for gymnasium and later high school, which was canonical for at least 15 years (1922–1937). Ajdukiewicz (possibly with the help of Twardowski) was the author of the reformed programme published two years before the war (1937).

Articles in the Present Volume

The present volume is composed of the following parts: original articles, translations of Twardowski's archival texts, a report on a discussion about the teaching of logic, and reminiscences on distinguished educators of the LWS.

In the opening article, *Kazimierz Twardowski on Teaching Philosophy and Philosophical Education*, Ryszard Kleszcz introduces the reader to the wide variety of Twardowski's efforts to improve philosophy teaching, especially at Lwów University (proseminar, seminar, Philosophy Club, library, Open Lectures series), which led to the programme's success and foundation of the LWS. Twardowski, regarded by his students as a figure akin to Socrates, viewed the role of a philosophy teacher not only as one of transmitting knowledge but, above all, one of shaping the students' character. The requirements for becoming a philosophy teacher

were considerably demanding (“be comprehensively trained in both the humanities and the mathematical and natural sciences”). Twardowski believed that pro-paedeutics of philosophy should focus not on the history of philosophy but rather on logic and psychology (particularly the approach represented by Brentano) to provide an introduction to the scientific method. Finally, Kleszcz acquaints the reader with the “subjects he taught and to which he paid the most attention,” like psychology, logic, and medieval philosophy, between 1895 and 1931. Importantly, “for Twardowski, the very practice of philosophy also had a distinct moral dimension,” and he was “keenly interested in the problems of pedagogy.” Kleszcz concludes his article with an extended reflection on the contemporary relevance of Twardowski’s programme for teaching philosophy and offers a choice of ideas worthy of further development.

The third article, written by Wojciech Rechlewicz, entitled *Basic Concepts and Principles of Didactics according to Kazimierz Twardowski*, focuses on the analysis of Twardowski’s first publication in the Polish language, namely the handbook *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki i logiki do użytku w seminariach nauczycielskich i w nauce prywatnej* [Basic Concepts of Didactics and Logic for Use in Teachers’ Seminars and Private Study]. Rechlewicz claims that the ideas on teaching and upbringing presented in the book and especially the fact that it is “written in clear and simple language that can serve as an example for contemporary publications in didactics” make the book inspiring even today. Although Twardowski’s terminology may now be outdated (e.g., “material education” and “formal education” have been replaced by “knowledge” and “skills”), his approach remains closely aligned with contemporary approaches in Polish didactics. Moreover, Twardowski believed that formal education (skills) is superior to material education (knowledge). Rechlewicz claims that “Twardowski’s didactics has features of objectivist paradigms, especially the normative paradigm.” Perhaps most surprising to modern readers is Twardowski’s belief that not only psychology but also logic serves as an auxiliary science of didactics. Finally, Rechlewicz compares Twardowski’s didactics to the approaches of several Polish contemporary educators, such as Wincenty Okoń, Czesław Kupisiewicz, or Franciszek Bereźnicki, emphasizing that one still derives benefits from reading Twardowski’s handbook.

The next article, by Anna Drabarek, is entitled *Moral Aspects of Instruction and Education in the Lvov-Warsaw School*. Although ethics was not the primary area of

research for the LWS members, they nonetheless contributed significantly to ethical reflection. Twardowski, a cognitivist in ethics, believed that “judgements and moral norms result from cognitive activity.” He was regarded as a sage, akin to Socrates, who led by example and shaped the character of his students by developing moral principles in them. One of his students, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, was the originator of the concept of independent ethics. Another student, Tadeusz Czeżowski, supported this idea, asserting that “the art of skilful judgement should [...] be practised and perfected, just like the art of observation.” The LWS members also emphasized the need for integrity in scientific research, particularly the need to respect the limits of one’s competence and to follow the principle of critical thinking. Additionally, an atmosphere of tolerance for diverse, and at times opposing, views (a “reasonable” tolerance) prevailed among LWS members, along with “the freedom to advocate for it.” Such an approach also demanded specific conditions for research. Beyond the scholar’s internal freedom (from dogmas, etc.), “the freedom of science as an institution” was necessary. This notion was explicitly emphasized in Twardowski’s influential paper *O dostojęństwie uniwersytetu* [On the Dignity of the University]. Finally, Drabarek concludes that the principles of moral aspects of instruction and education are in line with Aristotle’s virtue ethics represented nowadays by scholars such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum.

In his article titled “*The Most Important Task*” and “*Great Personal Value*”: *The Role of Teaching and Upbringing in the Activities of Izydora Dąmbska*, Krzysztof Andrulonis offers a general characterization of Izydora Dąmbska’s educational philosophy and pedagogical practices. He emphasizes her integration of teaching and upbringing, viewing education as a holistic process that shapes both intellect and character. In particular, the author describes Dąmbska’s didactic approach as a blend of axiocentrism (value-centred education) and paidocentrism (student-centred education). This synthesis manifested in her ability to act as both an authoritative guide and egalitarian partner to students, fostering respect without subordination. The article divides Dąmbska’s educational activities into three periods: high school teaching until 1939, secret instruction during World War II, and university-level teaching post-1945. It explores her proposals for curricular reform alongside opinions from students and colleagues who praised her authenticity, moral integrity, reliability, precision of expression, and clarity of thought. The author also highlights Twardowski’s influence on Dąmbska’s didactic ideals and their Socratic origins.

Aleksandra Gomulczak's article, *Ingarden's Criticism of Twardowski's Philosophical Programme and the Reception of Phenomenology in the Lvov-Warsaw School*, offers a reconstruction of Roman Ingarden's critical attitude towards Twardowski's programme and examines the impact of Ingarden's reservations on the reception of phenomenology within the LWS. The author begins by characterizing the key elements of Twardowski's programme, distinguishing its concept of philosophy, philosophical style (including, among other things, postulates of clarity of speech and minimalism), as well as model of philosophical education. The next section discusses Ingarden's critique of absolute clarity as a valid methodological postulate, arguing that it leads to the neglect of genuine philosophical problems and the exclusion of other philosophical traditions, particularly phenomenology. Ingarden's accusations of Twardowski's lack of systematicity, which, in his view, prevented the formation of a true research community, is also discussed. However, as the author notes, it is doubtful whether fostering such a community, as Ingarden envisioned it, was Twardowski's goal at all. The third part of the paper examines the actual reception of phenomenology in the LWS. The author highlights thinkers such as Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Leopold Blaustein, and Józef M. Bocheński, who, contrary to Ingarden's opinion, did not ignore phenomenology but engaged in a critical dialogue with it. Furthermore, Gomulczak points out that Edmund Husserl influenced the School on issues such as antipsychologism, the concept of semantic categories, the theory of signs, expressions, and meanings, the theory of parts and wholes, and the theory of the act, content, and object of representation. The article concludes that although the philosophers of the LWS did not disregard phenomenology, Twardowski's intellectual formation shaped their reception of it.

Another paper, authored by Ewelina Grądzka and Paweł Polak, *The Historical, Pedagogical, and Philosophical Background of Kazimierz Twardowski's Project of Teaching Philosophical Propaedeutics*, is a kind of an introduction to the publication of an English translation of two documents, *Draft of High School Curriculum for Teaching Propaedeutics of Philosophy* and *Memorial of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov on the Guidelines of the Curriculum of Propaedeutics of Philosophy in High Schools: Manuscript by Kazimierz Twardowski*, that also can be found in this volume. Twardowski, beyond his engagement at the university level, devoted considerable effort to improving precollege philosophical education, a field

that is often neglected. The authors focus on presenting the context for the three programmes of teaching the school subject of philosophical propaedeutics that were prepared (fully or partly) by Twardowski after Poland regained independence in 1918, and a new educational system had to be established. The authors decide to call the programmes “minimalistic” (1921/1922), “maximalist” (1935) and “pragmatic” (1937). They conclude that, for at least 15 years during the interwar period, Polish students were educated according to Twardowski’s ideas (based on the programme from 1921/1922, which allotted three hours per week to philosophy). These ideas were rooted in his personal educational experience at the Austrian gymnasium Theresianum and his studies under the guidance of his influential teacher, Franz Brentano. Therefore, the subject was composed of two pillars: logic and psychology. However, the programme faced criticism and calls for reform. In response, Twardowski prepared an extended version in 1935, which introduced additional areas such as epistemology, ethical issues, aesthetic issues, metaphysical issues, and sociology, aiming to foster the development of the so-called worldview. This programme was eventually rejected and a shorter version, found in Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s archive, was published as a temporary solution in 1937. Unfortunately, the outbreak of World War II hindered further development of the idea of propaedeutics of philosophy, and after the war, the communist regime eliminated this subject from school.

Additional Documents

The next section of the volume includes translations of Twardowski’s two papers on the programme of philosophical education. The *Draft of High School Curriculum...*, prepared in two versions, was found unpublished in Twardowski’s archive at the Kazimierz Twardowski Library in Warsaw. The document was originally sent to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education along with the *Memorial of the Polish Philosophical Society...* as a proposal for the reform and improvement of philosophy teaching in high schools in 1935. In 1932, Janusz Jędrzejewicz’s reform had been introduced, and there was a demand for a new programme adjusted to the requirements of the New Education movement and civic upbringing that had inspired the reform. The *Memorial...*, while acknowledging the importance of other philosophical disciplines in shaping a worldview,

maintains that logic and psychology should remain at the core of the propaedeutics of philosophy programme, providing a list of reasons to support that claim. The *Memorial...* was first published in Polish by Ryszard Jadczak in “Edukacja Filozoficzna” in 1988. Since it represents Twardowski’s perspective on the importance of teaching philosophy to young people, its translation into the English language was considered significant for this volume.

Another component of the volume is a report on the debate “How to Teach Logic? Diagnosis of the Current State and Prospects of Logical Education in Poland,” which was held on 14 January 2024, and organized as part of the celebration of the Sixth World Logic Day at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw. It aimed to present the problems associated with the teaching of logic in Poland and to inspire academics to take action to improve logical education. The report was edited by Marek Porwolik.

In the introduction to the discussion on logic, Anna Brożek, Dorota Leszczyńska, and Kordula Świątorzecka highlight the long tradition of teaching logic in Poland, which experienced its greatest flourishing in the 20th century, when Polish logic achieved international recognition. The authors present the institutional context in which mathematical logic was developed and taught in Poland, leading to the establishment of the Warsaw School of Logic. At the same time, they emphasize the role of Kazimierz Twardowski, under whose influence logic in Poland was not limited to mathematical logic, but was understood broadly, encompassing logical semiotics and the general methodology of sciences. Furthermore, the authors argue that the difference of opinion between Łukasiewicz and Ajdukiewicz, on whether to teach mathematical logic or practical logical skills, is not genuine, as both types of education are needed. In the end, they summarize the state of logic education in Poland.

The introduction is followed by eight short papers which focus on various aspects of logic education. Maria Manzano, representative of the Commission on Logic Education (CLE), emphasized in her talk the interdisciplinary nature of logic and its role in the creation and transmission of information. She described the CLE initiative and introduced the European ALFA project, which aims to share experiences among logic teachers. Andrzej Indrzejczak emphasised the importance of teaching logic in the modern world due to the flood of information of varying cognitive value. He argued that a logic course should be attractive, engaging, include numerous practical exercises, and be adapted to the needs of

students in particular disciplines. Tomasz Jarmużek emphasized that a prerequisite for the effective teaching of logic is addressing the question of why and for what purpose it should be taught. He listed both the hidden functions of teaching logic, such as providing employment and building the prestige of the discipline, and its overt functions, such as increasing logical knowledge and skills. Jerzy Pogonowski, in turn, observed that the same problems have persisted in the teaching of logic for years. He emphasized the crucial role of proof methods and metatheoretical issues in the didactics of formal logic. He also noted that the growing connection between logic and cognitive science could lead to an increased importance of logic in academic teaching. Irena Trzcieniecka-Schneider argued while the core curriculum provides for the teaching of logical culture, the necessary information is either absent from textbooks or is presented in a distorted way. In response to these problems, she postulated that texts should be written jointly with representatives of other disciplines to demonstrate the usefulness of logic in a given discipline and that logic education should be introduced as early as possible. Bartłomiej Skowron's paper took the form of a response to five criticisms made by students against formal logic – that it is useless, impractical, too abstract and formal, and that it is too difficult. He outlined several measures to respond to these objections, including the use of technological advances (such as large language models or YouTube) and the demonstration of the normative dimension of logic. Krzysztof A. Wieczorek, meanwhile, drew attention to the lack of modern textbooks on informal logic that offer sufficient examples and exercises. In response to this gap, he proposed creating an online database containing exercises and authentic statements illustrating logical fallacies, which could also serve to integrate the community of logicians. Finally, Marcin Koszowy observed that one of the key elements of teaching logic should be fostering an attitude of logical thinking, which manifests in an effort to improve logical knowledge and skills. He suggested that a list of typical logical attitudes and dispositions, which ought to be the outcome of logical education, should be explicitly stated in the logic curriculum, and he proposed methods for their implementation.

The discussion on logical education is further supplemented by an impressive list of Polish logical textbooks.

The final component of the volume consists of reminiscences of the teaching activities of three distinguished educators of the LWS: Kazimierz Twardowski,

Izydora Dąmbska, and Czesław Lejewski. The reminiscences of the first two coryphaei of the School are preceded by a separate introduction by Krzysztof Nowicki.

A memoir that stands out among the rest is Peter Simons's paper about Czesław Lejewski. While most of the collected reminiscences focus on figures active within the Polish scientific community and are presented from a Polish perspective, Simons's text offers a British perspective on Lejewski's teaching in exile. The author presents the context of Lejewski's work at the University of Manchester and the distinctive features of his teaching style. Simons recalls the content and form of Lejewski's lectures, both from direct experience and secondhand accounts. In the article, he presents a number of Lejewski's philosophical views and their influence on his own philosophical development.

Closing these introductory remarks, we would like to announce that the next issue of "Edukacja Filozoficzna" will also be devoted to philosophical education at the Lvov-Warsaw School – a topic that remains vast and far from exhausted.

In this issue, we have sought to explore the issue of philosophical education at the Lvov-Warsaw School from multiple perspectives. To complement this verbal outline, we include photographs of Twardowski among seminarians as well as images of Twardowski's students with their own students. After all, a picture can often convey more than a thousand words.

Kazimierz Twardowski on Teaching Philosophy and Philosophical Education

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Abstract: Kazimierz Twardowski studied philosophy in Vienna under Franz Brentano. In 1895, he took over the Department of Philosophy at the University of Lvov. Twardowski created and implemented his own programme of philosophical education at the University of Lvov. This article discusses and critically analyses the content of this programme and the way it was implemented.

Key words: teaching philosophy, Franz Brentano, Kazimierz Twardowski, Lvov School, Lvov-Warsaw School, programme of philosophical studies

The secret of Twardowski's influence and achievement as a teacher lay not only in the power of his mind, his vast and varied knowledge, his didactic talents and efficiency, but also in the Socratic quality of his personality, to which all his pupils testify unanimously.

Z.A. Jordan, *Philosophy and Ideology*

1. Introduction

The founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School (hereinafter: LWS), Kazimierz Twardowski, studied in Vienna, under the guidance of Franz Brentano.¹ His way of understanding and practising philosophy was largely formed by his contacts with this

¹ Cf. A. Brożek, *Kazimierz Twardowski w Wiedniu*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2010, pp. 76–100.

eminent teacher.² Brentano was a significant intellectual and personal authority for Twardowski. In his *Autobiography*, he makes, *inter alia*, the following statement about Brentano: “The form and content of his lectures made the deepest impression on me.”³

In November 1895, Twardowski was appointed to the Chair of the Philosophy Department in Lvov, where the local situation was not conducive to philosophical studies. At the same time, however, Galicia, while part of partitioned Poland, allowed relatively greater freedom of speech and academic freedom than other partitioned territories. Nevertheless, Lvov University lacked systematic philosophy classes. Izydora Dąmbska, Twardowski’s student and assistant from 1926 to 1930, characterized this situation as follows:

There was neither an establishment nor a library at the University, no society or institution or publishing house outside the University to serve the purposes of philosophy. A fallow ground. But it was very opportune, because a lively intellectual movement was just beginning in Lvov, and there were many people who were talented and thirsty for science. [...] This current of intellectual life lacked a centre for systematically and scientifically practised philosophy.⁴

Twardowski was a meticulous observer of how philosophy was taught in other centres in Europe, especially in German-speaking countries, and he wanted to implement these best practices at Lvov University. He was, however, not only a scholar and educator specializing in didactics, but also an organizer and administrator of the university. Twardowski also held various administrative posts, including serving several terms as dean and vice-dean, and during World

² On Brentano’s understanding of philosophy, see R.M. Chisholm, *Brentano and Meinong Studies*, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highland, NJ, 1982, passim; D. Jacquette, *Introduction: Brentano Philosophy*, in: *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, ed. D. Jacquette, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, pp. 2–19; R. Ingarden, *Le Concept de philosophie chez Franz Brentano*, published in two parts in “Archives de Philosophie” 1969, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 458–475, and Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 609–638. On his philosophical impact, see K. Schumann, *Brentano’s Impact on Twentieth-Century Philosophy*, in: *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, ed. D. Jacquette, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, pp. 277–297.

³ K. Twardowski, *Autobiografia filozoficzna (Selbstdarstellung)*, trans. E. Paczkowska-Łagowska, “Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria” 1992, No. 1, pp. 22–23. Unless stated otherwise, all translations are my own.

⁴ I. Dąmbska, *Czterdzieści lat filozofii we Lwowie*, “Przegląd Filozoficzny” 1948, Vol. 49, Nos. 1–3, pp. 15–16.

War I as the university's rector (1914–1917). He was also very active in popularizing philosophy in Lvov and other Galician towns.

As a professor at the University of Lvov (renamed as the Jan Kazimierz University in 1918), Twardowski worked intensively as an educator. As a part of his activity he intended to introduce his students to systematic scientific work. In his opinion, a philosophy teacher should not only teach, but also educate to develop in students the desired qualities, such as: appreciation of rational factors, reflectivity, perseverance, precision and systematicity. The development of such features required systematic teaching and educational work. When he took charge of the Lvov philosophy department, Twardowski set a clear plan for its advancement, as described by Dąmbska:

The plan was bold, although seemingly ineffective: to create a scientific style of philosophizing in Poland, practising those branches of philosophy that belong to science, using strict research methods. Clearly mark the boundaries – by applying the postulate of clarity and validity of statements – where science ends in philosophical investigations and poetry or profession of faith begins. This postulate of treating philosophy scientifically had nothing to do with materialism, popular in the second half of the 19th century in some circles of philosophizing naturalists, and it also differed in more than one respect from the anti-metaphysical postulates of positivism.⁵

Through this programme he aimed to implement what Brentano had taught him, which the professor clearly indicates in his *Autobiography* when he says:

I felt called to bring the way of philosophizing that I learned from Franz Brentano closer to my compatriots, and especially, to introduce the spirit and method of this philosophy to the academic youth.⁶

In order to pursue these goals, appropriate structures had to be established, and Twardowski's great achievement was the gradual creation of such structures at the University of Lvov. After only two years of work in Lvov, Twardowski founded a philosophical college, equipped with a philosophical library.⁷ It is worth noting two seminars held at that college: a proseminar and a higher semi-

⁵ Ibid., pp. 14–15.

⁶ K. Twardowski, *Autobiografia filozoficzna (Selbstdarstellung)*, op. cit., p. 29.

⁷ The library of the Philosophical College housed about 8,000 items in 1930.

nar. The first one was an introductory class during which texts were read and commented on, with a weekly report on the fragment read. At the end of the year, the so-called annual work was written. Successful completion of the proseminar was a condition for admission to the actual seminar, which was a higher level of philosophical initiation.⁸ During those classes texts by philosophers were read and commented on, always in the original languages. Becoming a participant in the seminar meant acquiring the privilege of access to the Lektorium.⁹ This is what Stefan Swieżawski, a participant of the last classes of this type at the University of Lvov, writes about this seminar:

In the academic year 1927/28, Twardowski read Franz Brentano's *Versuch über die Erkenntnis* at his seminar. [...] The reading was, of course, of the original text, in German, and each participant made an effort to have his own copy of the book. In my copy, which I still have, I have clearly marked the pages read and discussed at each seminar session; sometimes only half a page was managed to be read and considered at a time.¹⁰

These seminar-type classes introduced the students to the secrets of the scientific workshop and, at the same time, developed interpretation skills. Interestingly, Twardowski engaged in polemics with his students very gently and skilfully, trying rather to bolster their strengths. Swieżawski, who during seminar-type classes (first at the proseminar, then at the seminar) wrote papers first on the thought of David Hume and then on John Locke, valued that method very highly, observing:

Professor Twardowski taught both the difficult art of getting to the heart of the idea of the author being read, and purely technical methods of preparing index cards useful for a given dissertation. Just as in the classes taught by the professor, also in the works written under his supervision there was a single

⁸ Cf. I. Dąmbaska, *Filozofia na Uniwersytecie Jana Kazimierza we Lwowie w latach 1918–1945*, "Zeszyty Lwowskie" 1971, No. 2, pp. 80–81.

⁹ The seminar participants had to sign a set of rules which they had to strictly adhere to. Any violation resulted in sanctions, including removal from classes. As Swieżawski notes: "Looking today, from a distance of many years, at the period of the 'first training' of philosophy, I clearly see that these long hours of reading and digging through texts that were usually difficult to understand, making extracts and summaries from these readings, were the very essence of learning – more than lectures, seminars, conversations" (S. Swieżawski, *Wielki przełom 1907–1945*, RW KUL, Lublin 1989, p. 97).

¹⁰ Ibid.

requirement: a decisive moving away from excessive verbalism and total responsibility for every word.¹¹

Seminar classes, especially the seminars proper, constituted the core of philosophical education. It was also there, during seminar classes, that the philosophical talents of people who later often became doctors of philosophy or Twardowski's assistants, were revealed.

2. Twardowski on Philosophical Education

Here we will consider how this outstanding scholar and founder of a philosophical school (Lvov School), viewed philosophical education and what requirements he set for young people who undertook such studies. It should be noted right away that the aim of philosophical study, according to Twardowski, was "to acquire the ability to independently consider philosophical issues," and not only to become familiar with the philosophical vocabulary or the general history of philosophy.¹² We must remember that Twardowski, as a student of Brentano, following the example of his master, wanted to practise what was called scientific philosophy.¹³ In order for philosophy to be exercised in a way that guarantees (in its methodological aspect, one might say) its scientificity, it should be practised by properly prepared researchers who should meet quite high – according to Twardowski – requirements.¹⁴ The potential philosopher (the future teacher of philosophy) had to be comprehensively trained in both the humanities and the mathematical and natural sciences. As Twardowski himself notes on this very issue:

Whoever wants to devote himself to philosophy and who wants to work profitably in its field, should acquire appropriate education in both the humanities and mathematics and natural sciences. This education will be adequate if it is not only the general education in both fields that is provided by a secondary school that covers them, but if it also includes a more detailed knowledge of

¹¹ Ibid., p. 98.

¹² K. Twardowski, *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne*, Księgarnia S.A. "Książnica Atlas" T.N.S.W., Lwów 1927, p. 172.

¹³ Cf. R. Kleszcz, *Metoda i wartości. Metafilozofia Kazimierza Twardowskiego*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2013, pp. 25–50.

¹⁴ K. Twardowski, *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne*, op. cit., pp. 172–176, 194–197.

one of the humanities, one of the natural sciences and mathematics. This is the only, apparently rational, position on this matter.¹⁵

In other words, the study of philosophy requires reliable extra-philosophical preparation because, as Twardowski notes, only this guarantees the use of the opportunities offered by the study of philosophy:

Therefore, the study of philosophy and independent philosophical work must be based on sufficiently extensive scientific preparation in the field of non-philosophical knowledge. Otherwise, this study and work will inevitably become one-sided and must lead to a very far-reaching specialization, inconsistent with the very essence of philosophy.¹⁶

When starting philosophy studies, a student should have some general knowledge of what the scientific method is. To avoid one-sidedness, it would be good to know the method of mathematical sciences (the *a priori* method) and the empirical method appropriate for natural sciences.¹⁷ Generally speaking, a student of philosophy should have much broader knowledge of auxiliary sciences than a student of other disciplines. Almost all of the specific sciences are auxiliary sciences for philosophy. Such knowledge is taught in high school, although, according to Twardowski, it is difficult to count on good preparation of a typical high school graduate in this area. The creator of the LWS was convinced that the competences of young people entering higher education were often far from satisfactory. These weaknesses are also visible among young people undertaking philosophy studies, because:

those who want to devote themselves to philosophy in the strict sense look with horror at the Greek texts of Plato and Aristotle, and even at the Latin texts of Descartes or Leibniz. And there are many students who do not know how to use logarithmic tables or even dictionaries.¹⁸

According to Twardowski, although the study of philosophy at the moment of its start should already presuppose the possession of certain competences, one should strive to create such a curriculum of philosophy that the student is able

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 194–195.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 196.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 158–159, 174–175.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 123.

to acquire competences equipping him or her with the knowledge we have discussed. To this end, it is important to create an appropriate form for the study of philosophy and to teach the subjects in this study in the right order. Thus, at the first stage, it is not the history of philosophy that should be taught, but logic and psychology, since these disciplines provide knowledge of the methods typical of the *a priori* sciences (logic) and of the empirical sciences (psychology).¹⁹ Logic is an important tool to meet the requirements of precision and clarity. Knowledge and, above all, training in this matter equip us with skills that allow us to deal with the difficulties posed by philosophical research and creativity. In turn, psychology was treated by Twardowski, in accordance with the approach typical of Brentanism, as a discipline important for other sciences, and in particular for philosophical sciences. It was in the Austrian philosopher's programme that descriptive psychology, presented in *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874), became a necessary foundation for philosophical research.²⁰ The subject of this research was the analysis of the symptoms of mental life. So, according to Brentanist Twardowski, these two disciplines – logic and psychology – would be the ones with which the study of philosophy should begin. Mastering them protects against mistakes common among those who discuss philosophical issues. This is how Twardowski sums it up:

No one begins the study of mathematics with differential equations, or the study of chemistry with its organic section. There are some basic areas both here and there. They are logic and psychology in philosophy, which constitute its propaedeutics. [...] logic and psychology represent two types of research methods also used in the field of philosophical sciences.²¹

The study of these disciplines is intended to allow philosophy students to gain, or improve, competence in their knowledge of the scientific method. The student of philosophy also needs competences beyond purely philosophical ones. The requirements in this respect – according to Twardowski – seem to him to be indispensable for the following reasons: (1) the detailed sciences provide philosophy

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 174 ff.

²⁰ Cf. F. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, L. L. McAlister, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1973; see also K. Mulligan, *Brentano on the Mind*, in: *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, ed. D. Jacquette, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, pp. 66–97.

²¹ K. Twardowski, *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne*, op. cit., p. 174.

with material for research; (2) in relation to certain philosophical sciences, some of the detailed sciences play the role of auxiliary sciences; (3) the methodological correctness needed in philosophical research can be acquired by becoming familiar with the methodological requirements of the detailed disciplines.

Linguistic competences in the field of classical and modern languages are highly necessary for a student of philosophy.²² The student of philosophy's use of works written in various foreign languages is also important, because it protects him/her from a certain type of one-sidedness present in philosophical works of every language. Twardowski strongly warned against such bias. Hence, in order to avoid it, Poles should become acquainted with the achievements of German, French and English thought.

Already at first glance it is clear that the expectations imposed by Twardowski on prospective philosophy students are extensive and difficult to implement in practice. As Twardowski himself points out, in the history of philosophy these criteria were largely met by a few geniuses, such as Aristotle or Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, although the requirements can be considered understandable and justified, when we talk about scientific philosophy and make far-reaching methodological demands on it. The fulfilment of these prerequisites by the researcher would provide – then as now – excellent preparation for scientific work in the area of philosophy, already at the starting point.

When talking about the requirements set out by Twardowski for students of philosophy, it is essential to highlight one more aspect. When Twardowski took up the position of professor, he found that in the context of philosophical studies the situation in Lvov was not the best. It was important to him that Poles represent an appropriate level in this respect.²³ The philosophy teacher's task was also to create organizational conditions that would enable him/her to actively participate in philosophical life. The activity of the Philosophical Club in Lvov was such a form of introducing students to philosophical life. At its weekly meetings, various philosophical issues were reported and discussed, and Twardowski, who was an authority for young students, participated in these meetings. The great logician Jan Łukasiewicz wrote about the activities of this student association:

The Philosophy Club meeting would start with a paper by some student, followed by a discussion. Everyone waited to hear what Twardowski would say.

²² Ibid., pp. 144–145.

²³ Cf. I. Dąmbaska, *Filozofia na Uniwersytecie Jana Kazimierza*, op. cit., pp. 82–83.

They believed that he could solve any problem. And there were quite a few issues. Whether man has a soul, whether he always acts egoistically, whether you can tell by the style of a written work whether it was written by a woman or a man, and so on. [...] The Philosophy Club was an excellent school of thought and had a great influence on young people. Thanks to the club I moved from law to philosophy and became a student of Twardowski's.²⁴

As I have already mentioned, while Twardowski believed that the study of philosophy should not begin with its history, he nevertheless argued that the history of philosophy should occupy an important place within the discipline. It should include the study of the works of the classics of all epochs, while textbooks on the history of philosophy should serve as a helpful commentary. The study of philosophy itself should begin, as I have already mentioned, with psychology and logic, and it is of the utmost importance to familiarize oneself with what was called the scientific method. Only after becoming acquainted with the scientific method there is time for the systematic study of the philosophical disciplines. In Twardowski's opinion, this familiarization with the systematic branches of philosophy should preferably begin not with reading textbooks, but with a comprehensive, monographic study of some selected issue. And only after studying and assimilating several such problems in depth, one should move on to a systematic study of a given branch of philosophy. As Twardowski put it:

Whoever really wants to study logic or psychology, ethics or aesthetics, or the theory of knowledge, should take a topic and get to know it as well as possible through monographic studies of the subject. It is necessary to look at it from all sides and in different lights, and to try to discover in it the sides that have not yet been illuminated by anyone.²⁵

Generally speaking, Twardowski's conception was that the study of philosophy should consist of delving into the very philosophical issues, aiming at considering them substantively, but taking into account the historical development of the issue in question.

²⁴ J. Łukasiewicz, *Pamiętnik*, eds. J. Jadacki, P. Surma, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2013, p. 46.

²⁵ K. Twardowski, *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne*, op. cit., pp. 173–174.

3. Philosophy Studies Programme

Now, let's take a look at Twardowski's educational practice and see what subjects he taught and to which he paid the most attention. The philosopher taught classes at the University of Lvov from 1895 to 1931. An analysis of the list of his lectures (*de facto* also classes and seminars) clearly shows that in his curriculum the professor was guided by his metaphilosophical views and the desired standards of philosophical education and teaching needs, which required positivist grassroots work.²⁶ By far the largest number of classes were on various issues of psychology. This was due to their importance, in Twardowski's opinion, to philosophical training. Psychology, in Brentano's programme, was, as it were, the basic auxiliary science to philosophy. Beginning in the academic year 1901/02, Twardowski systematically taught classes in experimental psychology. In 1907, the Psychology Laboratory was established at the University of Lvov, and in 1920 the Institute of Psychology.

Also quantitatively significant were lectures on logic together with methodology, which aimed to not only expose the students to the deductive method, but also to teach accuracy in thinking. As I have already mentioned, Twardowski himself was aware of being, in some sense, a forerunner of teaching mathematical logic in Poland. In the academic year 1899/1900, his lecture "On the Aspirations of Reform in the Field of Formal Logic" was held, and it constituted the first presentation in Poland dedicated to generally acquainting the audience with new trends in logical research. Peter Simons describes this lecture as follows:

Twardowski, Brentano's last important Viennese student, taught a course on the reform of logic at Lwów, and his lectures, while rudimentary by later standards, were attended by or at least known to later stars of the Lwów-Warsaw School such as Łukasiewicz and Leśniewski.²⁷

The programme also included quite a few lectures on the history of philosophy from antiquity to the present. Thus, already in the first year of Twardowski's teaching activity, he lectured on the problems of the history of philosophy from its

²⁶ Cf. list of lectures and seminars of Twardowski at the University of Lvov, in R. Jadczak, *Kazimierz Twardowski. Nota biobibliograficzna*, Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, Oddział w Toruniu, Toruń 1991, pp. 59–77.

²⁷ P. Simons, *Judging Correctly: Brentano and the Reform of Elementary Logic*, in: *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, ed. D. Jacquette, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, p. 63.

beginnings to the end of the 18th century. There were also lectures on the history of Greek philosophy (in the years 1898/99, 1905/06, 1906/07, 1907/08, 1912/13, 1924/25); Renaissance philosophy (1908/09); modern philosophy (1909/10, 1917/18 1922/23); and finally, on philosophy of the 19th century: 1903/04. Although Twardowski was not an expert, nor, we should add, a fan of medieval philosophy, he also taught classes in this field (1900/01, 1908/09).²⁸

All these subjects were intended to implement appropriate standards and teach the culture of intellectual work at the highest level, while at the same time introducing the traditions of philosophical thinking. Ethical issues, presented both historically and systematically, were also clearly represented in the lectures under discussion. Reflection of this kind was a very important element of philosophical study. It should also be noted that for Twardowski the very practice of philosophy also had a distinct moral dimension. This is expressed very emphatically by Dąmbska:

To practise philosophy, according to Twardowski, is not only to solve certain theoretical issues. It is also a path of moral perfecting and improvement, a path of acquiring the true wisdom in life, a path to inner independence and self-mastery. To be a philosopher is not only to realize certain intellectual values but also moral values. In Twardowski's mind there was a vision of the ideal of the ancient sage, modelled on the figure of Socrates. And he himself had something of Socrates in him.²⁹

What is noteworthy, however, is the relatively weaker representation of classes in the theory of knowledge and metaphysics.³⁰ Metaphysical issues, apart from Twardowski's historical lectures, were taken up only in the early days of his Lvov activities, when he still treated metaphysics as a branch of philosophy, scientifically conceived. Later, in accordance with his metaphilosophical convictions, he did not discuss strictly metaphysical issues in his classes.³¹ Thus, we can say that

²⁸ He also published a popular work on medieval philosophy: K. Twardowski, *O filozofii średniowiecznej wykładów sześć*, H. Altenberg, Lwów 1910.

²⁹ I. Dąmbska, *Filozofia na Uniwersytecie Jana Kazimierza*, op. cit., p. 77.

³⁰ In the indicated roster, we find only three lectures devoted to this issue. In the winter semester of the 1899/1900 academic year it is the "Fundamental Issues of the Theory of Cognition and Metaphysics" lecture, in the winter semester of 1917/18, and in the summer semester of the 1924/25 academic year it is the "Theory of Cognition" lecture.

³¹ Cf. R. Kleszcz, *Kazimierz Twardowski on Metaphysics*, in: *Tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School: Ideas and Continuations*, eds. A. Brożek, A. Chybińska, J. Jadacki, J. Woleński, Brill, Rodopi, Leiden 2016, pp. 135–151.

in philosophical education Twardowski preferred those disciplines that would train philosophers capable of maintaining the standards of scientific philosophy, while also having a strong background in the history of philosophical thought. This extremely ambitious programme could not have been realized if it had not been combined with Twardowski's extraordinary character as a teacher and educator, with his extraordinary discipline, fortitude and pedagogical genius. As a professor, Twardowski was keenly interested in the problems of pedagogy, gave lectures on the subject and authored publications in this area.³² He was interested not only in the education of students of philosophy, but also in the education and further training of teachers in general.

4. Conclusions

Twardowski's educational programme implemented by him in Lvov produced excellent results, first in the form of the creation of the Lvov School and later the LWS. Thus, it was more successful than any other contemporary Polish philosophical school. The formation of the Lvov School and the LWS was, of course, the resultant of several major and favourable circumstances: the value of the teaching programme, Twardowski's personality, favourable conditions in Galicia (freedom of speech, academic freedom) in the years 1895–1914, the existence of a sizable group of very talented young people, etc. The genesis of the Lvov School and later the LWS is, of course, an exciting topic for separate comparative research. At this point, however, another important question arises, concerning the relevance of this educational programme in our modern times, in which we face various difficulties in teaching philosophy. A reliable and systematic answer to this question would require extensive analysis. Here I will only take the liberty of suggesting synthetically some directions that the search for answers to this question should, in my opinion, take.

The presented philosophy curriculum, if we only consider its effects, seems worthy of high esteem. However, our attitude, let's say an approving one, to this educational programme does not necessarily entail acceptance of all the basic metaphilosophical assumptions made by Twardowski. Thus, in particular, we do

³² Cf. K. Twardowski, *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki i logiki do użytku w seminariach nauczycielskich i w nauce prywatnej*, Towarzystwo Pedagogiczne, Lwów 1901.

not have to accept his claim that psychology holds particular importance for philosophy, nor the catchphrase of scientific philosophy, especially in the form the professor proposed.

It should be assumed that Twardowski, as a teacher and university professor, wished to achieve his teaching goals in a deliberate manner; nevertheless, certain ways of realizing the goal can be associated with his personal characteristics, which, however, do not have to be considered necessary conditions for the implementation of this programme.

Without adopting the idea of scientific philosophy, we can, however, assume at the same time that every student of philosophy needs to have a knowledge, better than that of a standard high school graduate, of the detailed sciences and the methods applied within them. We do not have to be naturalists to agree that the modern practice of most branches of philosophy cannot be done in complete isolation from the detailed sciences and their modern achievements.

But how does one obtain such competence as mentioned in the item above? Twardowski imposed certain requirements that should be met by beginners in the study of philosophy. These concerned knowledge of the scientific method, that is, in practice, a science which uses inductive methods and a deductive science. At the same time, Twardowski had doubts whether high schools provide students with such competence. Nowadays, this scepticism about general high school preparation should probably be much stronger. If a significant portion of people entering university are ill-prepared for it, then how can we expect, already during philosophical studies, the effect of adequate general preparation? One has to agree with what Twardowski said that it is extremely difficult to make up for high school deficiencies at the university level. I think that it is possible to achieve (to some extent at least) the desired effect in the study of philosophy with not only courses in general logic, obviously, but also with a properly structured study of general methodology for the use of philosophers, as well as a course in the history of science. This would allow students to gain insight into the methods used by the sciences and their methodological diversity. The forms of education that Twardowski adopted and applied seem worthy of use. The proseminar form, the systematic, planned introduction of novice students to reading of philosophical texts, the analysis of student work and the meticulous extraction and analysis of mistakes made, seem valuable. The model for working at a higher level was the seminar the professor conducted. Implementing this today, however, would

demand extensive knowledge of both classical and modern languages. A realistic requirement would seem to be, in addition to knowledge of English, which we take for granted, at least an intermediate knowledge of Latin and a second modern language.

Twardowski was known to take his duties as a teacher of philosophy and professor seriously. Someone who offered as much as he did to his listeners had a certain right to expect that they would also fulfil their own obligations. It seems that today, too, taking students seriously requires enforcing the commitments they have undertaken.

The study of philosophy is inseparable from a certain axiological commitment, and this in turn requires a clear combination of rights and responsibilities. Conceding Twardowski's point in this regard, one needs to hope that philosophy students are, at the very least, aware of this axiological "stigma" of philosophy.

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The Historical, Pedagogical, and Philosophical Background of Kazimierz Twardowski's Project of Teaching Philosophical Propaedeutics

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Abstract: This paper aims to present the context and background of Kazimierz Twardowski's programmes of teaching the school subject of philosophical propaedeutics, which has not been done extensively before. We propose to categorize the programmes as follows: "minimalistic" (1921/1922), "maximalist" (1935) and "pragmatic" (1937). The article accompanies the first English edition of Twardowski's 1935 programme, as it is impossible to understand the meaning of this document without a broader context. We conclude that through the whole interwar period Twardowski influenced the programme that was officially in use, and in this way he shaped Polish intellectual culture. Twardowski and his philosophical school (the Lvov milieu) were the main actors in the development of philosophical propaedeutics in interwar Poland. Unfortunately, after World War II the communist regime eventually eliminated propaedeutics of philosophy as a fully-fledged school subject.

Key words: Kazimierz Twardowski, propaedeutics of philosophy, *Psychologie und Philosophie*, philosophy in school, education for democracy, critical thinking, informal logic

1. Introduction

Teaching philosophy as a path to a rational and fruitful human life has a long history, with various manifestations in successive historical periods under specific circumstances and adapted forms. In the history of Polish intellectual culture, the ideas developed among members of the Lvov-Warsaw School assume particular importance. It is often emphasized that Kazimierz Twardowski and his students played a key role in the development of philosophical propaedeutics in

Poland during the interwar period.¹ We want to confront this familiar vision with in-depth historical research. This research includes print and non-print archival sources and contextual studies.

In this paper, we aim to present the reconstruction, context and background of Twardowski's programmes for teaching philosophic propaedeutics, which has not been done extensively before. This study was inspired by the publication in this journal issue of an English translation of Twardowski's 1935 programme proposal. This proposal was not the only one prepared by Twardowski – manuscripts from 1921, 1922 and 1937 are also preserved.² This unique collection, only in its entirety, can give an adequate idea of how the concept of philosophical propaedeutics evolved and was adapted to its local and historical circumstances in interwar Poland. Thus, understanding these changing conditions is a necessary first step to achieving a deeper understanding of Twardowski's conception of philosophical propaedeutics. Twardowski's concepts not only have great historical value – they also introduce many topical issues in philosophical education that are worth studying.

¹ Brief analyses of the role and significance of Twardowski and his students for the development of philosophical propaedeutics in 1920–1939 have already been made; cf., e.g., R. Jadczyk, *Z dyskusji nad propedeutyką filozofii w szkole średniej*, "Studia Filozoficzne" 1984, Nos. 11–12, pp. 151–159; M. Woźniczka, *Rekonstrukcja poglądów przedstawicieli Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej na proces nauczania filozofii*, in: *Polska filozofia analityczna. W kręgu Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej. Księga poświęcona pamięci Ryszarda Jadczyka*, ed. W. Tyburski, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 1999, pp. 155–157; J. Wojtysiak, *Edukacja filozoficzna w ujęciu szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej*, in: *Filozofia i edukacja. Materiały z sympozjum z cyklu "Przyszłość cywilizacji Zachodu" zorganizowanego przez Katedrę Filozofii Kultury KUL*, eds. P. Jaroszyński, P. Tarasiewicz, I. Chłodna, Fundacja "Lubelska Szkoła Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej," Lublin 2005, pp. 189–200. These analyses were essentially based on major publications. Even these cursory analyses indicate the great importance of Twardowski and his school. In the present work, on the basis of a broader source base and taking into account wider contexts, we want to strengthen, detail and better ground these conclusions.

² Manuscripts of the programmes *Program psychologii. Projekt programu nauczania dla szkół średnich* [Psychology Programme: Draft Curriculum for High Schools] from 1921, *Projekt programu logiki* [Draft Logic Programme] from 1922 and *Szkieł programu nauczania propedeutyki filozofii w liceach ogólnokształcących* [Draft High School Curriculum for Teaching Propaedeutics of Philosophy] from 1935 can be found at the Kazimierz Twardowski Library (formerly known as Joint Libraries of WFiS UW, IFiS PAN and PTF) in Warsaw at Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, URL: <https://polaczonebiblioteki.uw.edu.pl/>. An unpublished manuscript of the programme *Propedeutyka filozofii – Wydział humanistyczny, etc.* [Propaedeutics of Philosophy – Faculty of Humanities, etc.] from 1937 can be found in Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's documents in the archive of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw.

Kazimierz Twardowski was a Polish analytical philosopher and a student of Franz Brentano,³ the founder of the largest Central European analytical school, namely the Lvov-Warsaw School⁴ (hereinafter: LWS). He was born into a noble family in Vienna belonging to the Polish minority, where he received his education first in the prestigious Theresianum gymnasium and later at the University of Vienna.⁵ After defending his habilitation thesis, he moved to Lvov, where he was appointed to chair a department at the university there.⁶ Lvov was historically Polish (then called Lwów, now Lviv in Ukrainian) and had a large Polish majority there. Twardowski raised “an army of intellectualists” who would significantly influence Polish culture in the 20th century.⁷

³ Twardowski was Franz Brentano's close student – along with Alexius Meinong, Edmund Husserl, Carl Stumpf and Anton Marty – at the University of Vienna. Alois Höfler was one of Brentano's school members. Although Brentano was a *Privatdozent* (he could teach but without salary or the right to supervise theses, and this is why Twardowski's official supervisor was Robert von Zimmerman, author of the Herbartian textbook for propaedeutics of philosophy used in the Theresianum), he managed to attract students who considered him an expert in the ancient style. Cf. K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, in: *Kazimierz Twardowski on Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. J.L. Brandl, J. Woleński, trans. A. Szylewicz, Brill-Rodopi, Amsterdam 1999, pp. 17–31.

⁴ Cf. A. Brożek, F. Stadler, J. Woleński, eds., *The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in the European Culture*, Springer, Cham 2017; A. Chybińska et al., eds., *Tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School: Ideas and Continuations*, Brill-Rodopi, Leiden 2016.

⁵ Cf. A. Brożek, *Kazimierz Twardowski: die Wiener Jahre*, Springer, Wien 2011.

⁶ A. Brożek, *Wiedeńskie lata Kazimierza Twardowskiego*, “Filozofia Nauki” 2009, Vol. 17, No. 3(67), pp. 133–164.

⁷ Cf. K. Kijania-Placek, J. Woleński, eds., *The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1998; R. Poli, F. Coniglione, J. Woleński, eds., *Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School*, Rodopi, Amsterdam 1993; P.M. Simons, *Logical Philosophy, Anti-Irrationalism, and Gender Equality: Three Positives of the Lvov-Warsaw Enlightenment*, in: *The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in the European Culture*, eds. A. Brożek, S. Friedrich, J. Woleński, Springer, Cham 2017, pp. 3–14; J.J. Jadacki, *From the Viewpoint of the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Rodopi, Amsterdam 2003; J.J. Jadacki, *Polish Analytical Philosophy: Studies on Its Heritage. With the Appendix Containing the Bibliography of Polish Logic from the Second Half of the 14th Century to the First Half of the 20th Century*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2009; A. Brożek, *The Significance of Kazimierz Twardowski in Philosophy and Culture*, “Pro-Fil” 2014, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 32–46; A. Brożek, *Analiza i konstrukcja. O metodach badania pojęć w Szkole Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2020; A. Brożek, *Wiedeńskie lata Kazimierza Twardowskiego*, op. cit.; A. Brożek et al., *Anti-Irrationalism: Philosophical Methods in the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2020; M. Będkowski et al., *Analysis – Paraphrase – Axiomatization: Philosophical Methods in the Lvov-Warsaw School*, in: *Formal and Informal Methods in Philosophy*, eds. M. Będkowski et al., Brill,

The work examined here refers to an influential period in Polish history, especially for Polish education. After 123 years, Poland finally regained its independence in 1918 after being divided into three partitions among Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary. The main objective then was to reunite the nation and to build a new vision for education. Since there were so many challenges, the necessary reforms took almost the entire interwar period (i.e., 1918–1939). Although around a century has passed since these reforms began, making it seem an extremely distant period in cultural history, Twardowski's basic ideas about philosophical propaedeutics still seem relevant. In our opinion, these ideas from the noble Polish intellectual tradition could still be used today to strengthen and modernize Polish society. The first step on this path is to study the legacy of Twardowski's educational ideas and his school, which has not yet been fully explored in terms of archival resources. The present publication aims to complete this task in order to further develop the research on the adaptability of the idea of philosophical propaedeutics today.

We begin this article by outlining the history of how philosophy has been used in concepts of education and upbringing in Poland. We then present the main historical contexts that determined the development of the idea of philosophical propaedeutics in Poland at the beginning of the 20th century. We begin by tracing the challenges that arose in the context of Poland's regained independence and the need to build a cohesive, modern state. We then take a closer look at how educational policy, which was one of the most important external determinants of the development of philosophical propaedeutics, was changing. Next, we present the discussion on propaedeutics that took place in the circles of Polish philosophy, and then juxtapose specific curricula related to propaedeutics that were developed in the interwar period (1918–1939). The contributions of Twardowski and his students are then presented and Twardowski's programmes compared to other propositions. We also analyse the extent to which Twardowski's ideas were influenced by his Austrian background. Finally, general conclusions about the development of philosophical propaedeutics in Poland are drawn and a first attempt to classify Twardowski's programmes is made. Given the aims of this article, we do not seek to undertake a deep analysis of the programmes, because this is a task for a separate, in-depth study. This article concludes by summariz-

Leiden 2020, pp. 56–74; J.J. Jadacki, *Polish Philosophy of the 19th and 20th Centuries: Heritage Studies*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warsaw 2015.

ing the main determinants of how philosophical propaedeutics developed in Poland during the interwar period.

2. Philosophy in Education: The Polish Intellectual Heritage before World War I

To understand the significance of Twardowski's ideas in relation to the teaching of philosophy, one must first understand how local traditions of teaching philosophy developed. Indeed, views about what kind of philosophy should be taught and what educational roles it should fulfil have changed fundamentally over time, and Twardowski's proposals represent a historically important stage in this evolution.

Elements of philosophical education were present in Poland from the Middle Ages as part of the medieval school curriculum, and they played a typical role in introducing students to a higher intellectual culture.⁸ We cannot exactly trace the scope of the philosophy taught in cathedral schools, but it seems that some elements of philosophy were introduced in Poland together with the introduction of the whole medieval concept of education.⁹ Elements of scholastic philosophy were also taught in Polish schools from the time of the Enlightenment educational reforms of the 18th century.¹⁰

New concepts of philosophy in education, called *studia humanitatis* in Latin, appear in parallel to scholastic philosophy since the 16th century, with the philosophical part focused on moral philosophy.¹¹ The idea of using philosophy for education was also formulated in the local context of practical humanistic phi-

⁸ J.J. Jadacki, *Jakiej filozofii uczniowie potrzebują*, "Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny" 1982, Nos. 3–4, pp. 3–4; Cf. also A. Karbowski, *Dzieje wychowania i szkół w Polsce w wiekach średnich. T. 1: Od 966 do 1363 roku*, nakł. Księgarni K. Grendyszyńskiego, Petersburg 1898, URL: <http://www.kpbc.ukw.edu.pl/dlibra/plain-content?id=2004>; Z. Kałuża, *Lektury filozoficzne Wincentego Kadłubka. Zbiór studiów*, Instytut Tomistyczny, Warszawa 2014, pp. 14–21.

⁹ For more information about medieval school philosophy in Poland, see J.J. Jadacki, *Jakiej filozofii uczniowie potrzebują*, op. cit., pp. 79–80.

¹⁰ Cf., e.g., Z. Ogonowski, *Filozofia szkolna w Polsce XVII wieku*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1985; J.J. Jadacki, *Jakiej filozofii uczniowie potrzebują*, op. cit., pp. 81–83.

¹¹ A. Kamler, *Uwagi o edukacji moralnej synów szlacheckich w XVI-wiecznej Rzeczypospolitej*, in: *Honestas et turpitude. Magnateria Rzeczypospolitej w XVI–XVIII wieku*, eds. E. Dubas-Urwanowicz, M. Kupczewska, K. Łopatecki, J. Urwanowicz, Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne, Białystok 2019, pp. 189–201, URL: <https://repcyfr.pl/Content/18166/PDF/Kamler.pdf>.

losophy, starting with the sapiential role of philosophy in the *specula* of Mikołaj Rej and later in the educational concepts of Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski and Sebastian Petrycy of Pilzno.¹² Interestingly, even famous Polish politician and king's advisor Jan Zamoyski established a private academia in Zamość and there created a curriculum that emphasized philosophy teaching.¹³

Humanist ideas about the role of philosophy in education in the context of practical life resulted in a lasting educational tradition that served as a basis for the Enlightenment reforms of the Komisja Edukacji Narodowej (Commission for National Education, 1773–1794),¹⁴ although the pre-positivist attitude led to narrowing the scope of traditional philosophy in curricula.¹⁵ Despite the introduction of elements of logic and epistemology, as developed by Condillac, the elements of philosophical propaedeutics were still not systematically treated as a distinct subject of importance in the educational process.

With the collapse of the independent Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, local intellectual traditions¹⁶ came under strong cultural pressure of the imperial powers of Austria, Prussia (Germany), and Russia. From 1867, the part of Poland within Austria's borders, which was known as Galicia, gained a large degree of cultural and political autonomy, thus allowing it to develop its own educational

¹² Cf., e.g., A. Michalkiewicz-Gorol, *Twórczość Sebastiana Petrycego jako most pomiędzy przed-zaborową i pozaborową polską myślą pedagogiczno-filozoficzną*, "Język. Religia. Tożsamość" 2022, No. 2(26)B, pp. 157–173. Other humanistic concepts of philosophy in education are described in A. Kamler, *Uwagi o edukacji moralnej synów szlacheckich...*, op. cit.

¹³ Cf. I. Dąmbska, *Filozofia w Akademii Zamojskiej w dobie Renesansu. Jan Zamoyski i jego koncepcja nauczania filozofii*, in: *Nauczanie filozofii w Polsce w XV–XVIII wieku*, ed. L. Szczucki, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1978; Dąmbska wrote also about teaching logic at the Academic Gymnasium of Gdańsk in the 17th century. Cf. I. Dąmbska, *Logika w Gimnazjum Akademickim Gdańskim w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku*, "Rocznik Gdański. Organ Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauki i Sztuki w Gdańsku" 1956, Vol. 15/16, pp. 199–223.

¹⁴ K. Bartnicka, K. Rozmus, *The Commission of National Education and Its Transformation in the Years 1773–1794*, "Rozprawy z Dziejów Oświaty" 2018, Vol. 55, pp. 9–60.

¹⁵ For more details about philosophy in the Commission for National Education, see B. Pleśniarski, *Nauki filozoficzne w szkołach Komisji Edukacji Narodowej*, "Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici. Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne. Pedagogika" 1974, No. 4(65), pp. 47–68; cf. also S. Janeczek, *Epistemologia w dydaktyce fizyki Komisji Edukacji Narodowej*, "Roczniki Filozoficzne" 2002, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 203–262. More about the philosophical culture of the Commission for National Education can be found in S. Janeczek, *Oświeceniowa kultura naukowa w kontekście filozoficznym. Z dziejów Komisji Edukacji Narodowej (cz. 2)*, "Roczniki Filozoficzne" 2015, Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 124–131.

¹⁶ For more on the Polish traditions, especially the concept of Polish national pedagogy, see R. Charzyński, *Kształt polskiej pedagogiki narodowej według Wiktora Wąsika*, "Polska Myśl Pedagogiczna" 2021, Vol. 7, No. 7, pp. 233–246.

concepts more freely. Nevertheless, the new ideas were strongly influenced by Austrian concepts, and the same applied to philosophical propaedeutics, the concepts and traditions of which derived from the Austrian educational system.

Propaedeutics of philosophy was introduced into the Austro-Hungarian curriculum in 1849 thanks to the involvement of Hermann Bonitz of Prussia, who helped Leo Thun-Hohenstein, minister for religious affairs and education,¹⁷ and Franz Exner to successfully reform education at the gymnasium and university levels: "That practical pedagogical project was deeply intertwined with the bureaucratic institutions of imperial-royal Austria-Hungary, concerned as it was with the improvement of what today we would call human capital, especially the bureaucrats who were defined as national assets, a special class of knowledge workers who ran the state."¹⁸

The idea came from Prussia, where it was introduced by Alexander von Humboldt's reforms, although it was not that successful. In 1849, two hours were dedicated to logic and psychology, but this was increased to four hours in 1858. Finally, the duration settled at three hours in 1908. There was constant dissatisfaction with the application of the subject and the need for reform. One of the reasons for limiting propaedeutics to psychology and logic, according to Austrian philosopher Alois Höfler, was the idea of the "bankruptcy of the philosophical systems" tied with idealistic philosophy.¹⁹ In Lvov, Salomon Igel²⁰ similarly mentioned that philosophy was discredited and inadequate for young minds, because the German philosophy of the early 20th century was too ready to construct systems regardless of scientific results.²¹ There was also a practical reason. The reforms from 1849 removed the Department of Philosophy from preparatory courses for law,

¹⁷ R. Melville, *Thun, Leo Graf von*, "Neue Deutsche Biographie" 2016, Vol. 26, pp. 222–224; cf. also, e.g., the Britannica entry: *Leo, count von Thun und Hohenstein*, URL: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Leo-Graf-von-Thun-und-Hohenstein>.

¹⁸ K. Arens, *The Specter of "Austrian Philosophy": Ernst Mach and a Modern Tradition of Post-Philosophy*, in: *Ernst Mach – Life, Work, Influence*, ed. F. Stadler, Springer, Cham 2019, p. 30.

¹⁹ S. Schneider, *Sprawy bieżące. W sprawie propedeutyki filozoficznej*, "Muzeum. Czasopismo Towarzystwa Nauczycieli Szkół Wyższych" 1901, Vol. 17, No. 4, p. 299.

²⁰ Salomon Igel (1889–1942) was a pedagogue and philosopher who studied for a PhD under Twardowski and belonged to the LWS. He was director of the Jewish Society of Folk and High Schools in Lvov. He published on education and psychology, e.g., S. Igel, *O przedmiocie psychologii*, Nakładem "Księgarni Nowości," Lwów 1927. He committed suicide at the beginning of 1942 to avoid arrest by the Gestapo, Nazi Germany's secret police.

²¹ S. Igel, *Dydaktyka propedeutyki filozofii*, in: *Encyklopedia wychowania. Nauczanie*, Vol. 2, ed. S. Lempicki, Nasza Księgarnia, Warszawa 1935, p. 4.

medicine and theology, and it became an independent research institution. The course was moved to the gymnasium level, where two extra grades were added. Thanks to Franz Exner, the philosophical basis of the reform was the “prominent educational philosophy associated with early receptions of Kant, Herbartianism, which was in fact the official pedagogy of the Austrian and Austro-Hungarian Empires.”²² It was “assumed that the human mind could be influenced, if not transformed, by education.” This propaedeutics was intended to prepare for real scientific work “to inculcate and critique the ways of working and thinking inherent in and distinctive to each science.” Interestingly, the propaedeutics in Austria-Hungary also attained a social goal: “this critique included what is called ‘moral education’ in the literature today, but which is better described, using Kant’s terminology, as the ability to make moral judgments – to evaluate socially and ethically, not just logically. In this joint approach to education, epistemology and psychology are brought together in a dynamic relationship.”²³

Confirmation can be found in Robert von Zimmermann’s textbook *Philosophische Propädeutik* (1860): “At its foundation, then, the entire propaedeutics is a study of the mind, because [the object of this study] is the mind and the forms in which it appears. However, its first part stresses the psychic side of psychology, the latter, its logical side; the first treats thoughts exclusively as acts of mind, the second, as an attempt to grasp truth. Thus the first part, which describes to us the tools [used], must precede the second, which teaches how to use them.”²⁴ It is worth adding here that it was a canonical textbook that educated many Viennese intellectuals in the second half of the 19th century, including Twardowski.

Eventually, Zimmerman’s textbook was replaced by Höfler and Alexius Meinong’s *Philosophische Propädeutik* (1890), which represents the view of Brentano’s school: “What distinguished Höfler’s textbook was that in place of Herbartian psychological categories he introduced Brentanian distinctions and determinations.”²⁵ Such a Brentanian view of psychology in philosophical propaedeutics played a fundamental role for Twardowski’s own concepts.

²² K. Arens, *The Specter of “Austrian Philosophy”*, op. cit., p. 24.

²³ Ibid., p. 32.

²⁴ R. Zimmermann, *Philosophische Propädeutik*, 2nd ed., Wilhelm Braumüller k.k. Hofbuchhändler, Wien 1860, p. 6. English translation quoted after: K. Arens, *The Specter of “Austrian Philosophy”*, op. cit., p. 32.

²⁵ D. Fiset, F. Stadler, G. Fréchette, eds., *Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy*, Springer, Cham 2020, p. 140.

Due to the political and cultural dependency of Galicia on Austria-Hungary and the Viennese concepts of education that were inherited by Twardowski, this approach significantly influenced Polish philosophy teaching in the interwar period. Poland's regained independence in 1918 opened up new possibilities for developing the educational system.²⁶ Philosophical propaedeutics played an important role in this as its cultural significance came to be recognized, and it was regarded as an important tool for modernizing and strengthening society.

3. The Interwar Contexts of Philosophical Propaedeutics in Poland

3.1. The Challenges of Regained Independence

After regaining independence in 1918, the Polish school system, like many other aspects of the country's functioning, was divided into three post-partition systems. There was therefore not only a demand for unification²⁷ but also modernization. Although Galicia had the best conditions for developing the Polish high school, the conservativeness of the Rada Szkolna Krajowa (RSK, the State School Board, German: Landesschulrat) wasted that opportunity. In the Prussian partition, the system was dominated by Germanization (i.e., the imposition of German culture), and the situation was similar in the Russian partition (Russification). Nevertheless, the alternative private high school system that developed after the "school strike" of 1905 in the Russian partition introduced modern ideas that inspired the independent Polish education system.²⁸ During World War I,

²⁶ For more information on the Polish contributions to the development of philosophical propaedeutics in the period 1900–1920, cf. M. Woźniczka, *Nauczanie filozofii w Polsce w I połowie XX wieku*, in: *Studia z Filozofii Polskiej*, Vol. 1, eds. M. Rembierz K. Śleziński, Wydawnictwo „Scriptum”, Bielsko-Biała–Kraków 2006, pp. 305–307.

²⁷ "Aiming at the loss of the national identity of the Polish people, the German or Russian ruling classes tried to support the disintegration processes, using every opportunity to strengthen the distinctiveness of the individual Polish lands, applying differentiated economic, national, educational and cultural policies to them. [...] In addition to the influence of the economic and political system of the partitioners, the quality and character of education in the various Polish lands was also influenced by the Polish population itself – its economic situation, class structure, and social activities." W. Sieciński, *Administracja i organizacja szkolnictwa powszechnego i średniego w II Rzeczypospolitej*, "Studia Administracyjne" 2016, Vol. 8, pp. 80–81.

²⁸ F.W. Araszkiewicz, *Szkoła średnia ogólnokształcąca na ziemiach polskich w latach 1915–1918*, "Rozprawy z Dziejów Oświaty" 1967, Vol. 10, p. 164; J. Niklewska, *Modele wychowawcze pry-*

as the possibility of Poland's independence arose, teachers and educators closely followed emerging modern pedagogical ideas and solutions worldwide to prepare the groundwork for education in a reborn Poland.²⁹

The significant achievement of the World War I period was that plans for an independent Polish school system were discussed, and preparations were made between 1915 and 1918. This was possible thanks to the work of grassroots, non-governmental organizations, and teachers' organizations, such as the important Stowarzyszenie Nauczycielstwa Polskiego (Association of Polish Teachers), which was established in November 1914 by the Komisja Pedagogiczna (Pedagogical Commission), and the teachers' congresses that were held between 1916 and 1918. In addition, this was possible thanks to the work of academic experts, including Twardowski's students, for example Bogdan Nawroczyński³⁰ (a representative of the Pedagogical Commission) and Ludwik Jaxa-Bykowski³¹ (the director of the Komisja Planów i Podręczników Towarzystwa Nauczycieli Szkół Wyższych [Commission for Curriculum and Textbooks of the Society of High School Teachers]). Finally, the Provisional Council of State³² established the Departament Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego (Department of Religious Affairs and Public Education) in 1917.

Aside from the unification of the school system, the greatest challenges were illiteracy and access to a quality education for all children, particularly for those from working-class or rural families. There was therefore considerable discussion on the role and accessibility of high schools, which were generally private,

watnych szkół polskich w Warszawie u progu pierwszej wojny światowej, "Almanach" 1997, Vol. 1, pp. 145–166; see also, e.g., W. Sieciński, *Administracja i organizacja szkolnictwa...*, op. cit., p. 83.

²⁹ G. Michalski, *Czasopiśmiennictwo pedagogiczne organizacji nauczycielskich u progu Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, "Nauki o Wychowaniu. Studia Interdyscyplinarne" 2020, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 82–95.

³⁰ Bogdan Nawroczyński (1882–1874) was a historian of pedagogy, pedagogue, and co-creator of Polish scientific pedagogy, and Twardowski was his PhD supervisor. From 1926, he was a professor at the University of Warsaw, where he helped to organize pedagogical studies. During World War II, he participated in conspiracy teaching. After the war, he was forced into retirement, but from 1958, he was allowed to teach again, and he continued his work on comparative pedagogy. He is admired for the clarity and accuracy of his pedagogical thought.

³¹ Ludwik Jaxa-Bykowski (1881–1948) was a Polish professor, biologist, psychologist, pedagogue, and student of Twardowski, who was his PhD supervisor. He worked as a teacher at various gymnasiums. He was director of the Department of Science and Higher Education at the Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego (Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education) and the editor of the "Muzeum" magazine, as well as the first rector of the underground Polish University of the Western Lands during World War II.

³² It was established on 14 January 1917 by Prussia and Austria-Hungary.

as a gateway to university. High schools were elitist, accessible only to the rich, intellectual rather than practical, and focused on transmitting knowledge rather than upbringing. Memorization was the critical teaching method, and the curriculum was overloaded.

The main objectives of the Pedagogical Commission were the democratization of education and the creation of high-quality elementary schools. Moreover, education needed to be relevant to everyday life, with methods being applied that served students' individual work and engaged them. The overloaded curriculum also needed to be modernized and reduced in hours.

Finally, on 17 March 1921, the so-called March Constitution proclaimed free and obligatory school education (Articles 118 and 119). Nevertheless, it proved very challenging to comply with this proclamation. Before independence in Poland, only 16% of children attended school in the Russian partition, less than 40% in the Austrian partition, and around 81% in the Prussian partition, although this was mostly Germanized education.³³ Poland struggled with a lack of school buildings, overloaded multi-grade classes, and a lack of teachers during the entire interwar period. The initial period of independence was also a hectic time with rapidly changing governments, causing education to be neglected. Efforts focused on building primary schools, getting all children into school, and developing teachers' education. No general system reforms took place until 1932.

Between 20 January 1919 and December 1919, distinguished philosopher, logician, and former Twardowski student Jan Łukasiewicz was Minister of Religious Affairs and Public Education in Ignacy Paderewski's non-partisan and temporary government. There were rumours that Twardowski would be offered the position, but this did not transpire. Łukasiewicz introduced a decree of obligatory education for those aged seven to fourteen and teacher education through the creation of five-year teacher seminars.³⁴ He also managed to regulate salaries for teachers and establish rules for minority schools. Three new universities were also founded in Poznań and Vilnius, as well as the Szkoła Główna Gospodarstwa

³³ I. Kość, E. Magiera, *Polityka oświatowa wobec szkolnictwa powszechnego w okresie międzywojennym (1918–1939)*, in: *Polityka oświatowa w Polsce w XX wieku. Historyczne tradycje i współczesne odniesienia*, eds. I. Kość, E. Magiera, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, Szczecin 2008, pp. 29–30.

³⁴ The requirement was six years of primary school, with the programme being similar to high school and with added pedagogical subjects. However, these seminars did not give access to university. They were replaced by pedagogical high schools with the reform of 1932, allowing access to university.

Wiejskiego (University of Life Sciences) in Warsaw. Łukasiewicz promoted many clerks to become ministerial staff.

3.2. Educational Policy: Between National, Civic and State Upbringing

In the interwar period, two main aims for upbringing collided and intertwined in Polish education policy. One was dominant in the pre-World War I period when Poland was still partitioned. The pressures of cultural colonization fostered the idea of national upbringing, whereby the nation was perceived as the greatest social reality and good. The main idea was to promote patriotism and the unifying power of a nation that survived despite Poland not being a sovereign state. Education therefore sought to maintain awareness of Polish traditions and culture and resist the influence of the Germanic and Russian imperial cultures. It also deferred to the strong position of the Catholic Church and the idea of Catholicism as a source of national identity and destiny.

After 1918, when Poland regained its political, economic, and cultural independence, the national upbringing continued to dominate, although the Second Republic of Poland was multicultural. This was supported by a political movement called Endecja (National Democracy) and the famous politician Roman Dmowski. Ideas of national upbringing were represented in the LWS by figures like Irena Pannenkowa.³⁵

In 1919, an initial attempt was made to reform high school in order to make it less about teaching and more about upbringing, with this being more achievable with fewer hours. The aim was to fulfil the objectives of the national education policy. However, high school ultimately remained elitist and intellectualist.

At the beginning of the interwar period, when Endecja was governing, there was no time for significant changes in the wider structure of the school system. The first reform in 1919 began with a programme for high schools aimed at “nationalizing high school.” In other words, it sought to connect high schools more with the contemporary situation of Poland, because the teaching was considered too universally applicable, so it needed to change its character to one of Polish up-

³⁵ Irena Pannenkowa (1879–1969) was born in Warsaw and educated in Warsaw and Lvov. She was a philosopher (she earned her doctorate under Twardowski), teacher, journalist, and an independence, social and educational activist. See I. Pannenkowa, *Myśli o wychowaniu narodem*, nakł. Polskiego Towarzystwa Pedagogicznego, Lwów 1918, URL: <http://pbc.up.krakow.pl/dlibra/publication/5396/edition/5287>; I. Pannenkowa, W.A. Szyjkowski, *Nowe myśli o wychowaniu. Reforma szkolna*, Drukarnia W.A. Szyjkowskiego, Warszawa 1925.

bringing.³⁶ It was to be modernized following the New Education movement's³⁷ ideas by rejecting verbalism and any kind of encyclopaedic learning. However, little progress was made in changing its elitist character, being separated from the rest of the school system, which was already in transition to egalitarianism. The only measurable change was in dividing the eight-year gymnasium into a three-year lower gymnasium (preparatory) and a five-year higher gymnasium, but access for underprivileged children was not improved.

A further step was taken by a subsequent government to emphasize the "national upbringing" role of high school more strongly. A new subject was therefore introduced called "Learning about Contemporary Poland" in order to teach the practical aspects of being a citizen. Some other subjects were also granted priority, such as geography, history, and the Polish language.³⁸ The position of philosophical propaedeutics, which focused on psychology and logic,³⁹ seemed less essential in this sense, because it was not clear how it could contribute to fulfilling the desired goals.

A more precise vision of education began to be formulated between 1923 and 1925, with it shifting more towards civic education with solid elements of national and religious values. Student councils were encouraged and considered to be an initial attempt at social and political life.⁴⁰ However, Stanisław Grabski, Minister of Religious Affairs and Public Education, proposed a new law that rejected the modernist vision of education in high school and sought to sustain its elitist and intellectual profile to prevent the "overproduction of intelligentsia (*nadprodukcja inteligencji*)."⁴¹ He faced severe criticism for discriminating against the children of the working class and farmers, and his bill was ultimately rejected.⁴¹

³⁶ MWRiOP, *Program naukowy szkoły średniej*, Warszawa 1919.

³⁷ The New Education movement was influenced by, among others, John Dewey, and was the European counterpart to progressive education. It distinguished itself from the traditional curricula of the 19th century focused on the preparation for the early-industrial university. Students should learn "by doing," while the teacher should rather facilitate the learning process, focusing on the students' interests. Additionally, it aimed to contribute to building a better society. After World War I, a new social order appeared, not so much differentiated by social class, and the movement was a response to that.

³⁸ W. Leżańska, *Edukacja obywatelska w szkołach średnich ogólnokształcących w Polsce międzywojennej*, "Przegląd Historyczno-Oświatowy" 2019, Nos. 1–2, pp. 204–223.

³⁹ MWRiOP, *Program naukowy szkoły średniej*, op. cit., p. 83.

⁴⁰ Among others, Ludwik Jaxa-Bykowski, Józef Mirski and Aleksander Patkowski wrote about school councils. Cf., e.g., L. Jaxa-Bykowski, *Zagadnienie naszej polityki szkolnej*, "Muzeum. Czasopismo Towarzystwa Nauczycieli Szkół Wyższych" 1926, No. 1, pp. 3–42.

⁴¹ I. Kość, E. Magiera, *Polityka oświatowa...*, op. cit., pp. 39–40.

Another idea came into force after the May 1926 *coup d'état* organized by first Marshal of Poland Józef Piłsudski, and it was promoted by the Sanacja (the Sanation movement, where the name derived from the Latin *sanatio*, meaning healing). The main task was to heal Polish politics and the economy. One way to achieve this was the state upbringing model, albeit with it being more civic-oriented. The argument behind this was that independent Poland comprised 30% national and religious minorities. Thus, while the national upbringing model had fulfilled its role in unifying Poles before independence, it did not suit the contemporary situation of a state that was not exclusively populated by Catholic Poles. Indeed, what worked before the war in serving the nation's unification under the partitions was outdated in the new reality. The new model was also closer to trends of a modern vision of the state that focused on well-educated, rational citizens who were aware of their rights and religious freedoms and could facilitate the cultural and economic growth of the neutral state. Nevertheless, these citizens needed to also be loyal to the state, with the state being the overriding priority.⁴² The most significant theoreticians of state education were Sławomir Czerwiński, who synthesized the romantic ideal of a warrior with the positivist ideal of the employee/worker, and later Janusz Jędrzejewicz, with both men becoming Ministers of Education. Nevertheless, the students of Twardowski, Nawroczyński and Kazimierz Sośnicki,⁴³ also significantly enriched the discussion.⁴⁴ Interestingly, the model also aimed to educate the elite to excel in intellectual and moral aspects, engage in social life, be loyal to the state, and become hard-working employees. This was the role of high school, with the vision being to create a citizen warrior-employee. This model paid off during World War II, with there being plenty of patriotic engagement, determination, and devotion among the Polish people to fight for their country. It was criticized, however,

⁴² Cf. W. Jamrożek, *The Educational Practice and Thought of the Second Polish Republic on the 90th Anniversary of Regaining Independence*, "Biuletyn Historii Wychowania" 2019, No. 38, pp. 301–307.

⁴³ Kazimierz Sośnicki (1883–1976) studied philosophy (with Twardowski as his PhD supervisor), pedagogy, and mathematical and natural sciences in Lvov and later in Paris, Berlin, Leipzig, Vienna and Zurich. Between 1929 and 1939, he lectured general didactics and pedagogy at the University of Lvov. He later worked at the universities in Toruń and Gdańsk. See K. Sośnicki, *Podstawy wychowania państwowego*, Książnica – Atlas, Lwów 1933.

⁴⁴ S. Sztobryn, *Badania z zakresu historii filozofii wychowania w twórczości Bogdana Nawroczyńskiego i Kazimierza Sośnickiego. Prekursorzy współczesnej historiografii myśli pedagogicznej*, "Przegląd Pedagogiczny" 2014, No. 1, pp. 122–130.

especially by the Catholic Church,⁴⁵ for leading to secularization and an upbringing that was controlled by the ideals of one party, because worshipping the state meant worshipping the Sanacja leader, Marshal Piłsudski.

There were two ideal types of state upbringing, however – positive and irrational. Representatives of the positive, like Sośnicki, demanded a rational reflection on the concept of the state. Their sociological vision of the state included a social structure, where citizens are actively creating and working for the state's good. The second type, meanwhile, aimed for fanaticism, mysticism, and fetishism with regards to the state.⁴⁶ This was one of the main objections against Sanacja's direction.

Following the May 1926 *coup d'état*, Sanacja was busy with the transfer of power, so educational issues were again postponed, this time until 1929. Teachers awaited the promised school system reforms and an improvement in their status. Sanacja introduced a new concept of upbringing that was not so different from Endecja, with the model shifting from a civic-national upbringing to a state-civic upbringing. Loyalty to the state and its leaders, especially Piłsudski, became the priority, but civic values were also emphasized, such as hard work, responsibility, respect for work, and the sacrifice of personal goals for the common good. Intellectual education was not crucial, but character formation was. High school was therefore supposed to prepare the elite leaders of the future to take responsibility for the country. Interestingly, there was no need to significantly change the system or its programmes. All that was needed was for the cult of Piłsudski and state-centred pedagogy, as well as the abovementioned values, to be introduced. Thus, the revised programmes were published in 1930 and 1931.

The school was to become a place of civic upbringing, with students coming to love the country, becoming willing to sacrifice for it, and working hard for its prosperity. This was essential because it was not yet 20 years since the regaining of independence and Europe was becoming unstable in the run up to World War II.

⁴⁵ Cf. J. Szczepaniak, *Spór pomiędzy Kościołem a państwem o katolicki charakter szkoły polskiej (1926–1939)*, "Rocznik Filozoficzny Ignatianum" 2019, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 115–133; J. Szczepaniak, *Próba podporządkowania władzom oświatowym nauczania i wychowania religijnego w szkole (1926–1937)*, "Rocznik Filozoficzny Ignatianum" 2020, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 283–309.

⁴⁶ E. Magiera, *Wychowanie państwowe w szkolnictwie powszechnym Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, Szczecin 2003, pp. 24–26.

On 11 March 1932, Jędrzejewicz's reform was introduced, bringing fundamental changes to the system, programme and methods, and upbringing aims. The basis of the new system was a seven-grade primary school with a systematic programme that enabled talented pupils to continue their education in a four-year gymnasium that in turn facilitated entry, after exams, to a two-year high school. On the one hand, this supposedly made high school more accessible, but in practice, it remained elitist. The new programmes were intended to strictly fulfil the new aims of upbringing, with school being relatable to the reality of everyday life.⁴⁷ The role of student councils was emphasized, and the discussion of key issues in students' lives was one of their particular aims.

Interestingly, before the war, Twardowski was a promoter of a national school that nurtured Polish values; he taught Polish culture, language, and history, and protected his students from Germanization by removing the German language from primary school and reducing the German literature in high school. In addition, schools were to provide a high level of education, reducing illiteracy and offering higher salaries for teachers. Schools should also nurture "rozumny patriotyzm polski" (rational Polish patriotism), for example, by celebrating national holidays, supporting Polish products, and promoting unity among Poles. Twardowski also understood that some national weaknesses should be addressed, such as a lack of conscientiousness and discipline. Acquiring independence required the "collective work of the society," so teaching conscientiousness and discipline was an ethical, pedagogical and national duty: "Poland is a great thing, and one of the greatest pieces of this great thing – is Polish school."⁴⁸

In the 1930s, Twardowski was tasked with creating a programme of philosophical propaedeutics, which would fulfil the aims of Jędrzejewicz's reform. It must have been difficult for him to align the programme with the political requirements. Twardowski did not support the Sanacja government and strongly criticized the reform, especially the part related to university. This is evident in his "testament" text, which was placed in his coffin when he was buried, *The Majesty of the University*.⁴⁹ He defended the university's independence from the cur-

⁴⁷ Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 1932 r. o ustroju szkolnictwa, URL: <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=wdu19320380389>.

⁴⁸ K. Twardowski, *Przemówienie podczas wiecu rodzicielskiego w sprawie unarodowienia szkoły (1905)*, in: *Mysł, mowa i czyn*, Vol. 2, eds. A. Brożek, J.J. Jadacki, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2014, p. 393.

⁴⁹ K. Twardowski, *The Majesty of the University*, in: *The Idea of the University*, eds. L. Nowak, J. Brzeziński, trans. O. Wojtasiewicz, Rodopi, Amsterdam 1997, pp. 9–17.

rent political fights and state influence on scientific investigation. On the other hand, Twardowski aligned with some values promoted by Sanacja in the public education programmes, but he had a particular understanding of these issues. He believed that universities should raise students in the spirit of searching for objective truth, above all differences and in cooperation for the good of society; however: “This is not to say that the university shapes the souls of those young people in a given social or political way or develops in them a certain inclination or certain approach to their practical life goals.”⁵⁰

4. Visions of Philosophical Propaedeutics in the Second Republic of Poland (1918–1939)

Many concurrent visions of philosophical propaedeutics existed in Poland in the interwar period. Other than for Twardowski, it was not evident that psychology and logic should be the only means to teach philosophy in school, so this view had to compete with many others. One of the most comprehensive summaries was prepared by a Jewish philosopher engaged in the subject, Ignacy Halpern (later Myślicki),⁵¹ in 1919. The first division in attitudes towards teaching philosophy was whether it should be taught as part of other school subjects or as a separate subject. The first option seemed one-sided, with it being supported by humanists and language and science teachers, while the second option positioned philosophy as “unifying, complementary and crowning teaching.” Nevertheless, this option also had seven variants: theological, systematic, problem-oriented (*zagadnieniowy*), historical, encyclopaedic, logical/logic-based, psychological/psychology-based, and mixed (Halpern’s vision).⁵²

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 12.

⁵¹ Ignacy Halpern-Myślicki (1874–1935) was a historian of philosophy, translator and researcher of the works of Baruch Spinoza, a pedagogue. He received his PhD under Wilhelm Dilthey and studied in Lipsk and Berlin. He lectured at Wolna Wszechnica Polska (the Free Polish University) in Warsaw. He was also a member of the Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne (the Polish Philosophical Society) since its inception. After World War I, he changed his surname to Myślicki.

⁵² I. Halpern, *O propedeutyce filozofii w szkole średniej*, “Przegląd Filozoficzny” 1919, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 223–250. More on this will be presented in our next paper, *Philosophy for Modernizing and Strengthening Society: Kazimierz Twardowski’s Contribution to the Discussions about Propaedeutics of Philosophy in Poland* (forthcoming in “Edukacja Filozoficzna”).

The discussion among Polish scholars developed from 1900 over three phases, namely, before independence in the Austrian partition of Galicia, after regaining independence in 1919–1920, and from 1926 until the Jędrzejewicz reform.⁵³ The first phase was centred on a questionnaire that was sent to teachers and later published.⁵⁴ It was followed by Jagiellonian University Professor Maurycy Straszewski's analysis of the state of propaedeutics in Galicia and by Twardowski's recommendations. In 1919, Kazimierz Sośnicki proposed different programmes for various school types – namely humanistic, mathematical-natural sciences and philological (classical) – due to the different types of thinking involved.

The most heated discussion, however, was that of the mid-1920s to 1930s, which was initiated by Stanisław Ossowski⁵⁵ of the Warsaw branch of the LWS. Bohdan Zawadzki,⁵⁶ Regina Rajchman-Ettingerowa,⁵⁷ Bolesław Gawecki,⁵⁸ Helena

⁵³ Cf. R. Jadczał, *Z dyskusji nad propedeutyką filozofii...*, op. cit.; J.J. Jadacki, *Jakiej filozofii uczniowie potrzebują*, op. cit.

⁵⁴ *Ankieta w sprawie nauczania propedeutyki filozoficznej w gimnazjach*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1903, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 241–244.

⁵⁵ S. Ossowski, *Propedeutyka filozofii w szkole średniej*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1926, Vol. 29, pp. 230–234.

⁵⁶ B. Zawadzki, *Propedeutyka filozofii w szkole średniej*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1927, Vol. 30, pp. 207–211. Bohdan Zawadzki (1902–1966) was a psychologist and a student and collaborator of Władysław Witwicki (PhD supervisor), as well as a professor at the University of Vilnius. After its closure, he moved to the USA and worked among others at the City College of New York.

⁵⁷ R. Rajchman-Ettingerowa, *Propedeutyka filozofii w szkole średniej*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1930, Vol. 33, pp. 131–135. Regina Rajchman-Ettingerowa (1879–1931) was a Polish philosopher and translator. She studied in Berlin, Bern and Zurich. Her philosophy was described like this: "[She] represents critical realism and monistic parallelism, which is complemented by historical materialism in the field of social phenomena." F. Ueberweg et al., *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie. 5: Die Philosophie des Auslandes vom Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts bis auf die Gegenwart*, Mittler, Berlin 1928, p. 325. Unless stated otherwise, all translations are our own.

⁵⁸ B. Gawecki, *W sprawie propedeutyki filozofii*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1930, Vol. 33, Nos. 1–2, pp. 135–139. Bolesław Gawecki (1930–1933) was a Polish philosopher. He studied mathematics, physics and philosophy at the University of Munich and the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. He worked as a gymnasium teacher and at the underground Polish University of the Western Lands during World War II. He was interested in the philosophy of nature. In 1930, Gawecki became the Instructor of Propaedeutics of Philosophy at the Ministry of Education and made organizational changes. He supposedly prepared the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education (MWRiOP) publication *Poradnik w sprawach nauczania i wychowania oraz administracji w szkołach ogólnokształcących*, Książnica – Atlas, Warszawa 1934.

Leleszówna,⁵⁹ and Bohdan Kieszkowski⁶⁰ also contributed to the debate.⁶¹ Unlike previous discussions, this one focused on criticizing the existing programme, which, as we will see in the following section, turned out to be authored by Twardowski.

Kazimierz Twardowski participated in the discussion about the reform of philosophical propaedeutics from the beginning of his academic career in Lvov.⁶² As Igel remarked,⁶³ Twardowski published a few texts about teaching propaedeutics of philosophy. The most extended of these was *Filozofia w szkole średniej* [Philosophy in High School],⁶⁴ in which he complained about underestimating the role of philosophical propaedeutics as “one of the most significant subjects in the high school curriculum.” The text does not refer to practical issues (like number of hours, programme) but is rather “apologetic.” Other than claiming that it prepares students to “think independently and rigorously,” the most inspiring presentation of Twardowski’s emotional attitude to the problem was reflected in the following argument: “Contact of the youth with the propaedeutics of philosophy has a similar meaning in their cognitive development as the emergence of philosophy had in human history for the cognitive development of the whole of

⁵⁹ H. Lelesz, *Cel nauczania propedeutyki filozofii w szkołach średnich*, “Przegląd Filozoficzny” 1931, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 51–52. Helena Lelesz (Leleszówna) (1893–1972) was a Polish philosopher, psychologist, and teacher of French and philosophy. She studied philosophy in Paris (as André Lalande’s student) and published there her dissertation *La conception de la vérité* (1921). She then returned to Poland (Warsaw). Lelesz was involved in child psychology, e.g., she conducted a survey among schoolgirls about the professional characteristics of teachers. She published a textbook for teaching propaedeutics of philosophy: *Podręcznik propedeutyki filozofii dla klasy drugiej liceów ogólnokształcących*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Książek Szkolnych, Lwów 1938.

⁶⁰ B. Kieszkowski, *Zagadnienie programu propedeutyki filozofii*, “Przegląd Filozoficzny” 1931, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 53–60. Bohdan Kieszkowski (1904–1997) was a historian of philosophy and a student and later assistant to Prof. Władysław Tatarkiewicz in Warsaw.

⁶¹ This discussion and the text *Filozofia w szkole średniej* [Philosophy in High School] have been described in our forthcoming article in “Edukacja Filozoficzna”, *Philosophy for Modernizing and Strengthening Society: Kazimierz Twardowski’s Contribution to the Discussions about Propaedeutics of Philosophy in Poland*.

⁶² It should be noted here that Twardowski was actively involved in the reform of Galician education, especially during his presidency of the Society of High School Teachers. See E. Grądzka, *Kazimierz Twardowski’s Philosophy of Education: Attempting a Reconstruction*, “Logos i Ethos” 2020, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 7–39.

⁶³ S. Igel, *Dydaktyka propedeutyki filozofii*, op. cit., p. 5.

⁶⁴ K. Twardowski, *Filozofia w szkole średniej*, “Ruch Filozoficzny” 1919, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 1–6; English translation: K. Twardowski, *Philosophy in High School*, trans. E. Grądzka, “Edukacja Filozoficzna”, forthcoming.

humanity: it is a moment of emergence of scientific self-awareness; it is a moment of turning from the sensual world that had attracted the investigative thought until then towards one's spirit and how it works and creates. This turn is being prepared before but becomes fully aware and systematic here."⁶⁵

5. Contributions of Twardowski and His Students to Works on the Philosophical Propaedeutics Programme during the Interwar Period

The history of the development of philosophical propaedeutics in independent Poland should begin several years before the full restoration of independence in November 1918. As a result of World War I, starting in 1915, a part of the Polish lands from the Russian partition gradually gained limited independence under the control of the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary). At that time, an important question arose concerning the introduction of a new Polish education system in the region. In the programme for Królestwo Polskie (the name of the former Russian partition core) published in 1917, we can find information about 13 school subjects. Among them was "Psychology and Logic," with two hours for a four-year high school.⁶⁶ Interestingly, the subject was not called "Propaedeutics of Philosophy." Nevertheless, the programme for independent Poland was called "Propaedeutics of Philosophy," with three hours being dedicated to the subject.

In mid-August 1920, following a year of discussions about the number of hours, themes, and criticism connected with the programme proposed by the Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego (MWRiOP, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education), the Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne (PTF, Polish Philosophical Society) put forward its own programme of philosophical propaedeutics to MWRiOP but it only concerned psychology. This proposal was later published in the journal "Muzeum. Czasopismo Towarzystwa Nauczycieli Szkół Wyższych" [Museum: Journal of the Society of High School Teachers] as *Program nauczania psychologii w szkole średniej* [Programme

⁶⁵ K. Twardowski, *Filozofia w szkole średniej*, op. cit.

⁶⁶ F.W. Araszkiewicz, *Szkola średnia ogólnokształcąca...*, op. cit., p. 178.

of Teaching Psychology in High School].⁶⁷ According to the content of the article, a detailed programme was prepared based on Twardowski's presentation. This paper was followed by a publication by Ludwik Jaxa-Bykowski, a student of Twardowski, titled *Szkic programu ćwiczeń praktycznych z psychologii w gimnazjum* [Draft Programme of Practical Exercises in Psychology in Gymnasium].⁶⁸

On the other hand, in Twardowski's archive at the Kazimierz Twardowski Library,⁶⁹ we can find a draft programme of psychology (from 1921)⁷⁰ and logic (from 1922).⁷¹ It is possible that these served as the foundation for the PTF programme, although a comparison reveals some significant differences. Moreover, it seems that Twardowski's programme, rather than the PTF's programme, eventually became canonical. We have conducted a detailed comparison of Twardowski's programmes from 1921 and 1922 and the one officially published by the MWRiOP: *Program gimnazjum państwowego. Wydział Humanistyczny. Prope-deutika filozofii* [Programme for Public Gymnasium: Humanities. Propaedeutics of Philosophy]⁷² from 1922 (1st ed.),⁷³ 1924 (2nd ed.),⁷⁴ 1926 (3rd ed.),⁷⁵ 1928 (4th ed.)⁷⁶

⁶⁷ Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, *Program nauczania psychologii w szkole średniej*, "Muzeum. Czasopismo Towarzystwa Nauczycieli Szkół Wyższych" 1921, Vol. 36, Nos. 1–2, pp. 28–33.

⁶⁸ L. Bykowski, *Szkic programu ćwiczeń praktycznych z psychologii w gimnazjum*, "Muzeum. Czasopismo Towarzystwa Nauczycieli Szkół Wyższych" 1921, Vol. 36, Nos. 1–2, pp. 34–51.

⁶⁹ URL: <https://polaczonebiblioteki.uw.edu.pl/index.php/en/main-page-2/library/>.

⁷⁰ Published as: K. Twardowski, *Projekt programu psychologii dla szkół średnich* (1921), in: *Dydaktyka*, ed. A. Brożek, Wydawnictwo Academicon, Lublin 2023, pp. 243–250.

⁷¹ Published as: K. Twardowski, *Programy logiki gimnazjalnej* (1922), in: *Logika. Cz. 1*, ed. J.J. Jadacki, Wydawnictwo Academicon, Lublin 2023, pp. 35–47.

⁷² The officially published programme does not differ in content between editions except for the order of teaching logic and psychology (in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd eds. logic is first and psychology second, whereas in the 4th and 5th eds. psychology goes first and logic next).

⁷³ MWRiOP, *Program gimnazjum państwowego. Wydział humanistyczny*, Książnica Polska Tow. Naucz. Szkół Wyższych, Warszawa 1922, URL: <https://polona.pl/preview/c5737d15-2dae-4c03-849c-8fce2cd3d846>.

⁷⁴ MWRiOP, *Program gimnazjum państwowego. Wydział humanistyczny*, 2nd ed., Książnica Polska Tow. Naucz. Szkół Wyższych, Warszawa 1924, URL: <https://polona.pl/preview/377775b3-1e79-4e94-aabe-0c6a341af767>.

⁷⁵ MWRiOP, *Program gimnazjum państwowego. Wydział humanistyczny*, 3rd ed., "Książnica-Atlas" Tow. Naucz. Szkół Wyższych, Warszawa 1926, URL: <https://polona.pl/preview/43121dfb-d58c-443c-a18d-7895696ce2b5>.

⁷⁶ MWRiOP, *Program gimnazjum państwowego. Wydział humanistyczny*, 4th ed., "Książnica-Atlas" Tow. Naucz. Szkół Wyższych, Warszawa 1928, URL: <https://polona.pl/preview/339bd34f-a07a-4d44-b7ab-54404d920d74>.

and 1931 (5th ed.).⁷⁷ As a result, we discovered that the MWRiOP programme almost entirely replicates Twardowski's proposals from 1921 and 1922. The subject was allocated three hours⁷⁸ – which Twardowski and the PTF considered insufficient for conducting experiments and exercises, and so the PTF restricted the programme to just psychology and logic – in the eighth grade of gymnasium.⁷⁹

The comparison shows that it was Twardowski's vision (significantly inspired by his Austrian experience and Brentano's philosophy, which will be discussed further on) that dominated propaedeutics teaching in interwar Poland until at least 1931. Consequently, the significant debate that took place between 1926 and 1931 on the inadequateness of the programme to contemporary expectations, which was mentioned above, referred to Twardowski's ideas.

In 1923, the first Polish Philosophical Congress was held in Lvov. One of its postulates was the significant extension of the programme of propaedeutics of philosophy, advocating for more hours to be dedicated to it. Additionally, it was emphasized that there was a "a burning need for textbooks" for propaedeutics as well as methodological guidelines for teachers.⁸⁰

After the congress, the PTF together with the Warsaw Philosophical Institute, the Philosophical Commission of the Poznań Society of Friends of Science, the Polish Philosophical Society in Warsaw and the Philosophical Society in Kraków⁸¹ sent a memorial to the MWRiOP, requesting more hours for propaedeutics of philosophy as well as competitions for propaedeutics teachers' positions and training courses for propaedeutics teachers to upgrade their qualifications.⁸²

⁷⁷ MWRiOP, *Program gimnazjum państwowego. Wydział humanistyczny*, 5th ed., Państwowe Wydawnictwo Książek Szkolnych, Lwów 1931, URL: <https://polona.pl/preview/ec7a2a56-f53e-413c-9b00-ed3b240c9ee2>.

⁷⁸ F.W. Araszkiewicz, *Szkola średnia ogólnokształcąca...*, op. cit., p. 226.

⁷⁹ The system was as follows: seven years of obligatory primary school were followed by an optional eight-year gymnasium divided into a three-year lower high school and a five-year higher high school that concluded with a final "matura" exam that enabled access to university without further exams. If a student wanted to continue education in the gymnasium, it was already possible after finishing the fifth grade of primary school and passing the entrance exams.

⁸⁰ *Księga pamiątkowa Pierwszego Polskiego Zjazdu Filozoficznego*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1927, Vol. 30, p. 360.

⁸¹ Warszawski Instytut Filozoficzny, Komisja Filozoficzna Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne w Warszawie and Towarzystwo Filozoficzne w Krakowie; see G. Głuchowski, *Propedeutyka filozofii w czasach II Rzeczypospolitej*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1988, Vol. 45, No. 3, p. 242.

⁸² *W sprawie propedeutyki filozoficznej w szkole średniej*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1924, Vol. 8, p. 157.

The MWRiOP replied that it would take into consideration the increase in the number of hours, and would organize competitions together with competitions for other subjects and would prepare training courses for unskilled propaedeutics teachers.⁸³

In 1930, the MWRiOP established a new post of Instructor of Propaedeutics of Philosophy and entrusted it to Bolesław Gawecki, a philosopher from Kraków. He soon decided to organize a conference in Lvov, inviting teachers and professors of philosophy.⁸⁴ Gawecki presented his goals, which included organizing teachers' training (six days long) and methodological conferences (one to two days long) with open lessons, exercises, and lectures by specialists in methodology and contemporary scientific achievements. The second goal was to publish a guide for teachers, *Poradnik w sprawach nauczania i wychowania oraz administracji w szkołach ogólnokształcących* [Guide to Teaching, Upbringing and Administration in High Schools].⁸⁵ Interestingly, contrary to the discussion that was mentioned above, the guide aimed to justify the programme and its goals in their present form. It focused more on providing instructions on how to apply the programme, listing books and textbooks, and suggesting psychology exercises, which will be explained more thoroughly later on. Additionally, plans were made to establish a psychologist position at school, launch a new journal, and create an association for propaedeutics teachers.

Gawecki also limited the discussion at the conference to four main aspects, namely, the number of hours, the order of teaching psychology and logic, the unification/diversification of the programme for all types of schools, and the type of digressions into other disciplines of philosophy. The meeting was led by Twardowski, but Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz⁸⁶ was the keynote speaker who began

⁸³ Cf. R. Jadczyk, *Z dyskusji nad propedeutyką filozofii...*, op. cit.; *W sprawie nauczania propedeutyki*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1925, Vol. 9, p. 27.

⁸⁴ *W sprawie nauczania propedeutyki*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1930, Vol. 12, pp. 269–270.

⁸⁵ MWRiOP, *Poradnik w sprawach nauczania...*, op. cit.

⁸⁶ Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890–1963) was one of the closest students of Twardowski and privately his son-in-law. In 1921, Ajdukiewicz was nominated as vice-director of the Pedagogical Institute in Lvov and worked to establish Studium Pedagogiczne (Teachers' College), like at Jagiellonian or Warsaw University, and prepared its teaching programme. He was supposed to take the position of director at the Studium. He was also a teacher at the III Public Gymnasium in Lvov until 1925. He was, among others, head of the 2nd Chair of Philosophy at Warsaw University (1925–1928), later head of the Chair of Logic at Lvov University (1928–1939), and finally head of the 2nd Chair of Logic (1957–1961) at Warsaw University. During World War II, he lectured at the secret academic teaching centre of Lvov University. Between 1948 and 1952, he was rec-

the discussion. He was critical of the old programme and expressed a need for change, especially in the part relating to logic, since the methods of reasoning used there were not useful in everyday life, so semantics should be added and the part on definitions should be redeveloped. There was no mention of psychology. The digressions into other disciplines of philosophy could be dedicated to scepticism, idealism, criticism, realism, conventionalism, and rationalism.

Other speakers at the event included Leopold Blaustein,⁸⁷ Salomon Igel, Roman Ingarden,⁸⁸ J. Kardasz, Muller, Artur Rappaport, Roth, Świerczyński, and Miron Zarycki. However, there is no information available on their suggestions. Four resolutions were made: two hours in the seventh and two hours in the eighth grade of gymnasium should be dedicated to propaedeutics of philosophy; logic should be taught first and psychology second; the programme should be uniform for all types of gymnasium, although an extension of the programme could vary; and the digressions mentioned by Ajdukiewicz in the case of logic should be made. In addition, in the classical gymnasium, some history of ancient philosophy should be taught, and as part of psychology lessons, when the character is discussed, ethical issues should be included. When aesthetical feelings are mentioned, aesthetics should be discussed, and some aspects of social psychology. Concepts such as materialism, spiritualism, and so on should also be explained.

Jędrzejewicz's reform finally began in the 1930s. The MWRiOP efforts to reform the programmes went through two stages. First in 1930, when the school reform was still at a preparatory stage, two commissions on upbringing and didactics were set up to prepare guidelines for the creators of the future programmes

tor of the University of Adam Mickiewicz in Poznań. He received an honorary doctorate from Clermont-Ferrand University in 1962. He was the editor of "Studia Philosophica" (1934–1950) and "Studia Logica" (1954–1963) and a member of the editorial committee of "Erkenntnis" and "Logique et Analyse."

⁸⁷ Leopold Blaustein (1905–1942/1944) was a Polish philosopher, phenomenologist, aesthetician and psychologist, as well as a student of Twardowski and an expert and critic of Edmund Husserl's philosophy. He wrote, among others, about children's laziness, the youth's self-esteem and discipline in modern upbringing.

⁸⁸ Roman Ingarden (1893–1970) was a Polish philosopher and student of Twardowski, but he did not belong to the LWS. Edmund Husserl was his PhD supervisor. He studied philosophy and mathematics in Lvov and Göttingen. During the interwar period, he was a gymnasium teacher in Lublin, Warsaw and Toruń. From 1933, he was a professor at the University of Lvov. During the war, he participated in secret teaching and worked on his main work entitled *Controversy over the Existence of the World*. After World War II, he was a professor at universities in Toruń and Kraków.

for primary school. Interestingly, the first part provided information about children's cognitive development,⁸⁹ but there were no guidelines for high schools. Polish philosophers therefore acted on their own initiative and began preparing a programme of propaedeutics of philosophy without any guidelines.

In Twardowski's diary, in the entry for 15 September 1932, there is information about a meeting he called about Ajdukiewicz's initiative to discuss a programme of a future propaedeutics. Ajdukiewicz, Blaustein, Izydora Dąmbska,⁹⁰ Igel, Ingarden, Maria Jędrzejewska, Stanisław Kaczorowski, Maria Kokoszyńska and Sośnicki were present, but not Mieczysław Kreutz, who was away from Lvov at the time. Ajdukiewicz and Ingarden learned from Balicki⁹¹ that the critical problem was whether the programme should focus on logic and psychology with "philosophical digressions" or rather just a discussion based on philosophical text. It was decided that the first option was best, with only Sośnicki dissenting. Next, a commission was chosen to prepare a submission to the MWRiOP.⁹² On 27 September 1932, the diary entry read: "All were present – Ajdukiewicz, Igel, Ingarden,"⁹³ as well as Twardowski.

⁸⁹ MWRiOP, *Wytyczne dla autorów programów szkół ogólnokształcących. Szkoła powszechna. Gimnazjum*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Książek Szkolnych, Lwów 1933, pp. 7–39.

⁹⁰ Izydora Dąmbska (1904–1983) was a Polish philosopher, logician, translator and epistemologist, as well as a student of Twardowski (her PhD supervisor) and later his close collaborator. She taught in high schools in Lvov. After Twardowski's death, together with Daniela Gromska, she took over the journal "Ruch Filozoficzny." She also visited, among other places, Vienna, where she established contact with the Vienna Circle, especially Moritz Schlick. In 1936, she participated in the 2nd International Congress for the Unity of Science, which was organized by the Vienna Circle in Copenhagen. She worked voluntarily as a nurse in a war hospital and later organized underground teaching in Lvov. After World War II, she was forced to leave Lvov and move to Gdańsk, where she worked in a library. Like many other LWS members, she was denied access to teaching and publishing. Finally, in 1956, she was offered a chair at the Jagiellonian University. She gathered many students and travelled abroad to conferences, but since she rejected Marxism, she was again barred from teaching. However, in 1964, at the request of her students, she created a *privatissimum*, reviving the Austrian tradition of private seminars. Her name was censored, but Pope John Paul II was among those of her students who remembered her "love of truth." Zbigniew Herbert, a significant Polish poet, dedicated a poem to her called *Potęga smaku* [The Power of Taste].

⁹¹ Twardowski probably had in mind Juliusz Balicki, who was head of the programme department at the MWRiOP. Cf. W. Jamrożek, *Kongresy i zjazdy pedagogiczne w rozwoju polskiej myśli i praktyki edukacyjnej (do 1939 roku)*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań 2015, p. 17.

⁹² K. Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Cz. 2: 1928–1936*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2001, p. 241.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

Many, especially Sanacja supporters, believed there was a need for urgent reform, as it was mentioned above. The programme, as we propose, prepared by Twardowski, was considered overloaded, disconnected from real-life issues, lacking in civic education problems, unfavourable to active teaching methods, devoid of leading ideas, influenced by partitions, ignorant of modern findings in psychology, and lacking in integration of the material. Additionally, the programme should help to secularize society, find one's worldview, and support a state-based upbringing.

The programme was criticized by many because there were many visions of propaedeutics teaching, as presented in the discussion above. A response to the programme's criticism can be found in the *Poradnik...*⁹⁴ from 1934, also mentioned above. The first part tries to explain the role of philosophical propaedeutics in high school and counter the scepticism as to whether it can "contribute to expanding the student's mental horizon, bring him closer to understanding life and understanding human relationships, training him in correct reasoning, teaching him healthy criticism."⁹⁵ Nevertheless, this scepticism led to underestimating and negating the subject, resulting in reduced hours. However, a "properly understood and well taught" (*dobrze nauczana*) propaedeutics could and should play a crucial role in teaching and upbringing, but the problem was a lack of well-prepared teachers. Although psychology and logic served as the basis, teachers needed to refer to philosophical elements in other school subjects, with this being a starting point for other philosophical issues that were related to the interests of pupils. "The entire course of teaching is intended to develop students' ability to think factually, clearly, precisely and critically, and to appropriately express their thoughts in words and writing."⁹⁶ The aim was to achieve a philosophical synthesis of the material taught in high school. This should be a critique of concepts, scientific assumptions and synthesis (i.e., general view) of the results of science, thus helping to form a view about the world and humans' role in it. Nevertheless, teachers were not to provide a ready-made worldview but rather prepare students for a "critical analysis of possible views" in order to make mature choices. This would help provide the state with enlightened, educated and valuable citizens.⁹⁷ The most appropriate method involved lectures and *heuresis* rather than just asking guiding questions in a seminary-style discussion. This ap-

⁹⁴ MWRiOP, *Poradnik w sprawach nauczania...*, op. cit.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 3.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 4.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 7.

proach ensured nothing was imposed from above. Instead, it stemmed from the students' interests, did not provide dogmatic solutions, encouraged independent thinking under the guidance of the teacher, and so on. However, "Under no circumstances should we allow pseudo-philosophical, superficial and chaotic sophistry at school."⁹⁸ Psychology must be life-related, and introspection should be a source of knowledge. The argumentation provided closely mirrored the expectations of the state-upbringing programme. It seems that the author intended to explain the old programme in light of new political circumstances while avoiding major changes. Remember, this was still a programme similar to Twardowski's from 1921 and 1922. However, it seems that the *Poradnik*... did not play its role in saving the programme from reform, and work on a new programme started. Although Jędrzejewicz's reform began in 1932, the *Poradnik*... was published in 1934, whereas Twardowski's new programme was prepared only in 1935. The *Poradnik*... likely provides clues as to why there was such a long gap between the 5th edition of the programme (1931), the beginning of the reform, and the work on a new programme. It seems that there were intentions to keep it unchanged.

On 18 September 1934, Twardowski met with Prof. Konstanty Chyliński, the Undersecretary of State for the MWRiOP, who asked him to prepare a propaedeutics programme. Twardowski responded that the PTF had already been working on one but had stopped due to a lack of guidelines from the MWRiOP. Nevertheless, he promised to resume the endeavour. Twardowski deduced that Chyliński favoured the "systematic teaching of propaedeutics and not limiting it only to reading philosophical text and having a philosophical talk."⁹⁹

In "Ruch Filozoficzny," a report was published stating that in January 1935 the PTF had sent to the MWRiOP a document titled *Memorial of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov on the Guidelines of the Curriculum of Propaedeutics of Philosophy in High Schools (Manuscript by Kazimierz Twardowski)*¹⁰⁰ along with a draft for a programme of philosophical propaedeutics. The *Memorial*... and the programme from 1935¹⁰¹ can also be found in Twardowski's archive. The

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 11.

⁹⁹ K. Twardowski, *Dzienniki*, op. cit., p. 362.

¹⁰⁰ K. Twardowski, *Memorial of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov on the Guidelines of the Curriculum of Propaedeutics of Philosophy in High Schools (Manuscript by Kazimierz Twardowski)*, ed. R. Jadcak, trans. E. Grądzka, "Edukacja Filozoficzna" 2025, Vol. 77, pp. 249–254.

¹⁰¹ K. Twardowski, *Szkic programu nauczania propedeutyki filozofii w liceach ogólnokształcących*, 1935, AKT T-16-56, Biblioteka im. Kazimierza Twardowskiego w Warszawie, URL: <https://archiwum.poznan.biblioteki.uw.edu.pl/akt/dokumenty/projekty/skic-programu-nauczania-propedeutyki-filozofii/>.

MWRiOP confirmed that it would use the documents in its work but did not allocate the necessary hours to implement the programme. It required three hours in both high school grades, but the Ministry offered only two hours in the last grade. Consequently, the PTF sent another memorial in September 1935 to emphasize the need for increased hours. As a result, the programme draft was accepted as “guidelines” for future programme authors, and the three hours, as previously established, were retained.¹⁰²

The 1935 draft programme of teaching propaedeutics of philosophy in high school, which can be found in Twardowski’s files in the archive (and which is published in translation in this issue),¹⁰³ was comprised of nine chapters and had two versions. Here we present the main sections/chapters/leading ideas.

- I. SUBJECTIVITY–OBJECTIVITY OF SENSORY COGNITION OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD (2nd version – SENSORY COGNITION OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD)
- II. RATIONAL COGNITION (2nd version – THINKING)
- III. THE QUESTION OF TRUTH (2nd version – THE QUESTION OF LOGIC)
- IV. THE QUESTION OF SCIENCE
- V. HUMANITIES (2nd version – SPIRITUAL WORLD AND NATURAL WORLD)
- VI. THE QUESTION OF HUMAN PERSONALITY (2nd version – HUMAN INDIVIDUAL)
- VII. SOCIETY
- VIII. THE QUESTION OF GOOD
- IX. THE QUESTION OF BEAUTY¹⁰⁴

Interestingly, after some critical political events in 1935 – such as the new April Constitution, the death of Piłsudski, the new compromised government, and so on – a change in pedagogy occurred. The focus shifted from state upbringing to national and moral-religious upbringing. The increasing threat from Nazi Germany also emphasized the need for a military upbringing.

¹⁰² *Sprawozdanie w sprawie programu nauczania propedeutyki filozofii*, “Ruch Filozoficzny” 1935, Vol. 13, Nos. 5–10, p. 166.

¹⁰³ K. Twardowski, *Draft of High School Curriculum for Teaching Propaedeutics of Philosophy*, trans. E. Grądzka, “Edukacja Filozoficzna” 2024, Vol. 77, pp. 243–248.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

However, already in 1930 Gawecki acknowledged that philosophical propaedeutics as a school subject dated back to the Austro-Hungarian period and had been adopted in independent Poland mostly unchanged. Nevertheless, it seems that this happened without any deep conviction from the school authorities responsible for curriculum decisions. Indeed, there was no belief that this subject could be an important component of secondary education and a crucial factor in the upbringing of young people.¹⁰⁵

In 1936, in a paper submitted in 1934 and published two years later, also Igel mentioned that the propaedeutics programme had not been reformed since the beginning of independence and was still based on the Austrian programme, which caused a lot of dissatisfaction: "However, there is general dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs and voices are increasingly heard demanding either more philosophy or a complete change of the current programme."¹⁰⁶

In Kazimierz Twardowski's archive,¹⁰⁷ there is a document sent by Chyliński on 16 January 1936 inviting Twardowski to prepare a propaedeutics programme based on the guidelines already drafted by a group of academic consultants. It is quite probable that this refers to the programme from 1935 and the *Memorial...* sent to the MWRiOP by the PTF. However, Twardowski was asked to prepare the programme not alone but with Ajdukiewicz and Kreutz.¹⁰⁸ Twardowski accepted the proposal, and although the deadline was 15 March 1936, there were delays. This suggests that until a new programme was published, the programme from 1922 was still in use, reflecting Twardowski's vision.

¹⁰⁵ B. Gawecki, *W sprawie propedeutyki filozofji...*, op. cit., p. 135.

¹⁰⁶ S. Igel, *Dydaktyka propedeutyki filozofii*, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁰⁷ Kazimierz Twardowski's Archive – AKT-K-02-1-25 k. 29 (letter from the MWRiOP to Twardowski) and AKT-K-02-1-25 k. 30 (answer from Twardowski to the MWRiOP)

¹⁰⁸ Mieczysław Kreutz (1893–1971) is considered one of the most significant Polish psychologists of the 20th century. He was one of Twardowski's closest students, and in 1928 he became the head of the Zakład Psychologii (Department of Psychology) after Twardowski, and later head of the Chair of Psychology that Twardowski helped to create for him. He was also a teacher at the III Public Gymnasium in Lvov. After World War II, he worked at the University of Wrocław until he finally arrived in Warsaw, where he worked until the end of his life. He educated a new generation of psychologists and remained a dominant figure until his death. His interests focused on the issue of introspection (following Twardowski) and a critique of psychological tests. He proposed "interrogative introspection," which was inspired by witness interrogation, based on a fixed questionnaire in experimental settings. One of his publications is still valid today: *Kształcenie charakteru. Wskazówki praktyczne*, Nasza Księgarnia, Warszawa 1946. Both topics of introspection and character seem to be neglected in contemporary psychology. Introspection was heavily criticized by schools in psychology that emphasized unconsciousness and behaviourism.

Twardowski's health was deteriorating, and in 1933, he had already rejected another proposal from the ministry to review all the proposed programmes for primary and high schools. Therefore, the suggestion to collaborate with Ajdukiewicz and Kreutz could have been due to Twardowski's health issues (he died in February 1938), as well as a desire to modernize his proposals to fit contemporary expectations. However, it is puzzling why Igel was not invited to help prepare the programme, given that he was part of the commission in 1932 and had prepared an extensive entry in the *Encyklopedia wychowania. Nauczanie* [Education Encyclopaedia: Teaching] entitled *Dydaktyka propedeutyki filozofii* [Didactics of Propaedeutics of Philosophy],¹⁰⁹ which was the most comprehensive analysis of the state of propaedeutics of philosophy in Poland at that time. Indeed, Igel frequently referenced Twardowski in his publication. Nevertheless, while Igel's ideas differed from Twardowski's in some aspects, they were remarkably close in others, such as the justification for extending the programme beyond logic and psychology.

Finally, in 1937 the MWRiOP published *Program nauki (tymczasowy) w państwowym liceum ogólnokształcącym z polskim językiem nauczania. Propedeutyka filozofii* [Programme of Teaching [Temporary] for Public High School with Polish Language Teaching: Propaedeutics of Philosophy].¹¹⁰ It significantly differs from the 1935 programme in Twardowski's archive. It is based on the two pillars of cognition and behaviour, and it is designed for three hours only, whereas Twardowski prepared a programme for six hours (three hours in both first and second grade). Thus, Twardowski's programme was not used in the form he had offered it. However, in the archive of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, at the Polska Akademia Nauk (Polish Academy of Sciences), we found an unpublished and undated manuscript of a draft programme titled *Propedeutyka filozofii – Wydział humanistyczny, klasyczny, matematyczno-fizyczny, i przyrodniczy*¹¹¹ [Propaedeutics of Philosophy – Faculty of Humanities, Classics, Mathematics-Physics, Natural Sciences]. Importantly, after conducting a detailed comparison, we found it to be

¹⁰⁹ S. Igel, *Dydaktyka propedeutyki filozofii*, op. cit.

¹¹⁰ MWRiOP, *Program nauki (tymczasowy) w państwowym liceum ogólnokształcącym z polskim językiem nauczania. Propedeutyka filozofii*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Książek Szkolnych, Lwów 1937.

¹¹¹ K. Ajdukiewicz, *Propedeutyka filozofii – Wydział humanistyczny, klasyczny, matematyczno-fizyczny, i przyrodniczy*, Materiały Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza, III-141, j.a. 137, PAN Archiwum, Warszawa.

very similar to the temporary one, leading us to surmise that Ajdukiewicz had a hand in its preparation. Additionally, in his collection, we found part of a letter¹¹² sent to Twardowski on 12 April 1937 in response to his letter with the draft of the programme (though the draft itself was not found attached to the letter in the collection) from 8 April 1937. He expressed excitement about Twardowski including the issue of the sources of conviction in the programme. Ajdukiewicz participated in a radio talk on this topic, and Twardowski disagreed with him on whether all those sources of conviction could be treated equally. Ajdukiewicz claims that he emphasized this problem a year earlier in a paper on criticism at a meeting of a Didactic Section.¹¹³ He also believed that these issues should not be covered at the beginning of the programme but later, after discussing the act, memory, perception, and so on. He also mentions the goals of teaching in the letter, but we cannot find them in either the 1935 programme or Twardowski's archive. Ajdukiewicz also refers to a discussion he had with others at Blaustein's house.

It seems that despite his poor health, Twardowski continued working on the programme until 1937. We propose that the programme found in the Ajdukiewicz collection, which is similar to the one published as temporary, is Twardowski's programme, which he revised with the help of at least Ajdukiewicz to fit the three-hour limitation and respond to the criticisms and expectations. In the Ajdukiewicz collection, there are also two other programmes: one prepared by Gawecki (no date provided) and one published by the MWRiOP, *Program nauki w liceum ogólnokształcącym. Filozofia (projekt)*¹¹⁴ [Programme of Teaching for High School: Philosophy (Draft)] in 1937. Despite their significant differences, psychology and logic remain the foundation of each programme.

¹¹² K. Ajdukiewicz, *List do Kazimierza Twardowskiego*, 12.04.1937, Materiały Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza, III-141, j.a. 137, k. 15, PAN Archiwum, Warszawa.

¹¹³ Ajdukiewicz does not clarify which Didactic Section but we can assume it was that of the Warsaw Philosophical Society. Didactic Sections functioned as subgroups in various Polish philosophical organizations: Warsaw Philosophical Society (since 1930) and Vilnius Philosophical Society (since 1932) both had a Didactic Section; the PTF had a Philosophy Teaching Section (since 1930) and a Methodical Group of Teachers of Philosophy Propaedeutics in Lvov. See "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1939, Vol. 15, pp. 66–68; S. Igel, *Dydaktyka propedeutyki filozofii*, op. cit., p. 5; G. Głuchowski, *Propedeutyka filozofii...*, op. cit., pp. 243–244.

¹¹⁴ MWRiOP, *Program nauki w liceum ogólnokształcącym. Filozofia. Wydział humanistyczny, klasyczny, matematyczno-fizyczny i przyrodniczy (projekt)*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Książek Szkolnych, Lwów 1937.

Interestingly, in 1938, Nawroczyński wrote in the publication *Program szkolny* [School Programme] that it was only for primary school, because the high school programme was still a work in progress: “At the time of writing this work, the Ministry has issued programmes only for these two general schools. However, the programmes for primary and secondary schools, as well as for high schools, have not yet been developed.”¹¹⁵ He had probably written that before the temporary programme was announced.

In 1938, Ajdukiewicz published the textbook *Propedeutyka filozofii dla liceów ogólnokształcących* [Propaedeutics of Philosophy for High School],¹¹⁶ and this was accepted by the Ministry as fulfilling the requirements of the temporary programme. On 6 February 1939, at the initiative of W. Auerbach, PhD, the textbook was discussed at a meeting of the Didactic Section of the Warsaw Philosophical Society.¹¹⁷

Leleszówna too prepared a textbook, *Podręcznik propedeutyki filozofii dla klasy drugiej liceów ogólnokształcących* [A Textbook for Propaedeutics of Philosophy for the Second Grade of High School] (1938),¹¹⁸ as did Tadeusz Czeżowski: *Propedeutyka filozofii: podręcznik dla II klasy wszystkich wydziałów w liceach ogólnokształcących* [Propaedeutics of Philosophy: A Textbook for Second Grade of All Departments of High School] (1938),¹¹⁹ and B. Gawecki: *Propedeutyka filozofii. Podręcznik dla kl. drugiej liceów ogólnokształcących* [Propaedeutics of Philosophy: A Textbook for Second Grade of High School] (1938).¹²⁰ Interestingly, Gawecki’s textbook was later republished under the changed title *Myślenie i postępowanie* [Thinking and Behaviour]¹²¹ in 1975. Leleszówna’s and Gawecki’s textbooks show that after the reform, philosophers outside the LWS became more actively involved in the development of propaedeutics, although Twardowski’s school remained the main source of ideas.

¹¹⁵ B. Nawroczyński, *Program szkolny*, Nasza Księgarnia, Warszawa 1938, p. 3.

¹¹⁶ K. Ajdukiewicz, *Propedeutyka filozofii dla liceów ogólnokształcących*, Książnica – Atlas, Lwów 1938.

¹¹⁷ *Sekcja dydaktyczna*, “Ruch Filozoficzny” 1939, Vol. 15, p. 68.

¹¹⁸ H. Lelesz, *Podręcznik propedeutyki filozofii dla klasy drugiej liceów ogólnokształcących*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Książek Szkolnych, Lwów 1938.

¹¹⁹ T. Czeżowski, *Propedeutyka filozofii. Podręcznik dla II klasy wszystkich wydziałów w liceach ogólnokształcących*, K.S. Jakubowski, Lwów 1938; 2nd edition under new title: T. Czeżowski, *Główne zasady nauk filozoficznych*, 2nd ed., Nakł. Księgarni Naukowej T. Szczęsny i S-ka, Toruń 1946.

¹²⁰ B. Gawecki, *Propedeutyka filozofii. Podręcznik dla kl. drugiej liceów ogólnokształcących*, Inst. Wydaw. “Biblioteka Polska,” Warszawa 1938, URL: <https://pbc.gda.pl/dlibra/publication/88515/edition/79994>.

¹²¹ B.J. Gawecki, *Myślenie i postępowanie*, Pax, Warszawa 1975.

Before 1938 there was a general problem with the availability of an appropriate textbook for philosophical propaedeutics in Poland written by a Polish author for the Polish programme. Although there were some different propositions, these were mostly translations and aimed at an academic level, or they were separate textbooks for psychology or logic.¹²² In his *Self-Portrait*, Twardowski negatively refers to the Austrian school textbook by Robert von Zimmermann titled *Philosophische Propaedeutik*, which Twardowski had to study from in gymnasium. He envied the classes with Alois Höfler and later recommended Höfler's textbook in a positive review.¹²³ In 1927, Zygmunt Zawirski, a student of Twardowski, finally translated it into Polish. Twardowski criticized also the lack of a Polish textbook for philosophical propaedeutics even before independence and perceived it as an unacceptable passiveness of the Polish philosophical and teaching community: "I did not know until now that writing a textbook requires official authorization and encouragement from the authorities. [...] It would be high time to break once and for all with this constant waiting for 'salvation' from the authorities; one must rely on one's own strength and initiative; the fact that the authorities do nothing in a given direction should not encourage individuals to do nothing either."¹²⁴ Only in 1928 did Władysław Witwicki, another of Twardowski's students, publish *Zarys psychologii* [Introduction to Psychology].¹²⁵

Twardowski died on 11 February 1938. The following year, World War II began, ushering in a tragic period of persecution for Polish people and culture, first by Nazi Germany and then by the communist Soviet Union. After World War II, attempts were made to return to the teaching of philosophical propaedeutics, but it was excluded from the curricula by the communists for ideological reasons. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Tadeusz Kotarbiński¹²⁶ tried to rescue philosophy from communist exclusion from education and even agreed to close philosophi-

¹²² Cf. M. Woźniczka, *Nauczanie filozofii w Polsce...*, op. cit.

¹²³ K. Twardowski, Alois Höfler. *Psychologie*, in: *Mysł, mowa i czyn*, Vol. 2, eds. A. Brożek, J.J. Jadacki, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2014, pp. 171–179.

¹²⁴ K. Twardowski, *Nauka propedeutyki filozoficznej w gimnazjach*, "Tygodnik 'Słowa Polskiego'" 1902, No. 14, p. 6.

¹²⁵ W. Witwicki, *Zarys psychologii. Podręcznik dla uczniów szkół średnich i seminarjów nauczycielskich*, Książnica – Atlas, Lwów 1928.

¹²⁶ Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886–1981) was a Polish philosopher, logician and ethicist, as well as a student of Twardowski (PhD supervisor) and a prominent member of the LWS. He was a professor of philosophy at the University of Warsaw from 1919. His students included Alfred Tarski, the Chairman of the PTF (1927–1975). After World War II, he co-organized the newly established University of Łódź, of which he became the first rector. He was also President of the Polish

cal journals just to keep propaedeutics of philosophy within the high school curriculum. Nevertheless, these efforts were in vain. First the subject was reduced to logic only in 1949 (one hour in the ninth grade). Finally, in 1954 it was removed from the school curriculum.¹²⁷ The efforts of Ajdukiewicz and Kotarbiński demonstrate, however, the high status that philosophical education had for members of the LWS as part of Twardowski's heritage, and that it was considered problematic for the communist regime.¹²⁸

6. Twardowski's Philosophical Propaedeutics Programmes in the Context of the Curricula Proposed during the Interwar Period

To better understand how important the contribution of Twardowski and his school was, it is worth taking a closer look at the development of the programmes in the interwar period.

Twardowski's 1935 programme, which was prepared for a two-year high school, was considered elitist from the beginning. This type of school had been introduced by the MWRiOP on 11 March 1932 by the Jędrzejewicz reform.¹²⁹ This reform was eventually abandoned after World War II by the new Soviet-dependent government in 1948.¹³⁰

The reform was based on modern psychological and pedagogical research under the influence of the New Education movement. Its theoretical weaknesses were soon uncovered, however, and further investigation by Sośnicki, among others, appeared to strengthen the reform and avoid ideologizing and fetishizing the concept of the state.

Academy of Sciences (1957–1962). His second wife was Janina Kotarbińska, another member of the LWS. He was the founder of reism, and his main works relate to praxeology.

¹²⁷ More on the fate of propaedeutics of philosophy after World War II can be found in J.J. Jadacki, *Jakiej filozofii uczniowie potrzebują*, op. cit.

¹²⁸ R. Kuliniak, M. Pandura, Ł. Ratajczak, *Filozofia po ciemnej stronie mocy. Krucjaty marksistów i komunistów polskich przeciwko Lwowskiej Szkole Filozoficznej Kazimierza Twardowskiego. Cz. 1: Lata 1945–1951*, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2018; R. Kuliniak, M. Pandura, Ł. Ratajczak, *Filozofia po ciemnej stronie mocy. Krucjaty marksistów i komunistów polskich przeciwko Lwowskiej Szkole Filozoficznej Kazimierza Twardowskiego. Cz. 2: Problem reformy szkolnictwa wyższego w świetle partyjnej ofensywy ideologicznej*, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2019.

¹²⁹ Cf. W. Jamrożek, *The Educational Practice and Thought of the Second Polish Republic...*, op. cit.

¹³⁰ Cf. S. Wołoszyn, *Nauki o wychowaniu w Polsce w XX wieku. Próba syntetycznego zarysu na tle powszechnym*, 2nd ed., Strzelec, Kielce 1998.

Twardowski worked during a period of changing attitudes towards education. He was a graduate of the prestigious Viennese Theresianum gymnasium. On the one hand, he clearly exemplified its excellence, discipline, and rigour (e.g., he learned Greek and Latin). On the other hand, he experienced the painful cost of an upbringing that resembled military service and the forced memorization of large volumes of material. Indeed, he considered it to be a close-minded, disempowering experience, and so he viewed the traditional Herbartian school as outdated and favoured more progressive approaches. He also advocated for school being more related to the economy and everyday life and more oriented towards promoting patriotism by at least teaching Polish history and culture and referring to the traditions of the Commission for National Education. However, the New Education movement¹³¹ began to influence Polish educationalists with its psychological attitude and child-centred pedagogy. Twardowski had reservations about its ideas, but at the same time, he understood the need to adjust the programme to the “laws” of child development and to make it more utilitarian. He saw education as a process of character formation that should not be individualistic but rather oriented to the needs of society.¹³²

In the interwar period, there was an ongoing discussion and a degree of controversy over the state of philosophy in high school, such as whether it should be accessible to lower classes or remain elitist; whether it should be intellectual or inspired by the New Education movement; how many hours should the programme encompass (i.e., was a reduction necessary and possible?); whether it should provide teaching or upbringing; and whether it should be taught independently or during other subjects. With societal changes, access to high school education became increasingly important, and its economic utility was a growing topic of discussion. Until then, it had been oriented towards teaching ancient languages and cultures and universal knowledge. Twardowski was aware of this outdated policy and highlighted the increased importance of teaching science and mathematics and giving education a more Polish nature, such as by teaching Polish history.¹³³

¹³¹ The progressive education movement in Europe became known as the New Education movement. E. Wolter, *Nowe wychowanie*, “Kwartalnik Naukowy” 2014, No. 4(18), pp. 36–49. After World War I, a new social order emerged, and the old class-dominated system based on preparing students for university started to appear unsatisfactory. Ellen Key, Maria Montessori, John Dewey, Georg Kerschensteiner and Jean Piaget are considered some of the adherents of this movement.

¹³² More on Twardowski’s vision of education can be found in E. Grądzka, *Kazimierz Twardowski’s Philosophy of Education*, op. cit.

¹³³ K. Sośnicki, *Kazimierz Twardowski jako pedagog*, “Nowa Szkoła” 1959, No. 4, pp. 24–26.

Table 1. Programmes of teaching philosophical propaedeutics in Poland during the interwar period (1920–1939)

No.	Year	Title	Author
1.	1921 (memorial from 10.08.1920)	<i>Program nauczania psychologii w szkole średniej</i> ^a [Programme of Teaching Psychology in High School] <i>Szkic programu ćwiczeń praktycznych z psychologii w gimnazjum</i> [Draft Programme of Practical Exercises in Psychology in Gymnasium] ^b	Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne (PTF, Polish Philosophical Society) L. Jaxa-Bykowski (Lvov)
2.	1921	<i>Program psychologii. Projekt programu nauczania dla szkół średnich</i> [Psychology Programme: Draft Curriculum for High Schools] ^c	K. Twardowski
3.	1922	<i>Projekt programu logiki</i> [Draft Logic Programme] ^d	K. Twardowski
4.	1922 1924 1926 1928 1931	<i>Program gimnazjum państwowego. Wydział Humanistyczny. Propedeutyka filozofii</i> [Programme for Public Gymnasium: Humanities. Propaedeutics of Philosophy] (1st ed., pp. 96–103, ^e 2nd ed., pp. 94–101, ^f 3rd ed., pp. 90–97, ^g 4th ed., pp. 123–130, ^h 5th ed., pp. 75–80 ⁱ)	Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego (MWRiOP, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Edu- cation)
5.	1934	<i>Poradnik w sprawach nauczania i wychowania oraz administracji w szkołach ogólnokształcących</i> [A Guide to Teaching, Upbringing and Administration in High Schools]	MWRiOP
6.	1935	<i>Szkic programu nauczania propedeutyki filozofii w liceach ogólnokształcących</i> [Draft High School Curriculum for Teaching Propaedeutics of Philosophy] ^j <i>Memorial of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov on the Guidelines of the Curriculum of Propaedeutics of Philosophy in High Schools (Manuscript by Kazimierz Twardowski)</i> ^k	K. Twardowski PTF
7.	1937	<i>Program nauki w liceum ogólnokształcącym. Filozofia (projekt)</i> ^l [Programme of Teaching for High School: Philosophy (Draft)]	MWRiOP

^a Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, *Program nauczania psychologii...*, op. cit.; K. Twardowski, *Program nauczania psychologii w szkole średniej*, in: *Mysł, mowa i czyn*, Vol. 1, eds. A. Brożek, J.J. Jadacki, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2013, pp. 524–529.

^b L. Bykowski, *Szkic programu ćwiczeń praktycznych...*, op. cit.

^c K. Twardowski, *Projekt programu psychologii...*, op. cit.

^d K. Twardowski, *Programy logiki gimnazjalnej...*, op. cit.

^e MWRiOP, *Program gimnazjum państwowego...*, op. cit. (1922).

^f MWRiOP, *Program gimnazjum państwowego...*, op. cit. (1924).

^g MWRiOP, *Program gimnazjum państwowego...*, op. cit. (1926).

^h MWRiOP, *Program gimnazjum państwowego...*, op. cit. (1928).

ⁱ MWRiOP, *Program gimnazjum państwowego. Wydział humanistyczny...*, op. cit. (1931).

^j Published as: K. Twardowski, *Projekt programu propedeutyki filozofii dla liceów ogólnokształcących* (1935), in: *Dydaktyka*, ed. A. Brożek, Wydawnictwo Academicum, Lublin 2023, pp. 251–256.

^k K. Twardowski, *Memorial of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov...*, op. cit.

^l MWRiOP, *Program nauki w liceum ogólnokształcącym. Filozofia*, op. cit.

8.	(no information provided)	<i>Propedeutyka filozofii – Wydział humanistyczny, klasyczny, matematyczno-fizyczny, i przyrodniczy</i> ^m [Propaedeutics of Philosophy – Faculty of Humanities, Classics, Mathematics-Physics, Natural Sciences]	K. Twardowski/ K. Ajdukiewicz (found in K. Ajdukiewicz's archival collection)
9.	1937	<i>Program nauki (tymczasowy)</i> [Programme of Teaching (Temporary)]	MWRiOP
10.	(no information provided)	<i>Projekt rozkładu materiału nauczania propedeutyki filozofii</i> [Draft of the Distribution of Teaching Material for Propaedeutics of Philosophy]	B. Gawecki (found in K. Ajdukiewicz's archival collection)

^m K. Ajdukiewicz, *Propedeutyka filozofii – Wydział humanistyczny...*, op. cit.

Source: own work.

The list of programmes presented in Table 1 related to propaedeutics of philosophy reveals the complexity of the problem and work undertaken, highlighting several interesting facts. First, although Poland was already independent and united, the centre for the development of propaedeutics remained in Lvov, which was then the strongest intellectual centre of the former Galicia region. Consequently, Polish programmes clearly followed the Austrian¹³⁴ traditions of propaedeutics, with modifications to meet the changing needs and goals of the educational system. Twardowski, his students, and their associated institutions were at the centre of developing the Polish concepts of philosophical propaedeutics in the interwar period.

7. How Strong Was Austrian Philosophical Influence? Twardowski's Understanding of Philosophy and Psychology for Propaedeutics

We have repeatedly pointed out that the Polish interwar concept of philosophical propaedeutics grew out of Austrian pedagogical concepts absorbed during the period of Galician autonomy. The special role played by philosophers from the former Galicia in the development of propaedeutics in the interwar period also

¹³⁴ Interestingly, Austria continues to teach the subject, but it is now called *Psychologie und Philosophie* (PuP). Psychology is taught first, in the seventh grade, followed by philosophy in the eighth grade of the *allgemeinbildende höhere Schule* (AHS).

suggests a strong Austrian influence.¹³⁵ The key figure is, of course, Kazimierz Twardowski, who served as the link between Vienna and Lvov. Thus, it is worth at least sketching what elements of Viennese philosophy influenced the interwar concepts of propaedeutics of philosophy and how strongly they are visible in the Polish concepts.

Franz Brentano, who taught at Vienna University, influenced¹³⁶ Twardowski's conception of philosophy in that it should be "scientific philosophy," and any questions about the inner or external experience should be solved using an empirical method. Philosophy is a set of disciplines, including the history of philosophy, psychology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, the theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and other areas like the philosophy of religion. Philosophers opted for realism, searched for absolute truth, and were reluctant to speculate, with the foundation being psychology and the analytic method. Analysis enabled clarification, and this was also fundamental for Twardowski, who believed there was a straightforward relationship between clear thinking and the clear expression of thoughts.¹³⁷ He was against using obscure language that made philosophy obscure. Although logic played a role in that fundamental process, he warned against *symbolomania* and *pragmatophobia*, which refer to the detachment of logic from reality.

Over time, Twardowski became more sceptical about the position of metaphysics and considered questions like "essence, beginning, the aim of all beings and destiny of humans," which is more of a worldview than philosophy. He believed that metaphysics should be the final reflection on the results of science, rather than the starting point, as is the case in many systematic philosophies. A worldview is a personal matter, and it is best if everyone has one, but it should be based on rational, critical reflection.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ Of the participants in the discussions and drafters, apart from Twardowski, the vast majority were educated in Lvov during the Austrian partition. Another key figure, Gawecki, was educated in Kraków during the period of Galician autonomy.

¹³⁶ Cf. A. Betti, *Twardowski and Brentano*, in: *The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School*, ed. U. Kriegel, Routledge, New York 2017, pp. 305–310; A. Betti, *Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, in: *The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School*, ed. U. Kriegel, Routledge, New York 2017, pp. 334–340.

¹³⁷ K. Twardowski, *On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style*, in: *Kazimierz Twardowski on Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. J.L. Brandl, J. Woleński, trans. A. Szylewicz, Brill-Rodopi, Amsterdam 1999, pp. 257–259.

¹³⁸ Cf. R. Kleszcz, *Metoda i wartości. Metafilozofia Kazimierza Twardowskiego*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2013.

Psychology is considered part of philosophy¹³⁹ because it originates from theories of knowledge and ethics. Importantly, psychology is not a part of our physiology, despite claims to the contrary by figures like August Comte. Mental phenomena (i.e., our thoughts, feelings, images, decisions, concepts, wishes, desires, beliefs) are therefore not a particular type of physiological phenomenon, as they do not occupy any physical space. We also gain knowledge about them not through the physical senses but rather an “inner experience” through the so-called introspective method. This inner experience is possible because we can *perceive* mental phenomena, even if we cannot *observe* them. Observation (like with Comte) is not fundamental to this experience (like in the case of the lightning). Additionally, introspection refers only to our own mental phenomena, making it a *subjective method*. We can also use our memory to aid introspection or experiment by repeating the experience to remember it better. Herbert Spencer divided psychology into the subjective and objective types, with these effectively complementing each other.

The emphasis on psychology in philosophy led to a problem known as *psychologism*. Jan Woleński identified two types of psychologism: methodological and ontological.¹⁴⁰ The first refers to applying methods from psychology that give us access to the inner experience. The second makes creations like logic, art, and so on part of psychology, because they are products of the mind. Twardowski neglected this version in his 1902 text following criticism from Edmund Husserl. To address the problem, Twardowski proposed distinguishing between the actions and the products of the mental processes. Psychology investigates the acts (i.e., the thinking), whereas the product (i.e., the thought) would be of interest to other disciplines, such as the humanities.

The concepts of upbringing and education were analysed according to this division,¹⁴¹ namely the action (i.e., the process of upbringing/educating) versus the product (i.e., the achieved upbringing/education). In Polish, the two terms upbringing and education refer to different areas. Education is concerned with

¹³⁹ K. Twardowski, *Psychology vs. Physiology and Philosophy*, in: *Kazimierz Twardowski on Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. J.L. Brandl, J. Woleński, trans. A. Szylewicz, Brill-Rodopi, Amsterdam 1999, pp. 41–64.

¹⁴⁰ J. Woleński, *Filozoficzna Szkoła Lwowsko-Warszawska*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1985, pp. 40–42.

¹⁴¹ K. Twardowski, *On the Notion of Education*, in: *On Prejudices, Judgments, and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. A. Brożek, J.J. Jadacki, Rodopi, Amsterdam 2014, pp. 121–129.

developing the mind, whereas upbringing focuses on the moral development of the human will. The latter should provide the ability to make sound decisions, so it needs psychology and logic to achieve that goal, while ethics helps to understand precisely what decision-making depends upon.

There are three significant phases of upbringing. First, there is the establishment of reasonable order, absolute obedience to a consistent and coherent teacher, and the use of punishment. This is followed by intellectual development, where a teacher must seek motivations beyond just punishment, such as values. Finally, there is self-upbringing, because moral upbringing never ends and continues throughout life, requiring us to practice our will in correct decision-making. Thus, Twardowski proclaimed: "Teach less, educate more, but above all upbringing!" This is also what his students recall. He raised through education, and he was considered a sage with very high moral standards, often being compared to Socrates. Personal contact with the master is the key to the success of Twardowski's didactics. Dąmbska recognized that friendship or even love arose among the students and the professor.¹⁴² He formed their character through high expectations of duty, conscience, accuracy, and reliability. His ethos outlived him, and he remains symbolic of Polish philosophical culture to this day. Tadeusz Czeżowski, another of his students, distinguishes three aspects of Twardowski's creative attitude as an academic teacher: "ideal of philosophically educated person, method of teaching and its implementation."¹⁴³

It should be remembered, however, that for Twardowski this ethos was a continuation of the ethos of the Brentano school. Twardowski masterfully adapted this Viennese philosophy from the second half of the 19th century to create the foundations of modern Polish intellectual culture.¹⁴⁴ This unique example of a fruitful combination of local and global values deserves further analysis. It is

¹⁴² Cf. I. Dąmbska, *Filozofia na Uniwersytecie Jana Kazimierza we Lwowie w latach 1918–1939*, in: *Wybór pism psychologicznych i pedagogicznych*, ed. M. Decewicz, Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, Warszawa 1992, p. 482.

¹⁴³ T. Czeżowski, *Kazimierz Twardowski jako nauczyciel*, in: *Kazimierz Twardowski. Nauczyciel, uczony, obywatel. Przemówienia wygłoszone na Akademii Żałobnej urządzonej w Auli Uniwersytetu J.K. w dniu 30 IV 1938 przez Senat Akademicki, Radę Wydziału Humanistycznego Uniwersytetu Jana Kazimierza i Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne*, eds. S. Lempicki et al., Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, Lwów 1938, p. 477.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. R. Kleszcz, *Twardowski – racjonalność, geniusz organizacyjny i mistrzostwo w nauczaniu*, in: *Rozum i wola. Kazimierz Twardowski i jego wpływ na kształt kultury polskiej XX wieku*, ed. J.J. Jądacki, Wydawnictwo Academicum, Lublin 2021, pp. 49–96.

worth emphasizing that this aspect of Twardowski's activity, underestimated by historians of philosophy, was of key cultural importance and should be counted among the major achievements of Twardowski and the LWS.¹⁴⁵

8. Conclusions

Kazimierz Twardowski was the main figure in developing propaedeutics of philosophy during the interwar period and therefore his influence on the intellectual culture of Poland was significant. His own ideas were important, and these arose from his personal experience of education in Vienna and his engagement in organizing a gymnasium education system in Galicia, as well as his philosophical background as a student of Franz Brentano and colleague of Alois Höfler. Although there was a lively discussion from the beginning of Polish independence (with input from Stanisław Ossowski, Bohdan Zawadzki, Regina Rajchman-Ettingerowa, Bolesław Gawecki, Helena Leleszówna, Bohdan Kieszkowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Salomon Igel, and Kazimierz Sośnicki) criticizing ideas included in the programme eventually published in 1922 by the MWRiOP (which, as we exposed, had been prepared by Twardowski), the Austrian form of limiting propaedeutics of philosophy to teaching psychology and logic dominated until the publication of a new programme in 1937.

Propaedeutics of philosophy was originally introduced to the Austrian, and consequently Galician, curriculum during the significant educational reforms of 1849. It replaced an introductory course at university, so its main aim was to prepare future students, thus determining the subject's format and content. With time, its psychology content moved from a Herbartian viewpoint to a Brentanian one (it can be observed in the change in textbooks from Zimmerman's to Höfler's and Meinong's one). For Twardowski, like for Brentano, psychology was a fundamental science of philosophy that taught how the experimental method works, whereas logic prepared for theoretical, analytical thinking. However, in the new reality of independent Poland, together with changes in the educational system following Jędrzejewicz's reforms from 1932 at organizational, ideological (Sanacja political ideals) and methodological levels (New Education movement), Twardowski had to adjust his programme to meet contemporary expectations.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. J. Wojtyśiak, *Edukacja filozoficzna w ujęciu szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej*, op. cit.

Whether he was eager to do this is unclear, but his preparation of the 1935 programme shows that he made an effort to meet the expectations while keeping the original idea of focusing on psychology and logic in the first year, when there was more time available. The programme was then developed further in the second year, which was before final exams and therefore had less time available. He divided the programme into problems in response to the postulates of the New Education movement. For the second year, he introduced aspects of aesthetics, ethics, and sociology. The programme seemed to be more oriented towards everyday problems than before. Nevertheless, apparently it did not meet the expectations of the MWRiOP and another version was published as temporary in 1937. Although this version is almost the same as the programme found in Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's archive, it is highly possible that it was mainly prepared by Twardowski. Nevertheless, it was organized into two main areas, namely cognition and behaviour. The main challenge in the interwar period was justifying the need for keeping propaedeutics of philosophy in the high school curriculum. Indeed, there were two opposing tendencies: one wanted to maintain the elitist character of high school as the building ground for the future intelligentsia, while the other wanted to follow the New Education movement with its practical vision of a more egalitarian education based around life issues. In addition, there was a demand for a state upbringing that promoted the state's values. Twardowski tried to satisfy all these expectations and argued for the practicality of propaedeutics for life in a democratic society, because thinking influences action, shows the value of criticism and proper justification of one's opinions, thus strengthening growth and prosperity of society. We can find such a justification of propaedeutics also in the *Poradnik*..., a guide for teachers published by the MWRiOP in 1934. It seems that Twardowski and the content of the *Poradnik*... point to keeping the subject unchanged, especially due to no change in the number of hours (three hours per week).

A comparison of Twardowski's three main proposals can be a way of categorizing them. The first programme from 1921 (psychology) and 1922 (logic) could be called "minimalistic." The second from 1935 could be referred to as "maximalist." Finally, the one that is supposedly his, from 1937, could be called "pragmatic." These various proposals demonstrate how the concept of philosophical propaedeutics evolved and adapted to local and historical circumstances.

Additionally, it is important to add that Twardowski's work was accompanied by the contributions of the PTF and Twardowski's students. The PTF actively discussed and referred to the MWRiOP via memorials, trying to influence the ministry's decisions and plans. In 1921, the PTF even published its own programme, though only for psychology. In 1935, the PTF published the *Memoorial...* that referred to Twardowski's programme of the same year. There was also the position of Instructor of Propaedeutics of Philosophy at the MWRiOP since 1930, entrusted to Bolesław Gawecki, a philosopher from Kraków. His aim was to support teachers and to work on the vision of propaedeutics, which was fulfilled partly by a conference to discuss the future of propaedeutics in Lvov or the publication of the *Poradnik...* in 1934. Twardowski's students, despite supporting him as members of the PTF, also disagreed with the vision of their master, which can be seen in Sośnicki's article or the critique of the programme from 1922 presented by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz at a conference organized by Gawecki. Therefore, when the MWRiOP finally decided to reform the programme and entrust it to Twardowski, they asked for Ajdukiewicz and Mieczysław Kreutz's assistance.

Unfortunately, the outbreak of World War II stopped the work on teaching propaedeutics, and it was later dismissed by the communist state and its Marxism-Leninism ideology. However, this significant Polish heritage could inspire a contemporary discussion of the necessity and aims of programmes of teaching philosophy in schools. The 1935 programme seems a particularly interesting vision that, on the one hand, focuses attention on something that is nowadays referred to as critical thinking but with a particular approach (i.e., cognitive psychology, biases, logic, philosophy of science). While it attractively extends the foundations to more philosophical topics, after some modernization, it could serve as a broad introduction to questions in philosophy that relate to everyday life and the formation of a worldview. Except for ethical issues that are widely accepted, what is also significant is that paying attention to aesthetics and social issues from a philosophical perspective would create more space for discussion.

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Basic Concepts and Principles of Didactics according to Kazimierz Twardowski

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Abstract: Kazimierz Twardowski primarily articulated his views on teaching and upbringing in his handbook *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki i logiki do użytku w seminariach nauczycielskich i w nauce prywatnej* (1901). The purpose of this article is to present the basic concepts and principles of didactics as seen by Twardowski and to show that they do not differ significantly from those adopted by some of the more recent Polish didactic theorists representing the same didactic paradigm as Twardowski (i.e., normative). Twardowski's handbook can still inspire readers, as it contains a lot of practical advice for teachers and is written in clear and simple language that can serve as an example for contemporary publications in didactics.

Key words: Kazimierz Twardowski, didactics, teaching, education, educational teaching

1. Introduction

Kazimierz Twardowski, as evidenced by numerous statements from his students, was a master of teaching and upbringing.¹ Though not the primary focus of his research, he addressed pedagogical issues in several of his works. The most important of these is the handbook *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki i logiki do użytku w seminariach nauczycielskich i w nauce prywatnej* [Basic Concepts of Didactics and Logic for Use in Teachers' Seminars and Private Study].² Other important pedagogical views of Twardowski can be found in the lecture *O pojęciu wychowania* [On the Concept of Upbringing]³ and in *Mowy i rozprawy z okresu jego działalności*

¹ Cf., e.g., T. Czeżowski, *Kazimierz Twardowski jako nauczyciel*, in: K. Twardowski, *Wybór pism psychologicznych i pedagogicznych*, ed. R. Jadcak, Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, Warszawa 1992, pp. 477–479.

² K. Twardowski, *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki i logiki*, Towarzystwo Pedagogiczne, Lwów 1901.

³ K. Twardowski, *O pojęciu wychowania*, in: K. Twardowski, *Wybór pism psychologicznych i pedagogicznych*, ed. R. Jadcak, Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, Warszawa 1992, pp. 411–422.

w *Towarzystwie Nauczycieli Szkół Wyższych* [Speeches and Dissertations from the Period of His Activity in the Society of Teachers of Higher Education].⁴

The aim of this article is to present how Twardowski understood the basic concepts and principles of didactics. I also want to show that his approach does not differ significantly from newer approaches in Polish didactics, although some of his terminology is now outdated. Twardowski's didactics is particularly valuable for its practical presentation of the content without excessive elaboration, as well as for the clarity and brevity of the language. In the following sections, I will present: the concepts and principles that Twardowski considered to be crucial for didactics, the juxtaposition of some of them with newer concepts and principles, and finally the conclusions that can be drawn from this deliberation. In the text, I omit the part of Twardowski's views on education which is not directly related to didactics.⁵ The reconstruction of Twardowski's didactics will be based on the above-mentioned handbook.⁶

If we assume that didactics is paradigmatic, then Twardowski's didactics has features of objectivist paradigms, especially the normative paradigm. The newer approaches cited here, with which Twardowski's views will be compared, will share the same paradigmatic character. Hence, an assessment of Twardowski's views from the perspective of a non-objectivist paradigm, such as constructivism, would differ from the one formulated in the conclusions.⁷

⁴ K. Twardowski, *Mowy i rozprawy z okresu jego działalności w Towarzystwie Nauczycieli Szkół Wyższych*, Towarzystwo Nauczycieli Szkół Wyższych, Lwów 1912.

⁵ Twardowski's views on education, encompassing both teaching and upbringing, can be found in W. Rechlewicz, *Non multa, sed multum. Idee pedagogiczne Twardowskiego*, in: *Rozum i wola. Kazimierz Twardowski i jego wpływ na kształt kultury polskiej XX wieku*, ed. J. Jadacki, Wydawnictwo Academicon, Lublin 2021, pp. 469–529. These views are also discussed in Dominik Traczykowski's unpublished doctoral dissertation, *Pedagogical Aspects of Kazimierz Twardowski's Thought* (2020).

⁶ This handbook is the only comprehensive study of this subject in Twardowski's oeuvre published during his lifetime. The aforementioned *Mowy i rozprawy* addresses many specific educational issues of its time, rather than general didactic concepts. Many of Twardowski's speeches of this kind, collected from various sources, can be found in K. Twardowski, *Mysł, mowa i czyn*, Vol. 1, eds. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2013, and K. Twardowski, *Mysł, mowa i czyn*, Vol. 2, eds. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2014. It is also worth mentioning that Twardowski lectured on general didactics at Lvov University (cf. D. Traczykowski, *Cele nauczania w myśli Kazimierza Twardowskiego*, "Roczniki Pedagogiczne" 2016, Vol. 8 (44), No. 1, p. 11).

⁷ Objectivist paradigms are founded on, among other things, the belief that scientific knowledge is fundamentally objective, is cumulative and allows for increasingly accurate knowledge of reality. Normative didactics focuses on teaching understood as the effective achievement of top-down

2. Concepts and Principles of Teaching

Teaching includes activities aimed at the systematic imparting of knowledge and the development of intellectual abilities, such as the abilities to perceive, reason, and memorize. Instructing, on the other hand, is giving information because of the opportunity, and not in a systematic way. Providing information is material education, and building intellectual abilities is formal education. The two sides of teaching cannot be separated from each other as acquiring knowledge develops intellectual abilities, and developing intellectual abilities requires imparting knowledge. However, some school subjects focus specifically on one side of education (e.g., history involves more material education, while mathematics is based more on formal education).⁸ The formal aspect of education is more important than the material one, especially at the elementary level of education.⁹ A student with developed intellectual abilities can easily fill information gaps, but intellectual abilities are difficult to develop if their development is neglected early in the course of education. However, formal education is often neglected because it is more difficult than material education, its progress is more difficult to assess, and some believe that it occurs automatically as a result of material education.¹⁰

Didactics is the study of the principles and methods of teaching. General didactics concerns teaching any subject, and specific didactics (methodology) deals with a specific subject. Pedagogy is the study of physical, intellectual and moral education; thus, didactics is part of pedagogy (the main means of intellectual education is teaching). The auxiliary sciences of didactics are psychology and logic. Psychology teaches about the laws of mental life that should be taken into

educational goals. In connection with this, it develops norms and principles of didactic activity, in which the leading role is always played by the teacher. The elements of the didactic process described by normative didactics create a coherent whole, which is, however, accused of being too abstract and detached from the reality of school (cf. D. Klus-Stańska, *Paradygmaty dydaktyki. Myśleć teorią o praktyce*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2018, pp. 59–60, 63–79). Constructivism in its various forms assumes, on the other hand, that knowledge is not a reflection of the world, but a construction of the cognizing subject; this type of thinking has been present in didactics for over 100 years (D. Klus-Stańska, *Konstruktywizm edukacyjny – niejednoznaczność, kontrowersje, dylematy*, “Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji” 2020, No. 4 (51), pp. 8, 12, <https://doi.org/10.26881/pwe.2020.51.01s>).

⁸ K. Twardowski, *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki*, op. cit., pp. 5–7.

⁹ Twardowski points out that his handbook mainly concerns education in a folk school, and thus elementary education (ibid., p. 11).

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 172–174.

account in didactics. Logic is related to didactics in the following way: knowledge consists in the ability to make true judgments, and the science of the truthfulness of judgments is precisely logic.¹¹

The curriculum is the order in which school subjects follow each other, while the syllabus is the order of information conveyed within individual subjects and lessons. The correct curriculum should follow the laws of logic and psychology: new knowledge and skills should relate to those already acquired; they should connect with each other (continuity); what is easier should precede what is more difficult (gradability). Due to the conditions and goals of teaching, certain types of curricula can be distinguished. The analytical curriculum begins with the general concept and then delves into the details. The synthetic curriculum takes the opposite approach. The inductive curriculum proceeds from individual cases or facts to the general rule, while the deductive curriculum starts with a general principle and progresses to the individual cases covered by this principle. The genetic curriculum explains how a thing comes into being. The cyclical, or concentric, curriculum broadens the material acquired at an earlier stage of learning. Particular curricula can be combined with each other (e.g., analytical and synthetic curricula). The course of the lesson is correct when it is a closed whole, the curriculum is properly selected, and the teacher makes sure that the students understand the material. Sometimes the provision of new material should be preceded by a revision of the older material to which the new one refers.¹²

The form of teaching is the way in which the teacher aims for the students to acquire knowledge. The acroamatic form (from the Greek *akroama* – “what is listened to”), also known as the lecturing form, involves conveying information through sentences, while the heuristic form (from the Greek *heurein* – “to find”) guides students to find the information on their own. The deictic form of teaching, or visualization of knowledge, consists in enabling students to perceive specific objects. Strictly speaking, it is not a form of teaching but an auxiliary means of it, because the mere acquisition of an image is not yet the acquisition of knowledge about it. The deictic form of teaching plays a fundamental role, as perception is the basis of knowledge and intellectual activities.¹³ It is also a means of animating and making learning easier.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 10–12.

¹² Ibid., pp. 118–137.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 138–139.

When using the acroamatic form of teaching, the teacher should be clear and concise, speaking from memory, as listening to read-out content weakens students' attention. However, one should not speak for too long, too loudly or too softly, too quickly or too slowly, monotonously or with pathos. Also, students should not be required to take notes of what the teacher says, as the school material is contained in textbooks. At lower levels of education, the acroamatic form of teaching usually takes the form of a description or a story. The descriptions should be vivid, that is, they should enable students to imagine what is being described. A description becomes a story when it relates to events; a story holds a special charm for young minds.¹⁴

A teacher using the heuristic form of teaching indicates the type of information the student is to find, provides or recalls the relevant data, and asks guiding questions (e.g., the student is asked to find out how many millimetres there are in a decimetre, and the teacher asks what a decimetre is, how many centimetres there are in a decimetre, etc.). The heuristic form can only be used when it does not entail excessive effort and it does not take up too much time. Its usefulness is not the same for all subjects – it can be widely used in geography or mathematics, but not in history. The heuristic form of teaching stands above the acroamatic one, as it favours the linking of new information with the old one, makes it possible to revise the acquired knowledge and check the degree of its mastery, it motivates students to pay attention, increases their interest in learning and forces them to perform intellectual activities. It also contributes to memorizing information, trains students in speaking and expressing thoughts, and helps the teacher to get to know the students and their abilities.¹⁵

Visualization of knowledge is direct when it consists in evoking the perceptive image of an object (e.g., the teacher talks about an electric spark and shows it).¹⁶ Visualization can take the form of showing broadly understood specimens, activities, and experiments. Indirect visualization is carried out primarily through models, that is, artificial reproductions of objects (e.g., the eye model), images (e.g., photographs, drawings), schematic and tabular compilations (e.g., compara-

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 139–142.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 142–147.

¹⁶ Perception consists of: the sensations experienced, their synthesis (i.e., the image) and the judgment about the existence of an object corresponding to the image. Images can be divided into perceptive, reproductive and productive (cf. K. Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, H. Altenberg, Lwów 1898, pp. 18–25).

tive compilation of country sizes). Proper visualization requires that all students have the same ability to perceive, and to see a three-dimensional object from all angles. The teacher should limit the number of objects shown and prefer direct visualization. Indirect visualization should be supplemented with a description or a story.¹⁷

A teaching method is a way of performing a teaching activity related to both the curriculum and the form of teaching.¹⁸ The curriculum and the form of teaching should depend on the mental level of the students; they should also be correctly selected – the most advantageous are the inductive curriculum, the heuristic form and visualization of knowledge.¹⁹

Didactic questions play a fundamental role in teaching.²⁰ A question not only indicates the subject to be answered, but also makes some judgments about that subject itself.²¹ A question may require a conclusive answer between at least two assumptions, or may need to be supplemented by adding certain information to the one already contained in the question. Due to the purpose of the question, it is possible to distinguish between guiding, informative and consolidating (revising and practising) questions; one and the same question may serve different purposes. The question should be adapted to the mental development of the student, should be unambiguous (indicating clearly what kind of answer it requires), and should not contain any erroneous judgments. The question should be asked in a questioning tone, not an imperative or inquisitorial tone; initially, it should be aimed at all learners.²²

The answer to the question should be linguistically correct (grammatically and stylistically), pronounced clearly, fluently, calmly, loudly, with the right ac-

¹⁷ K. Twardowski, *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki*, op. cit., pp. 151–157.

¹⁸ Strictly speaking, Twardowski writes that the teaching method consists of all activities performed while teaching according to certain rules. However, this wording seems incorrect as the method cannot rely on the performance of activities, but on the way in which they are performed.

¹⁹ K. Twardowski, *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki*, op. cit., pp. 157–158, 182.

²⁰ Twardowski's insights regarding questions and answers were probably one of the inspirations behind Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's concept in this area (cf. A. Brożek, *Pytania i odpowiedzi. Tło filozoficzne, teoria i zastosowania praktyczne*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2007, pp. 272–273).

²¹ Currently, the judgments contained in the question are recognized as assumptions of the question, presuppositions (cf. J. Jadacki, *Spór o granice poznania. Elementy semiotyki logicznej i metodologii*, 2nd ed., Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2002, pp. 238–240) or ontic commitments (A. Brożek, *Pytania i odpowiedzi*, op. cit., p. 145).

²² K. Twardowski, *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki*, op. cit., pp. 158–165.

cent, unaided, based on understanding, true, and accurate (containing only what the question is about). It should also be accompanied by appropriate behaviour (no unnecessary movements, looking in the eyes of the teacher). What the teacher does next, depends on the student's response to the question. When the student does not answer a question, it should be determined why. In this situation, the student should repeat the question, and if he/she is able to do so and still does not know the answer, the teacher uses guiding questions. If the answer is satisfactory, the teacher should make sure that it is unaided and based on comprehension by asking additional questions about the argumentation, examples, and meaning of the words used. When the answer is unsatisfactory, its (linguistic or factual) deficiencies should be shown, and the student should be made to correct it. If such a correction is not possible, the answer should be corrected by another student, and only as a last resort by the teacher.²³

An assignment is an order for the student to perform some work related to studying on their own. Thanks to assignments, the teacher learns about the students' abilities and the effectiveness of their own work. Assignments can be oral, written or manual; done at school or at home; preparatory, memory, revising or practising. An assignment is similar to a question, and its execution is similar to an answer; therefore, the rules for questions and answers apply. Assignments should be varied and possible to be done even by less advanced students. The essence of school education is the direct influence of the teacher on the students, hence homework should play only a supporting role: it should be kept to a minimum and concern material that has already been covered in class. Exercises develop intellectual abilities. Frequent repetition of activities leads to ease, proficiency, and confidence in performing the activity. Exercises should be done unaided and accurately; they must also present some difficulty to overcome. They should be graded: when a certain level of skill is achieved, their difficulty should be increased.²⁴

Learning is effective when, after graduating from school, students: 1. know the more important material they have learned and are able to use it; 2. are able to independently perform intellectual activities in which they were trained; 3. have an alert mind and are interested in what they have understood thanks to school; 4. teaching has had an educational impact. The conditions for the effectiveness of

²³ Ibid., pp. 166–168.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 168–171, 174–176.

learning are accessibility, practicality, thoroughness, interaction of students with the teacher and his/her personal impact on students. Learning is accessible when it is understandable, therefore it must be adapted to the level of mental development and knowledge of students and be conveyed in an appropriate way. The practicality of education lies in the ability to apply the acquired knowledge and skills, and its thoroughness ensures that essential content remains in the minds of the students. Students interact with the teacher by learning with maximum attention and performing activities with the utmost diligence. The attention can be involuntary or voluntary. The students' involuntary attention is aroused by what interests them on its own (e.g., children looking at drawings). The material that is not interesting for students may be related to the material of interest and thus also stimulate their attention. Teaching material that does not arouse involuntary attention requires the student to pay voluntary attention, depending on their will. This will can be stimulated for students by indicating the benefits of the practical application of the taught material, appealing to their willingness to distinguish themselves from other students, the prospect of a reward or the avoidance of punishment, parents' satisfaction, or satisfaction resulting from the fulfilment of an obligation.²⁵

The personal influence of the teacher is a very significant factor in the effectiveness of learning. This interaction consists of three elements. The first is the students' attachment and trust towards the teacher. Thanks to this attitude, students develop a love of learning, because affection for a person also includes what is related to that person. The teacher gains the students' attachment through kindness and consideration. The second element is the seriousness of the teacher, which is externally expressed in their movements and manner of speaking, and internally, it consists in the students' belief in the truthfulness of everything that the teacher says. Therefore, teachers should admit when they are wrong, and not hide this fact – its discovery by the students would result in a loss of trust. Third, the teacher should encourage students to learn by motivating them, increasing their self-confidence, and avoiding anything that discourages them from learning. Excessive requirements, among other factors, can be particularly discouraging.²⁶

The above-described personal influence of the teacher is also one of the factors of the educational influence of school. Teachers should set an example for

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 179–191, 195–196.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 205–208.

the students – be a model of diligence, conscientiousness, justice and kindness. They should be punctual, scrupulous and perform their duties with full commitment. When students become convinced that the teacher shows favouritism or is biased, school loses its positive educational influence.²⁷ Another educational factor of school is connected with material and formal education: educational teaching. Such teaching consists, first, in introducing students to ethical concepts and principles that should be related to the taught content. Second, educational teaching is realized through the interaction of students and the teacher, as described above. This interaction encourages students to pay proper attention to learning and diligently perform related activities, which in turn develops their sense of duty, accustoms them to systematic, independent and diligent work,²⁸ builds prudence, honesty, and the tendency to maintain order and to use time properly. These are the features and skills – supplemented by the ability to control oneself and fulfil social duties – that school takes into account when conducting educational activities. It cannot provide students with a complete education, but should shape the above-mentioned qualities as the basis for further character development.²⁹

The constant educational factors of school – apart from the two mentioned – are discipline and the collective nature of learning. Discipline is based on the observance of school regulations and teacher's instructions by students; it gives the students' will a direction in accordance with the school's goals. The collective nature of learning introduces students to social responsibilities, as school in many ways resembles society. It is made up of individuals who differ from each other and have different goals, but are also a whole and are governed by common laws. This creates an opportunity for students to develop courtesy, honesty, mutual trust, respect for others' property, truthfulness, and civil courage. It enables the perpetuation of the belief that the value of a person lies only in their moral character and social usefulness, and it enables stigmatizing negative phenomena, such as exaltation of some over others, jealousy, or envy. There are also occasional

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 218–220.

²⁸ Twardowski emphasized that diligent work is also a national obligation (K. Twardowski, *Unarodowienie szkoły*, in: K. Twardowski, *Mowy i rozprawy z okresu jego działalności w Towarzystwie Nauczycieli Szkół Wyższych*, Towarzystwo Nauczycieli Szkół Wyższych, Lwów 1912, p. 148).

²⁹ K. Twardowski, *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki*, op. cit., pp. 210–212. The figure of a perfect student, based on Twardowski's views, is presented by Traczykowski (D. Traczykowski, *Cele nauczania*, op. cit., pp. 13–19).

educational factors, which are: instructions, advice, warnings, orders, prohibitions, rewards and punishments. The use of these measures should not involve humiliating some students in comparison to others. Discipline should not deprive children of freedom of mind, cheerfulness, and liveliness; and the goal can be reached by a teacher with “common pedagogical sense.”³⁰

3. Twardowski's Didactics and the Approaches of Selected Polish Educators

The terms “material education” and “formal education” are no longer used. They have been replaced by “knowledge” and “skills,” but this is only a terminological difference and not a difference in kind. Twardowski's thesis about the superiority of formal education (skills) over material education (knowledge) is correct, as is his diagnosis of the causes of neglecting skills education. The phenomenon of the domination of transferring knowledge without proper education of skills is still present in education and is called didactic encyclopedism (materialism).³¹ Newer didactics – similarly to Twardowski – analyses different types of curricula, including deductive, inductive, linear, concentric and spiral.³² Various lesson types are also considered, for example: lecture-style, problem-based, exercise-based, expository.³³ Twardowski's terminology in this regard is no longer sufficient, but it can still play an inspiring role, especially for a wider use of logical concepts in the theory of teaching (e.g., the analytical and synthetic curricula). Twardowski's statements about the correct curriculum are now reflected in the systemic principle.³⁴

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 215–218, 220–222.

³¹ B. Niemierko, *Kształcenie szkolne. Podręcznik skutecznej dydaktyki*, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2007, p. 31.

³² Cf. K. Kruszewski, *Nauczanie i uczenie się faktów, pojęć, zasad*, in: *Sztuka nauczania. Czynności nauczyciela*, 7th ed., ed. K. Kruszewski, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2012, pp. 158–160; K. Kruszewski, *Metody nauczania*, in: *Sztuka nauczania*, op. cit., pp. 196–198.

³³ F. Bereźnicki, *Podstawy dydaktyki*, 3rd ed., Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, Kraków 2011, pp. 321–328.

³⁴ The systemic principle consists primarily of: proper ordering and division of teaching material, mastering the previous material by the student, which is necessary to understand the new material, connection between the subjects taught, appropriate ordering of the activities of the teacher and students into a purposeful sequence of actions (cf. W. Okoń, *Wprowadzenie do dydaktyki ogólnej*, 5th ed., Wydawnictwo Akademickie Żak, Warszawa 2003, pp. 171–175).

The forms of teaching (acroamatic, heuristic, deictic) are now referred to as teaching methods. Newer didactics distinguishes between methods based on the word (talk, story, discussion, lecture, work with a book), on observation and measurement (e.g., the demonstration method), and on applied activity (e.g., the method of laboratory classes).³⁵ Another typology distinguishes expository methods (learning by assimilation), problem-focused methods (by discovering), valorizing methods (by experiencing) and applied methods (by doing).³⁶ The problem-focused methods are especially important, as they significantly go beyond the heuristic form of teaching that Twardowski writes about. These include the classic problem-focused method, as well as the methods of: cases, situational, simulation games, didactic games, micro-learning, and the exchange of ideas. The heuristic form in Twardowski's understanding roughly corresponds to the talk method.³⁷ Therefore, also in terms of teaching methods (forms), Twardowski's approach needs to be supplemented. This does not change the fact that his insights on the heuristic form (talks) have not lost their relevance. The same applies to the didactic theory of questions and answers, which at present – it seems – is sometimes treated too vaguely.³⁸

The postulate of visualization of knowledge as broadly as possible is entirely consistent with newer didactic theories which speak of the principle of visualization.³⁹ This alignment also extends to Twardowski's recommendation that exercises and assignments should be performed by students on their own. Currently,

³⁵ Cz. Kupisiewicz, *Dydaktyka. Podręcznik akademicki*, 13th ed., Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, Kraków 2012, p. 132.

³⁶ W. Okoń, *Wprowadzenie do dydaktyki*, op. cit., p. 245.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 255, 262–268. Wincenty Okoń distinguishes between an introductory talk, a talk presenting new knowledge, and a consolidative talk. An introductory talk prepares students for work, e.g., by reminding them of the knowledge they have or explaining new terms. A talk presenting new knowledge activates understanding of new material and connects it with the material already mastered. A consolidative talk operates on the material already mastered and connects it with some broader wholes, e.g., issues or systems (cf. ibid., pp. 254–256).

³⁸ E.g., Franciszek Bereźnicki states that questions should be clear, specific, understandable, unambiguous in their formulation, and addressed to all students; however, unlike Twardowski, he treats this topic superficially, without broader explanations and examples (cf. F. Bereźnicki, *Podstawy*, op. cit., p. 255). Czesław Kupisiewicz treats this issue similarly (cf. Cz. Kupisiewicz, *Dydaktyka*, op. cit., p. 138).

³⁹ Cf. W. Okoń, *Wprowadzenie do dydaktyki*, op. cit., pp. 175–178; F. Bereźnicki, *Podstawy*, op. cit., pp. 228–230; Cz. Kupisiewicz, *Dydaktyka*, op. cit., pp. 110–111. The postulate of visualization of knowledge has been present in didactics since at least the times of John Amos Comenius, so Twardowski's remarks on this subject were nothing new. However, the rules of visualization proposed

the principle of independence is related to an even wider range of didactic interactions, especially to the independence of thinking, acting, planning, carrying out and checking one's own work.⁴⁰ Newer Polish didactics also emphasizes the principles of accessibility, gradation of difficulty, combining theory with practice (Twardowski's practicality of learning), adapting the requirements to students' abilities, and the principle of the lastingness of knowledge (Twardowski's thoroughness of education).⁴¹

Twardowski's remarks regarding the teacher's personal influence, which serves both didactic and educational purposes, are important. A fundamental role in this respect is played by educational teaching and especially by its didactic aspect – Twardowski argues convincingly that teaching in accordance with the rules of didactics also leads to the achievement of educational goals of school. There seems to be too little coverage of this fundamental issue in the literature; some scholars do not even notice the influence of the correct teaching process on the achievement of educational goals.⁴² On the other hand, Twardowski assumes that school cannot provide a complete education, which is – it seems – consistent with the current views.⁴³

4. Conclusions

Kazimierz Twardowski's teaching theory cannot be considered complete today. It needs to be supplemented by the issues indicated in the previous section. It could also be accused of excessive "Herbartianism," that is, assigning a decisive role to the teacher in the teaching process. But this accusation would be justified only from the point of view of one of the non-objectivist paradigms. However, the question of the validity of individual didactic paradigms will be omitted here. It is only worth noting that the normative paradigm is still strongly represented in Polish didactics, it has strong points (such as, e.g., elegance and clarity of struc-

by Twardowski and the classification of its types are valuable and accurate (a similar classification of types of visualizing knowledge can be found in Cz. Kupisiewicz, *Dydaktyka*, op. cit. p. 134).

⁴⁰ W. Okoń, *Wprowadzenie do dydaktyki*, op. cit., pp. 178–181.

⁴¹ Cf. F. Bereźnicki, *Podstawy*, op. cit., pp. 230–231; Cz. Kupisiewicz, *Dydaktyka*, op. cit., pp. 113–115, 122–124.

⁴² E.g., Bereźnicki states that the common belief that educational tasks are automatically fulfilled as a result of teaching is not true (F. Bereźnicki, *Podstawy*, op. cit., p. 200).

⁴³ Cf., e.g., K. Konarzewski, *O wychowaniu w szkole*, in: *Sztuka nauczania*, op. cit., p. 284.

ture, systemic approach, emphasis on the multifaceted nature of teaching and learning), and among its representatives one can find outstanding Polish theoreticians of didactics, such as the cited here Wincenty Okoń, Czesław Kupisiewicz or Franciszek Bereźnicki.⁴⁴

The advantages of Twardowski's didactics definitely outweigh its imperfections. Its most important and current principles are as follows: the superiority of formal education over material education (i.e., teaching skills over the transfer of knowledge), the advantage of the heuristic method over the acroamatic one (the heuristic method should be extended by the more contemporary problem-focused methods), teacher's personal influence and educational teaching. One can therefore still derive benefits from reading *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki i logiki*, especially since this handbook contains many practical tips for implementing general didactic principles (e.g., on asking questions and assessing responses). Finally, the language of the handbook should be mentioned: it is concise, clear and simple, which is not always the case when it comes to pedagogical works. This book can therefore be used by both adepts of the teaching profession (as a practical guide) and pedagogical theorists (as a model of disquisition).

To sum up: Twardowski's didactics is not only of historical significance. Most of its principles remain relevant today, incorporating elements that are insufficiently addressed in current theories. An additional value is the clarity and brevity of the disquisition.

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⁴⁴ Cf. D. Klus-Stańska, *Dydaktyka wobec chaosu pojęć i zdarzeń*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie Żak, Warszawa 2010, p. 12; D. Klus-Stańska, *Paradygmaty dydaktyki*, op. cit., pp. 63, 76–77.

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Moral Aspects of Instruction and Education in the Lvov-Warsaw School

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Abstract: This article presents the educational and culture-forming impact of the Lvov-Warsaw School as a specific scientific and educational environment focused not only on shaping its scientific and research programme, but also on the moral aspects of upbringing and education. At the School, special attention was given to the precision of expression by emphasizing the postulate of clarity in thought and word, logical correctness, and methods of doing science in an objective, impartial, reliable and critical manner. Tolerance and freedom were two key principles respected by members of the School in conducting and publishing scientific research. The most important element of the relationship between the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School, Kazimierz Twardowski, and his students was the teacher's charisma combined with camaraderie, which resulted in the pedagogical success of both the founder of the School and his students. However, Twardowski did not impose any specific philosophical doctrine on his pupils; rather, he taught them, above all, clear and critical thinking. This specific philosophical minimalism became an essential element of the concept of philosophy practised in his school.

Key words: Lvov-Warsaw School, criticism in science, tolerance and freedom in science, dignity of the university

1. Introduction

The Lvov-Warsaw School of Philosophy was founded on 15 November 1895, when Kazimierz Twardowski became associate professor of philosophy at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov. The School's development spanned several stages. The initial period, which lasted about seven years, ended with the defence of the first doctoral theses written under Twardowski's supervision, and led to the formation of a group of his academic collaborators. The second period, spanning from 1916 to 1918, was marked by the formation of the views and interests of Twardowski's students. The third period, from 1918 to 1930, saw the crystallization of

the School's views. At that time, a logical school was founded in Warsaw, formed by students mentored by Twardowski, and the name "Lvov-Warsaw Philosophical School" came into common use. The School flourished in the 1930s, when it achieved its major academic successes and gained worldwide reputation, primarily thanks to the Warsaw School of Logic. The Lvov period may be seen as a kind of prelude to the mature stage of the Lvov-Warsaw School of Philosophy. A characteristic feature of the School was the emphasis it placed on academic collaboration, the expansion of international contacts, the publication of its own professional journals, and the creation of non-university academic institutions. Twardowski devoted a lot of time and attention to his students, and his goal was to educate and promote competent philosophers. He himself represented a moral attitude towards philosophy and passed it on to his disciples, convinced that philosophy was a true school of character in that it forged important moral ideals. The most important element of Twardowski's relationship with his students was the charisma of the teacher combined with camaraderie, which resulted in the pedagogical success of both the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School and his students. Twardowski, however, did not impose any specific philosophical doctrine on his pupils; first of all, he taught them clear and critical thinking. This peculiar philosophical minimalism became an essential element of the concept of philosophy practised in his School.

The educational and cultural impact of the Lvov-Warsaw School as an academic and educational community was based not only on the development of a scientific and research programme, but also on the moral aspects of instruction and education. The School attached particular importance to the precision of expression by emphasizing the postulate of clarity of thought and language, logical correctness, and methods of doing science in an objective, impartial, reliable and critical manner. A very important principle upheld in the Lvov-Warsaw School was freedom in conducting scientific research and the publication of findings.

Kazimierz Twardowski and his students, including Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, among others, proposed a number of improvements and solutions to enhance the efficiency of instruction and successfully incorporated them into academic practice. Many representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School performed important organizational functions in higher education, and three of them were university vice-chancellors. An important goal of their activities was to firmly establish the belief that academic schools are to create

a tradition of disseminating general knowledge at a higher level, and that the curriculum of studies in the humanities should include a mandatory course in the history of philosophy and logic.¹ In the Lvov-Warsaw School, the issues of instruction and education were closely linked to the personality of the academic teacher, and thus with their pedagogical talent and expertise. Only a teacher who commanded respect as a scientific and moral authority could earn the title of Master.

2. The Main Tenets of Ethics in the Lvov-Warsaw School

To analyse the moral aspects of instruction and education in the Lvov-Warsaw School, which were crucial to its functioning, it is necessary to present the most important ethical views developed by the philosophers of this formation, despite the fact that ethics was not their primary area of research.

Twardowski, the School's founder, was a cognitivist² in ethics, believing that judgements and moral norms result from cognitive activity. He had little confidence in the argument about the self-evident nature of judgements derived from heartfelt conviction and intuitive cognition. Twardowski's views underwent a kind of metamorphosis from apriorism and intuitionism³ to empiricism.⁴ He proposed that theoretical propositions in ethics should be derived from a generalization of facts provided by experience. He therefore regarded the commandment to love one's neighbour as an excessive demand on the moral subject, and proposed justice as a rational minimum that is achievable by applying the principles of scientific ethics. One may note, however, two epistemological and methodological arguments converging in Twardowski's ethical views. According to the first argument, based on induction, one arrives at beliefs that influence human moral choices through experience. The second argument, on the other

¹ T. Kotarbiński, *Funkcje społeczne* [Social Functions], in: T. Kotarbiński, *Wybór pism* [Selected Writings], Vol. 2, PWN, Warszawa 1958, pp. 481–483.

² The opposite of cognitivism is noncognitivism, which denies cognitive value to judgements. Non-cognitivism most commonly appears in the forms of subjectivism and nihilism. Cf. R.B. Brandt, *Etyka. Zagadnienia etyki normatywnej i metaetyki* [Ethics: Issues in Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics], PWN, Warszawa 1996, pp. 456–460.

³ K. Twardowski, *Etyka wobec teorii ewolucji* [Ethics in Relation to the Theory of Evolution], "Przełom" 1896, Vol. 1, No. 18, pp. 551–563.

⁴ K. Twardowski, *O zadaniach etyki naukowej* [On the Tasks of Scientific Ethics], "Etyka" 1973, Vol. 12, pp. 125–155.

hand, says that there are intuitively knowable just principles that influence the degree and direction in negotiating interests between people. This reveals some inconsistency in his theory, which nevertheless makes these ethical views an interesting set of propositions, including intuitive as well as empirical and rational elements. Twardowski believed that in order to be able to effectively moderate, reduce, or eliminate the aporias, the contradictions that exist between the interests of individuals and associations of individuals, it is necessary to combine people's empirically treated aspirations with moral principles recognized as axioms. This view probably stemmed from Twardowski's conviction that, though the world has an objectively organized structure, the moral subject can only gradually discover it through empirical experience.

Tadeusz Kotarbiński, one of Twardowski's students, is known as the originator of the concept of independent ethics.⁵ The postulate of the independence of ethics had already been advocated earlier by Twardowski himself. Ethics, at its starting point – that is, at the moment of experiencing morality – should be methodologically independent of other sciences. However, an analysis of ethical principles, whose content is determined by moral obligations, and a closer examination of the methods used to formulate these principles, reveal the dependence of ethics on philosophy. One such principle is, for example, that of respect for the human being as the basis of all moral obligations. Kotarbiński does not create a metaethical theory in which he critiques relativism, subjectivism or absolutism. However, he declares an aversion to utilitarianism and thus takes a position in axiology and, to an extent, in metaethics. This is because he assumes the cognitive character of ethics, since in ethics there is room for rational argumentation, and consequently there should be a common understanding of the terms and principles involved. When, for example, we evaluate an act in moral terms by stating that it is honourable or dishonourable, these are statements about persons, and such statements, according to Kotarbiński, have the feature of objectivity just like statements about things. Independent ethics, also called the ethics of practical realism or the ethics of a trustworthy protector, tries to answer the following question: how should one live and what should one do with their life in order to avoid feeling remorse, understood as a specific kind of shame? Kotarbiński believed this required moral knowledge, dialogue, and a figure of true authority as a role model in one's life.

⁵ T. Kotarbiński, *Zasady etyki niezależnej* [Principles of Independent Ethics], in: *Pisma etyczne* [Ethical Writings], Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1987.

Tadeusz Czeżowski, like Kotarbiński, was a proponent of autonomous ethics. He believed that the ways of constructing ethics, both inductive and deductive, must be methodologically autonomous. Ethics must fulfil the conditions of rational knowledge and be based on premises provided by science, but should nevertheless minimize dependence on scientific authorities. According to Czeżowski, the application of rationalized methods of reasoning in ethics makes its autonomous character possible.⁶ He believed that any ethical system must always be in touch with moral experience, which constitutes for ethics both a starting point and a kind of verifier. For we can never be sure whether the value system we have chosen is true, since a complete and absolute truth about what is good and what is evil is not attainable. We cannot arrive at it through speculation; we can only approach it. The moral experience on the basis of which we create our system of values is also a kind of test case for moral intuitions, which Czeżowski treats as a particular, personal, individual experience of what is good. Consequently, judgements on the value of a thing may be justified directly, that is, by appealing to the obvious. And even though such judgements are often false, we can eliminate and correct these errors. The art of skilful judgement should, according to Czeżowski, be practised and perfected, just like the art of observation. Developing and perfecting excellence in ethical observation provides the opportunity for increasingly effective human communication and thus the elimination of elitist value systems based on egotism.

However, Czeżowski also claimed that it is not always true that moral experience is the starting point, because the starting point may be the assessment of an already existing act, and experience in the form of an emotional reaction appears after the assessment.⁷

3. Implementation of the Ethos of the Lvov-Warsaw School

When Kazimierz Twardowski was appointed professor at Lvov University in 1895, he was only 25 years old. Upon taking up the Chair of Philosophy in Lvov, he in-

⁶ L. Gumański, *Tadeusz Czeżowski*, in: *Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Tadeusza Czeżowskiego* [Commemorative Book in Honour of Professor Tadeusz Czeżowski], ed. L. Gumański, Wydawnictwo UMK, Toruń 1980, pp. 5–8.

⁷ T. Czeżowski, *Czym są wartości – wprowadzenie do dyskusji* [What Are Values: Introduction to the Discussion], in: T. Czeżowski, *Pisma z etyki i teorii wartości* [Papers in Ethics and Value Theory], Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1989, p. 118.

tended to carry out a very ambitious yet seemingly modest plan: to create a new style of doing philosophy in Poland.⁸ His philosophical talent and pedagogical imagination led him to analyse philosophical problems using strict methods of research. This involved defining the method of scientific inquiry in philosophy, achieved by applying the criteria of clarity and validity of claims. Philosophy as a science was to be clear and properly substantiated. The renewal⁹ of Polish philosophy should begin, according to Twardowski, with teaching the subject at an appropriate level already in high school.

For philosophy to be taught at university level, it needed to be preceded by preparatory work which consisted in becoming familiar with scientific methods used in individual disciplines of science. In addition to all these postulates aimed at the revival of philosophy in Poland, Twardowski added yet another, and a very significant one. He claimed that practising philosophy consisted not only in solving theoretical problems, but was also a way to improve morally and gain practical wisdom, independence, and self-mastery.¹⁰

He was able to bring this plan to fruition thanks to his undeniable pedagogical talent and organizational skills. For example, already in his third year in charge of the Philosophy Department, he established the first philosophy seminar in Poland, and in 1901 his students had the opportunity to participate in experimental psychology classes, also held for the first time. In 1904, he founded the Polish Philosophical Society.

In 1911, in order to facilitate the publication of research papers by Lvov philosophers, Twardowski established the periodical “Ruch Filozoficzny” [Philosophical Movement]. It should be noted, however, that the purpose of founding the journal was not to make the Lvov community independent of the Warsaw-based “Przegląd Filozoficzny” [Philosophical Review], but to complement the latter with the most extensive information possible, above all on the philosophical “movement” in Poland and beyond.

⁸ H. Skolimowski, *Polish Analytical Philosophy*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1967, p. 128.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

¹⁰ A. Drabarek, *Etyka umiaru. Ideał człowieka i jego szczęście w poglądach filozofów ze Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej* [The Ethics of Moderation: The Ideal of a Person and Their Happiness in the Views of Philosophers from the Lvov-Warsaw School], Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2004, p. 26. Unless stated otherwise, all translations of citations are my own.

Twardowski's inexhaustible academic, pedagogical, organizational and popularizing activities "infected" his students as well. Not only did he act as a teacher delivering lectures in philosophy, or as the editor of the journal he founded, but he also gave talks and translated philosophical works into Polish.¹¹ Thanks to Twardowski, Poles had the opportunity to study the philosophical thought of antiquity, as he persuaded his student Władysław Witwicki, among others, to translate Plato's dialogues into Polish. Not surprisingly, Twardowski's students saw their teacher as a modern-day Socrates, not only because of the clarity of his thought and language, but also because of his uncompromising commitment to putting moral principles into practice. He impressed them with the moral courage with which he proclaimed his views, and that helped him enlist numerous followers from among whom he was able to select the most talented ones, those most useful to philosophy. Therefore, the high level of education, so characteristic of the Lvov-Warsaw School, was founded, among other things, on the fact that it placed very high substantive and moral demands on both teachers and students, who had to demonstrate independent and creative thinking. Not all of Twardowski's students reached such a high level of creative activity; those who met these demands, however, thanks to the pedagogical imagination of their teacher, were very well prepared to pursue independent exploration in philosophy. Twardowski's teaching activity encompassed the ideal of philosophical education, the method of instruction, and the manner of its implementation. He believed the ideal of a philosopher consisted of both intellectual and moral moments, strength of thought and strength of character modelled on the ancient sages. In the teaching method he used, he supplemented curricular work with other forms of intellectual encounter, reaching far beyond the university. An important part of this method was the example he set with his own life and work. This approach to implementing his teaching method addressed the fundamental issues of pedagogy, as it maintained a proper balance between instruction and education. Twardowski educated through teaching. He shaped character by developing moral principles in his students – specifically, a belief in the existence of the absolute values of truth and goodness.¹²

¹¹ For example, he translated *Nietzsche's Philosophy* by Hans Vaihinger, and, together with his student Jan Łukasiewicz, David Hume's *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.

¹² A. Drabarek, *Etyka umiaru*, op. cit., p. 29; K. Sośnicki, *Działalność pedagogiczna Kazimierza Twardowskiego* [Kazimierz Twardowski's Pedagogical Activities], "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1959, Vol. 19, Nos. 1–2, pp. 24–29.

3.1. Integrity and Criticism in Science

Specific rules of procedure in the pursuit of scientific truth were not only developed, but also followed by Twardowski and his students of the Lvov-Warsaw School. In order to adhere to the principle of scientific integrity, it was necessary to demand high competence and to respect the limits of such competence, and not to succumb to the temptation of presenting less substantiated claims as better justified ones, or even as dogmas. Tadeusz Czeżowski, a student of Twardowski's, explicitly criticized such an attitude, stating that integrity in science was:

the opposite of shoddy workmanship, sloppiness, all kinds of fraud – but also negligence and disregard for duty, chasing advantage at the lowest cost.¹³

Integrity in science is primarily founded on methodological reliability. To meet its demands, according to Czeżowski, it is necessary to formulate the claims that make up a theory accurately, clearly and precisely, and to properly substantiate them. Such substantiation may be presented both in the form of axioms, definitions, proven theses, and in the form of conjectures which are more or less probable.

It is also worth quoting a statement made by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz regarding the postulate of integrity in science. He wrote:

[T]hink in such a way that you know well what you are thinking about; speak in such a way that you not only know well what you are talking about, but also that you can be sure the one to whom you are speaking, listening to you attentively, will be thinking about the same thing as you; whatever you assert, assert it with as much firmness as the logical force of your argument allows.¹⁴

According to philosophers of the Lvov-Warsaw School, the integrity required in scientific proceedings should further be supported by the principle of critical thinking. Twardowski aptly describes the pathologies in doing science and presenting the truth that critical thinking shields us from, and says that this is precisely what is taught by philosophy, for:

¹³ W. Tyburski, *Etos uczonego w Szkole Lwowsko-Warszawskiej* [Ethos of the Scholar in the Lvov-Warsaw School], in: *Polska filozofia analityczna. W kręgu Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej* [Polish Analytical Philosophy: In the Circle of the Lvov-Warsaw School], eds. R. Wiśniewski, W. Tyburski, Wydawnictwo UMK, Toruń 1999, p. 131.

¹⁴ K. Ajdukiewicz, *Pozanaukowa działalność Kazimierza Twardowskiego* [Non-Scientific Activities of Kazimierz Twardowski], "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1959, Vol. 19, Nos. 1–2, p. 31.

it awakens in us a criticism that protects us from blindly yielding to authorities, from comfortably indulging in nice little intellectual habits, and from putting too much trust in our human reason, which is so very limited; it makes us demand clarity and exactness wherever the scientific argumentation is to be applied, and fight against all kinds of muddles of thought that strive to replace with their intoxicating vagueness the grasp of details and overall clarity.¹⁵

The criticism, not judgementalism, so desirable in science should be based on a sound analysis of the views being evaluated. This attitude requires courage, therefore, rather than conformism and bias. Such an attitude of particular diligence should be developed by the scholar first of all in relation to their own views, because self-criticism and an uncompromising attitude to one's own errors in scientific reasoning gives us the right to criticize others; otherwise, it becomes morally suspect. However, the criticism so desirable in the work of a scholar must not turn into a conviction of one's own infallibility and the rightness of one's judgement, as this often leads to conceit and pride. An attitude lacking humility, contrary to that Socratic "I know that I know nothing," generates an unreasonable complacency that prevents the scholar from acknowledging the possibility of being wrong. And error, according to Czeżowski, is a kind of "sanction that warns us against the sin of pride, laziness and passion."¹⁶

3.2. Tolerance and Scientific Freedom in the Lvov-Warsaw School

Did the philosophers of the Lvov-Warsaw School not contradict the principle of tolerance, which was one of the important virtues of this School, in following the principle of reliable criticism in science? No, they did not, for Twardowski's students argued that despite his absolute respect for the principle of criticism in science, their master did not impose any substantive views on them and was a tolerant person.¹⁷ This was because tolerance in the Lvov-Warsaw School was understood as both acceptance of every view and the freedom to advocate for it. It was a rational tolerance, founded on respect for human intellectual effort.

¹⁵ K. Twardowski, *O dostojęństwie uniwersytetu* [On the Dignity of the University], Uniwersytet Poznański, Poznań 1933, par. 16.

¹⁶ T. Czeżowski, *Pożyteczność błędu*, [The Usefulness of Error], in: T. Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne* [Philosophical Lectures], 2nd ed., PWN, Toruń 1969, p. 208.

¹⁷ T. Kotarbiński, *Funkcje społeczne*, op. cit., p. 205.

It could also be described as “reasonable” tolerance, supported by the demand for reliable justification, which, in turn, led to the rejection of error or baseless claims. When speaking of tolerance, Twardowski was primarily concerned with views on issues for which there was no satisfactory solution, or at least none that had been proposed thus far.

Consequently, unfair means in a discussion, imposing one’s opinion in an arbitrary manner, and applying undue pressure were eliminated in favour of dialogue with the discussion partner. The School upheld the belief that everyone should be able to advocate their own views, while having the right to criticize ideas which they disagreed with if they considered them to be wrong and insufficiently substantiated. Czeżowski, who advocated a benevolent tolerance even for opposing views, made a very interesting point on the matter. He believed that respect for dissenting views was perfectly illustrated by the maxim *victus sed non convictus*:

The formula *victus sed non convictus* – defeated but not convinced – expresses a psychological truth, which is applicable at times. For it is not enough to show the truth to someone in order to win him over; it must be assimilated by his own effort; he must become familiar with it, so that it becomes his truth – and this takes time, sometimes years, to achieve.¹⁸

The model of tolerance pursued by members of the Lvov-Warsaw School was possible only on the premise of freedom to practise science and scientific research. This was understood, first, as personal, internal resilience that prevented one from succumbing to “any motives leading to a betrayal of the postulate of integrity,”¹⁹ and second, as external freedom that guaranteed autonomy in conducting scientific research and criticism. Twardowski distinguished these two dimensions of freedom as the scholar’s freedom of research and the institutional freedom of science. At this point, it is worth citing a statement by Czeżowski, who wrote about freedom in science in his *Odczyty filozoficzne* [Philosophical Lectures], published after the war, criticizing the process of making science partisan, which threatened its autonomy:

¹⁸ T. Czeżowski, *O dyskusji i dyskutowaniu* [On Discussion and Debating], in: T. Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne* [Philosophical Lectures], 2nd ed., PWN, Toruń 1969, p. 194.

¹⁹ T. Czeżowski, *O rzetelności, obiektywności i bezstronności w badaniach naukowych* [On Reliability, Objectivity and Impartiality in Scientific Research], in: T. Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne* [Philosophical Lectures], 2nd ed., PWN, Toruń 1969, p. 209.

One of the greatest dangers which threaten the taking of such an independent, unbiased attitude towards objective truth, is internal adherence, rather than mere formal affiliation, to organizations which order their members to profess certain beliefs, or at least to behave as if they professed them. Whoever wishes to serve such an organization faithfully relinquishes their spiritual independence and will resent anything that opposes such beliefs; they will easily be tempted to disregard arguments for the acceptance of facts or opinions that are incompatible with such beliefs – and if they are nevertheless forced to recognize them, they will be prepared to do so only in the secret of their thoughts; they will not want to boldly profess them, even though as a professor, which literally means “one who professes,” they are obliged to do so. Such danger is not, as we know, equally great for all fields of scientific research. There are directions in the search for objective truth so far removed from all matters of life, and methodically so developed that there is no fear that any non-scientific considerations could distort them. Other scientific issues, on the other hand, are so intertwined with current interests and so closely connected with our emotional life that one who wishes to consider them exclusively in terms of objective truth must make a truly heroic effort not to let oneself be pushed off the only right path, the one defined by the scientific method.²⁰

Ajdukiewicz, on the other hand, claimed that freedom of science is the freedom of the scholar to choose the subject of their research and the method of substantiating it, which is guaranteed by the freedom of thought and speech.

[F]reedom of thought consists, first of all, in that one has the right to believe and is able to believe in anything and only that which is supported by factual arguments, and there is no obligation or necessity to believe in anything that is not supported by rational arguments, much less in something against which such arguments speak.²¹

Arguing in favour of freedom in science, Czeżowski also draws attention to the concepts of objectivity and impartiality, which, when used in scientific discourse, are not identical. Objectivity is understood here as refusing to succumb to

²⁰ T. Czeżowski, *W sprawie deontologii pracownika naukowego* [On the Deontology of the Researcher], in: T. Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne* [Philosophical Lectures], 2nd ed., PWN, Toruń 1969, p. 245.

²¹ K. Ajdukiewicz, *O wolności nauki* [On Freedom of Science], “*Nauka Polska*” 1957, No. 3, p. 10.

sympathies and antipathies both in judging oneself and others, and being guided primarily by the principle of scientific criticism. Thus, it is possible, Czeżowski believes, to remain objective by joining one of the arguing sides, the one which, according to the objective researcher, is in the right. As for the principle of impartiality, he understood it differently. He wrote:

We have distinguished between impartiality in the narrower and in the broader sense, impartiality of the arbitrator and impartiality of the observer. A researcher remains an impartial observer when he publishes his findings even if they can be used to support an opposing view, as long as the researcher remains solely on the scientific position and does not use his findings to draw any practical consequences entering into the subject of the dispute. This is because the responsibility for these consequences rests solely with the one who draws them. A researcher remains an impartial arbiter, on the other hand, even when based on his findings he enters into a dispute, but in doing so does not go beyond the limits of his scientific competence. This way of understanding impartiality is related to the demand for the autonomy of science and makes a case against any subordination to political or other considerations of its right to be guided solely by the directives of logic and scientific methodology. This entitlement, in turn, flows from the premise that what is true is also right. The righteous pursuits of politics and other spheres of activity in life do not need to fetter science in its pursuit of truth following the right paths, as they do not need to fear the truth; on the contrary, the shackling of science by the powers that be leads to the conclusion that these powers are not backed by the truth and are not pursuing righteous goals. The claim that science is not objective and impartial is therefore untenable with this understanding of objectivity and impartiality. However, it has other aspects as well. In one of them, it insinuates that researchers holding certain views have intentions directly incompatible with scientific integrity. Such an allegation, in order to be justified, would have to be based on a thorough analysis of the argumentation of the author being criticized and on a demonstration that such argumentation does not satisfy the precepts of scientific integrity. In the absence of such an analysis, it must be rejected as unacceptable.²²

²² T. Czeżowski, *O rzetelności*, op. cit., p. 211.

Impartiality and objectivity in science must coexist with the virtue of responsibility, which should be treated as a moral value. These principles of discipline in scientific inquiry are not just general methodological rules that complement reflection in research; they become axiological principles that are essential to the research process. Czeżowski rejects arguments that demonstrate the impossibility of applying the principle of objectivity and impartiality in science, citing social, economic and political determinism that makes scientists dependent on the external conditions in which they live. He believes this argumentation points to the relativity of cognition, which may ultimately overcome relativism, but only in favour of a worldview considered to be the expression of the highest form of evolution. However, according to Czeżowski, any such justification can be subjected to the test of critical analysis, where only those assumptions that are most substantiated are accepted. When it becomes apparent that a scholar is being forced to accept such a view, they may consider this type of pressure to be “a weapon of militant dogmatism.”²³ Giving in to this pressure contradicts the principles that should guide a scholar.

This attitude was primarily exhibited in the Lvov-Warsaw School by Twardowski, who considered the independence of science from ideological pressures a priority. He insisted that the university must renounce prejudices arising from traditions and customs, peer pressure, or subjective preferences that interfere with the pursuit of objective knowledge.²⁴

3.3. The Dignity of the University

In his seminal work *O dostojęństwie uniwersytetu* [On the Dignity of the University], Twardowski wrote:

[T]he task of the University is to pursue scientific truths and probabilities and to cultivate the ability to inquire into them. The very core and nucleus of academic work is thus scientific creativity, both in terms of content and method. [...] From these efforts grows the edifice of scientific knowledge, objective knowledge which demands recognition solely on the basis that it is, according to the laws of logic, substantiated, and which imposes itself on the human mind solely but irresistibly by the force of argument. The objective nature of

²³ Ibid., p. 212.

²⁴ K. Twardowski, *O dostojęństwie uniwersytetu*, op. cit., par. 3.

scientific inquiry is highlighted in that it does not take orders from any external factors, and that it does not want to serve any incidental considerations, but recognizes only experience and reasoning as its masters, and that it only has one task: to pursue properly substantiated judgements that are true or, at least as probable as possible. Serving this purpose, the University is indeed radiant with dignity, flowing down to it from the momentous significance of the function it performs. After all, it brings man the light of pure knowledge; it enriches and deepens science, it discovers ever new truths and probabilities – in a word, it creates the highest intellectual values that man may ever achieve.²⁵

In writing these words, Twardowski expressed his belief that excessive interference of state authorities and politics in matters of the university was an impediment not only for reasons of prestige, undermining, as it were, the independence of scientific institutions, but also because it restricted their scientific and moral development. Therefore, the goals and tasks of universities and schools that he considered to be most important should not be restricted either by the state or the Church. Twardowski and his students realized that the strength of the newly created Polish society after 123 years of captivity lay in the wisdom and knowledge of its individual citizens, and that only through instruction and education could a rationally understood patriotism be promoted within the nation. Twardowski's students were similarly critical of the university's dependence on the state.²⁶ The independence of the university was also discussed by Czeżowski in his treatise *O stosunku nauki do państwa* [On the Relation of Science and the State].²⁷ In his view, schools were, of course, state institutions and as such served the purposes of the state. And the state made it the goal of schools to teach and educate citizens to perform their civic duties to the best of their ability. Such citizens should display an appropriate degree of mental development as well as moral and patriotic

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ In his treatise entitled *Idea wolności* [The Idea of Freedom], T. Kotarbiński wrote: "The authorities must not exert pressure on the beliefs of teachers in general. Beating minority students at universities should not be tolerated. The introduction of a law to remove professors from universities for their beliefs and views is a glaring example of the lack of freedom or tolerance in a country that has fought for them for so long" (in T. Kotarbiński, *Wybór pism* [Selected Writings], Vol. 1: *Myśli o działaniu* [Thoughts on Actions], PWN, Warszawa 1957, p. 119).

²⁷ T. Czeżowski, *O stosunku nauki do państwa* [On the Relation of Science and the State], Komisja Jubileuszowa Kasy im. Mianowskiego, Warszawa 1933.

principles consistent with the good of the state and their fellow citizens. And yet, Czeżowski claimed, the school could contribute to the fulfilment of these important goals only if science was not subordinated to the partisan interests of those in political power. It was imperative that university and school authorities, along with teachers and students, placed science at the forefront and recognized education as the main means of instruction. He wrote:

Understood this way, school instruction not only teaches, but also educates. For by requiring diligence and perseverance, it trains the will and teaches one to overcome difficulties and obstacles. It points to the ideal that is the most lofty, the most pure, because it is higher than all particular struggles and desires – the all-human ideal of truth. And by instilling selfless love of truth, it builds the foundation of ethics in souls, since all ethical action is selfless. A school that loses its proper scientific character, however, is a bad school not only from a scientific point of view, but also from the state's point of view. It becomes like a rudderless boat, tossed about by waves of interests and political compromises – such a school will be regarded by any party that comes to power as an instrument for educating the youth in the spirit of its ideology.²⁸

Thus, Czeżowski's beliefs concerning truth and the role of the university in its proclamation resonate with Twardowski's view when he states, unequivocally, that the primary task and ethical obligation of scholars and teachers is the diligent pursuit of truth, as this is their duty to society. This obligation is further reinforced by the moral imperative, emphasized by Czeżowski, in the form of a connection between methodology and ethics. Related to this postulate is the principle of integrity, which is the basic criterion for the validity of logically substantiated beliefs and scientific judgements. Therefore, no considerations other than those mentioned above can determine which claims a scholar should defend and which should be rejected. Such an attitude also prepares one to falsify a previously adopted view and abandon it, if it turns out to be wrong or insufficiently substantiated. Indeed, the possibility of error is an opportunity in the scholar's work, provided that they are prepared to accept valid criticism and review an erroneous position.²⁹

²⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

²⁹ T. Czeżowski, *Pożyteczność błędu*, op. cit., p. 208.

4. Conclusions

Kazimierz Twardowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, and Tadeusz Czeżowski, as teachers and educators of the younger generation, were well aware of the responsibilities and duties that come with being a teacher. A teacher and educator must be truthful and must be convinced of the correctness of what they claim. For, as Kotarbiński wrote:

In the aura of half-truths, untruths or anti-truths, the teacher's function becomes disabled. Polarized light transforms into a laser that may serve to cut, but can no longer serve to enlighten.³⁰

Therefore, intellectual improvement should go hand in hand with moral improvement, for only together can they produce a positive outcome – wise individuals who act prudently, effectively and are guided in life by the principles of kindness and justice. The relationship between teacher and student must not be based on falsehood or equivocation, for the resulting harm extends beyond one person inflicting damage on another. This evil is much broader in scope, undermining faith in the authority of the teacher, the very person who is supposed to teach others how to arrive at truth and goodness. A society deprived of teachers with steadfast moral principles and extensive knowledge will inevitably degenerate, losing the opportunity to develop and improve itself.

Through their publications, lectures, scientific and didactic work, Twardowski and his students made a significant impact on the cultural development in Poland. World War II interrupted the activities of the Lvov-Warsaw School, but after the war, the vast majority of its representatives worked at Polish universities. Thanks to Kotarbiński, Czeżowski, Ajdukiewicz and many others, a new generation of scholars emerged, raised in the good old traditions handed down to them by Twardowski's students.

It must be said that the approach to doing philosophy pursued by the Lvov-Warsaw School, together with its principles of ethics, remains valid and operational, as it enables comparing alternative concepts by contrasting their characteristic features. In the concept of moral instruction and education proposed by

³⁰ T. Kotarbiński, *Moje marzenie* [My Dream], in: T. Kotarbiński, *Myśli o ludziach i ludzkich sprawach* [Thoughts on People and Human Affairs], Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Warszawa 1986, p. 333.

Twardowski and his students, I can see elements of Aristotle's virtue ethics, which serve as a natural ally for those involved in education. The need to revitalize the moral principles proposed by the Lvov-Warsaw School aligns with contemporary theories of virtue ethics as presented in the works of Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum, and others.³¹

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³¹ A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN, 1981; M.C. Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997.

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Ingarden's Criticism of Twardowski's Philosophical Programme and the Reception of Phenomenology in the Lvov-Warsaw School*

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Abstract: This paper examines Roman Ingarden's criticism of Kazimierz Twardowski's philosophical programme. According to Ingarden, the style of philosophizing cultivated by Twardowski prevented his students from engaging in complex philosophical problems. Ingarden's writings suggest that, as a result, they ignored phenomenology. The paper argues that Ingarden's criticism is not entirely accurate. Members of the Lvov-Warsaw School were familiar with Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, and although they often criticized it, they recognized its value. Moreover, it can be demonstrated that Husserl's ideas influenced several of Twardowski's students.

Key words: Twardowski's philosophical programme, philosophical styles, phenomenology vs analytic philosophy, philosophical education, philosophical methods, Kazimierz Twardowski, Roman Ingarden

1. Introduction

The Lvov-Warsaw School (henceforth: LWS) is widely recognized as the Polish school of analytic philosophy.¹ This is because the most significant accomplishments of this school pertain to the fields of mathematical logic and philosophy of language. The style in which the LWS members conducted their research – em-

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¹ H. Skolimowski, *Polish Analytical Philosophy: A Survey and a Comparison with British Analytical Philosophy*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1967; J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1989; J. Jadacki, *Polish Analytical Philosophy*, Semper, Warszawa 2009; A. Brożek et al., *Anti-Irrationalism: Philosophical Methods in the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Semper, Warszawa 2020.

phasizing clarity of speech and justification of statements – also contributed to the school’s recognition. However, this style of philosophizing did not originate from the source of the analytic tradition, which is English philosophy. Its roots lie in Austrian philosophy, specifically the School of Brentano, of which Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the LWS, was a member. Twardowski was so impressed by Brentano’s way of teaching that he set himself the goal of disseminating the “Brentanian style” of philosophizing among the Poles.²

Another significant aspect of the Brentano School is relevant in this context. Namely, Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, like Twardowski, was Brentano’s student. Hence, the LWS and the phenomenological movement share the same roots. The periods of Twardowski’s and Husserl’s studies in Vienna overlap to some extent, and their acquaintance resulted in mutual interest in each other’s work.³ This connection enabled several of Twardowski’s students to visit Husserl in Göttingen and Freiburg im Breisgau.⁴ One of those students was Roman Ingarden, who initially studied at the University of Lvov (now Lviv, Ukraine).⁵ In Göttingen, Ingarden became acquainted with phenomenology and decided to work on his doctoral dissertation under Husserl’s supervision.⁶ Ingarden was a passionate opponent of the style and genre of philosophy cultivated by Twardowski’s students.⁷ At the same time, up until 1939, he stayed close to the environment of the LWS.

² K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. J.L. Brandl, J. Woleński, Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta 1999, p. 28.

³ See E. Husserl, *Besprechung von: K. Twardowski “Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine Psychologische Untersuchung”*, in: E. Husserl, *Aufsätze und Rezensionen 1890–1910. Husserliana*, Vol. 22, ed. B. Rang, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague-Boston-London 1979, pp. 349–358; E. Husserl, *Intentional Objects*, in: R.D. Rollinger, *Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano*, Springer, Dordrecht 1999, pp. 251–284. According to Karl Schuhmann, those discussions led Husserl to formulate his theory of intentionality. See K. Schuhmann, *Husserl and Twardowski*, in: *Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School*, eds. F. Conglione, R. Poli, J. Woleński, Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta 1993, pp. 41–58.

⁴ The list of Twardowski’s students who studied under Husserl includes Stefan Błachowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Henryk Mehlberg, and Leopold Blaustein. See W. Płotka, *Early Phenomenology in Poland (1895–1945): Origins, Development, and Breakdown*, “Studies in Eastern European Thought” 2017, Vol. 69, pp. 79–91.

⁵ The Polish name of the city is Lwów.

⁶ R. Ingarden, *Moje wspomnienia o Edmundzie Husserlu*, “Studia Filozoficzne” 1981, Vol. 2, p. 9. For the original German version of the text, see R. Ingarden, *Meine Erinnerungen an Edmund Husserl*, in: E. Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden. Mit Erläuterungen und Erinnerungen an Husserl*, ed. R. Ingarden, Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag 1968, pp. 106–135.

⁷ On Ingarden’s relationship with the LWS, see A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, eds., *Intuition and Analysis: Roman Ingarden and the School of Kazimierz Twardowski*, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2022.

This paper sets two goals. First, it examines Ingarden's standpoint in relation to Twardowski's philosophical programme. Second, it assesses whether this programme impacted the reception of phenomenology by the LWS. Ingarden argues that the style of philosophizing cultivated by Twardowski and his students prevented them from engaging in complex philosophical inquiries. He seems to hold an implicit view that this programme led them to ignore phenomenology. However, I argue that it did not force LWS members to such extremes. I suggest instead that Twardowski's programme may have influenced how they engaged with Husserl's philosophy. A separate, extensive study would be required to describe and analyse in detail the various ways in which Twardowski's students responded to Husserl's philosophy and phenomenology in general. In this paper, I will only highlight the main figures, their key viewpoints and the areas in which they made use of Husserl's philosophy.

The paper is divided into three sections. First, I briefly sketch the fundamental elements of Twardowski's philosophical programme. Second, I present Ingarden's criticism of this programme and justify my view that Ingarden implicitly believes that it contributes to the LWS's reluctance towards phenomenology. Third, I argue that this criticism is too radical by showing diverse attempts made by Twardowski's students to tackle Husserl's philosophy.

2. The Essentials of Twardowski's Philosophical Programme

Twardowski provides the characteristics of his philosophical programme in various papers and speeches,⁸ and he admits it is inspired by Brentano's

⁸ K. Twardowski, *On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products*, op. cit., pp. 257–260; K. Twardowski, *Opening Lecture at the Lvov University*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Prejudices, Judgements and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, Rodopi, Amsterdam–New York, 2015, pp. 35–44; K. Twardowski, *Address at the Inauguration of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Prejudices, Judgements*, op. cit., pp. 45–50; K. Twardowski, *Psychology vs. Physiology and Philosophy*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products*, op. cit., pp. 41–64; K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., pp. 26–29. Numerous studies explore the LWS's philosophical style and methodology, e.g., M. Rzewuska, *O języku, stylu i polszczyźnie filozofów szkoły Twardowskiego*, in: *Rozprawy filozoficzne*, ed. L. Gumański, Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu, Toruń 1969, pp. 313–333; J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy*, op. cit.; A. Brożek et al., *Anti-Irrationalism*, op. cit.; R. Kleszcz, *Metoda i wartości. Metafilozofia Kazimierza Twardowskiego*, Semper, Warszawa 2013; M. Będkowski, *"Jasnościowcy". O stylu naukowym Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej z perspektywy idei prostego języka (rekonesans)*, "Oblicza Komunikacji" 2019, Vol. 11, pp. 87–104.

approach.⁹ Overall, Twardowski's philosophical programme consists of three elements: (1) the concept of philosophy, (2) the philosophical style, and (3) the programme of philosophical education.

2.1. The Concept of Philosophy

There are five main components of Twardowski's concept of philosophy. First, Twardowski regarded philosophy as a science based on experience, including internal (psychic) and external (sensory) perception.¹⁰ Second, he argues that philosophy is the name of a set of "philosophical sciences" that includes the theory of knowledge, psychology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, philosophy of history, and philosophy of natural sciences.¹¹ Third, Twardowski initially considers psychology to be the basis of other philosophical disciplines since they all require internal perception or both internal and external perception.¹² However, around 1902, he changed some of his views in response to Husserl's arguments against psychologism.¹³ Fourth, according to Twardowski, philosophy and the natural sciences differ neither in subject nor method.¹⁴ Initially, he considered metaphysics to be the bridge between these two kinds of sciences, but he later started to doubt whether scientific metaphysics was possible.¹⁵ Finally, Twardowski believed that truth is the foremost aim of philosophy.¹⁶

A number of Twardowski's students adopted such a concept of philosophy.¹⁷ They developed and applied various methods (analysis of concepts, paraphras-

⁹ K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., p. 20.

¹⁰ K. Twardowski, *Opening Lecture*, op. cit., pp. 36–37.

¹¹ K. Twardowski, *Psychology vs. Physiology*, op. cit., p. 60. It should be noted that Twardowski excludes the history of philosophy from this set. K. Twardowski, *On Scientific Preparation for Philosophy*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Prejudices, Judgements*, op. cit., p. 58.

¹² K. Twardowski, *On Psychology vs. Physiology*, op. cit., p. 60.

¹³ K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., p. 31. Jan Woleński distinguishes between ontological and methodological psychologism in Twardowski's philosophy. Because of Husserl's argument, Twardowski rejected ontological psychologism (objects studied by philosophy are mental), but he sustained methodological psychologism (inner perception is the basis of philosophical inquiry). J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 41.

¹⁴ K. Twardowski, *Opening Lecture*, op. cit., pp. 37–39.

¹⁵ K. Twardowski, *Address at the 25th Anniversary Session of the Polish Philosophical Society*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products*, op. cit., pp. 271–272.

¹⁶ K. Twardowski, *Opening Lecture*, op. cit., p. 43. Moreover, Twardowski defended the absoluteness of truth against relativism. See K. Twardowski, *On So-Called Relative Truths*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Actions, Products*, op. cit., p. 148.

¹⁷ See A. Brożek et al., *Anti-Irrationalism*, op. cit., pp. 40, 51, 64, 71, 74–75.

ing, axiomatization, and formalization) across all philosophical disciplines.¹⁸ One should also note that a lot of LWS members did not accept the distinguishing of psychology and were adherents of anti-psychologism in logic.¹⁹

2.2. The Philosophical Style

I adopt Leon Koj's concept of "philosophical style," which includes the subject matter, point of departure, type of argumentation, scope of philosophical theories (maximalism vs minimalism), attitude towards history, literary form, accepted assumptions, and value system.²⁰ In this vein, Twardowski's idea of philosophical style consists of four primary components: (1) clarity of speech, (2) justification of statements, (3) minimalistic scope of inquiry, and (4) value system. All of them are certain prescriptions or postulates.

(1) The postulate of clarity of speech is so essential for the LWS members that they are sometimes called "clarity-makers."²¹ Basically, Twardowski argued that even the most complex philosophical problems can be formulated and expressed clearly if one is clear with oneself.²² If one thinks clearly, one writes clearly; hence, obscure philosophical writing is a sign of obscure thought. He does not accept the excuse made by some philosophers that the complexity of philosophical problems is the reason for obscure writing.²³ Moreover, Twardowski makes a somewhat controversial claim: if philosophical work is unclear, one should not strain to understand it.²⁴

(2) The second component of Twardowski's philosophical style emphasizes the proper justification of statements and exact thinking.²⁵ Reliable justification stands above adherence to any philosophical school or attachment to a philosophical system.²⁶ According to Twardowski, the problem with philosophical systems, schools, or any "-isms" is that they are often built upon theses accepted

¹⁸ Those methods are discussed in detail in A. Brożek et al., *Anti-Irrationalism*, op. cit.

¹⁹ J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 83.

²⁰ L. Koj, *O stylach w filozofii*, "Edukacja Filozoficzna" 1991, Vol. 12, pp. 85–86. See A. Brożek, *O stylach filozoficznych i dylematach metodologicznych*, "Analiza i Egzystencja" 2009, Vol. 10, pp. 77–89.

²¹ See M. Będkowski, *"Jasnościowcy"*, op. cit., p. 104.

²² K. Twardowski, *On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style*, op. cit., p. 257.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 257–258.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 258–259.

²⁵ K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., p. 28.

²⁶ K. Twardowski, *Opening Lecture*, op. cit., p. 42.

without proper justification. As a result, thinkers who adhere to one school or system “in principle” condemn those who adhere to another.²⁷ However, if philosophers were only concerned about facts, justification, and truth – like scientists – they would not have such diverse philosophical systems since “there is only one truth in every subject.”²⁸

(3) Next, Twardowski proposes a “minimalistic” way of conducting philosophical investigations. Namely, instead of constructing whole philosophical systems by means of speculation, he prefers to examine specific issues and systematically gather detailed knowledge.²⁹ He considers philosophy to be a science created by a joint effort of many, not a result of the work of one genius.³⁰

(4) Last but not least, Twardowski demands philosophers cultivate the values of criticism, anti-dogmatism, and independence. Those values are developed through a constant exchange of ideas during discussions and debates, which are much more essential to philosophy than to other sciences.³¹ According to Twardowski, the philosophical sciences exist in “far-ranging abstraction and deal with questions which are invariably connected [...] with man’s spiritual life, easily exposing the issue to numerous mistakes.”³² Hence, philosophers tend to overlook certain facts and interpret them falsely. Therefore, mutual peer control is indispensable since co-workers who see the problems from different angles can prevent one-sidedness.³³ Another virtue nurtured by Twardowski is independent thinking; he argues that “next to the correct method and pure love for truth, independence of thought has always seemed to me to offer the most secure warrant for succeeding in scientific work.”³⁴ By independence of thought, Twardowski means that one should free oneself from the influence of those factors that muddy one’s thinking; independent thought is only concerned with whether a given opinion is true and logically valid.³⁵

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 43.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 41.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 43.

³¹ K. Twardowski, *Address at the Inauguration*, op. cit., p. 47.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., p. 48.

³⁴ K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., p. 27.

³⁵ K. Twardowski, *Independence of Thinking*, in: K. Twardowski, *On Prejudices, Judgements*, op. cit., p. 89.

2.3. Philosophical Education

To enable his students to meet the demands described above, Twardowski created a programme of philosophical education and institutions devoted to philosophy, like the Polish Philosophical Society and a journal called "Ruch Filozoficzny" [Philosophical Movement].³⁶ His educational programme is well conceived and has two primary objectives. First, to enable students "to become acquainted with the most important branches of philosophy, the respective problems and methods of dealing with them, and the most characteristic attempts at their solution."³⁷ Second, to show students the proper path and allow them to seek out the goal by themselves. Even if their goal differs from Twardowski's.³⁸ To achieve those objectives, Twardowski created a set of "core courses" that emphasized a methodical approach but did not neglect the history of philosophy. However, since he believed lectures were not the most effective means to "steer young people in those directions," he inaugurated a philosophical seminar at the University of Lvov.³⁹ This allowed students to participate in regular, systematic exercises and discussions, which Twardowski considered indispensable to philosophical education.

This general overview of Twardowski's educational programme is incomplete without several details. Namely, the ideal he created requires students to become acquainted with scientific disciplines outside philosophy, including mathematics, one natural science, and one of the humanities.⁴⁰ Equally important is education in both the history of philosophy and recent philosophy.⁴¹ Finally, it is essential to read classical philosophical works in the original. Hence, the knowledge of Greek and Latin is indispensable.⁴²

Let's emphasize that all of the elements of this philosophical programme, especially the postulates of clarity of speech, justification, criticism, anti-dogmatism, and high expectations for philosophical education, are certain ideals that philosophers should strive for. Whether and how the LWS members applied

³⁶ K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., p. 28.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 27.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ K. Twardowski, *On Scientific Preparation*, op. cit., p. 57.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 58. Woleński emphasizes that "the knowledge of, and importance attached to, the role of history of philosophy can be treated as a specific characteristic of the Lvov-Warsaw School, which singles it out among other philosophical schools, especially those inclined to an analytic interpretation of philosophy." J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 25.

⁴² K. Twardowski, *On Scientific Preparation*, op. cit., p. 59.

those postulates is a separate topic that warrants a comprehensive study beyond the scope of this paper.⁴³

3. Ingarden on Twardowski's Philosophical Programme

Since the beginning of his studies, Ingarden was critical of Twardowski's teachings and the philosophical developments of his school.⁴⁴ Already in 1911, Ingarden viewed the University of Lvov as dominated by "the positivistic atmosphere" since some of Twardowski's students were under the influence of Bertrand Russell and Ernst Mach. Others practised Brentanian descriptive psychology, and in general, "few people believed in philosophy."⁴⁵ Ingarden was thus happy to travel abroad; however, the primary reason was to study mathematics. Twardowski advised him to go to Göttingen, Marburg, or Berlin, and Ingarden chose the first.⁴⁶ He attended Husserl's lectures and seminars and was "thrilled" when he learned that "one can still ask philosophical questions about the essence."⁴⁷ Ultimately, Ingarden decided to work on his doctoral dissertation with Husserl, spent several years in Göttingen, and followed him to Freiburg im Breisgau. When Ingarden obtained his doctorate in 1918, he returned to Poland. After his habilitation in 1924 – which was supervised by Twardowski – he moved back to Lvov and worked as a *Privatdozent* and mathematics teacher until 1933, when he was appointed to the chair of philosophy. Thus, Ingarden remained in an environment dominated by the LWS members for many years. At the same time, he was their passionate critic, engaged co-worker, and, to some of them, a teacher.⁴⁸

⁴³ Scholars provide numerous examples to support the claim that the LWS members generally adhered to these postulates. See M. Rzewuska, *O języku, stylu i polszczyźnie*, op. cit., pp. 319–327; M. Będkowski, *"Jasnościowcy"*, op. cit., pp. 95–96, 99–101; A. Brożek et al., *Anti-Irrationalism*, op. cit., pp. 209–236, 248–287, 293–314.

⁴⁴ According to Anna Brożek and Jacek Jadacki, Ingarden considered Twardowski's lectures to be too elementary. He was also dissatisfied with Twardowski's academic "regime," which precluded beginners from participation in advanced courses. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, *Interpersonal and Intertextual Relations between Roman Ingarden and the Members of the Lvov-Warsaw School*, in: *Intuition and Analysis*, op. cit., p. 17.

⁴⁵ R. Ingarden, *Moje wspomnienia*, op. cit., p. 9. Unless stated otherwise, all translations are my own.

⁴⁶ R. Ingarden, *Wspomnienia z Getyngi*, "Przegląd Artystyczno-Literacki" 1998, Vols. 5–6, p. 12.

⁴⁷ R. Ingarden, *Moje wspomnienia*, op. cit., p. 9.

⁴⁸ See especially Ingarden's polemics with Kotarbiński. T. Kotarbiński, *O potrzebie zaniechania wyrazów "filozofia", "filozof", "filozoficzny" itp.*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1921, Vol. 6, pp. 81–86;

Overall, the atmosphere of Göttingen and Husserl's teaching style greatly influenced Ingarden. This influence is discernible in some of his criticisms of Twardowski's philosophical programme. I distinguish two targets of this criticism: the postulate of clarity of speech (1) and a minimalistic approach to philosophical investigations (2). I argue that Ingarden holds an implicit view that adherence to those postulates led the LWS members to ignore phenomenology (3).

3.1. Criticism of the Postulate of Clarity of Speech

Ingarden essentially agrees with Twardowski's thesis that philosophical works should be clearly written and that the lack of clarity in thinking results in obscure writing.⁴⁹ However, he attacks Twardowski's conclusion that the lack of clarity in a philosophical work is an excuse not to read it. Ingarden interprets this statement as an admission of the absoluteness of clarity. He argues that establishing criteria for the clarity of philosophical writings is problematic. He assumes that a writing style is clear if it enables the reader to think about the same things and in the same way as the author. Defined this way, clarity is relative, since it depends on the aptitude of the reader.⁵⁰ For example, a philosophical work may seem obscure

T. Kotarbiński, *O istocie doświadczenia wewnętrznego*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1922, Vol. 25, pp. 84–196; T. Kotarbiński, *Odpowiedź*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1922, Vol. 25, pp. 535–540; R. Ingarden, *Spór o istotę filozofii*, "Przegląd Warszawski" 1922, Vol. 2, No. 14, pp. 161–172; R. Ingarden, *W sprawie "Istoty doświadczenia wewnętrznego"*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1922, Vol. 25, pp. 512–534. See also S. Richard, *Are There Ideal Objects? The Controversy between Kotarbiński and Ingarden*, in: *Franz Brentano's Philosophy after One Hundred Years: From History of Philosophy to Reism*, eds. D. Fisette, G. Fréchette, H. Janoušek, Springer, Dordrecht 2021, pp. 149–165. In the Polish Philosophical Society, Ingarden directed the Section on the Theory of Cognition and the Section on Aesthetics. He contributed to Twardowski's "Ruch Filozoficzny" by writing reports on the leading phenomenological publication, "Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung," established by Husserl in 1912. In 1932, Ingarden founded the journal "Studia Philosophica," which aimed to promote Polish philosophy in foreign languages. He invited Twardowski and Ajdukiewicz to join the editorial board. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, *Interpersonal and Intertextual Relations*, op. cit., p. 24. Finally, he was a teacher of the youngest generation of Twardowski's students, including Leopold Blaustein, Eugenia Blaustein (née Ginsberg), Zofia Lissa, and Walter Auerbach.

⁴⁹ R. Ingarden, *O jasnym i niejasnym stylu filozoficznym*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1919, Vol. 5, p. 45. Wojciech Rechlewicz points out that Ingarden agreed that the obscurity of thinking entails the obscurity of the work but not the other way around. The work style may be clear, but the work itself may be obscure. W. Rechlewicz, *Ingarden's Position in the Polemic around Twardowski's Article "On Clear and Unclear Style"*, in: *Intuition and Analysis*, op. cit., p. 213.

⁵⁰ R. Ingarden, *O jasnym i niejasnym stylu*, op. cit., p. 45.

to a reader who is a novice, lacks specific – analytical or interpretative – skills, is accustomed to certain philosophical language (conceptual framework), or, finally, is an adherent of a different philosophical school (his philosophical views are not aligned with those presented in the work).⁵¹

Twardowski responded to this criticism in his letters to Ingarden.⁵² He agrees with Ingarden's standpoint that clarity is relative and asks him to point out the fragments of his work that suggest otherwise. Moreover, Twardowski admits that if one were to conclude from his paper that clarity is absolute, it is possible that he expressed himself "obscurly."⁵³

3.2. Criticism of the Postulate of Minimalism

Ingarden delivers the harshest criticism of Twardowski's programme and the LWS in the paper entitled *The Main Currents of Polish Philosophy* and in his private writings.⁵⁴ On the one hand, Ingarden holds Twardowski in high esteem and appreciates his role in creating philosophical education in Poland.⁵⁵ On the other hand, he is dissatisfied with the direction taken by his school, in which adopting Twardowski's philosophical programme played a major role.

According to Ingarden, Twardowski's activity initiated a new period of Polish philosophy by imposing a new style of philosophizing.⁵⁶ Instead of constructing extensive philosophical systems, Twardowski recommended that students work

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 46–47.

⁵² R. Kuliniak, D. Leszczyna, M. Pandura, eds., *Korespondencja Romana Witolda Ingardena z Kazimierzem Twardowskim*, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2016, pp. 179–183.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 179–180.

⁵⁴ R. Ingarden, *Główne kierunki polskiej filozofii*, "Studia Filozoficzne" 1973, No. 1 (86), pp. 3–15. Originally written in German, this lecture intended to inform the international community about the developments in Polish philosophy. To my knowledge, the original German version of this paper was not published. See R. Ingarden, *Dzieje mojej kariery uniwersyteckiej*, "Kwartalnik Filozoficzny" 1999, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 183–201; R. Ingarden, *Letter to Henryk Skolimowski written 06.11.1967*, in: *The Roman Ingarden Digital Archive*, URL: <http://ingarden.archive.uj.edu.pl/en/archiwum/letter-to-henryk-skolimowski-written-06-11-1967>.

⁵⁵ Ingarden praised Twardowski not only for his role in the development of Polish philosophy but also for his philosophical achievements. According to Ingarden, Twardowski was a pioneer in the following fields: the introduction of a distinction between act, object, and content of presentation, analysis of the formal structure of objects, and an attempt to overcome psychologism without falling into idealism. R. Ingarden, *Główne kierunki*, op. cit., p. 8. See also R. Ingarden, *The Scientific Activity of Kazimierz Twardowski*, "Studia Philosophica" 1948, Vol. 3, pp. 17–30.

⁵⁶ R. Ingarden, *Główne kierunki*, op. cit., p. 7.

on narrow, precisely defined issues, avoiding those that are hard to embrace. The precision of inquiry and scientific responsibility for "each formulation, each thesis" were of primary importance.⁵⁷ Ingarden recognized the significant merits of this programme. Twardowski taught students to precisely define concepts and introduce subtle linguistic and material distinctions, emphasizing the importance of unambiguity in proposed statements and their strict justification. Ingarden also admitted that such principles are similar to those applied by the phenomenological method of "distinction."⁵⁸

However, Ingarden argued that Twardowski's programme also had substantial drawbacks. His students started to avoid any theories and concepts that were not clear enough and to exclude all problems that seemed unsolvable. Twardowski's postulates resulted in rejecting metaphysics, brushing traditional theoretical and cognitive issues aside, and narrowing philosophical inquiry down to detailed descriptive-psychological, logical, and formal-ontological questions. Hence, the rule of "absolute clarity" and the method of analysis of isolated problems led Twardowski's students to abandon more complex and challenging issues.⁵⁹

Ingarden's criticism goes even further. Namely, he argues that Twardowski's philosophical programme failed because Twardowski did not create a community of researchers who understand each other. According to Ingarden, he was unable to lead such a community, embrace vast connections of problems, and conduct systematic work on those problems.⁶⁰ Twardowski's methodological rules are at fault here: if one only works on isolated problems, one loses sight of any connections between them. This, in turn, leads to oversimplification and fruitless work on falsely posed issues, whereas the meaning of authentic and deep problems unfolds only in connection with other problems.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 7–8.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 8.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 8–9. Ingarden argues that adherence to Twardowski's programme resulted in stagnation, causing some outstanding students to break away under the leadership of Jan Łukasiewicz. This group formed the Warsaw branch of the LWS. In Ingarden's opinion, members of this group radicalized Twardowski's principles, which led them to scepticism, mere analysis of words, denial of the unity of philosophy, truth-relativism, and so-called "anti-irrationalism," which consists of the rejection of intuition and the belief in the omnipotence of contemporary methods of mathematical-logical research. R. Ingarden, *Główne kierunki*, op. cit., pp. 9–10. Ingarden identifies the philosophy of the Warsaw branch with neo-positivism. See R. Ingarden, *Próba przebudowy filozofii przez neopozytywistów*, in: R. Ingarden, *Z badań nad filozofią współczesną*, PWN, Warszawa 1963, pp. 655–662; also T. Szubka, *Roman Ingarden o filozofii analitycznej*,

Ingarden's criticism is pretty harsh and even radical, for it leads to the conclusion that the LWS has failed as a philosophical school. To anyone who is familiar with the achievements and influence of Twardowski's school, such criticism seems inaccurate.⁶² However, it is important to note that when Ingarden describes this ideal of a "community of researchers," he has something specific in mind. This is where the influence of Husserl's Göttingen Circle comes into play.

In his recollections, Ingarden describes the style of Husserl's teaching and the environment he created in Göttingen. First, Husserl was a great teacher "who understood his students and was always able to find a clear answer to the questions they posed."⁶³ Second, his lectures – except the lecture on the history of philosophy – took the form of "enquiring meditations," which Husserl used to develop his own theories.⁶⁴ Third, although Husserl's seminars consisted of discussing classical philosophical works, their main goal was not to analyse and interpret the text. Husserl treated those works as a point of departure for his own inquiries about their main problems and possible ways to solve them. Ingarden admits that, although it was illuminating, it did not help students follow philosophers' thoughts and understand their work.⁶⁵ This is why Husserl's seminars were difficult for students who were unfamiliar with phenomenology. Participation in those seminars consisted of active co-thinking (*Mitdenken*) and engaging in discussions arranged by Husserl with reference to significant parts of the texts.⁶⁶ Fourth, after the publication of Husserl's *Ideen zu einer Reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (henceforth: *Ideen I*) in 1913,⁶⁷ it became the main subject of study during his seminars.⁶⁸ Fifth, Ingarden complains that, after the First World War and relocation to Freiburg im Breisgau, Husserl lost connection with most of the people from the Göttingen Circle and, to be able to

"Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria" 2020, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 123–129. On anti-irrationalism, see K. Ajdukiewicz, *Logistyczny antyirracjonalizm w Polsce*, in: *Fenomen Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*, eds. A. Brożek, A. Chybińska, Academicon, Lublin 2016, pp. 145–156.

⁶² See J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy*, op. cit.; A. Brożek, F. Stadler, J. Woleński, eds., *The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in European Culture*, Springer, Cham 2017; A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, eds., *At the Sources of the Twentieth Century Analytical Movement: Kazimierz Twardowski and His Position in European Philosophy*, Brill, Leiden 2022.

⁶³ R. Ingarden, *Wspomnienia z Getyngi*, op. cit., p. 17.

⁶⁴ R. Ingarden, *Moje wspomnienia*, op. cit., p. 6.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ See E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Vol. 1, trans. F. Kersten, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1982.

⁶⁸ R. Ingarden, *Moje wspomnienia*, op. cit., p. 8.

work, he was forced to create a new “phenomenological environment.”⁶⁹ In this sense, Husserl's teaching activity seems mainly directed at developing phenomenology with the help of his students.⁷⁰

Given the above description, I think it seems reasonable to assume that Ingarden's ideal of a community of researchers working on vast interconnected problems under the leadership of one philosopher was based on his experience in Göttingen. He likely wanted Twardowski to guide his students in a specific direction, offering them a defined vision of philosophical research that would foster some sort of philosophical movement. However, Ingarden claims that Twardowski's principles made this impossible.

I agree that Twardowski did not create a philosophical movement in this sense. However, whether he wanted to do so – as stated by Ingarden – is doubtful.⁷¹ First, Twardowski admits that he never expected his students to follow in his steps in terms of philosophical interests.⁷² Second, he considers the main value of his school to be in the methodical sphere, for he clearly states that

the fundamental feature that characterizes this School [the LWS] lies in the domain of formal methodology, namely in the quest for the greatest possible precision and exactness in thinking and in the expression of what is thought, as well as in the most exhaustive substantiation possible of what has been thus brought forth, and in the utmost rigour in the conduct of proofs.⁷³

Third, although the LWS was not a philosophical movement in the same vein as phenomenology, it became a movement in terms of its influence on the devel-

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 13.

⁷⁰ This is also confirmed by Leopold Blaustein, Twardowski's and Ingarden's student who attended Husserl's lectures and seminars in 1925. He provides a valuable comparison between Twardowski's and Husserl's styles of teaching and points to several substantial similarities and differences. One of them is that Husserl “tends to raise himself co-workers in phenomenology. And, by his own declaration, he is willing to show interest only in those students who adopt this standpoint.” L. Blaustein, *Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia*, in: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia*, eds. D. Bęben, M. Ples-Bęben, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2013, p. 231.

⁷¹ R. Ingarden, *Główne kierunki*, op. cit., p. 8.

⁷² K. Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Część I. 1915–1927*, ed. R. Jadczak, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Warszawa-Toruń 2002, p. 160. He was satisfied with both Łukasiewicz and Witwicki, who evolved in completely different directions. Twardowski had never imposed any particular doctrine on his students, which is shown by the richness of the topics of doctoral dissertations written under his supervision. See J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 8–13.

⁷³ K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., p. 28.

opment of Polish philosophy. The methodical principles cultivated by Twardowski and his students have been passed down through generations of Polish philosophers and continue to be evident today.⁷⁴

Let's point out that not only Twardowski but also other LWS members were satisfied with the results of the adoption of his programme. For example, Izydora Dąmbska argues that, unlike a Neo-Kantian or phenomenological school, the LWS was not determined by any philosophical doctrine shared by all members but by the style of philosophizing and common scientific language.⁷⁵ She stresses that even those of Twardowski's students who had different views on the very concept and method of philosophizing, embraced his emphasis on scientific philosophy. As a result, the philosophy of the LWS encompassed a variety of standpoints, including spiritualism, materialism, nominalism, and realism, represented by logicians, psychologists, philosophers of science, and theoreticians of art.⁷⁶ In this regard, the LWS was a pretty diversified school in terms of accepted doctrines.⁷⁷

3.3. The Alleged Disinterest in Phenomenology

Now, I believe Ingarden's general objection against Twardowski's programme, namely, that it prevented his students from inquiring into complex issues, implicitly suggests that this programme led them to ignore phenomenology. There are several reasons for this. First, Husserl's and Ingarden's works were often perceived by the LWS members as unclear.⁷⁸ Thus, those for whom clarity is a philosophical work's

⁷⁴ On the development of the tradition of the LWS, see J. Jadacki, *Polish Analytical Philosophy*, Semper, Warszawa 2009; Á. Garrido, U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, eds., *The Lvov-Warsaw School: Past and Present*, Birkhäuser, Cham 2018; A. Brożek, *The Lvov-Warsaw School after 1950*, "Edukacja Filozoficzna" 2022, Vol. 74, pp. 141–160.

⁷⁵ I. Dąmbska, *Czterdzieści lat filozofii we Lwowie 1898–1938*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1948, Vol. 44, p. 17.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ For the justification of why the LWS is considered a unified philosophical school despite its doctrinal variety, see J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 302–304; P. Polak, K. Trombik, *The Kraków School of Philosophy in Science: Profiting from Two Traditions*, "Edukacja Filozoficzna" 2022, Vol. 73, pp. 211–213.

⁷⁸ K. Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Część II. 1928–1936*, ed. R. Jadczyk, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Warszawa-Toruń 2002, p. 76; W. Tatarkiewicz, *Szkoła fenomenologów*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1913, Vol. 3, No. 10, p. 257; H. Mehlberg, *Edmund Husserl. Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1930–1931, Vol. 12, pp. 28a–28b; L. Blaustein, *Edmund Husserl*, op. cit., pp. 224–225; J. Łukasiewicz, *Pamiętnik*, ed. J. Jadacki, Semper, Warszawa 2013, pp. 65–66.

principal value may have been sceptical about phenomenology. Second, on many occasions, Ingarden complained that Polish philosophers ignored his research and, by extension, phenomenology. He expressed this mostly in private writings. For example, Ingarden stated that when he returned to Poland in 1918, he realized that

[e]verything I've learned abroad – especially with Husserl – is conceived here as misleading, obscure chatter. Generally, all the problems I learned about during my studies are foreign to our philosophers. And vice versa, my colleagues in Warsaw and elsewhere preached – sometimes with utmost cheek and pretension to excellent scholarship – what I perceived as unbelievably backward, banal, avoidance of problems, and most of all, something far away from essential philosophical issues.⁷⁹

For this reason, Ingarden wanted to disseminate phenomenology in Poland.⁸⁰ He worked hard to achieve this by engaging in the activities of the Polish Philosophical Society, lecturing, and publishing.⁸¹

Still, he was disappointed with Twardowski's students' response to phenomenology. Ingarden writes bitterly about his Lvovian years, saying that "he was treated with total disrespect" and "as *quantite négligeable*."⁸² Those harsh words result from Ingarden's difficult situation at the time. He was convinced that, after obtaining his habilitation in 1924, he would soon be awarded the chair of philosophy at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov.⁸³ This was not the case, and he had to wait until 1933 while working as a teacher at a junior high school. For these circumstances, Ingarden blamed Twardowski.⁸⁴ First, he believed that Twardowski supported Ajdukiewicz in securing the position, and second, because of

⁷⁹ R. Ingarden, *Dzieje mojej kariery*, op. cit., pp. 184–185.

⁸⁰ This goal was stated in his first introduction to phenomenology. R. Ingarden, *Dążenia fenomenologów (I)*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1919–1920, Vol. 22, No. 3, p. 118.

⁸¹ Ingarden offered courses on Husserl's *Ideas* (1926/1927), *Logical Investigations* (1927/1928), and *Cartesian Meditations* (1932/1933), and lectured on *Introduction to Phenomenology* (1937/1938). R. Ingarden, *Wykłady, ćwiczenia i seminaria uniwersyteckie według "Spisu wykładów"*, *Uniwersytet im. Jana Kazimierza we Lwowie*, in: *Roman Ingarden (1893–1970). Fenomenolog ze szkoły Edmunda Husserla*, eds. K. Ingarden, R. Kuliniak, M. Pandura, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2023, pp. 246–248. Ingarden's *Collected Works* consists of 14 volumes.

⁸² R. Ingarden, *Dzieje mojej kariery*, op. cit., p. 194.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 193–196. See R. Jadczyk, *Koleje starań o profesurę dla Romana Ingardena we Lwowie*, "Kwartalnik Filozoficzny" 1999, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 229–242. On the relationship between Twardowski and Ingarden, see A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, *Interpersonal and Intertextual Relations*, op. cit., pp. 20–29.

Twardowski's alleged resistance to phenomenology.⁸⁵ There is some truth to this. In his *Dzienniki* [Journals], Twardowski recalls his desire to bring Ajdukiewicz back to Lvov in 1927, and in 1931, he expresses concerns over Ingarden's nomination for the chair of philosophy. However, the reason for this is Twardowski's belief that Ingarden would not be a good teacher and he would "scare students away."⁸⁶ Moreover, in his letter to Husserl, who had intervened on Ingarden's behalf, Twardowski admits that there are not enough philosophy chairs in Poland, and that giving one to a representative of such a "special philosophical direction" as phenomenology is unlikely.⁸⁷

4. The Reception of Phenomenology in the LWS

Above, I tried to show that Ingarden suggested that the LWS members ignored phenomenology. His view is not entirely accurate.⁸⁸ The list of Twardowski's students who, at least at some point, refer to phenomenology is considerable. First, they discuss phenomenology in general. Second, they analyse and make use of various concepts developed by Husserl. In this sense, they were, more or less, under his influence.

4.1. Phenomenology in the Eyes of the Lvov-Warsaw School

The LWS's response to Husserl's philosophy and his movement occurred relatively early. In his 1913 paper, Władysław Tatarkiewicz describes the main features and representatives of the "school of phenomenologists."⁸⁹ He emphasizes the

⁸⁵ R. Ingarden, *Dzieje mojej kariery*, op. cit., pp. 193–194.

⁸⁶ K. Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Cz. I*, op. cit., p. 309; K. Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Cz. II*, op. cit., p. 181.

⁸⁷ E. Schuhmann, K. Schuhmann, eds., *Edmund Husserl. Briefwechsel. Band I. Die Brentanoschule*, Springer, Dordrecht 1994, pp. 182–183.

⁸⁸ On the reception of phenomenology by Polish philosophers, including LWS members, see G. Küng, *Phenomenology and Polish Scientific Philosophy*, in: *Polish Scientific Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 59–68; W. Plotka, *Early Phenomenology in Poland*, op. cit. See also the anthology of early phenomenology in Poland, which includes numerous works by Twardowski and his students: D. Bęben, M. Ples-Bęben, eds., *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2013.

⁸⁹ W. Tatarkiewicz, *Szkoła fenomenologów*, op. cit. By comparison, except for some reviews of Husserl's books, it seems that the first paper discussing phenomenology in English was published in 1925 by William Boyce Gibson. See W.B. Gibson, *The Problem of Real and Ideal in the Phenom-*

significance of Husserl's argument against psychologism and describes phenomenology as a presuppositionless, eidetic *a priori* science of essence that is not to be identified with descriptive psychology.⁹⁰ Phenomenology applies the so-called method of distinction that consists of "distinguishing the essences and creating a typology of essences, meanings, contents, acts, and beings."⁹¹ According to Tatarkiewicz, this method is not new, but phenomenologists prioritize it. In this respect, they reflect the general tendencies of the time, for the method of distinction bears significant similarities to the method applied by Twardowski and his school. Because Twardowski and Husserl share the same roots (Brentano), their respective schools represent "one big philosophical group."⁹² Tatarkiewicz highly values Husserl's *Logical Investigations* but considers *Ideen I* obscure in terms of the arrangement of content, terminology, and articulation. In his opinion, works by younger scholars provide a better introduction to the phenomenological workshop.⁹³

Phenomenology also interested Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, who visited Göttingen during the academic year 1913/1914. According to Ajdukiewicz, the main task of phenomenology is to provide an intuition of the essence (*Wesensschau*), and he makes an interesting remark that "what phenomenologists call the intuition of essences may also be called careful scrutiny of the meaning of words."⁹⁴ He argues that phenomenological inquiries contributed "to clarifying basic scientific concepts by eliminating ambiguity and introducing subtle 'almost scholastic' distinctions."⁹⁵ As an example, Ajdukiewicz points to Ingarden's *The Literary Work of Art*.⁹⁶ He also considers Ingarden "one of the most outstanding of Husserl's students."⁹⁷ However, it should be noted that in his opening address at the International Congress of Scientific Philosophy in Sorbonne in 1935, Ajdukiewicz

enology of Husserl, "Mind" 1925, Vol. 34, pp. 311–333.

⁹⁰ W. Tatarkiewicz, *Szkoła fenomenologów*, op. cit., pp. 256–261.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 260.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 257.

⁹⁴ K. Ajdukiewicz, *Problems and Theories in Philosophy*, trans. H. Skolimowski, A. Quinton, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1973, pp. 44–45.

⁹⁵ K. Ajdukiewicz, *Kierunki i prądy filozofii współczesnej*, in: K. Ajdukiewicz, *Język i poznanie*, Vol. 1, PWN, Warszawa 2006, p. 254.

⁹⁶ See R. Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, trans. G.G. Grabowicz, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973.

⁹⁷ K. Ajdukiewicz, *Kierunki i prądy*, op. cit., p. 254.

wicz expressed scepticism about applying methods such as Husserl's *Wesensschau*. He argued that they cannot be considered scientific until their results are intersubjectively communicable and controllable.⁹⁸

The phenomenological method is also discussed by Tadeusz Czeżowski, who, unlike Ajdukiewicz, considers intuition – be it Husserlian, Bergsonian, or existentialistic – as a valid philosophical method encompassed by an extended notion of empirical knowledge. Such intuitionistic methods examine the objects of human sciences, moral and aesthetic values, and the world as such. However, they are not yet as developed as the methods of natural sciences.⁹⁹

The greatest interest in phenomenology among the LWS members was displayed by Leopold Blaustein, the author of the first monograph discussing Husserl's philosophy in Polish, which he submitted as his doctoral dissertation.¹⁰⁰ In his works, Blaustein discusses Husserl's theory of act, content, and object of presentation, as well as phenomenology in general. First, Blaustein comments on the problems with the reception of phenomenology in Poland. He argues that the Poles consider Husserl insufficiently clear and exact. Moreover, phenomenologists often use concepts and methods explained in Husserl's unpublished works. This contributes to various interpretative problems.¹⁰¹ Second, Blaustein distinguishes between narrow and wide concepts of phenomenology. He defines the

⁹⁸ K. Ajdukiewicz, *Przemówienie powitalne delegacji polskiej na Międzynarodowym Kongresie Filozofii naukowej w Sorbonie w roku 1935*, in: *Fenomen Szkoły*, op. cit., p. 158. According to Ajdukiewicz, "scientific cognition is first such and only such content of thought as can be communicated to others in words understood literally, that is without metaphors [and] analogies [...]. Secondly, only those assertions can pretend to the title of scientific cognition whose correctness can be decided in principle by anybody who finds himself in the appropriate external conditions. In a word, scientific cognition is that which is intersubjectively communicable and controllable." K. Ajdukiewicz, *Problems and Theories*, op. cit., p. 46.

⁹⁹ T. Czeżowski, *Zagadnienie istnienia świata w świetle przemian metodologicznych*, in: T. Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne*, PWN, Toruń 1969, p. 27. See also T. Czeżowski, *O metafizyce, jej kierunkach i zagadnieniach*, Wydawnictwo Antyk, Kęty 2004, pp. 59–66.

¹⁰⁰ L. Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, Nakładem Towarzystwa Naukowego, Lwów 1928. Blaustein's primary philosophical interests were descriptive psychology, aesthetics and pedagogy. On Blaustein's work, see the extensive research by Witold Płotka. W. Płotka, *A Critical Analysis of Blaustein's Polemic against Husserl's Method*, "Husserl Studies" 2021, Vol. 37, pp. 249–270; W. Płotka, *Approaching the Variety of Lived Experiences: On the Psychological Motives in Leopold Blaustein's Method*, "Gestalt Theory" 2020, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 181–194; W. Płotka, *Beyond Ontology: On Blaustein's Reconsideration of Ingarden's Aesthetics*, "Horizon" 2020, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 552–278.

¹⁰¹ L. Blaustein, *Edmund Husserl*, op. cit., pp. 224–225.

former as a “descriptive science of ideal essences which are given in lived experiences of pure consciousness and examined after performing phenomenological *epoché*.”¹⁰² The latter can be defined as the “entirety of eidetic ontologies *a priori*, which apply the method of seeing the ideal essences (*Wesensschau*).”¹⁰³ Those ontologies constitute the basis for other sciences.

Blaustein delivers various arguments against both concepts of phenomenology. For example, he argues that it is hard to determine whether essences – which he identifies with general objects – exist. It is permissible to presume their existence but just hypothetically in order to explain specific facts. Moreover, although he admits that *Wesensschau* may correctly indicate the essential features of a given object, it does not have any probative value.¹⁰⁴ He argues that general objects can be treated as types of “lowest genera.” Such types are examined in perception, which knowingly ignores certain features of individual objects. And since *Wesensschau* is not a perception, it cannot provide such an analysis.¹⁰⁵ According to Witold Plotka, Blaustein's criticism has significant limitations and is actually targeted against Ingarden's concept of essence.¹⁰⁶ Blaustein concludes that “phenomenology is only possible as an empirical, descriptive science of types (lowest genera) of experiences of pure consciousness, and not as an *a priori* science of higher essences being ideal objects.”¹⁰⁷ Plotka points out that Blaustein restates phenomenology as empirical descriptive psychology that analyses types of lived experiences, which is “related but not equivalent to” Husserl's project presented in the first edition of *Logische Untersuchungen* and his project of phenomenological psychology presented in his 1925 lectures, which Blaustein attended.¹⁰⁸

Finally, significant interest in phenomenology was displayed by Józef M. Bocheński, who actually considered Ingarden “perhaps the greatest Polish thinker of all time.”¹⁰⁹ He argued that Ingarden was the only phenomenologist who took analytic philosophers seriously and believed Ingarden's criticisms were thought-

¹⁰² L. Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii*, “Ruch Filozoficzny” 1928–1929, Vol. 11, pp. 164b–166b.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 165b.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 164b–165a.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 165a.

¹⁰⁶ W. Plotka, *A Critical Analysis*, op. cit., pp. 257–258.

¹⁰⁷ L. Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny*, op. cit., p. 165b.

¹⁰⁸ W. Plotka, *A Critical Analysis*, op. cit., pp. 261–265.

¹⁰⁹ J.M. Bocheński, J. Parys, *Między logiką a wiarą*, Les Éditions Noir sur Blanc, Thise-Besançon 1994, p. 46.

fully considered in Poland.¹¹⁰ According to Bocheński, analytic philosophy is superior to phenomenology because the latter fails to appreciate the analysis of language, puts too much emphasis on intuition, and rejects axiomatization.¹¹¹ He provides exceptionally clear descriptions of the phenomenological method and its essential conceptual framework.¹¹² Bocheński held Max Scheler and Husserl in high regard, the latter being a “model of precision as a philosophical writer and reminds one of Aristotle in this respect.”¹¹³ Bocheński argued that phenomenologists paved the way for recognizing two fundamental standpoints: the objectivity of knowledge and the “human spirit’s true nature” as genuine *intellectus* capable of grasping the essences, while also possessing an “emotional” side.¹¹⁴ In this respect, phenomenology became one of the “great liberating forces of contemporary thought.”¹¹⁵ Like Tatarkiewicz, Bocheński contended that although phenomenologists applied a method that was not new, they endowed it with “remarkable refinement and purity and [...] employed it as *the* essential procedure.”¹¹⁶ However, since phenomenology remains the philosophy of essence, it lacks the capacity to grasp concrete, authentic being, which seems to be its significant flaw.¹¹⁷

We can see that although the LWS members were not uncritical towards phenomenology, they recognized its value and certainly did not ignore it. However, they likely did not view it as a tradition within which they wanted to work. Despite this, a number of Twardowski’s students were – to varying degrees – influenced by some of Husserl’s ideas.

4.2. Overview of the Reception of Husserl’s Theories in the LWS

Husserl’s influence on the LWS members may be seen in the following areas: (1) anti-psychologism, (2) the concept of semantic category, (3) theory of signs,

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 67.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 79.

¹¹² See J.M. Bocheński, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, trans. D. Nicholl, K. Schenbrenner, University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1956, pp. 127–153; J.M. Bocheński, *The Methods of Contemporary Thought*, trans. P. Caws, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht 1965, pp. 15–29.

¹¹³ J.M. Bocheński, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 131.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 152.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 153.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

expressions and meanings, (4) theory of wholes and parts, (5) theory of acts, contents and objects of presentations.

(1) I have already pointed out that Twardowski admitted that Husserl had significantly influenced his view on psychologism in logic.¹¹⁸ One of Twardowski's oldest students and the pioneer of logical research in the LWS, Jan Łukasiewicz, also discussed Husserl's arguments in his early papers and found them convincing.¹¹⁹ According to Woleński, Husserl's influence in Poland in this regard was of "fundamental importance."¹²⁰

(2) The concept of semantic category introduced by Husserl in the *Fourth Logical Investigation* was developed and formalized by Stanisław Leśniewski and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz.¹²¹ The former also wanted to translate *Logical Investigations* into Polish but abandoned the idea for unknown reasons.¹²²

(3) Husserl's theory of signs, expressions, and meaning presented in the *First Logical Investigation* was discussed and developed in various directions by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Maria Ossowska, Stanisław Ossowski, and Janina Kotarbińska.¹²³

¹¹⁸ K. Twardowski, *Self-Portrait*, op. cit., p. 31.

¹¹⁹ J. Łukasiewicz, *Teza Husserla o stosunku logiki do psychologii*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1904, Vol. 7, pp. 476–477; J. Łukasiewicz, *Logika a psychologia*, in: J. Łukasiewicz, *Z zagadnień logiki i filozofii. Pisma wybrane*, ed. J. Śłupecki, PWN, Warszawa 1961, pp. 63–65. However, later Łukasiewicz changed his standpoint and claimed that it had been Frege who influenced him through Husserl. J. Łukasiewicz, *Pamiętnik*, op. cit., p. 66.

¹²⁰ J. Woleński, *Husserl and the Development of Formal Semantics*, "Philosophia Scientiæ" 1997, Vol. 2, No. 4, p. 156.

¹²¹ S. Leśniewski, *Grundzüge eines neues Systems der Grundlagen der Mathematik*, "Fundamenta Mathematicae" 1929, Vol. 14, p. 14; K. Ajdukiewicz, *Syntactic Connection*, in: *The Scientific World-Perspective and Other Essays, 1931–1963*, trans. J. Giedymin, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Boston 1978, pp. 118–139. According to Woleński, the LWS members adopted a certain intuitive understanding of language as "a system of items directed to the world *via* meanings." Husserl's contribution lies in the "philosophical climate" in which such a concept of language was adopted. See J. Woleński, *Husserl and the Development*, op. cit., p. 157.

¹²² See C. Głombik, *O niedoszłych polskich przekładach "Logische Untersuchungen"*, in: *Polska filozofia analityczna. W kręgu Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*, eds. E. Tyburski, R. Wiśniewski, Scholar, Toruń 1999, pp. 89–106.

¹²³ See K. Ajdukiewicz, *On the Meaning of Expressions*, in: K. Ajdukiewicz, *The Scientific World-Perspective*, op. cit., pp. 35–68. See also A. Olech, *Some Remarks on Husserl's and Ajdukiewicz's Approaches to Meaning*, in: *The Heritage of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz*, eds. J. Woleński, V. Sinsi, Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta 1995, pp. 221–225; M. Ossowska, *Słowa i myśli*, in: M. Ossowska, *O człowieku, moralności i nauce*, PWN, Warszawa 1983, pp. 183–225; S. Ossowski, *Analiza pojęcia znaku*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1926, pp. 29–56; J. Kotarbińska, *Pojęcie znaku*, "Studia Logica" 1957, Vol. 6, pp. 57–143.

(4) Husserl's theory of wholes and parts was the subject of an analysis conducted by Eugenia Blaustein (née Ginsberg), who earned her doctorate based on this research.¹²⁴ According to Peter Simons, she was one of the first philosophers ever to analyse Husserl's theory.¹²⁵

(5) Husserl's theory of acts, contents and objects of presentations presented in the *Fifth Logical Investigation* sparked interest in Bronisław Bandrowski, Leopold Blaustein, Walter Auerbach and Tadeusz Witwicki. They incorporated Husserl's ideas into their analyses of various types of presentations, though never uncritically.¹²⁶ It is worth noting that Blaustein's use of Husserl's ideas in his theory of aesthetic experience led some scholars to classify him as an "analytic phenomenologist."¹²⁷ However, this view is contested by Płotka, who argues that Blaustein was influenced by various traditions, including Twardowski's and Carl Stumpf's descriptive psychologies, *Gestalt* psychology and Husserl's and Ingarden's phenomenology. According to Płotka, Blaustein's descriptive psychology was *phenomenologically* oriented. Although Blaustein did not use *epoché* or *Wesensschau*, "he followed the basic intuition that analysis should be focused on an object as it is presented or manifested in experience."¹²⁸

Finally, it must be noted that despite his criticism of the LWS, Ingarden admits that the last generation of Twardowski's direct students was partly under his influence.¹²⁹ This group, referred to by Woleński and Płotka as "the Lvov Circle of phenomenologists,"¹³⁰ includes Walter Auerbach, Leopold Blaustein, Zofia

¹²⁴ E. Ginsberg, *Zur Husserlschen Lehre von den Ganzen und Teilen*, "Archiv für systematische Philosophie und Soziologie" 1929, Vol. 32, pp. 108–120; E. Ginsberg, *On the Concepts of Existential Dependence and Independence*, in: *Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology*, ed. B. Smith, Philosophia Verlag, Munich-Vienna 1982, pp. 265–287.

¹²⁵ P. Simons, *Editorial Note*, in: *Parts and Moments*, op. cit., p. 262.

¹²⁶ B. Bandrowski, *Psychologiczna analiza zjawiska myślenia*, in: *Polska fenomenologia*, op. cit., pp. 37–48; L. Blaustein, *Imaginary Representations: A Study on the Border of Psychology and Aesthetics*, trans. M. Bokinić, "Estetika" 2011, Vol. 2, pp. 209–234; W. Auerbach, *O wątpliwym*, in: *Polska fenomenologia*, op. cit., pp. 307–324; T. Witwicki, *O stosunku treści do przedmiotu przedstawienia*, in: *Polska fenomenologia*, op. cit., pp. 325–339.

¹²⁷ See W. Miskiewicz, *Leopold Blaustein's Analytic Phenomenology*, in: *The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy: Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophical Legacy*, eds. S. Lapointe, J. Woleński, M. Mathieu, W. Miskiewicz, Springer, Dordrecht 2009, pp. 181–190.

¹²⁸ W. Płotka, *A Critical Analysis*, op. cit., p. 265.

¹²⁹ R. Ingarden, *Główne kierunki*, op. cit., p. 14.

¹³⁰ J. Woleński, *Ingarden and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, in: *Intuition and Analysis*, op. cit., p. 77; W. Płotka, *Early Phenomenology in Poland*, op. cit., p. 85. Unfortunately, most of them did not survive the Second World War.

Lissa, Tadeusz Witwicki (son of Władysław Witwicki), and Eugenia Blaustein (née Ginsberg). However, whether there are any significant features that unify this group remains to be investigated. Above all, one must ask whether there is something specific in how they engage with phenomenology. It is necessary to trace the various influences that shaped those philosophers. They were taught by Twardowski (Brentanian), Ajdukiewicz (analytic philosopher) and Ingarden (phenomenologist). Some of them studied abroad, where other philosophers may have influenced them. It remains to be determined to what extent they applied methods characteristic of the LWS. Initially, it seems that their primary method was the analysis of concepts combined with a descriptive-psychological approach. It is also worth pointing out that – with the exception of Ginsberg – they generally did not make use of logical tools.

5. Conclusions

Ingarden accused Twardowski's philosophical programme of imposing a style that prevented the LWS from examining complex philosophical issues, leading to the ignorance of phenomenology. Contrary to this view, I have argued that the LWS members' response to phenomenology was significant. However, Twardowski's programme may have indeed influenced how they approached it. While this issue requires a comprehensive study beyond the scope of a single paper, I would like to offer the following suggestions. First, Twardowski's preference for philosophical minimalism is reflected in his students' interest in specific, individual elements of Husserl's philosophy, which they then developed in various directions. Second, for many of them, the starting point was Brentanian descriptive psychology, through which they interpreted Husserl's ideas. Third, they valued the phenomenological method of distinction, which resembles the analysis of concepts practised by Twardowski; however, they generally – with the exception of Czeżowski – regarded the method of eidetic intuition as unreliable.

This paper has provided only an overview of the issues surrounding the relationship between the LWS, Ingarden, and phenomenology. Future research should involve more in-depth examinations of the content and methods applied by those members of the LWS who developed an interest in phenomenological

philosophy.¹³¹ In particular, the study of the so-called “Lvov Circle of phenomenologists” would be of great interest. It would be valuable to explore this issue in the broader context of the analytic–continental divide to see how the formation of those divisions manifested in Polish philosophy.

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¹³¹ Significant studies have already been devoted to the relationship between the LWS and Brentano, which may serve as a valuable point of departure for further research. See J. Woleński, *Brentanian Motives in Twardowski and His Students*, in: *The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School*, op. cit., pp. 47–64; D. Łukasiewicz, *Polish Metaphysics and the Brentanian Tradition*, in: *The Golden Age*, op. cit., pp. 19–32; A. Brożek, *Franz Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, in: *Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy*, eds. D. Fisette, G. Fréchette, F. Stadler, Springer, Dordrecht 2020, pp. 197–234.

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“The Most Important Task” and “Great Personal Value”: The Role of Teaching and Upbringing in the Activities of Izydora Dąmbska

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Abstract: This article aims to show the main features of the style and content of teaching that was proposed in Izydora Dąmbska’s texts and implemented in her educational practice. Her legacy emphasizes a close connection between teaching and upbringing, with teaching always serving a formative role as an integral part of the educational process. The article focuses on the analysis of Dąmbska’s pedagogical activity at two educational levels – high school and university, as well as within secret teaching during World War II. Moreover, the proposals formulated by Dąmbska herself regarding possible forms of modernizing curricula and teaching methods in secondary and higher schools are examined, as well as how her superiors, colleagues, and students assessed this activity. In the final part of the article, the similarities between the pedagogical solutions proposed by Dąmbska and the Socratic model of teaching are pointed out. A set of features characterizing the thoughts of Dąmbska regarding philosophy of education is provided.

Key words: axiocentrism, Dąmbska, philosophy of upbringing, paidocentrism, Lvov-Warsaw School, Kazimierz Twardowski

1. Introduction

Izydora Helena Maria Dąmbska is one of the most famous female figures associated with the Lvov-Warsaw School (hereinafter: LWS), with an extremely wide range of interests, including primarily epistemology and broadly understood logic, with an emphasis on semiotics.¹ The Polish philosophical community also

¹ This is how Dąmbska’s main interests are defined by Władysław Stróżewski; see W. Stróżewski, *Philosophari necesse est*, in: *Rozum–serce–smak. Pamięci Profesor Izydory Dąmbskiej (1904–1983)* [Mind–Heart–Taste: In Memory of Professor Izydora Dąmbska (1904–1983)], ed. J. Perzanowski, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Filozoficzno-Pedagogicznej Ignatianum, Kraków 2009, p. 27.

owes much to her as a historian of philosophy and the author of many translations of classics of philosophy, such as Descartes and Leibniz. At the same time, she had a fascinating biography² and an extraordinary personality. Władysław Stróżewski, who worked with her as an assistant in the Department of the History of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University, which she headed, offered a beautiful characterization of her:

Professor Izydora Dąmbska, so responsible, disciplined and demanding – and not only towards herself! – was at the same time extremely understanding towards others, firm and gentle, unwavering in her deepest convictions and truly tolerant, deeply convinced of the dignity of science and those who serve it, and at the same time full of modesty, painfully reacting to all wrongs and injustices, and at the same time generous and ready to justify many things (though not everything...), uncompromising in her assessment of evil – and boundlessly good.³

Both the character traits mentioned in the quoted words, and the personal convictions regarding what philosophy is and what goals it should serve,⁴ meant that teaching and the related shaping of the minds of school and university youth played a crucial part in her activities. This is evidenced by the expressions of gratitude she shared with her friends and devoted students involved in preparing a commemorative book for her, presented during the ceremonial session of the Cracow branch of the Polish Philosophical Society:

[W]e are educated not only by our professors and our colleagues. Our personality and scientific activity are enriched to no small extent by our students.

² Its most detailed discussion can be found in Jerzy Perzanowski's paper: *Izydora Dąmbska – filozof niezłomny* [Izydora Dąmbska: A Steadfast Philosopher], in: *Izydora Dąmbska (1904–1983). Materiały z sympozjum "Non est necesse vivere, necesse est philosophari."* Kraków, 18–19 grudnia 1998 r. [Izydora Dąmbska (1904–1983): Materials from the Symposium "Non est necesse vivere, necesse est philosophari." Cracow, 18–19 December 1998], ed. J. Perzanowski, Polska Akademia Umiejętności, Kraków 2001, pp. 11–108.

³ W. Stróżewski, *Philosophari necesse est*, op. cit., pp. 29–30. Unless stated otherwise, all translations are my own.

⁴ In Dąmbska's legacy, there are few metaphilosophical publications in which she explicitly presents her own position on the tasks facing philosophy and how it can be defined in principle. The most insight on this subject can be gained from her response to a survey conducted by Zbigniew Podgórzec in "Znak" magazine: I. Dąmbska, *Czym jest filozofia, którą uprawiam?* [What Is the Philosophy that I Practice?], "Znak" 1977, Nos. 8–9, pp. 1335–1337.

I have always, since my years as an assistant in Lvov, considered contact with students to be extremely valuable. And whenever I was given the opportunity [...] to help young people on their path to philosophy, I felt it to be the most important task and at the same time a great personal value. If there are people in Poland who want to consider themselves my students – and I know that there are such people – I also address to them the words of my most heartfelt thanks for all the moments of valuable co-philosophizing with them.⁵

These words clearly reveal the specific nature of the relationship that connected Dąmbska with her students. It was based on the conviction that academic youth were capable of fruitfully engaging in philosophical discussions and of taking part in them on an equal footing with scholars. The model of teaching emerging from this passage could be described as dialogical, due to the assumption of equality of the participants in the debate and the possibility of multilateral flows of knowledge. In such an assumption, one can see the influence of the ancient tradition, for example, Plato’s dialogues.

The aim of further considerations is to develop and systematize this general characteristic of Dąmbska’s pedagogical views. The key concepts I will use will be *teaching* and *upbringing*. However, I will particularly emphasize the latter, as I aim to defend the thesis that in Dąmbska’s thought, every form of teaching is at the same time an element of the educational process.⁶ It may therefore be helpful to specify the concept of upbringing itself, which will allow us to avoid ambiguity at the next stages of analysis. For this purpose, I will draw on the terms of *intellectual upbringing* and *moral upbringing* as used in pedagogy. The first is defined as “the field of upbringing, which refers to one of the basic values, which is truth. Therefore, the aim of intellectual upbringing is to equip man with knowledge

⁵ I. Dąmbska, *Podziękowanie* [Acknowledgements], “Ruch Filozoficzny” 1978, Vol. 36, Nos. 2–4, pp. 128–129.

⁶ In this position, it is easy to see the influence of her teacher, Kazimierz Twardowski, who had a similar view of the specificity of the connection between teaching and upbringing. In *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki* [Basic Concepts of Didactics], he states the following: “Teaching is educational if it does not deal exclusively with the material or formal education of students, but also aims to exert an educational influence on them. This is exactly what the teaching provided in the elementary school should be like” (K. Twardowski, *Dydaktyka. Inedita* [Didactics: Inedita], Vol. 4, ed. A. Brożek, Academicon, Lublin 2023, p. 136). This view, it seems, can also be extended to other types of schools, without distorting the author’s message in any way.

based on truth, i.e. the correspondence of what is known with reality.”⁷ Intellectual education serves to prepare a young person to consciously use sources of knowledge, to equip them with the ability to read critically, and at the same time make them aware that acquiring knowledge is a process, both due to the gradual development of the person being educated and the changes taking place in the surrounding reality.⁸ Moral education, in turn, is a field based on moral goodness, understood in the most general sense as “those values that are the source of the fundamental content of this education,”⁹ and its fundamental goal is to shape human conscience.¹⁰ In Dąmbska’s philosophy, these two fields seem to be inextricably linked.

I will analyse the levels of both school and academic teaching. In describing Dąmbska’s work, I will always try to adopt two perspectives – the person teaching and the person being taught. I will take into account both the postulates of the scholar herself and the assessments of her work formulated by students and superiors. On this basis, I will try to indicate the basic features that, in Dąmbska’s opinion, should characterize the educational process,¹¹ and also determine what connects her approach with two main trends in contemporary pedagogy – axiocentrism and paidocentrism.

2. Axiocentrism and Paidocentrism

According to Jan Zubelewicz, axiocentrism and paidocentrism are two fundamental positions within the philosophy of education.¹² They were founded on two different anthropological visions of humanity. The axiocentric approach sees hu-

⁷ A.M. de Tchorzewski, *Wstęp do teorii wychowania* [Introduction to the Theory of Education], Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Ignatianum, Kraków 2016, pp. 153–154.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

¹¹ I deliberately avoid using the terms *model of education* or *philosophy of education*, because they could wrongly suggest that Dąmbska developed a complete theory of education, which would be an exaggeration. However, in her own writings and those devoted to her, one can undoubtedly find many important remarks on how she imagined the educational process and how she implemented her vision in practice.

¹² J. Zubelewicz, *Filozofia wychowania. Aksjocentryzm i paidocentryzm* [Philosophy of Education: Axiocentrism and Paidocentrism], “Żak,” Warszawa 2002, p. 7.

mans as beings with an innate tendency towards both good and evil. In order to educate individuals to prioritize the former over the latter, it is necessary to foster in them an awareness of their participation in a tradition that shapes specific social roles and dictates moral norms. The task of a person raised in the spirit of axiocentrism is to struggle with their own weaknesses and the irremovable flaws of the world and other people in order to be able to avoid evil and be able to discover appropriate values that will make them a respectable participant in the cultural community. Supporters of paidocentrism, in the spirit of the philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseau, consider humans as beings who are good by nature, whose development is potentially unlimited. Their task is to liberate themselves from tradition, to overcome its limitations in the name of self-realization. Paidocentrism also proposes a theory of values that is radically different from axiocentrism – each person must establish them themselves, and the fundamental criterion for assessing their importance is an individual decision.¹³ It seems reasonable to say that axiocentrism is naturally connected with axiological objectivism, while paidocentrism is connected with subjectivism.

The positions discussed propose two completely different educational models. Axiocentrism prefers a high level of discipline and rigorous rules of conduct. Students should be held to high standards and these expectations should be enforced in a strict but fair manner in the form of numerous exams or tests. The teaching process is based on the role of the authority of the teacher, educator or parent. A young person should perceive them as having a monopoly on reason, whose decisions are not disputed, because they always result from appropriate premises. Of course, the role of authorities is to ensure that their wisdom, experience and moral impeccability are values that are implemented, not just declared. Paidocentrism focuses on a completely different model of education, characterized by a relationship of partnership between teachers and students, based on empathy and sincerity. The role of the guardian is to create conditions for their charges in which they will be able to fully satisfy their needs for expression, show inventiveness and discover what is important to them and how they would like to shape their fate. The place of authority here is taken by education in the field of student, citizen and human rights, treated as a set of fundamental principles, the recognition of which is obvious.¹⁴

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 28–59.

3. School Teaching: From the Perspective of a Teacher

After introducing all the necessary concepts, we can now turn to the main subject of the article. It is worth starting with a clarifying remark – Izydora Dąmbska's teaching activity can be clearly divided into three periods:

- **1928–1939:** work in secondary schools as a teacher of propaedeutics of philosophy, pedagogical subjects and Polish language;
- **1940–1945:** work in clandestine teaching, which included both secondary school students and students of Jan Kazimierz University;
- **1946–1983:** academic work, during which, with breaks,¹⁵ she taught philosophy students.

I will primarily analyse the first and third periods, because they were the most important from the perspective of shaping Dąmbska's vision of education.

Dąmbska worked in a number of Lvov schools: Queen Jadwiga State Girls' Gymnasium, Casimir the Great's 8th State Gymnasium, and Zofia Strzałkowska Private Girls' Gymnasium and High School,¹⁶ so she knew the problems of the school system at the time from her own experience. She did not hesitate to propose changes in curricula that would provide young people with better opportunities for full intellectual and moral development. One of the most important postulates was to open students more broadly to independent ethics. In her article *O etykę naukową w szkole średniej* [On Scientific Ethics in Secondary School],¹⁷ Dąmbska noted that, at that time, ethics was taught mainly to catechists, leading students to mistakenly believe that every moral system had to be associated with a specific religious faith. She pointed out a number of negative consequences of

¹⁵ According to Perzanowski, Dąmbska gave lectures commissioned by the University of Warsaw in 1946–1949, and lectured at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań in 1949–1950. In the years 1950–1957, during the Stalinist era, she was removed from academic teaching, only to return in 1957 during the October Thaw. The next seven years, spent at the Jagiellonian University, were undoubtedly Dąmbska's most valuable teaching experience. After being dismissed from her position as a lecturer again in 1964, she began to conduct *privatissima* for the most interested students, which she continued almost until her death. See J. Perzanowski, *Izydora Dąmbska – filozof niezłomny*, op. cit., pp. 22–74.

¹⁶ Archiwum Nauki PAN i PAU, signature K III-109. Legacy of I. Dąmbska. Quoted after: W. Szulakiewicz, *O uczących i uczonych. Szkice z pedeutologii historycznej* [On Teachers and Scholars: Sketches from Historical Pedeutology], Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 2014, p. 204.

¹⁷ I. Dąmbska, *O etykę naukową w szkole średniej* [On Scholarly Ethics in Secondary School], "Przegląd Klasyczny" 1936, Vol. 2, Nos. 9–10, pp. 711–715.

this state of affairs. Young people who abandon religion often reject moral norms at the same time, wrongly believing that there is an essential connection between them. Believers, on the other hand, treat the ethics related to their faith as the only correct approach, considering all other possible moral choices to be wrong. Finally, linking the spheres of ethics and religion suggests that the claims of ethics, like those of religion, are purely dogmatic. All the described threats mean that, according to Dąmbska, the burden of teaching ethics should rest primarily on the teacher of philosophical propaedeutics, who will familiarize students with the main directions of normative scientific ethics, understood by the philosopher as "any such ethics in which the practice does not refer to metaphysical or religious dogmas."¹⁸ Dąmbska does not stop at generalities – she cites specific examples of texts that students could work on as part of normative ethics lessons, and also suggests that teachers of classical philology and modern languages could provide additional support. She also notes that the goal of every teacher should be to teach criticism and caution, but that they cannot promote any of the systems discussed. As Dąmbska writes, a teacher of philosophical propaedeutics "will achieve his goal if he makes his students aware of how beautiful, wise and noble is the effort of human thought, seeking moral good, and how this effort is inseparable from human nature."¹⁹ The following words can be considered a kind of credo of the text under discussion:

If we want secondary schools to educate individuals with a clear, critical view of the world, if we want their students to be people who appreciate the importance of moral principles and moral obligations, we should lead young people to understand that there are independent ethical values, that developing a sys-

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 713.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 714. At the same time, these words also prove how important it is from the perspective of a young person's development to teach them the basics of philosophy. Kazimierz Twardowski undoubtedly had a similar opinion, writing more than 30 years earlier about subjects taught in junior high schools, and pointing out that the quality of teaching propaedeutics needed to be improved. He also emphasized the specific benefits of getting to know the basics of logic and psychology, taught as part of the aforementioned subject: "Logic [is] needed as an awareness of what a student does throughout junior high school: constantly [namely in what they learn] definitions, classifications, rules and laws, proofs, justifications, conclusions, assumptions, concepts, judgments, hypotheses. So [it is] needed. [...] Psychology – the same: it makes one aware of thought processes from another side. It is an important supplement to education: otherwise the mental world could easily give way in the student's consciousness to the physical [world]" (K. Twardowski, *Dydaktyka*, op. cit., pp. 178–179).

tem of ethical principles is generally a need of the human mind and that everyone can take up the effort and joy of working on themselves, regardless of their religion, race or nationality.²⁰

The above words indicate the complexity of Dąmbska's position, which cannot be easily categorized within the opposition of axiocentrism and paidocentrism. She is certainly associated with the first trend because of her belief in the existence of a normative, independent ethics and the postulate of working on oneself. A clear declaration of no consent to discrimination on religious, racial or ethnic grounds, along with an emphasis on the individual's independent reflection on themselves, is, however, closer to paidocentrism.

Dąmbska points out that shaping one's own morality should be the fruit of individual effort combined with reflection on "independent ethical values," the various forms of which have been outlined by philosophers throughout the centuries. The teacher's task is to present these values objectively, to the extent possible, so that the students can recognize those they consider important, or propose their own in creative opposition to the discussed values. As if in passing, Dąmbska also expresses in the above words her ideal of education, understood as "a certain description, vision or idea of a perfect person," who "is a mental construction by means of which an image of integrated properties and characteristics of a person is presented [...] such as does not yet exist in reality, but towards the realization of which all rational pedagogical efforts should aim."²¹ This is a person with a "clear, critical view of the world," and therefore a person striving for clarity both in knowing reality and expressing one's own thoughts, characterized by a reluctance to think dogmatically and accept statements on faith where the boundaries of scientific knowledge, including philosophical knowledge, reach. However, this does not mean completely denying the *raison d'être* of views that are not supported by reason and experience. As Dąmbska notes in the summary of her habilitation thesis *Irracjonalizm a poznanie naukowe* [Irrationalism and Scientific Cognition]:

The intention of the treatise was not to combat irrationalism in general, but to outline the boundaries within which it is not justified. However, if it is true to say that scientific knowledge is by definition anti-irrationalist, then the fight

²⁰ I. Dąmbska, *O etykę naukową w szkole średniej*, op. cit., p. 713.

²¹ A.M. de Tchorzewski, *Wstęp do teorii wychowania*, op. cit., p. 100.

against irrationalism, transferred to other areas of life, would be a fight to scientificize these areas. [...] This postulate turns out to be powerless in those cases in which the human mind seeks answers to fundamentally unsolvable problems.²²

Dąmbska therefore allows for the existence of such areas of life in which the requirement of rationality is not absolutely binding. Moreover, there are many of them, because science is only a small fragment of the inexhaustible wealth of typically human activities. Good upbringing should also prepare one for the fact that some views are necessarily only a matter of faith, because their subject escapes rational consideration. At the same time, however, Dąmbska was unfamiliar with attempts to excessively stretch the area of issues that the human mind cannot cope with. One can see in this position the inspiration drawn from the postulates of the LWS,²³ as well as continuity with her philosophical views.²⁴

At this point it is also worth considering in more detail the relationship between the position of Dąmbska and the pedagogical thought of her philosophical patron, Kazimierz Twardowski. The latter did not devote much space in his *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki* [Basic Concepts of Didactics] to the issue of separating scientific

²² I. Dąmbska, *Irracjonalizm a poznanie naukowe* [Irrationalism and Scientific Knowledge], Druk. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 1937, pp. 62–63.

²³ In describing the last 40 years of philosophy in Lvov, Dąmbska noted: “What was Twardowski’s plan? The plan was bold, although seemingly ineffective: to create a scientific style of philosophizing in Poland, using rigorous research methods to cultivate those branches of philosophy that belong to science. To clearly mark the boundaries – by applying the postulate of clarity and validity of statements – where science ends in philosophical inquiries and poetry or the profession of faith begins” (I. Dąmbska, *Czterdzieści lat filozofii we Lwowie 1898–1938* [Forty Years of Philosophy in Lvov 1898–1938], “Przegląd Filozoficzny” 1948, Vol. 44, Nos. 1–3, pp. 14–15).

²⁴ The postulate of cognitive criticism can be linked to Dąmbska’s interest in philosophical scepticism. As Zbigniew Orbik pointed out, the author of *Sceptycyzm filozoficzny a metoda naukowa* [Philosophical Scepticism and the Scientific Method] shows a positive attitude towards philosophical scientific scepticism, i.e., theoretical scepticism applied to scientific knowledge (Z. Orbik, *Filozofia Izydora Dąmbskiej* [The Philosophy of Izydora Dąmbska], Wydawnictwo Politechniki Śląskiej, Gliwice 2018, p. 83). A sceptical attitude may also prove helpful in research in the field of philosophical anthropology – as Dąmbska wrote towards the end of her life, in March 1982: “An essential element of the philosopher’s ethos is the persistent, critical, and perhaps even sceptical search for the truth about man as a cognizant and acting being” (quoted after J. Perzanowski, *Izydora Dąmbska – filozof niezłomny*, op. cit., p. 34). For more on the significance of the sceptical ethos for philosophy and Dąmbska’s attitude, see L. Zgoda, *Być sumieniem filozofii* (On the Scepticism of Prof. Izydora Dąmbska), “Ruch Filozoficzny” 1984, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 339–347.

and religious ethics. At first glance, his position seems clear and consists in treating moral and religious education together. He included among the tasks of elementary school “educational influence on children and school youth in a religious and moral direction, so that they grow up to be brave people who feel they have civic duties and are able to fulfil them.”²⁵ Later in his argument he added: “We speak of a RELIGIOUS and moral character, because the religion of Christ is the most perfect expression of what should be considered good in the ethical sense.”²⁶ It seems symptomatic, however, that although Twardowski speaks of religious and moral upbringing, he does not provide any specifics regarding the role of the Church in this process. The situation is different in the case of the family home, which, according to the philosopher, is the second key factor in the process of educating a young person, which cannot be ignored by school.²⁷ It should also not escape our attention that the above words come from a relatively early text, written in 1901, and moreover concerning the early stage of education. In *Projekt programu propedeutyki dla liceów ogólnokształcących* [Draft Programme of Propaedeutics for General Secondary Schools], written over 30 years later, in 1935, Twardowski addresses the issue of good in the form of a separate point and suggests discussing the following issues: “Some views on the essence of good in the moral sense (hedonism, utilitarianism, ethical evolutionism [Spencer], ethical objectivism). The subject of ethical evaluation. Duty (Kant). Ethical character. Responsibility and freedom of the ethical subject.”²⁸ This bundle of issues is nothing less than the key trends in philosophical ethics, and thus, in Dąmbska’s view, scientific ethics – demonstrating the community of thought that existed between them.

Let us now return to Dąmbska herself – in the previously discussed text *O etykę naukową w szkole średniej*, the author suggested, among other things, cooperation between teachers of philosophical propaedeutics and modern languages, including Polish. According to Dąmbska, this type of interdisciplinary approach should apply not only to teaching ethics, but also to logic. In the article *W sprawie nauczania logiki przy sposobności nauczania języka polskiego* [On Teaching Logic while Teaching Polish Language],²⁹ the author noted that,

²⁵ K. Twardowski, *Dydaktyka*, op. cit., p. 51.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 133.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 51.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 253.

²⁹ I. Dąmbska, *W sprawie nauczania logiki przy sposobności nauczania języka polskiego* [On the Teaching of Logic while Teaching Polish Language], “Przegląd Humanistyczny” 1930, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 279–288.

in principle, every field of knowledge, provided it is scientific in nature, has its own logical structure. In the case of language, grammar has a special status in this respect, because "certain branches of logic and grammar concern the same subjects, although they approach them from a slightly different point of view."³⁰ However, the possibility of developing logical thinking skills in Polish language lessons is not limited to this. Dąmbaska proposes two types of exercises that can accompany the reading of any texts, especially literary ones. The first of these are semantic exercises, which consist in pondering over the actual meaning of words and sentences occurring in a specific context. The second group of tasks, which can be described as logical,³¹ includes, among others, examining the correctness of inferences, definitions, as well as naming and defining the nature of errors occurring in them. In this way, according to the author, students will deepen their understanding of the texts they read, and will also acquire the competence of logical reasoning, which is necessary in all aspects of life. As Dąmbaska noted in the introduction to her considerations:

A general logical education is an indispensable condition for both honest scientific work and a virtuous life. A logical education develops in a person a critical mind, caution in formulating statements, a love of precision in reasoning, care for clarity and precision of expression, and these features, on which the so-called logical culture is based, are necessary both in research work and in practical life.³²

The proof that elementary logical culture is important in performing very diverse professions that may not be directly associated with this field is a series of lectures entitled *Elementy logiki dla bibliotekarzy* [Elements of Logic for Librarians], which Dąmbaska gave in 1957 at the Gdańsk Library. The introductory lecture included the following words:

Librarians often encounter obstacles in their work, the sources of which can be traced to the lack of necessary knowledge in the field of logic. Often, in works in the field of bibliology [...], logical shortcomings occur, which lower

³⁰ Ibid., p. 281.

³¹ However, Dąmbaska herself does not use this term.

³² I. Dąmbaska, *W sprawie nauczania logiki przy sposobności nauczania języka polskiego*, op. cit., p. 279.

the logical value of these works. One way to prevent these obstacles and shortcomings is to properly master the elements of logic.³³

Among the logical issues useful from the perspective of librarianship, Dąbska included the basics of semantics (including the study of names, their meanings, objects, relations, etc., and the study of the imperfections of everyday speech), the study of the principles of ordering elements of sets, the study of logical classification and definitions, as well as selected issues from the theory of reasoning, including logical errors and eristics.³⁴

In terms of valuing the role of the foundations of logic as a kind of foundation for acquiring knowledge in other fields, Dąbska aligns fully with Twardowski's position. The latter uses the concept of formal education, understood as a type of education that "aims to develop and practise intellectual abilities."³⁵ In addition to it, we can also distinguish material education, which "provides the mind with knowledge, supplies it with material that can later be used in various ways."³⁶ Their mutual relationship is best evidenced by the following passage:

Any [...] knowledge, possession of information, even the most numerous and diverse, is a dead capital without value, if it is not combined with the ability to independently and accurately apply it. It is not enough for a person to know a lot; they must also be able to use what they know. To this end, school education must not only provide students with a certain amount of knowledge, but also develop, strengthen, and perfect their intellectual abilities, so that they can easily and fluently perform those mental activities that are necessary for the independent application of acquired knowledge.³⁷

Although this idea is not mentioned explicitly in Dąbska's article, the examples of exercises she discusses allow us to state that her vision is far from pure

³³ I. Dąbska, *Elementy logiki dla bibliotekarzy. Skrypt wykładów prowadzonych w Bibliotece Gdańskiej w roku 1957* [Elements of Logic for Librarians: Script of Lectures Given at the Gdańsk Library in 1957], Biblioteka Gdańska, Gdańsk 1958, p. 1.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4. This enumeration also shows how broad the definition of logic adopted by Dąbska is. In the treatise *Niektóre pojęcia gramatyki w świetle logiki* [Some Concepts of Grammar in the Light of Logic], the philosopher defines logic as "the science of formal structures of the elements of our cognition and their connections" (quoted after Z. Orbik, *Filozofia Izydory Dąbskiej*, op. cit., p. 276).

³⁵ K. Twardowski, *Dydaktyka*, op. cit., p. 32.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

formalism, that is, completely omitting the material layer of teaching in favour of the formal one. The latter is to support the student in acquiring knowledge from individual fields, including literature and language. Twardowski reasoned similarly, and for him both extremes, materialism and didactic formalism, were alien.³⁸

So far, Dąmbska's texts devoted to teaching individual school subjects have been analysed. Meanwhile, lessons are not the only form of developing young people's interest in philosophy. In the polyphony of *Organizacja kółka filozoficznego w szkole średniej* [Organization of a Philosophy Club in Secondary School],³⁹ Dąmbska identifies three forms of extracurricular enrichment for deepening students' philosophical education:

- **occasional discussion meetings** – students participate in them without prior preparation, the topic of discussion is indicated by the teacher, the aim is to express their own views on a given issue and to provide arguments supporting their thesis and present counterarguments to opposing positions;
- **philosophy club** – during meetings, participants focus on joint reading of texts and commenting on them;
- **studio** – combines elements of individual and team work. Students meet with a certain frequency and conduct very diverse activities, such as organizing psychological experiments, conducting surveys, presenting papers, organizing discussions with the participation of guests or joint reading. The studio, in comparison with the philosophy club, is characterized by a greater variety of forms of cooperation and, consequently, a higher level of originality of the activities undertaken.

³⁸ Twardowski defined these extreme approaches in the following way: “[Didactic] materialism is that superficial view which considers a certain amount of acquired material – regardless of the way it was acquired – as a spiritual achievement, and as a result makes the amount of this acquired material the measure of education. This of course leads to *stupor paedagogicus* – commonly called ‘stupidity.’ On the other hand, considering formal education alone is also harmful, because it leads to indifference to the material on which the skills are trained. For example, learning languages in itself educates formally; but one must select such languages so that the greatest possible benefit results from it for material education at the same time. And one must not, while educating materially, overlook that one should also use it in a formal direction” (K. Twardowski, *Dydaktyka*, op. cit., p. 151).

³⁹ L. Blaustein, I. Dąmbska, S. Igel, T. Witwicki, *Organizacja kółka filozoficznego w szkole średniej* [The Organization of a Philosophical Club in a Secondary School], “Przegląd Filozoficzny” 1938, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 92–98.

The last of the forms of cooperation proposed by Dąmbska seems particularly interesting. As the author reports, at the time of writing the text, a workshop of this type was operating in one of the schools in Lvov, but nowadays similar initiatives are rather difficult to find. Meanwhile, the philosophical workshop in the form proposed by Dąmbska encourages students to manifest intellectual freedom, which is a component of the freedom of the human person. The value of the latter for the educational process cannot be overestimated, as confirmed by the words of Adolf E. Szołtysek: "The freedom of the I-human as: (1) a human person gives meaning to moral education, (2) a social being gives meaning to ethical education, (3) a citizen gives meaning to doctrinal education."⁴⁰

The efforts undertaken by Dąmbska, as well as many other outstanding educators, aimed at improving the quality of education in public and private schools, were brutally interrupted by the outbreak of war in 1939. Immediately after this event, the philosopher, together with Fryderyka Jarzębińska, began organizing secret education, which included both secondary school youth and students of Jan Kazimierz University.⁴¹ The classes conducted for students were aimed at preparing for the secret matriculation exam, which in turn allowed them to begin studies at the secret university. Dąmbska regularly served on examination committees as their chairwoman or member. The result of their efforts was at least 40 matriculation protocols and certificates. In addition, she conducted classes for both pupils and students.⁴² Interestingly, at that time her teaching focused on Polish grammar and the history of literature, not necessarily on philosophy – as one might assume, the message of texts such as *Reduta Ordo* or Part III of *Dziady* by Adam Mickiewicz spoke more powerfully and effectively to the imagination and conscience of students during the difficult war period, hence the decision to leave philosophy for more peaceful times. The explanation may also be

⁴⁰ A.E. Szołtysek, *Filozofia wychowania. Ontologia, metafizyka, antropologia, aksjologia* [Philosophy of Education: Ontology, Metaphysics, Anthropology, Axiology], Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 1998, p. 97.

⁴¹ As Maria Oberc emphasized, this idea would never have been realized if not for Dąmbska's personal persistence. Many people suggested to her that the war would end sooner or later and then it would be possible to return to teaching, but in the meantime it was necessary to take care of one's own safety. However, the philosopher replied: "We cannot waste time, no matter how long it will take, and who knows?" (see M. Oberc, *Profesor dr Izydora Dąmbska w tajnym nauczaniu* [Professor Izydora Dąmbska in Secret Teaching], "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1978, Vol. 36, Nos. 2–4, p. 123).

⁴² See *ibid.*, pp. 122–124.

more pragmatic – Polish, unlike introduction to philosophy, was an examination subject, so teaching it was of primary importance.

4. School Teaching: From the Perspective of the People Taught

Unfortunately, no testimonies of the students whom Dąmbska encountered while teaching in Lvov secondary schools have survived. However, thanks to the materials preserved in archival records, it is known that her work was highly valued by all of her superiors from that period. The opinion provided by her superior at the Queen Jadwiga State Girls' Gymnasium in Lvov can be considered representative:

Thanks to her thorough knowledge, love of the subject, she was able to set teaching at a very high level, arouse lively interest and achieve serious results of her work. She led a philosophical club for the whole year, which also included students from classes in which Ms Dąmbska did not teach. The club's work was also of a high standard [...]. With the values of her mind, character, disposition and subtle pedagogical tact, she was able to gain my full recognition and respect, great sympathy from her colleagues, warm attachment and full trust from her students.⁴³

The earliest opinion on the value of classes conducted by Dąmbska is connected with the period of secret teaching and was formulated by Maria Oberc, who passed her secret high school leaving exam in 1943. She noted that "her lessons stimulated thinking, discussion,"⁴⁴ which allowed students to explore subsequent issues on their own to a large extent. The relationship she had with the youth placed under her care was also characteristic:

She talked to everyone as an equal – she was rather shy, questioning, she let us believe that it was us who discovered the lands, that it was we – not her – who were the wise philosophers. She did not convince, did not impose..., she waited until we figured it out ourselves. During Polish lessons she sometimes read fragments of poems – quietly, calmly, and in such a way that we often

⁴³ Certificate of 30 August 1934. Quoted after: W. Szulakiewicz, *O uczących i uczonych*, op. cit., p. 205.

⁴⁴ M. Oberc, *Profesor dr Izydora Dąmbska w tajnym nauczaniu*, op. cit., p. 126.

cried and then were ready to shoot and die, although she never said: shoot, fight, die with honour! She did not use big words, she did not tolerate pathos.⁴⁵

These words allow us to assume that in her approach to students, Dąmbska implemented elements of both the paidocentric attitude and the moderate axiocentric attitude, according to which teaching is based on authority. In contrast to the extreme variety, the recognition of authority and acting according to its instructions is not a result of force and fear, but respect for the intellectual, moral, religious or other values represented by the educator.⁴⁶ The combination of these two relationships (partnership and authority), seemingly so difficult to reconcile, was present in Dąmbska's attitude towards her students. She adopted a dialogical, egalitarian attitude that, to her students, became a value worthy of respect. This in turn encouraged them to submit to the philosopher's influence and to remain open to other values she introduced into the discussion. It is possible that the author of *O narzędziach i przedmiotach poznania* [On the Tools and Objects of Knowledge] drew this axiocentric element of her own position from her mentor, Twardowski, whose views on the importance of the teacher's authority and his seriousness align closely with the position outlined above. This is evidenced by the following words:

The students must feel the teacher's superiority, and it is well known that seriousness does not hinder the acquisition of attachment and trust, but even facilitates it. Wanting to be serious for the students, the teacher must [...] avoid everything that could shake the students' faith in the truth of what he says, in the accuracy of what he does. Therefore, the teacher dare not give an answer to any question from the students that is not true, he dare not withdraw any order or command once given, and before he does something to the students, he should make sure that he will do it well.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Ibid. Another of her students, Leopold Zgoda, expressed a similar opinion about Dąmbska: "I think that the Professor had no taste for heroism and sanctity. I dare say that she only wanted to be and was – in a way appropriate for practising philosophy – a human being" (L. Zgoda, *Charakter i filozofia* [Character and Philosophy], in: *Rozum-serce-smak. Pamięci Profesor Izydory Dąmbskiej (1904–1983)* [Mind–Heart–Taste: In Memory of Professor Izydora Dąmbska (1904–1983)], ed. J. Perzanowski, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Filozoficzno-Pedagogicznej Ignatianum, Kraków 2009, p. 136).

⁴⁶ J. Zubelewicz, *Filozofia wychowania*, op. cit., pp. 40–41.

⁴⁷ K. Twardowski, *Dydaktyka*, op. cit., p. 131.

Both in Dąbska's and Twardowski's work, the teacher's role as an authority is not only compatible with the students' sympathy and attachment, but is in fact in harmony with them.⁴⁸ In the case of Dąbska, this postulate was subject to specification in the form of combining in her attitude understanding and kindness towards others with high substantive requirements towards herself, but also towards the people she taught, which was emphasized by Stróżewski, quoted at the beginning of the article.

Oberc's quoted statement also shows that Dąbska implemented a form of teaching that Twardowski called heuristic. He understood it as follows:

[T]he heuristic form of teaching consists in the fact that the student, following the teacher's instructions, arrives at the knowledge he is to acquire on his own. In order for the student to be able to acquire any knowledge on his own, the teacher must create the appropriate conditions for the mental work that the student is to perform in searching for that knowledge. To this end, the teacher must first of all tell the student what kind of knowledge he is talking about in a given case; in this way he gives the student's mental work a precisely defined direction.⁴⁹

Moreover, Twardowski pointed out that this form of teaching should be used wherever possible, but not abused in situations where it could lead to awkwardness.⁵⁰

5. Academic Teaching: In Organizational Terms

After 1945, Dąbska abandoned her work in secondary schools and focused on academic teaching. Although due to unfavourable political and historical circumstances she was able to teach at a university only for a short period of her life, she used this time in an extremely fruitful way. This applies especially to the period

⁴⁸ Twardowski expressed this idea in the following words: “In order to gain the attachment of students, the teacher must always treat them with the greatest kindness and understanding; students must continually be assured that the teacher only wants their well-being; any sarcastic remarks, any harassment, ridicule or disregard of students would be one of the most serious offenses of the teacher, who himself should have a heart for students and always look into their hearts” (K. Twardowski, *Dydaktyka*, op. cit., p. 130).

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 79.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 81.

from 1957 to 1964, when the philosopher headed the Department of the History of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University and taught courses for students in independent philosophical studies. The importance of this initiative, in Dąmbska's opinion, is reflected in a statement made at a conference held at the Ministry of Higher Education on 14 January 1957: "[I]t should be possible to study philosophy and obtain master's or doctoral degrees in its scope at those universities where the philosophy departments will be staffed by independent academics."⁵¹ The fact that without Dąmbska's participation it would have been impossible to establish independent philosophical studies at the Jagiellonian University caused her to reject offers from two other universities, Wrocław and Poznań, from which she also received offers to take up the position of professor.⁵² She knew that by choosing these institutions she would have to limit her teaching activities to conducting lectures commissioned for the needs of other faculties. Although she considered the need to include them in the curriculum to be important,⁵³ she saw her role differently. Looking back, it seems that it was the right choice.

In the above-quoted voice in the discussion, Dąmbska also provides arguments for the validity of her postulates. A fundamental one is the need to embed a certain kind of *philosophical culture* among future philosophy teachers, so that they would be able to take responsibility for the philosophical education of the

⁵¹ Quoted after J. Perzanowski, *Izydora Dąmbska – filozof niezłomny*, op. cit., p. 28. In the same speech, Dąmbska radically distanced herself from the understanding of philosophy adopted by Marxists. In her opinion, this term should be used to describe "the search for truth in the scope of basic issues of science and life, which is served by a set of philosophical disciplines in the form of logic, psychology, epistemology, ontology, ethics and aesthetics, as well as the history of the struggles of the human spirit in these fields" (ibid.). It is easy to see in this definition the influence of Twardowski, according to whom philosophy, by "making the truth itself the subject of its research, illuminating the paths leading to it, creating a theory of scientific knowledge, [...] becomes an ally and guide of all who strive for truth in any field of human inquiry" (K. Twardowski, *O dostojęństwie uniwersytetu* [On the Dignity of the University], Uniwersytet Poznański, Poznań 1933, p. 19).

⁵² J. Perzanowski, *Izydora Dąmbska – filozof niezłomny*, op. cit., p. 27.

⁵³ This is evidenced by another fragment of the already quoted statement at the conference at the Ministry of Higher Education on the reorganization of philosophical studies in Poland: "[C]ertain elements of logic, psychology, epistemology and ethics in the form of a lecture on the main principles of philosophical sciences are needed by students of all faculties, but depending on the scientific specialization they choose, the emphasis in the lecture on logic or epistemology would rest on different issues. A lecture on the history of philosophy combined with a lecture on the main directions or independent from it seems essential for those studying the humanities" (J. Perzanowski, *Izydora Dąmbska – filozof niezłomny*, op. cit., pp. 27–28).

young generation in the future.⁵⁴ These words prove that Dąmbska, although she no longer taught at school, never forgot about its needs. The same text also clearly reveals her concern for the formative impact that philosophical studies should have on their students. Dąmbska bluntly stated that since 1950 the discipline "has been in ruins," which is why "Poland is already facing the imminent disappearance of scientific achievements in the field of philosophy and the prevention of creating real foundations for its reconstruction and development, and the complete squandering of the significant achievements in this field of the interwar period and earlier."⁵⁵ The philosopher does not hesitate to call such a state of affairs "the defeat of Poland's spiritual culture," against which "we must defend ourselves."⁵⁶

As a result of the joint efforts of Dąmbska and Roman Ingarden, Kraków managed to largely return to the ethos of the LWS, which both scholars remembered from the pre-war period. It was a special situation, as reflected in Jerzy Perzanowski's comment: "Something like a miracle – in the middle of Gomułka's era, studying as in Lvov before the war. However, some managed to do so!"⁵⁷ The curriculum included lectures on basic philosophical disciplines, as well as monographs, where professors usually presented the results of their work. However, the seminars were of key importance. They were preceded by a proseminar in the first year of studies, and in each subsequent year, students had to choose two or three classes of this type. As Perzanowski noted:

They were just learning the art of philosophizing – under the guidance of the professor leading the seminar, they were co-philosophizing, learning the art of clear thinking, expressed in clear speech. The art of noticing, preparing and – if luck and the head were favourable – solving philosophical problems. A problematic view of philosophy and the fact that philosophy is a science, and a difficult science at that.⁵⁸

Dąmbska devoted a lot of effort to the needs of thorough preparation for the classes she taught. She approached her obligations to her students with great conscientiousness and reliability, considering this to be a standard that should apply

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 28.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 27–28.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 28.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 34.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 35–36.

to every university employee involved in teaching. She devoted herself fully to her students and did not forget about them even in the most difficult moments, as evidenced by the words from her farewell letter addressed to the Council of the Faculty of History and Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University after she was removed from teaching and reassigned to the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

I am also deeply concerned about the situation of the young people I have looked after over the years, especially the fate of the students who are just finishing their fourth year of studies, all of whom (12 of them) are writing their master's theses under my supervision. These young people are fervent in their philosophizing, and a large percentage of them are exceptionally talented [...]. Parting ways with these young philosophers is particularly painful for me.⁵⁹

Her sense of responsibility for the well-being of her students and the courage to stand up for them never left her, even after she was officially removed from teaching. She spoke in defence of the protesting students in a letter to the Minister of Education and Higher Education, Henryk Jabłoński, on 15 March 1968:

Today, formally standing outside the university community, I cannot, however, as a professor, not feel obliged to speak out at a time when the youth of higher education institutions are making legitimate demands for respect for the freedom of thought guaranteed by the constitution, and are met in retaliation with repression and accusations of a political nature that harm their good name. I therefore appeal to you, Mr Minister, [...] to support the legitimate demands of the youth and in this way contribute to repairing the relations prevailing in the world of science and culture in Poland.⁶⁰

The problem area of her classes at the Jagiellonian University was extremely diverse. She taught such subjects as: General Logic, Main Issues and Directions of Philosophy, Introduction to Philosophy, History of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, History of Modern Philosophy, History of Modern Philosophy and Science of Morality, and also gave monographic lectures.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 63.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 69.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 35–36.

6. Academic Teaching: Through the Eyes of Students and Colleagues

There is a certain trait of Dąmbska's character that appears in many of her students' accounts and is crucial for speaking about her in terms of an authority and a role model. This trait is *authenticity*. As Andrzej Wroński wrote:

Never before or since have I had the impression that attending university classes gave me so much as I did then. The professor was able to make the eternal problems of philosophy seem more important than anything else, and her patient and friendly encouragement was invaluable during clumsy attempts to think with my own head. When I try to name this trait of Izydora Dąmbska's personality that made philosophy in her version so absorbing, the term that most often comes to mind is *authenticity*.⁶²

Krystyna Stamirowska spoke in a similar tone:

The feature of the Professor that was perhaps most striking was [...] "what is called authenticity or moral integrity of a human person," that is, "the correspondence between what is on the outside and what is inside, as Plato says in *Phaedrus*." Professor Dąmbska was always herself; she did not pretend to be anything; the correspondence between what she thought and said and what she did was obvious.⁶³

Dąmbska was remembered in a similar way by one of her students who was most deserving of her memory, Jerzy Perzanowski: "Modest in manner and dress. Honest in thought. Full of natural, unforced dignity, *dignitas*. And true *philosophia*: love of wisdom. She was true: A true Lady. A true Philosopher. A true Professor. A true Human Being."⁶⁴

⁶² A. Wroński, *Wspomnienie* [In Remembrance], in: *Izydora Dąmbska (1904–1983). Materiały z sympozjum "Non est necesse vivere, necesse est philosophari."* Kraków, 18–19 grudnia 1998 r. [Izydora Dąmbska (1904–1983): Materials from the Symposium "Non est necesse vivere, necesse est philosophari." Cracow, 18–19 December 1998], ed. J. Perzanowski, Polska Akademia Umiejętności, Kraków 2001, p. 123.

⁶³ K. Stamirowska, *Sedno nauczania* [The Essence of Teaching], in: *Izydora Dąmbska (1904–1983). Materiały z sympozjum "Non est necesse vivere, necesse est philosophari."* Kraków, 18–19 grudnia 1998 r. [Izydora Dąmbska (1904–1983): Materials from the Symposium "Non est necesse vivere, necesse est philosophari." Cracow, 18–19 December 1998], ed. J. Perzanowski, Polska Akademia Umiejętności, Kraków 2001, p. 126.

⁶⁴ J. Perzanowski, *Izydora Dąmbska – filozof niezłomny*, op. cit., p. 13.

Such conduct directly stemmed from her declaration concerning how philosophy should be understood. At that time, she noted that for her it constituted “an essential existential function – a constant, despite the uncertainty of results, search for the order of truth and the duties it sets that transcends human life subject to transience and death.”⁶⁵ It is not difficult to see in this declaration a type of ethical intellectualism – truth appears to Dąmbska as a value in itself, in the shape of Stoic *virtus*, which calls for responsibility and demands realization for its own sake. Realization of the duties of a moral nature set by truth leads in turn to the improvement of the philosophizing person themselves. Her position on this issue finds support in Twardowski’s views, about which she wrote as follows:

According to Twardowski, practising philosophy is not only about solving certain theoretical issues. It is also a path of deepening and moral improvement, a path of gaining true wisdom in life, a path to internal independence and self-control.⁶⁶

Another feature of Dąmbska, which significantly influenced the way she conducted her classes, was the clarity of thought and the related ability to clearly interpret complex philosophical texts. This, in turn, was related to the precision of expression and careful selection of words for the reflections she wanted to share. As Władysław Stróżewski noted: “Her ability to analyse a philosophical text, her precision of expression – these were truly things that could be learned from her.”⁶⁷ Leopold Zgoda spoke in a similar tone: “It is precisely the responsibility for the word that makes us silent where everyone speaks similarly and without thinking or out of fear. The Professor – with words, attitude, but also reflection on silence – knew how to speak.”⁶⁸ This feature is mentioned once again when

⁶⁵ I. Dąmbska, *Czym jest filozofia, którą uprawiam?*, op. cit., p. 1337.

⁶⁶ I. Dąmbska, *Czterdzieści lat filozofii we Lwowie 1898–1938*, op. cit., p. 15.

⁶⁷ A. Brożek, *O tradycji Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego. Rozmowa z Władysławem Stróżewskim* [On the Tradition of the Polish Philosophical Society: A Conversation with Władysław Stróżewski], in: *Fenomen Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej* [The Phenomenon of the Lvov-Warsaw School], eds. A. Brożek, A. Chybińska, Academicon, Lublin 2016, p. 266.

⁶⁸ L. Zgoda, *O miłości, postawie i nauczaniu* [On Love, Attitude and Teaching], in: *Izydora Dąmbska (1904–1983). Materiały z sympozjum “Non est necesse vivere, necesse est philosophari.” Kraków, 18–19 grudnia 1998 r.* [Izydora Dąmbska (1904–1983): Materials from the Symposium “Non est necesse vivere, necesse est philosophari.” Cracow, 18–19 December 1998], ed. J. Perzanowski, Polska Akademia Umiejętności, Kraków 2001, p. 136.

Zgoda outlines the overall profile of the philosopher. I quote it in full, as a summary of this part of the considerations:

How do I see the Professor today? A characteristic figure of a fair height, a clear gaze, focused attention, a smile that confirms the significance of convention, a constant readiness to take up the subject of discussion, doubts related to the analysis of the text that were only ended by the passing of time, hands immersed in dark, rich, but closely cropped hair, and this wrestling with herself to make the right choice of words, vigilance so as not to cause any discomfort, striking modesty in everyday matters, memories from the years of study and not only, a delicate touch of the hand when saying goodbye. All this is subordinated to a constant, unequivocal hierarchy of values and the importance of matters, acquired from the family home and refined during the period of studies, and related to the original meaning of the word “philosophy.”⁶⁹

The best expression of appreciation for Dąmbska’s attitude and teaching is the popularity of the semi-secret epistemological and methodological seminar she founded, which began operating in November 1964, among final-year students and graduates. Its participants first discussed the results of Dąmbska’s own work, which was later published in the form of a collection of texts entitled *O narzędziach i przedmiotach poznania* [On the Tools and Objects of Knowledge], and later focused on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and Gottlob Frege’s semantic writings. The tradition of the seminar is continued to this day by the Izydora Dąmbska Methodological and Epistemological Team at the Cracow branch of the Polish Philosophical Society. Meanwhile, the room at the Institute of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University, where seminar meetings have been held since 1966, was named in her honour in 1999.⁷⁰

7. Dąmbska and Ancient Pedagogy

Dąmbska’s students and commentators on her work have repeatedly pointed to the Socratic features of her attitude. Leopold Zgoda wrote about the “Socratic

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 133.

⁷⁰ J. Perzanowski, *Izydora Dąmbska – filozof niezłomny*, op. cit., p. 66.

modesty and intellectual honesty”⁷¹ of Dąmbska, and in another place he noted: “What did Socrates teach? With words and deeds, character, attitude. With words and deeds, the Professor taught.”⁷² In turn, Perzanowski recalls in the introduction to his detailed chronicle of Izydora Dąmbska’s removal from the Jagiellonian University that she was stripped of her position as a lecturer “on a truly Socratic charge – of having a bad influence on the youth.”⁷³

These associations are not accidental, because Dąmbska’s educational attitude essentially matches the model set by Socrates himself. As Marcin Wasilewski writes, today Socrates symbolizes the perfection of teaching and the ideal teacher. The dialogues he conducted were aimed not only at repairing the souls and lives of his interlocutors, but also at perfecting the philosopher himself. The method he used was to encourage students to test their beliefs and moral doctrines, and the goal was to achieve virtue, associated with the healing of sick souls. An important feature of his approach was the coherence between word and action, as well as education through personal influence and setting a good example, and not through a systematic pedagogical doctrine. Importantly, Socrates never put himself in the role of an educator; he preferred that something elusive remain in his relationship with the young people around him.⁷⁴ These qualities are reflected in the way Dąmbska proceeded in her teaching and the lasting impression she left on her students.

Interestingly, Dąmbska herself characterized her mentor, Kazimierz Twardowski, in a similar way, which is another testimony to the significant role of the ties connecting her with the philosophical school established in Lvov:

The ideal of a philosopher that Twardowski nurtured was close to the ideal of the ancient sage, modelled on the figure of Socrates. Twardowski had something of Socrates in him, both in the emphasis he placed on the method of scientific work, and in the postulate of clarity and precision of terminology, and in the uncompromising nature of his ethics, and in his great civic courage. And in the fact that, like Socrates, he was a hunter of souls.⁷⁵

⁷¹ L. Zgoda, *O miłości, postawie i nauczaniu*, op. cit., p. 134.

⁷² L. Zgoda, *Charakter i filozofia*, op. cit., p. 133.

⁷³ J. Perzanowski, *Izydora Dąmbska – filozof niezłomny*, op. cit., p. 44.

⁷⁴ M. Wasilewski, *Pedagogika grecka. Od Protagorasa do Posejdoniosa* [Greek Pedagogy: From Protagoras to Poseidonius], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2017, pp. 104–106.

⁷⁵ I. Dąmbska, *Czterdzieści lat filozofii we Lwowie 1898–1938*, op. cit., pp. 17–18.

8. Conclusions

Izydora Dąmbska, although she cannot be considered a theoretician of pedagogy, undoubtedly integrated many important principles into both her teaching projects at the secondary and higher school levels and their practical implementations. These efforts, on the one hand, earned her the sympathy and recognition of students, and on the other hand, provided valuable guidance for future teachers of philosophy, but also educators in other fields. What is the essence of her proposals in the field of the educational process? Certainly, a dialogical attitude and equal treatment of those taught, avoiding the artificial creation of a relationship of subordination between them and the lecturer. On the contrary – encouraging them to participate in the discussion and to seek their own solutions to the problems raised. Treating each student as an intellectual partner in a joint search for truth did not interfere with, but rather encouraged, the fact that Dąmbska was universally regarded as an authority. Undoubtedly, the postulate of clarity and clarity of the teaching content was also important. Dąmbska’s attitude, due to its authenticity, intellectual honesty and combining high scientific requirements with gentleness and understanding, may become a role model for contemporary teachers as well.

When Ewa Chudoba, in the book *Córki Nawojki. Filozofki na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim 1897–1967* [Nawojka’s Daughters: Female Philosophers at the Jagiellonian University 1897–1967], written together with Anna Smywińska-Pohl, lists three areas of Izydora Dąmbska’s activity, she puts teaching young people first, ahead of library science, along with collecting bibliographic information in the field of philosophy, and philosophical scientific work (in the form of her own research and translations of classics).⁷⁶ It may have been a coincidence, but it is possible that in this way the author wanted to emphasize the importance that the philosopher attributed to education, which was embedded in the teaching of philosophy. If this was indeed the case, this recognition, though bold, seems convincing, especially in light of the analysis presented here.

⁷⁶ E. Chudoba, A. Smywińska-Pohl, *Córki Nawojki. Filozofki na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim 1897–1967* [Nawojka’s Daughters: Female Philosophers at the Jagiellonian University 1897–1967], Wydawnictwo Libron, Kraków 2017, p. 194.

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Czesław Lejewski as Teacher

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1. Preliminary Caution

I should state right at the outset that my personal experience of Professor Czesław Lejewski as a teacher is relatively modest. I attended one of his University of Manchester courses for a short time, and two complete courses at the University of Salzburg. Nevertheless, I formed a distinct impression of both the substance and style of his teaching, and I have supplemented my recollections with input from a colleague who also experienced his teaching.

2. Personal Background

Czesław Lejewski (1913–2001) studied Classics at the University of Warsaw, where he obtained a master's degree in 1936 with a dissertation on tropes in the sceptics. After military service he returned to the university in 1937 to study for a PhD in Classics, concentrating on ancient logic. This interest drew him to courses and seminars on logic given by Jan Łukasiewicz and Stanisław Leśniewski, and on philosophy by Tadeusz Kotarbiński. His dissertation, *De Aenesidemi studiis logicis*, was examined and passed among others by Łukasiewicz, but he was unable to obtain his degree due to the outbreak of war. He was taken prisoner by the invading Soviets and spent two years in Soviet labour camps, before joining the 2nd Polish Corps under General Władysław Anders after the Nazi invasion of the USSR. He subsequently made a long journey via Africa and the Americas to Britain, where he became an officer in the Polish parachute regiment. After the war, he taught Polish ex-servicemen in Britain, resuming studies with Karl Popper at

the London School of Economics, passing (with Łukasiewicz as examiner again) with the dissertation *Studies in the Logic of Propositions* in 1954. In 1956, he joined the Philosophy Department at the University of Manchester, where in 1966 he succeeded Arthur Prior as professor, and remained there until his retirement in 1980. He was visiting professor at Notre Dame University (USA) in 1960–1961 and at the University of Salzburg (Austria) in 1984.

Lejewski published around 50 articles, almost all on logic, covering both technical and philosophical aspects. The majority comment on, reconstruct, and extend the work of Leśniewski. His first article appeared in 1953, when he was already 40 years old. He was the clearest of Leśniewski's expositors¹ and the one who did most to extend his teacher's ideas in philosophically interesting directions.

3. Manchester Background

To understand the reception and influence of Lejewski as a teacher, it is necessary to know something about the situation in Manchester, where he spent nearly all his teaching career. For its time, for its relatively small size, and for the United Kingdom, Manchester was an unusually eclectic department, with members of the department covering a wider range of approaches than was then standard in Britain, including phenomenology and existentialism, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, and Alfred North Whitehead, as well as the more standard areas, Ludwig Wittgenstein, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, ethical and political philosophy, and parts of the history of philosophy, such as early modern philosophy from René Descartes to Immanuel Kant. Logic was a notable strength, and the professor of logic from 1959 to 1966 was the inventor of tense logic, Arthur Prior. Even logic in Manchester was eclectic, covering not only standard propositional and predicate calculus, but also relevance logic, aspects of the history of logic, and, with Lejewski and Desmond Paul Henry (see below) some Leśniewskian logic.

When Prior left Manchester for Oxford in 1966, Lejewski was appointed as his successor, ahead of internal and external competitors, and it is fair to say the appointment aroused some local resentment, not just because local candidates were

¹ But not the most influential: that title has to go to Bolesław Sobociński (see below).

passed over, but because it was considered by some that Lejewski's interests and expertise were unduly narrow. In the 1960s and 1970s, Britain was going through a social revolution in which music, literature, fashion, politics, and philosophy were embracing new and hitherto exotic approaches and attitudes, casting off the more static and conservative culture of the 1950s. By comparison with this exuberant flowering, Lejewski's teaching came to appear to the students of the time as somewhat unappealingly formal and stuffy, and his lectures narrow and old-fashioned. We should after all remember that he had been a student more than three decades earlier and his attitudes to logic, philosophy, and their history had been forged in the very different climate of pre-war Poland. Also by this time in Britain, students had little Latin and less Greek, both languages in which the classically trained Lejewski was adept. Lejewski's topics were traditional, and his style of presentation (dealt with in its own section below) was low-key, relying on content rather than any rhetoric.

4. My Experience of Lejewski as a Teacher

I was a postgraduate student of philosophy in Manchester from 1971 to 1975, when Lejewski was professor. In 1972, I started to attend his second-year undergraduate course "Metaphysics." It was a small group, taught in his office. He started by giving us an account of Aristotle's understanding of *first philosophy* as "the science of being as being," and discussed the various alternative accounts of this science in Aristotle, and how they might be related. There was a typewritten handout giving the quotations in English, and Lejewski went through the handout calmly and quietly, as was his general manner when teaching. Shortly afterwards, maybe after just one or two meetings, my supervisor called me in and basically forbade me from attending further meetings of the course. He and Lejewski had been rivals for the chair, and they were personally as well as philosophically opposed to one another. I had little choice but to agree, as my career had not yet properly begun.

The course later² discussed the distinction between unicategorical ontologies and multicategorical ontologies, which was compared to the difference between

² I am indebted to Robert Campbell for information on the later part of the course – the part that I missed.

black-and-white and colour film. Colour film can record black and white but black and white cannot record colour. So even if one thinks (as Lejewski did) that a unicategorical ontology adequately describes the world, one may employ the *language* of a multicategorical ontology to engage in discussion with someone who believes in several categories, though ultimately holding to the view that none of these extra categories is exemplified. Also, an important mereological distinction was made between *car parts* and *parts of a car*; the mereological sum of the fuel tank and the disc brake next to it are a part of a car, but *it* is not a car part (though those two summands of it are).

Despite my warning, I began reading around ideas I knew Lejewski worked on, such as mereology, initially through the delightful little book *Medieval Logic and Metaphysics* by Desmond Paul Henry. Henry was a historian of medieval philosophy and logic.³ Initially an adherent of Russellian predicate logic, he had been persuaded by Lejewski of the greater suitability of Leśniewski's systems for representing medieval work, and had become a "convert" to Leśniewskian thinking. I became interested in mereology, having read about early attempts by Edmund Husserl to develop a formal theory of part and whole, and wondered in my innocence how to formalize the theory of part and whole. I was showing some tentative axioms around the department to get comments and Lejewski happened to notice this. He told me my axioms were *far too weak*. From then onwards I became fascinated by mereology. This was not a formal meeting, just informal advice, but it was valuable, even though in the end I came to think his preferred theory (that of Leśniewski) was *far too strong*.

Later, after I had moved to Austria and Lejewski had retired, the Salzburg department invited him for the summer semester of 1984 as a guest professor. He taught two courses (in English): a seminar, "Ontology," and a research seminar, "Logical Consequence." I attended both courses from start to finish and it was these that gave me what knowledge by acquaintance I have of Lejewski the teacher.

³ Desmond Henry was also a notable graphic artist, producing complex abstract pictures made using modified wartime analogue bombsights together with pens and a drawing table. He was also something of a wit. He claimed – probably apocryphally – that Lejewski was once invited to and attended a conference thinking it was on mereology, only to find it was on Mariology.

5. Content

Lejewski's Salzburg seminar on ontology began very much as his metaphysics course had in Manchester a dozen years earlier: with Aristotle and the most general science. In quick succession, reference was made to other ontologists: Christian Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten, George Edward Moore, Franz Brentano, Kazimierz Twardowski and Tadeusz Kotarbiński. Lejewski supported Wolff's contention (though not his practice) that ontology could be pursued as exactly as Euclid had pursued geometry, namely as a formal science. The flavour of these introductory remarks can be readily captured by looking at the opening pages of Lejewski's papers in the bibliography given below, all of which are quite similar.⁴ Very quickly, the focus shifted to Kotarbiński's reism or pansomatism, of which Lejewski was a convinced adherent. In the paper *On the Dramatic Stage in the Development of Kotarbiński's Pansomatism*,⁵ he defended Kotarbiński against criticisms by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, and indeed in *Outline of an Ontology* he went beyond Kotarbiński to uphold an anti-atomistic ("gunky") ontology, according to which all objects have proper parts.⁶ The course, like that in Manchester, mentioned the idea of multicategorical ontologies, as found in the paper *A System of Logic for Bicategorical Ontology* as well as in *Ontology and Logic*,⁷ and ended with a sketch of *chronology*, Lejewski's own extension of Leśniewski's systems, dealing with temporally extended entities, a theory outlined in *Ontology: What*

⁴ C. Lejewski, *Ontology and Logic*, in: *Philosophy of Logic*, ed. S. Körner, Blackwell, Oxford 1976, pp. 1–28; C. Lejewski, *Outline of an Ontology*, "Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester" 1976, Vol. 59, pp. 127–147; C. Lejewski, *Logic and Ontology*, in: *Modern Logic: A Survey*, ed. E. Agazzi, Reidel, Dordrecht 1981, pp. 379–398; C. Lejewski, *Ontology: What Next?*, in: *Sprache und Ontologie / Language and Ontology: Proceedings of the 6th International Wittgenstein Symposium*, eds. W. Leinfellner et al., Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna 1982, pp. 173–185; C. Lejewski, *Logic, Ontology and Metaphysics*, in: *Philosophy in Britain Today*, ed. S.G. Shanker, State University of New York Press, New York 1986, pp. 171–196 (Polish translation: *Logika, ontologia, metafizyka*, "Filozofia Nauki" 1993, Vol. 1, pp. 15–33).

⁵ C. Lejewski, *On the Dramatic Stage in the Development of Kotarbiński's Pansomatism*, in: *Ontologie und Logik / Ontology and Logic*, eds. P. Weingartner, E. Morscher, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1979, pp. 197–214 (Polish translation: *O dramatycznej fazie rozwojowej pansmatyzmu Kotarbińskiego*, "Filozofia Nauki" 1994, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 23–36).

⁶ C. Lejewski, *Outline of an Ontology*, op. cit.

⁷ C. Lejewski, *A System of Logic for Bicategorical Ontology*, "Journal of Philosophical Logic" 1974, Vol. 3, pp. 265–283; C. Lejewski, *A System of Logic for Bicategorical Ontology*, in: *Problems in Logic and Ontology*, eds. E. Morscher, J. Czermak, P. Weingartner, Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, Graz 1977, pp. 99–117; C. Lejewski, *Ontology and Logic*, op. cit.

*Next?*⁸ In general, the material of Lejewski's taught courses tended to stay fairly close to ideas he had already put in print.

The other course, on logical consequence, overlapped in content considerably with his Popper "Library of Living Philosophers" piece,⁹ although towards the end of the course he elaborated a metalogical conception of the classical truth values T and F as names of classes of sentences: "T" naming all and only the true ones, and "F" naming all and only the false ones, and he sketched axioms for these, with nominal variables being variables for *names* of (declarative) sentences. To my knowledge, these ideas were not published. It should be said that Lejewski offered a completely metalogical reworking of Popper on inference, producing a typically impeccable account. For this "rescue of his honour" Popper was grateful, as his own attempts to "simplify" logic in the late 1940s had been severely criticised at the time. However, I later came to consider that Popper's ideas did not require such a rescue, but, after some fairly minor adjustments, could stand on their own terms favourable comparison with other "natural" ways of doing logic.

Lejewski spent a year at Notre Dame University in South Bend, Indiana, in 1960–1961. I have been unable to contact anyone who might have heard these classes, but I venture a conjecture. The principal figure of interest is Bolesław Sobociński, who had studied with Łukasiewicz and Leśniewski before the war, known Lejewski, and after the war emigrated to the United States, moving to Notre Dame in 1956, where he founded and edited the prestigious "Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic." Unlike Lejewski, Sobociński was able to develop and nurture a flourishing school of talented young logicians, and thus to recreate some elements of pre-war Warsaw intellectual life. Lejewski would doubtless have felt very much at home in this milieu, and I expect his teaching would have been more technically logical than in Manchester. The three-part series *Studies in the Axiomatic Foundations of Boolean Algebra*¹⁰ – in which Boolean algebra as treated by Ernst Schröder is interpreted within Leśniewski's ontology – was, although written in Manchester, published in the first volume of the "Notre Dame

⁸ C. Lejewski, *Ontology: What Next?*, op. cit.

⁹ C. Lejewski, *Popper's Theory of Formal or Deductive Inference*, in: *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, ed. P.A. Schilpp, Open Court, La Salle 1974, pp. 632–670.

¹⁰ C. Lejewski, *Studies in the Axiomatic Foundations of Boolean Algebra: Part 1*, "Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic" 1960, Vol. 1, pp. 23–47; C. Lejewski, *Studies in the Axiomatic Foundations of Boolean Algebra: Part 2*, "Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic" 1960, Vol. 1, pp. 91–106; C. Lejewski, *Studies in the Axiomatic Foundations of Boolean Algebra: Part 3*, "Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic" 1961, Vol. 2, pp. 79–93.

Journal,”¹¹ appearing when he was himself in Notre Dame, and bearing the telling acknowledgement: “In preparing the present essay for publication I have been helped by generous advice and illuminating criticism from Professor Sobociński.” My conjecture then is that this was the subject matter of at least some of his teaching during his time at Notre Dame University.

6. Manner

Having taught English since the 1940s, Lejewski spoke the language with exceptional accuracy, and only the faintest of accents. His diction was measured and careful, and he spoke in a quiet voice, which was never raised. He never pursued rhetorical effect. Though not lacking in humour, what amused him were things cerebral rather than earthy or ribald. He always spoke with quiet conviction, and I rarely if ever heard him back down in response to criticism or questioning. Especially among those with whom he was unfamiliar, he was polite in an old-fashioned way, which contributed to the impression among students that he was aloof and distant. As one got to know him better, and shared discussion of points, he would gradually unbend, and could be entertainingly informative, not least about some of the characters of the Warsaw School whom he had known. He reserved especial affection and admiration for his two favourite teachers, Leśniewski in logic and Kotarbiński in philosophy. He regarded both Jan Łukasiewicz and Alfred Tarski as more mathematical than philosophical, though he clearly respected them both in their different ways. I recall seeing him in the company of Józef Maria Bocheński, to whom he was evidently respectful though not deferential, and they happily traded stories about the rich panoply of Polish personalities.

When delivering lectures, Lejewski would dress smartly, usually in a grey suit, or blazer and grey flannels, with white shirt, and tie. Though his courses and non-technical papers would start with prose, pretty quickly logical symbolism would be brought in, and the blackboard would begin to be covered in formu-

¹¹ The articles are “symbol heavy,” and my offprint copy of the first article contains many pencilled corrections to formulas, inserted manually by Lejewski. Indeed, in the fourth number of the first volume (the three parts appeared one in each of numbers 1–3), he had to publish a list of 66 errata for Part 1. For the scrupulously accurate Lejewski this would doubtless have been a source of discomfort.

las. The symbolism was invariably that of Leśniewski's "informal" notation, itself based broadly on that of *Principia Mathematica*, with groups of dots in place of parentheses, dots for conjunction, and quantified variables for the universal and particular (not existential!) quantifiers placed in square brackets rather than parentheses, to emphasize that Leśniewski's quantifiers were *unrestricted*, that is, allowing substitution of expressions with any available semantic value for their syntactic category. In the case of nominal variables, that meant that empty names were admissible substituends, so that nominal quantification lacked existential import. Minor deviations from Leśniewski's practice were that in ontology Lejewski did not distinguish typographically between singular variables and not-necessarily-singular ones as Leśniewski did. His expressions for constants from ontology and mereology were adapted to the English language, so, for example, the mereological constants "cz," "ing," "zb" and "Kl" were rendered as "ppt," "pt," "cl" and "ccl" respectively, being mnemonic for "proper part," "part," "collection" and "complete collection" respectively. Collections were not sets or pluralities but mereological wholes, being either some-or-all of the *as* ("cl(*a*)"), or all of the *as* ("ccl(*a*)"). Semantically, "cl(*a*)" is usually plural if there is more than one *a*, singular if there is exactly one *a* (and denoting just this one *a*), and empty if there are no *as*; "ccl(*a*)" is a singular term provided there is at least one *a*, otherwise empty.

When writing formulas, Lejewski would write the variables and logical constants first, and then go back and fill in the requisite number of dots to get the bracketing right. It was clearly second nature to him, but listeners, including, it must be said, myself, were always struggling to keep up. How I longed for parentheses! All the while, Lejewski would keep up a gentle commentary, often reading formulas as something closer to English, and interspersing these with the usual patter of such expressions as "so now we can derive..." "we now assume..." "we can define..." and the like. Sometimes he would work from notes, but as often as not he did not need to consult these. For particularly intricate derivations, in Salzburg he wrote out formulas and sequences of formulas by hand; these were then distributed in photocopy. The special symbols and groups of dots would have taken too long to do in a more "typographical" way, and his handwriting was neat, so no ambiguity resulted. His typescripts submitted as copy for publication used the available alphanumeric and other characters from a standard typewriter keyboard; additional symbols not thus available were added by hand.

Throughout all his talks, lectures and seminars there was a certain gentle confidence and serene certainty in the way in which he made assertions, as if it would

be clearly out of the question to think otherwise. To sceptical or critical questions, he would respond patiently but unbendingly. If weighing up alternatives, they were always those he thought were plausible, and he was trying to work out which he thought was right. It was more a dialogue with himself than a discussion with his listeners. There were things he was ready to admit we did not know for sure, such as whether or not there are mereological atoms, but on an opinion that he held firmly, I never knew him to back down.

7. Reception

For those already interested in what Lejewski was talking about, it was always instructive to listen to what he said, even if one disagreed. Indeed, most listeners disagreed with some of what he said, because his uncompromising materialistic reism was such an extreme ontological view. On the history of logic or on particulars of Leśniewskian lore, he was a reliable oracle. Nevertheless, there was a pronounced narrowness to his fields of interest, and as indicated earlier, when I first encountered Lejewski, his interests seemed extremely ascetic in comparison with the rainbow of exotica emanating from other, more “trendy” philosophers. In the 1970s, Britain was still under the strong influence of the later Wittgenstein, with the rejection of philosophy as a discipline in favour of a therapeutic dissolution of the so-called problems of philosophy. Lejewski’s conviction that the fundamental disciplines of philosophy could be built up in a series of formal theories, starting from protothetic and proceeding through ontology, mereology, stereology, kinematics and onwards through to mechanics and beyond, appeared to be either a throwback to Spinozistic *more geometrico* rationalism or unfounded optimism. It was almost as far from Wittgensteinian therapy as it was possible to get, which, given its roots in Aristotle, Wolff, Brentano, Leśniewski and Kotarbiński, was to be expected. Logical positivism was by then fundamentally discredited, but like all Warsaw-trained philosophers, Lejewski was no positivist, but on the contrary, a wholehearted metaphysician with a logical method.

For all these reasons, though mostly highly regarded by the staff and students as an important and illustrious logician, undergraduates found him, while a patient teacher, a little remote and rather intellectually intimidating. He did not attract doctoral students. Had he been able to remain in Poland, or perhaps have followed Sobociński and Tarski to the United States, no doubt it would have been

different. He would probably then have known more people sharing his interests and ambitions. As it was, one got the feeling that in England he was a relatively isolated figure, despite enjoying the respect of such logicians as Arthur Prior and Peter Geach, and his former teacher, Jan Łukasiewicz.¹² The one disciple of whom Lejewski was genuinely proud was Audoënus Le Blanc, who came to Manchester to study with him when he was in retirement, so that Le Blanc's nominal PhD supervisor was another logician. Sharing the general Polish logical obsession with axiomatic systems with fewer, shorter, simpler, etc. axioms and primitives, Lejewski was clearly delighted that Le Blanc was able to shorten axioms for mereology, and produce an elegant system of computational protothetic.

Having started subjectively, I will finish in like vein. Czesław Lejewski was clearly pleased with and encouraged my own efforts to propagate mereology as a central part of ontology, even if he disagreed with some of the more speculative aspects of my work, so that while we had initially had a distant relationship, we eventually became firm friends. My own views in logic are basically Leśniewskian, and my ontology, while not reistic, is nominalistic and austere, so his example, both in person and through his writings, has affected my own standpoint. It is to be hoped that his legacy, some of it no doubt slumbering in his uncatalogued *Nachlass* in the Library of the University of Leeds, will be taken up, examined, and thought about by others, despite their being unable to hear it from him in person.

¹² When Łukasiewicz travelled from Brussels to Dublin, he went via London, meeting Lejewski for dinner in a Polish restaurant (J. Łukasiewicz, *Pamiętnik*, eds. J. Jadacki, P. Surma, Semper, Warszawa 2013, p. 90). Lejewski later visited the Łukasiewiczzes in Dublin: in February 1947, Łukasiewicz, who was feeling very isolated and alien in Ireland, wrote to Bocheński: "With Lejewski I talked to my heart's content about scientific matters and pre-war Warsaw" (ibid., p. 118), describing Lejewski as a "talented, nice and conscientious man" (ibid., p. 110). In February 1954, Łukasiewicz flew from Dublin to London (then a much rarer way to travel) to examine Lejewski's second PhD at the London School of Economics. According to Lejewski, his nominal supervisor, Karl Popper, opened the proceedings with: "Well, you've passed. Now let's talk." When Łukasiewicz became too ill to see the second edition of his *Aristotle's Syllogistic* through the press, the proofs were read and corrected by Lejewski, by this time in Manchester. This helps to explain why Łukasiewicz's (uncatalogued) *Nachlass* resides in the John Rylands University Library of Manchester. The Łukasiewiczzes had visited Manchester in February 1950 at the invitation of the mathematician Max Newman, where Łukasiewicz was happy to meet Alan Turing, whom he (rightly) regarded as the finest English logician of the time (ibid., p. 93).

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Debate “How to Teach Logic? Diagnosis of the Current State and Prospects of Logical Education in Poland” (14.01.2024):

Report edited by Marek Porwolik

The reported debate on teaching logic took place on 14 January 2024, as part of the celebrations for the 6th World Logic Day, at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Warsaw. The circumstances of the event allowed the participants to feel the symbolic presence of Jan Łukasiewicz and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz – two prominent representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School and at the same time two logicians who were highly active in the formation of the education system in Poland, and, in particular, in the teaching of logic.¹ The celebrations began on 12 January 2024 with a two-day symposium dedicated to Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. On that day, a ceremony was held to name room 108 at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Warsaw as the “Jan Łukasiewicz Hall” and to unveil a commemorative plaque above its entrance. The discussion took place in this very hall.

Teaching logic in Poland has a centuries-old tradition, but the greatest progress in this area occurred in the 20th century: a period when the practice of logic in Poland was also at its highest level. The beginning of the 20th century was a time when modern mathematical logic was born, and Polish scholars – pri-

¹ In 1918, Jan Łukasiewicz took charge of the Section for Science and Higher Education in the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education, established by the Regency Council. In 1919, he served as the Minister of Religious Affairs and Public Education in the government of Ignacy Paderewski. He also served twice as the Rector of the University of Warsaw. In the post-war period, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz was arguably the most important figure in Polish logical education: he not only promoted the dissemination of logic but also influenced the educational system by advocating for the constant presence of logic courses in all master's degree programmes. For four years, he served as the Rector of the University of Poznań (since 1956, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań).

marily Jan Łukasiewicz and Stanisław Leśniewski, along with their student Alfred Tarski – played a fundamental role in this development. Before the outbreak of World War II, Poland had three departments specializing in mathematical logic: two in Warsaw (Łukasiewicz's and Leśniewski's) and one in Lvov (Leon Chwistek's). The logical education in these centres was comprehensive and intensive, and the emerging young talents enabled the formation of the famous Warsaw School of Logic, an unprecedented phenomenon of global significance. Unfortunately, World War II caused a dramatic rupture in the continuity of this school. After the war, Tarski became a co-creator of the success of American logic (supervising 22 PhD students in logic in the USA), and Łukasiewicz continued his work for several more years in Dublin. In Poland, their students remained (including Andrzej Mostowski, Jerzy Słupecki, Andrzej Grzegorzczak, and Helena Rasiowa²), thanks to whom logical research was revived in the post-war period, although Warsaw never regained its position as the world capital of logic.

The emergence of mathematical logic in Poland did not hinder the parallel development of research in the field of traditional, philosophical, and informal logic. In the circles of Polish scholars in logic, logical topics are usually understood broadly, encompassing not only formal logic but also issues in logical semiotics and the general methodology of science. A great advocate of this broad understanding of logic and of its widest possible application was Kazimierz Twardowski, a Lvov philosopher and teacher of Łukasiewicz and Leśniewski. His lectures concerning the latest trends in logic (1899/1900) and his textbook *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki i logiki* [Basic Concepts of Didactics and Logic], published in 1901, had an enormous influence on the development of these disciplines. In turn, his “pragmatic” attitude towards logic and his caution when it comes to applying formal methods (see *Symbolomania i pragmatofobia* [Symbolomania and Pragmatophobia] (1921)) contributed not only to the development of pragmatic logic in Poland alongside mathematical logic but also to the fact that Polish mathematical logicians, in contrast to their colleagues from other countries, were much more concerned with providing solid philosophical and intuitive foundations for their systems. The philosophical school initiated by Twardowski, known as the Lvov-Warsaw School, and related to the Warsaw Logical School at least

² It is worth noting that in the post-World War II period, besides Helena Rasiowa, three other women associated with the Lwów-Warsaw School held chairs in logic: Janina Kotarbińska (in Warsaw), Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (in Poznań), and Maria Kokoszyńska (in Wrocław).

by genetic ties, specialized in broadly understood logic and the application of logical tools in philosophy. It is worth noting that Twardowski's interdisciplinary approach, combining elements of logic, psychology, and linguistics in philosophical research, shared many features with today's cognitive science research programmes. Among Twardowski's students, a pragmatic approach combined with excellent knowledge of mathematical logic was exemplified by distinguished scholars such as Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, and Tadeusz Czeżowski. All of this made logical research and logical teaching in Poland develop in various directions. While mathematical logic was considered the prime example of scientific rigor, pragmatic logic was considered the foundation of the morality of thinking and an essential element of every person's education.

For these reasons, only seemingly do the views of Łukasiewicz and Ajdukiewicz on logic education diverge. Łukasiewicz was an advocate of teaching mathematical logic, while Ajdukiewicz favoured teaching practical skills. The dispute between the "elite" teaching of logic under the formal rigor of mathematical logic and "egalitarian" familiarization with the practical side of this discipline recurs in many discussions. However, it is not a genuine dispute in the sense that both types of education are needed.

The involvement of academic teachers in the logical education of school and university students has a rich tradition in Poland. Among the issues related to the teaching of logic undertaken by Polish academics within the School were: what logic should be taught – formal logic or rather logic *sensu largo*; whether to emphasize teaching so-called pure logic or rather focus on the practical applications of logic; whether limit education to classical logic or to expand it to include non-classical logics; what methods to use in didactics of logic. Various resolutions were adopted. Regardless of the chosen approaches, many excellent textbooks were created and logic teaching programmes were realized at Polish Universities. Many renowned Polish logicians of the post-war period also undertook important activities in the field of logical education. Among the didactic publications of this time, let us mention textbooks written by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Andrzej Grzegorzczak, Andrzej Mostowski, Jerzy Śłupecki, Ludwik Borkowski, Kazimierz Trzęsicki, Zbigniew Ziemiański, Barbara Stanosz, and Teresa Hołówka, which are still highly respected by Polish academic teachers and continue to be widely used.³

³ K. Ajdukiewicz, *Zarys logiki* [Outline of Logic], *Logika pragmatyczna* [Pragmatic Logic]; A. Grzegorzczak, *Zarys logiki matematycznej* [Outline of Mathematical Logic], *Logika popular-*

The current interest of the international academic community in issues related to logic education was institutionally expressed in 2023: within the Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology (IUHPST/DLMPST, <https://dlmps.org/>), the Commission on Logic Education (CLE) was established, whose members are: Valentin Goranko (Stockholm University), Cathy Kessel (Association for Women in Mathematics), Fenrong Liu (Tsinghua University, Beijing), Maria Manzano (University of Salamanca), Joao Marcos (Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil), Ram Ramanujam (Louisiana State University, chair), and Sara L. Uckelman (Durham University). The primary goal of the CLE is to promote broadly understood logic education in high schools and universities worldwide. In response to this initiative, a reported debate was organized, to which CLE representative Prof. Maria Manzano and a group of Polish specialists in the field of logic, who also have extensive teaching experience, were invited. The Polish participants in the debate were: Prof. Andrzej Indrzejczak (University of Łódź), Prof. Tomasz Jarmużek (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń), Prof. Jerzy Pogonowski (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań), Dr. Irena Trzcieniecka-Schneider (University of the National Education Commission, Kraków), Dr. Bartłomiej Skowron (Warsaw University of Technology), Prof. Krzysztof Wieczorek (University of Silesia), and Dr. Marcin Koszowy (Warsaw University of Technology).

It can undoubtedly be said that Polish logicians have been unanimous for many years in their opinion that logic is undergoing a “retreat”: it is being taught less and less, and in some educational paths where logic should be taught, it is

na: przystępny zarys logiki zdań [Popular Logic: An Accessible Outline of Propositional Logic]; A. Mostowski, *Logika matematyczna: kurs uniwersytecki* [Mathematical Logic: University Course]; J. Śłupecki, L. Borkowski, *Elementy logiki matematycznej i teorii mnogości* [Elements of Mathematical Logic and Set Theory]; J. Śłupecki, K. Hałkowska, K. Piróg-Rzepecka, *Logika matematyczna* [Mathematical Logic], *Logika i teoria mnogości: podręcznik dla kierunku matematyki wyższych szkół pedagogicznych i specjalności nauczycielskiej uniwersytetów* [Logic and Set Theory: Textbook for Mathematics Department of Higher Pedagogical Schools and Teaching Specializations at Universities]; K. Trzęsicki, *Elementy logiki dla humanistów* [Elements of Logic for Humanists], *Logika z elementami semiotyki i retoryki* [Logic with Elements of Semiotics and Rhetoric], *Logika* [Logic]; Z. Ziemiński, *Logika praktyczna* [Practical Logic]; B. Stanosz, *Wprowadzenie do logiki formalnej: podręcznik dla humanistów* [Introduction to Formal Logic: Textbook for Humanists], *Ćwiczenia z logiki* [Logic Exercises]; B. Stanosz, A. Nowaczyk, *Logiczne podstawy języka* [Logical Foundations of Language]; T. Hołówka, *Kultura logiczna w przykładach* [Logical Culture in Examples], *Kultura logiczna w ćwiczeniach* [Logical Culture in Exercises]. An attempt at a comprehensive list of Polish logic textbooks is included in the Appendix of this report.

absent altogether. It must also be acknowledged that the Polish academic community has been aware of the phenomenon of diminishing logic education and the many misunderstandings regarding the scope of the material taught and the methods of teaching. Representative statements on these topics can be found in a series of texts published in "Filozofia Nauki" [The Philosophy of Science] 10/2, 2002, which refer to the conference "University Teaching of Logic" that took place in Warsaw in 2001.

This report comprises the collected and authorized statements of the participants of our debate. As the reader will notice, some themes, observations, and conclusions are new compared to those expressed in 2001. We also hope that these new elements will be of interest to CLE.

In statements regarding the specifics of Polish logic education, attention is drawn to the low quality of presentation of logical issues at the high school level (I. Trzcieniecka-Schneider), as well as the problem of the insufficient availability of modern informal logic textbooks (K. Wieczorek). A fundamentally new contribution is made by the discussion of specific experiences in using modern IT tools to make the material more engaging and accessible (B. Skowron). It is also noted that the university-level curriculum should be tailored to the usefulness of the presented concepts for a given group of students (B. Skowron, A. Indrzejczak). The multitude of functions (both hidden and explicit) of logical education is highlighted by T. Jarmużek. In turn, M. Koszowy presents new observations on the role of teaching logic in developing students' social competences. J. Pogonowski notes a tendency that may prove important from the perspective of the future development of logical centres in Poland, namely the increasing (including institutional) connections between some of these centres and teaching and research units dealing with cognitive science. We also want to draw attention to the emphasis on teaching formal logic, formal semiotics, and the metatheory of deductive systems (J. Pogonowski, A. Indrzejczak). This focus on contemporary formal tools follows the proud traditions of the Polish School of Logic.

There is no answer today to the question of whether the problems indicated in the statements of the participants in our debate will be at least partially resolved within a timeframe achievable for the current reader. It also remains an open question whether the suggestions and ideas formulated by the debate participants will result in any specific solutions implemented into the teaching practice. The main goal of the organizers, however, was to update the discussion and inspire

Polish academic logic teachers who, considering the institutional support from CLE, will want to attempt to bridge the gap between academic discussions on logic teaching and concrete actions to improve the state of Polish logic education.

Anna Brożek, University of Warsaw

Dorota Leszczyńska-Jasion, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań

Kordula Świątorzecka, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, Warsaw

We present the statements of the debate participants in the same order in which they spoke.

How to Teach Logic?

Maria Manzano

Unfortunately, I do not have the answer to the leading question of our debate, I guess that is why some of us are here today. Probably we all agree in that Logic is the interdisciplinary subject par excellence, the clue of any rational reasoning, and the nucleus of the emerging science of the creation and transmission of information.

The main reason I am here is to tell you about the existence of the Commission on Logic Education (<https://dlmps.org/pages/commissions>). It was proposed to the Division of Logic, Methodology Philosophy of Science and Technology in the general assembly during the 17th Congress of LMSPST, Buenos Aires, July 2023.

The commission aims to: (1) have a broad representation both geographically and in the main areas of logic (philosophical, mathematical, and applied computational); (2) be concerned with education at all levels, with a focus on secondary and tertiary education; (3) provide guidance and support for the development of methods, curricula, teaching materials (including textbooks, lecture notes, digital tools, etc.) for logic courses on various levels, for teacher education, and for various target audiences; (4) collect global data on the extend and impact of logic teaching at all levels, but with a focus on secondary and tertiary education, and in all disciplines (e.g., computer science, mathematics, philosophy).

The members of the steering group are: Valentin Goranko (Stockholm University); Laura Hernández Martín (University of Amsterdam); Cathy Kessel (University of California); Benedikt Lowe (University of Cambridge); Fenrong Liu (Tsinghua University); Maria Manzano (University of Salamanca), Joao Marcos (UFSC Florianopolis); Balder ten Cate (University of Amsterdam); Ram Ramanujam (chair, Azim Premji University, India) and Sara L. Uckelman (Durham University).

I will tell you about the European ALFA project on Tools for Teaching Logic that we had last century and about the International TTL Congresses that we held in 2000, 2006, 2011, 2015, and 2023.

The first goal of the ALFA project was to share our experience as teachers among Aracne members. We proposed: (1) the preparation of a metabook (with hypertext version), (2) the design of an online dictionary of logic terms, (3) the investigation of the existing software for the teaching of logic, (4) the translation of both elementary and interdisciplinary texts and software, (5) to help potential authors to write lecture notes, (6) the dissemination of our project both within our academic community and outside it (high school), thus bolstering a good image of Logic, and (7) to support women's participation in higher education.

The network we created was interdisciplinary and included professors and researchers from philosophy, mathematics, computer science, and linguistics. Holland, Italy, Great Britain and Spain were the European countries of the project. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay were the Latin American. Some of the results of the project can be consulted on the Aracne website: aracne.usal.es and others in the Summa Logicae digital library (<https://logicae.usal.es>)

The Summa Logicae contains a library organized by branches including: Applications, Studies on Logic, Fundamentals, Logical Systems, and Exercises. Pedagogy of Logic is included in Studies on Logic and in there you can find some of the Proceedings of the several Tools for Teaching Logic conferences we organized when the project finished.

Tools for Teaching conferences:

- First International Congress on Tools for Teaching Logic (<https://aracne.usal.es/congress/congress>), University of Salamanca, 14–17 June 2000,
- Second International Congress on Tools for Teaching Logic (<https://logicae.usal.es/SICTTL/>), University of Salamanca, 26–30 September 2006,

- Third International Congress on Tools for Teaching Logic (<https://logicae.usal.es/TICTTL/>), University of Salamanca, 1–4 June 2011,
- Fourth International Congress on Tools for Teaching Logic (<https://ttl2015.irisa.fr>), Rennes 9–12 June 2015,
- Fifth International Congress on Tools for Teaching Logic (<https://toolsforteachinglogic23.weebly.com>), Complutense University of Madrid, 23–24 March 2023.

We also published:

- 1) *Special Issue: Tools for Teaching Logic*, “Logic Journal of the IGPL,” Volume 15, Issue 4, August 2007 (<https://Academic.oup.com/jigpal/issue/15/4/>),
- 2) *Tools for Teaching Logic: Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence*, Springer, 2011,
- 3) *Special Issue: Tools for Teaching Logic*, “Journal of Applied Logics – If-CoLog,” Volume 4, Number 1, January 2017 (<https://collegepublications.co.uk/ifcolog/?00010/>).

Being in the year 2024, it would be interesting to consider: current needs, new tools we have as well as the evolution of logic and logic teaching over this century. The main question being: What can be done today?

How to Teach Logic?

Andrzej Indrzejczak

The remarks presented below regarding the teaching of logic are certainly not groundbreaking, but I hope they will not prove controversial either. Perhaps many people believe that teaching logic more extensively today is unnecessary. Modern logic is a complex scientific discipline, and its dissemination should be limited to a narrow circle of specialists or those aspiring to this title. For ordinary people, even those with higher education, this knowledge is redundant. Of course, these views are not new or specific to our times; after all, Descartes believed that every person has innate critical thinking skills and does not need a course in logic. The systematic reduction of logic courses in the curricula of many academic majors seems to reflect this belief. Logic is slowly becoming an extremely elite discipline, even though it would seem its subject matter should be relevant to everyone. However, it is worth emphasizing that we live in times of

easy access to information of very different cognitive values. In the case of young people, this often leads to a state of mental laziness and lack of discipline. Therefore, teaching logic seems more necessary nowadays than it was when access to information was limited. Logic can (or at least should) promote the development of habits for approaching information critically, filtering it, avoiding dogmatism, and presenting one's views in a rationally justified manner. But how to achieve such goals? This boils down, simply put, to two issues: how to teach logic and what to teach in a logic course.

How to teach? To put it simply – in an attractive and engaging way. The difficulty of presenting certain topics should always be alleviated by using well-chosen, funny examples. Of course, the currently available means of presentation should not be neglected. However, these are universal guidelines. In the case of logic, it should be emphasized that it is a very practical subject. I do not believe that anyone can learn logic just by listening to lectures or reading textbooks without independently undertaking the effort to solve problems and exercises on their own. I often tell students that logic is knowledge that enters the head through the hand. Someone who does not face the effort of solving a certain number of problems can only acquire a mistaken belief that they understand. Their errors will become apparent during the next test (hopefully not the exam). Of course, difficulties should be gradually increased, and one should try to encourage students to develop the habit of gradually mastering the material; “sleeping through” the entire semester and then attempting to desperately master all the material a week before the exam does not lead to success. This is the source of widespread beliefs about logic: that it's incomprehensible, extremely difficult, and ultimately unnecessary. Logical knowledge at a basic level, properly taught and dosed, is neither incomprehensible nor difficult. Hence, the basic requirement of a well-conducted logic course should be to divide the material into parts, each of which must always be mastered before moving on to the next step.

What to teach? Logic is not a monolith; the term itself is ambiguous, and the discipline is extremely rich and diverse. And since we are dealing with something akin to Wittgenstein's family of meanings, logic courses should also reflect this. For example, in terms of content, a logic course for philology students should look different from one for computer science students. It's not just about different language skills or knowledge, but primarily about the needs of students in a particular field. For example, in the case of philology students, the presenta-

tion of formal logic can be limited to a minimum, but it is worth putting greater emphasis on knowledge of language, presented with the help of modern formal tools, or methodological problems of analysis and interpretation. In contrast, in the case of computer science, emphasis on the presentation of formal logic, methods of automated reasoning, etc., is entirely justified. This also has implications concerning logic instructors, who represent different temperaments, research inclinations, and interests. It is therefore important task of departments heads to entrust logic courses (with varied material) to individuals who are best equipped to handle them.

What Is the Purpose of Teaching Logic?

Tomasz Jarmużek

Since our discussion is taking place, it is no longer necessary to answer the question of whether to teach logic. Apparently, we all have agreed that logic should be taught. However, I believe that this alone is not sufficient to effectively answer the question of how to teach logic.

To answer the question of how we should teach logic, we must first ask ourselves why, for what reason, or with what purpose should we teach logic. This question does not contest the need for teaching logic, but the answer to it is essential if we want to systematically address the question of how to teach.

The question about the purpose or reason for teaching logic fits into the problem of the functions of social institutions. And although practising logic is largely an introverted, internal, and very personal activity, teaching logic largely loses this character. Teaching in schools or universities is an institutionalized social activity based on formal interactions.

On the other hand, if we ask about the functions of teaching logic, a wide range of answers appears. We can talk about explicit and hidden functions. Hidden functions usually provoke the greatest controversy. So, let's mention two possible ones at the outset.

Firstly, teaching logic provides and can provide employment for many people. Although it seems that this is not the reason we want to teach logic, it cannot be taught without it. Simply considering this topic is engaging and draws us into discussion. The development of logic education will attract and engage even more

people. Secondly, another hidden function related to teaching logic is building the prestige of one's own discipline. By teaching pupils, students and other lay-people about our logical art, we instil in them the belief that it is important or even very important. Among the adepts, there will probably be those who will decide the fate of our world in the future, as well as the institutional fate of logic. Probably every discipline should care about its reception, validity and promotion. In a world where so many commercial, social and ideological projects vie for attention and interest, even the most valuable endeavours – and we consider logic to be such – cannot attract significant interest on their own. Therefore, this function – though implicit – seems important.

Among the explicit functions of teaching logic, we can also mention two. Firstly, we want to increase the knowledge of recipients and secondly, we want to increase their skills. These two functions seem complementary, but they actually are independent. Teaching knowledge about logic in an encyclopaedic sense is something different (and not insignificant) than teaching the application of logic. Certainly, teaching knowledge enhances the prestige and significance of our discipline in social awareness, especially considering the history of logic in Poland. On the other hand, skills seem to be what the modern world expects. What skills and for what purpose would we like to teach? This is a problem of separate importance.

Summarising my voice in the discussion, I believe that before we move on to answering the question of how to teach logic, we should thoroughly answer the question of what functions logic education should fulfil. Then, more systematically and operationally, we can answer the titular question. I have listed here a few obvious functions that are immediately visible to those interested. However, we can look for less obvious answers. Usually, these are the interesting ones, that change the perspective.

Logic and Cognitive Science – A Promising Love Affair

Jerzy Pogonowski

During the five decades of my teaching service, I have participated several times in discussions like the one today on teaching logic. I mention this because – as I remember – similar (or even the same) problems accompanying this educa-

tional adventure were always pointed out. I believe that this fact should be a significant signal for the current attempts to improve this type of teaching. Why have we been constantly complaining about the same difficulties for at least half a century, which still cannot be overcome (by both lecturers and students)?

My proposals regarding the didactics of (mathematical) logic were recently presented in the article *Jak nauczać logiki formalnej?* [How to Teach Formal Logic?], in: *Logika* [Logic], vol. II: *Kultura logiczna* [Logical Culture], eds. S. Janeczka, M. Tkaczyk, A. Starościc, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2018, pp. 281–295. In addition to some specific practical recommendations, I propose there that the concept of the proof method should be deemed most important. Students should be provided with information on the most important contemporary methods used (axiomatic method, natural deduction, resolution, analytical tableaux, and sequent calculi), of course, along with sets of exercises solved together with the lecturer or recommended for independent solving. I consider it essential in the didactics of formal logic to also pay attention to metatheoretical issues, such as: validity and completeness of proof methods, consistency, soundness, (un)decidability of mathematical theories, as well as the connections between the concept of proof and representations of the concept of computability.

In recent years, we have observed a reduction in the role of logic departments at many faculties of Polish universities. However, it is worth noting that newly established departments supporting cognitive studies are eager to be called departments of logic and cognitive science. Perhaps this is the beginning of a lasting trend, and logic is beginning to be seen as closely related to research on cognitive structures, just as it was previously mainly associated with the methodology of sciences. At the Poznań cognitive science department, we have at least seven semester-long courses on logical issues.⁴ Therefore, even if there is no chance for logic to be an independent academic major, its connections with cognitive science may contribute to raising its importance in academic teaching.

⁴ This number has changed with the evolution of the cognitive science curriculum; however, since the establishment of the cognitive science programme at UAM in 2005, it remains one of the richest offerings in terms of logic available at Polish universities within a single field of study (note by Dorota Leszczyńska-Jasion).

Logic as a Forgotten Dimension of Educational Culture

Irena Trzcieniecka-Schneider

I have been a member of the Textbook Evaluation Committee of the Polish Academy of Learning since its establishment in 2001, and I would like to share the image of teaching logic that emerges from textbooks and curricula of various subjects.

In the core curriculum, there is quite a lot of logic, wherein those are mainly skills in the field of logical culture: defining, justifying, drawing conclusions, etc. For example, in the History core curriculum for high school: "The student creates a historical narrative in a cross-sectional or problem-oriented approach; identifies the problem and constructs argumentation." Teaching contents of Polish Language include recognizing argumentative statements, where the student "indicates the thesis, arguments and conclusions," and in high school, "distinguishes arguments, key concepts and theses in argumentative text, and makes its logical summary." Similar formulations can be found in the core curricula of Biology and Physics. However, on the way from the curriculum to the textbook, these logical skills and educational goals often disappear or appear ultimately in an incorrect form. Perhaps it is our (logicians') years of neglect that resulted in the fact that the authors of textbooks simply do not know logic. On the Polish publishing market, one can find, for example, a Polish Language textbook in which the description of knowledge concerning argumentation and inferences is fundamentally incorrect. Fragments of classical propositional calculus, which were once present in mathematics textbooks for high schools and technical schools, are now obligatory only at the extended level. My fellow reviewer said that when reading mathematics textbooks, he gets the impression that in some of them, the word "proof" has been subject to censorship. There are no proofs or symbolic calculations, and mathematics seems to be only mathematics for accountants. Students educated with such textbooks have enormous difficulty mastering symbolic representations. It would seem that knowledge of logic could be supplemented by philosophy textbooks, but this is not necessarily the case. Taking once again an example from the Polish publishing market: in a certain textbook, there is no word "syllogistic" for Aristotle, no word "logic" for Leibniz, while Lvov-Warsaw School is mentioned only once and only during a rather cursory description of

the views of the Vienna Circle, where the authors write that the ideas of the Vienna Circle were spread in Poland by representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The authors apparently did not notice that the Lvov-Warsaw School was established, counting roughly, about 30 years earlier, and when the Vienna Circle was formed, it already had a significant body of work. Moreover, when reading this textbook, one cannot help but recall the words of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz that the most common offence against logical culture is the lack of substantive precision in thought and speech. The textbook is riddled with logical errors and flaws, most of which could have been avoided with greater linguistic discipline.

Each of the textbooks I mentioned had ministerial reviewers who did not notice often bizarre logical errors, so we should consider how the community of logicians in Poland can improve this situation. My second postulate is the publication of texts jointly written with a representative of a specific discipline, demonstrating the role of logic along with the methodology of science in that discipline and its teaching.

When to teach logic? I believe we should start as early as possible – in early education, beginning from the concept of sets using examples of sets of concrete objects – and gradually introduce more complex concepts, keeping in mind the stages of student development. It is important to apply the so-called spiral teaching method – so that at each subsequent stage of teaching the same concepts return in a richer, more developed way, because concepts introduced at a young age, in earlier stages of teaching, become natural concepts. Then there is no need to remind oneself: “Oh, there was such a definition!,” because the concept is simply assimilated, that is, “made one’s own.” Both logical knowledge and skills should be conveyed across various subjects of teaching, as some can be done in the Polish Language classes, and a lot of methodology can be taught in natural science classes, although most in Mathematics classes. Gradually, in the eighth grade, concepts such as satisfiability and model could be introduced. Then, in high school, in selected classes, it would be possible to introduce a separate course in formal logic. I think that the dispute within the Lvov-Warsaw School about which logic to teach is now solely a historical dispute because we are facing a different problem: how to simultaneously educate excellent formal logicians who will push our field forward and make new discoveries, and at the same time, take care of the logical culture of the entire society. One must be connected to the other because – using a football analogy – to produce one Lewandowski, hun-

dreds of thousands of boys must first train on school fields or in football schools. It is only for this purpose that one can emerge from them. Therefore, we also need to teach logic to as wide a group of students as possible.

Five Responses to Student Complaints about My Formal Logic Courses

Bartłomiej Skowron

Among the criticisms of the courses I teach in elementary formal logic are the following complaints: that logic is useless and impractical, too abstract and formal, and too difficult.

I have developed five responses to these criticism:

I use large language models (LLMs), like ChatGPT, Gemini, and others, in every class. An LLM can serve as an interactive logical assistant. LLMs are helpful tools for practising critical thinking. One can think of them as omniscient yet deceptive demons that produce truths indistinguishable from falsehoods. Moreover, in doing so, they pose a significant challenge to our sense of truthfulness, which is the primary cognitive apparatus of critical thinking. If you do not know how to use them, ask them.

I supplement logic classes with creative training tasks, which put the mind in a state of open exploration, rather than merely staring blankly at the rigid framework of logic in horror. Creativity training integrates students in class and allows original and surprising contributions to what are often monotonous and automated deliberations. It also helps to dispel the notion that logic is uncreative. I use the book by Krzysztof Szmidt: *Trening kreatywności. Podręcznik dla pedagogów, psychologów i trenerów grupowych* [Creativity Training: Handbook for Educators, Psychologists and Group Trainers], Sensus, Gliwice 2013. This book serves as a practical guide featuring proven exercises.

I point out the normative and ethical dimensions of logic. By cautioning students, I emphasize that illogical reasoning can lead to insanity – after all, no one wants to go insane. I also motivate students positively with the existentialists' motto: "Be free" and "Do not let others lead you." To be free, one needs to understand the framework because "one who is not guided by logos is instead dragged by it." Living in accordance with logos leads to a more flourishing life.

I emphasize the role of logical connectives in searching the Internet using Google, for example. We practise using logical connectives (OR, AND, NOT) in search databases available online. I mention the logical foundations of integrated circuits (microchips) and their role in digital civilization. And then I ask again: is logic really impractical?

Repetitio est mater studiorum. Logic is difficult for many students; therefore, repeated reasoning is essential for mastery. I provide YouTube recordings of the logical problems I have solved. These recordings, available 24 hours a day, allow students to watch the solution to the same problem multiple times, ultimately leading to a deeper understanding of the material.

Lack of a Modern Textbook on Informal Logic

Krzysztof A. Wieczorek

A serious problem that many people teaching logic must face is the lack of textbooks that would discuss topics worth presenting in classes on this subject. While there are many works on formal logic intended for students at various levels of advancement, it is difficult to find books that exhaustively cover issues in the broadly understood area of informal logic, especially in logical semiotics (with a particular emphasis on pragmatics) and argumentation theory. The creation of modern textbooks covering these often-neglected branches of logic seems to be an urgent necessity. It is very important that these textbooks, in accordance with the specificity of the topics discussed in them, be as practice-oriented as possible, so that their authors are able to show how logical theory relates to the everyday problems each of us encounters. They should equip students with tools that they can actually use outside university lecture halls.

A very important part of logic textbooks, especially those proposed above, is vivid examples and exercises. However, gathering a large number of diverse examples and devising interesting tasks that develop various skills poses a huge challenge for one person – the author of the book. Therefore, it seems like a good idea that the creation of the textbooks should be accompanied by the creation of an online database, which would be continually expanded by the community of people involved in teaching logic. The database would contain authentic utterances illustrating various broadly understood logical errors (equivocations, in-

correct definitions, significantly ambiguous or unclear statements, etc.), as well as showing abuses related to language and logic (misleading by making literally true statements with false implicature, using persuasive definitions, etc.). Such a database would also include various arguments (both strong and weak, burdened with various known logical errors) taken from newspaper articles, public debates, or even heard in private conversations. Such an online collection of authentic statements would be a great addition to textbooks on broadly understood logic. People teaching logic could use it to draw examples for the theory discussed in classes, as well as for creating exercises, quizzes, or exams. Additionally, building such a collection could contribute to the integration of the logic community in Poland, and the platform on which it would be placed could become a place for many interesting discussions related to the didactics of logic.

An Attitude to Think Logically as a Key Component of the Logical Education

Marcin Koszowy

It goes almost without saying that any teaching of logic should cover both the component of the *knowledge* of logic as well as the element of the *skills* of applying that knowledge while expressing one's thoughts, reasoning, and evaluating the language use, definitions, questions, inferences, and other outcomes of the cognitive processes. In what follows, we will provide some reasons for the claim that although the concept of an *attitude* to employ the knowledge of logic is *implicite* present in most of the accounts of the logical education, in order to get students more into the logical abilities and dispositions to be employed in their social interactions, logical attitudes and dispositions should be explicitly mentioned and thoroughly discussed with students as one of the key goals of the logical curricula, in addition to the typical emphasis put on the knowledge and skills of logic.

The notion of an attitude as one of the key aims of logical education is explicitly mentioned by Trzęsicki (*Wprowadzenie* [Introduction], in: *Logika* [Logic], Wydawnictwo UwB, Białystok 2012) according to whom logical knowledge and logical skills alone are not sufficient and thus should be complemented by a certain *attitude* which manifests itself in the pursuit of improvement of the knowledge of logic and the logical skills. Among the specific signals of such an attitude,

Trzęsicki lists: recognizing the importance of reflecting on thinking about beliefs and actions, engaging in debates about the logical fallacies and established thinking habits, and analysis of language and abstract concepts. Conversely, the expression of the lack of this kind of attitude includes such behaviours as, for example: waiting for the correct answers instead of striving to find them independently, failing to reflect on logical fallacies we committed, as well as failing to respond to criticism properly. Given the importance of the notion of an attitude to think and use language logically as a key goal of teaching logic, our claim is that the overall idea of the logical dispositions along with the detailed list of most typical and crucial logical dispositions should be emphasized to a greater extent during logic courses. In other words, the presence of the idea of shaping logical dispositions conceived as a persistent tendency to think logically might be important for students in terms of their social communication skills.

This postulate concurs with the example division of the general teaching effects within the Polish education system. Those effects are divided into three categories: (i) knowledge, (ii) skills, and (iii) social competences (see, e.g., *Potwierdzanie efektów uczenia się w szkolnictwie wyższym* [Confirming Learning Outcomes in Higher Education], <https://prk.men.gov.pl/potwierdzanie-efektow-uczenia-sie-w-szkolnictwie-wyzszym/>). In our view, the notion of an attitude to think logically, as explained above, concurs with the “social competences” category to be associated with the education in the field of logic, as being inclined or disposed towards performing any societally vital activity entails a list of certain competences that are crucial for an apt performance of certain attitudes and dispositions to be enabled when needed under particular circumstances. Thus, we think that the logic courses curricula should explicitly define a list of typical logical attitudes and dispositions to be achieved as a key component of the social competences related to logic. Importantly, such a specified, and optimally quite detailed list of dispositions could play a vital role within a logic course. For instance, at the beginning of a logic class, a lecturer may point to the list of crucial logical dispositions that are to be achieved during the course. Next, let us imagine that during each class particular dispositions are being practised. Finally, towards the end of a course, students may be asked what dispositions they find most relevant and important in both their expected professional activities and everyday efficient, rational, and reasonable communication. The example part of any logic course are the dispositions to identify the logical fallacies such as a false dilemma, *petitio principii*,

and *ignoratio elenchi*. In their case, a logical thinking attitude would mean being capable of immediately employing a defence procedure towards a given communication strategy that contains a certain fallacy type. Thus, at least in the case of logical fallacies, a general attitude to think logically would encompass a list of specific sub-attitudes to deal with a particular fallacy.

Although the attitude component in question lies at the heart of logic teaching, putting more emphasis on practising the various sub-attitudes associated with matching skills can help students become more aware of the specific social competencies inherent in logic education.

Logic Textbooks in Poland

Anna Brożek

Note: The list does not include unpublished manuscripts. For works from the 16th–19th centuries, the names of the publishing houses are not provided.

16th Century

Jan z Głogowa [John of Głogów] (1445–1507)

1499 – *Quaestiones super „Priora analytica” Aristotelis*, Leipzig.

1500 – *Exercitium super omnes tractatus „Parvorum logicalium” Petri Hispani*, Leipzig.

1507 – *Exercitium novae logicae*, Kraków.

Górski, Jakub [Gorscius, Jacobus] (1525–1586)

1563 – *Commentariorum artis dialecticae libri decem*, Leipzig.

Jan ze Stobnicy [Jan of Stobnica] (~1470–1519)

1504 – *Generalis doctrina de modis significandi grammaticalibus*, Kraków.

Twaróg, Michał [Michael Parisiensis] (~1450–1520)

1507 – *Quaestiones veteris ac novae logicae*, Kraków.

1507 – *Quaestiones in tractatus „Parvorum logicalium” Petri Hispani*, Kraków.

17th Century

Burski, Adam [Bursius, Adam] (~1560–1611)

1604 – *Dialectica Ciceronis*, Zamość.

Keckermann, Bartłomiej [Keckermann, Bartholomäus] (1572–1609)

1600 – *Systema logicae compendiosa methodo adornatum*, Hannover.

1605 – *Systema logicae tribus adornatum*, Gdańsk.

Korona, Marek (~1590–1651)

1639 – *Directorium albo raczej wprawowanie do pojęcia terminów elementów logicznych i filozoficznych* [Directorium or Rather Introduction to Understanding Terms of Logical and Philosophical Elements], Lwów.

The oldest known logic textbook written in Polish, notably published in Lwów.

Młodzianowski, Tomasz (1622–1686)

1671 – *Praelectiones metaphysicae et logicae*, Gdańsk.

1682 – *Praelectiones philosophicae de metaphysica et logica*, Mainz-Gdańsk.

Mościcki, Mikołaj (1559–1632)

1606 – *Rudimenta logices seu institutiones logicae libri septem*, Kraków.

1625 – *Elementa logices libri septem*, Kraków.

Szczaniecki, Stefan (1683–1737)

1694 – *Fragmenta ex logica*, Kalisz.

Śmiglecki, Marcin [Smiglecius, Martinus] (1564–1618)

1618 – *Logica selectis disputationibus et questionibus illustrata*, Ingolstadt.

This work, over 1,500 pages long, was published three times in Oxford during the 17th century. John Locke studied logic from it.

Tylkowski, Wojciech [Tylkowski, Adalberto] (1624–1695)

1669 – *Logica curiosa*, Kraków. Republished in 1692 in Oliwa.

Wierzchoński, Samuel (~1589–1642)

1620 – *In universam Aristotelis logicam quaestiones scholasticae*, Köln.

18th Century

Benisławski, Jan (1736–1806)

1744 – *Institutiones logicae*, Wilno.

Bohomolec, Jan (1724–1795)

1763 – *Conclusiones ex universa logica et metaphysica. Ex logica*, Warszawa.

Dobszewicz, Benedykt (1722–1794)

1761 – *Praelectiones logicae*, Warszawa.

Konarski, Hieronim Stanisław (1700–1773)

1767 – *De arte bene cogitandi ad artem dicendi bene necessaria*, Parts I–III, Warszawa.

Narbutt, Kazimierz (1738–1807)

1769 – *Logika, czyli rozważania i rozsądzania rzeczy nauka* [Logic, or Science of Considering and Judging Things], Wilno.

The second logic textbook written in Polish, after Marek Korona's. NB. The former was published in Lwów, and this one in Wilno.

Nikuta, Marcin (1741–1812)

1798 – *Sciographie de l'art de penser*, Warszawa.

Stęplowski, Kazimierz (1700–1772)

1753 – *Logica incipientium*, Kraków.

Włodek, Ignacy (1723–1780)

1780–1814 – *O naukach wyzwolonych w powszechności i szczególności księgi dwie* [On the Liberal Arts in General and in Particular: Two Books], Roma.

The first comprehensive textbook on scientific methodology written in Polish.

19th Century

Baranowski, Mieczysław (1851–1898)

1895 – *Dydaktyka uzupełniona zasadami logiki* [Didactics Supplemented with the Principles of Logic], Warszawa.

Biegański, Władysław (1857–1917)

1894 – *Logika medycyny* [The Logic of Medicine], W. Kowalewski Printing House, Warszawa. Subsequent edition: 1908. German translation: *Medizinische Logik*, C. Kabitzsch, Würzburg 1909.

Borzęcki, Teofil (1800–1887)

1862 – *Treść logiki popularnej poprzedzona krótkim wykładem psychologii* [The Content of Popular Logic Preceded by a Brief Lecture on Psychology], Warszawa.

Chałubiński, Tytus (1820–1889)

1874 – *Metody wynajdywania wskazań lekarskich* [Methods of Discovering Medical Indications], Warszawa.

The earliest Polish work dedicated to the logic of medicine.

Cyankiewicz, Andrzej (~1740–1825)

1784 – *Logika czyli myśli z Locke’a „O rozumie ludzkim” wyjęte* [Logic, or Thoughts Extracted from Locke’s “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding”], Kraków.

Dowgird, Anioł (1776–1835)

1828 – *Wykład przyrodzonych myślenia prawideł, czyli logika teoretyczna i praktyczna* [Exposition of the Natural Rules of Thinking, that is Theoretical and Practical Logic], Połock.

The best logic textbook of the first half of the 19th century. Again, it’s characteristic that it was published in Połock.

Gabryl, Franciszek (1866–1914)

1899 – *Logika formalna* [Formal Logic], UJ, Kraków.

Heryng, Zygmunt (1854–1931)

1896 – *Logika ekonomii* [The Logic of Economics], Warszawa.

Jankowski, Józef (1790–1847)

1822 – *Krótki rys logiki wraz z jej historią ułożony* [A Brief Outline of Logic along with Its History Arranged], Kraków.

Kozłowski, Władysław (1832–1899)

1891 – *Logika elementarna* [Elementary Logic], Lwów.

Kremer, Józef (1806–1875)

1849 – *Wykład systematyczny filozofii. T. I. Fenomenologia. Logika* [Systematic Exposition of Philosophy. Vol. I: Phenomenology. Logic], Kraków.

1876 – *Początki logiki dla szkół średnich* [The Beginnings of Logic for Secondary School], Kraków.

1878 – *Nowy wykład logiki* [New Exposition of Logic], Warszawa.

Kudasiewicz, Adolf (1820–1965)

1858 – *Próbki filozofii mowy* [Samples of the Philosophy of Speech], Warszawa.

The first Polish textbook addressing semiotic issues.

Molicki, Antoni (1847–1924)

1879 – *Wykład systematyczny tagmatologii. Część fundamentalna. Metodologia* [Systematic Exposition of Tagmatology: Fundamental Part. Methodology], Kraków.

Pechnik, Aleksander (1755–1835)

1897 – *Logika elementarna z dodatkiem objaśniającym* [Elementary Logic with an Explanatory Appendix], Tarnów.

Przeczytański, Patrycy (1750–1817)

1816 – *Logika, czyli sztuka rozumowania* [Logic, or the Art of Reasoning], Warszawa.

Struve, Henryk (1840–1912)

1863 – *Logika poprzedzona wstępem psychologicznym* [Logic Preceded by a Psychological Introduction], Warszawa.

1870 – *Wykład systematyczny logiki czyli nauka dochodzenia do prawdy*. T. I *Część wstępna* [Systematic Exposition of Logic, or the Science of Reaching the Truth. Vol. I: Introductory Part], Warszawa.

Trentowski, Bronisław (1808–1869)

1844 – *Myślini, czyli całokształt logiki narodowej* [Thoughtness, or the Overall National Logic], Vols. I–II, Poznań.

This textbook contains many neologisms; some of them have been adopted into Polish logical terminology.

Wiszniewski, Michał (1794–1865)

1834 – *Bacona metoda tłumaczenia natury* [Bacon's Method of Explaining Nature], Kraków.

Zagórzański, Józef (1835–1884)

1873 – *Logika formalna dla wyższych gimnazjów* [Formal Logic for Higher Gymnasias], Rzeszów.

Translations:

Bain, Alexander

– *Logika* [Logic], Warszawa.

Condillac, Étienne de

1802 – *Logika czyli pierwsze zasady sztuki myślenia* [Logic, or the First Principles of the Art of Thinking], Wilno.

This textbook was written by the author in French at the request of the Committee of National Education [Komisja Edukacji Narodowej].

Descartes, René

1878 – *Rozprawa o metodzie* [Discourse on the Method], Lwów.

Jevons, William Stanley

1886 – *Logika objaśniona figurami i pytaniami* [Logic with Illustrations], Warszawa.

Liard, Louis

1886 – *Logika* [Logic], Warszawa.

20th Century

Adamiak, Natalia (1922–2011)

1979 – *Logika* [Logic], Instytut Filozofii WNS UW, Warszawa.

Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz (1890–1963)

1928 – *Główne zasady metodologii nauk i logiki formalnej* [The Main Principles of the Methodology of Science and Formal Logic], the lectures of K. Ajdukiewicz edited by M. Presburger, Komisja Wydawnicza Koła Matematyczno-Fizycznego Słuchaczy Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa.

1953 – *Zarys logiki* [Outline of Logic], PZWS, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960 (hereafter abbreviated as 1955–1960). German translation: *Abriss der Logik*, Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin 1958.

1965 – *Logika pragmatyczna*, PWN, Warszawa. English translation: *Pragmatic Logic*, Reidel, PWN, Dordrecht, Warszawa 1974.

Baley, Stefan (1885–1952)

1923 – *Нарис логики* [Outline of Logic], Наукове Товариство ім. Шевченка, Lwów.

Batóg, Tadeusz (1934–)

1977 – *Zasady logiki* [Principles of Logic], Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań.

1986 – *Podstawy logiki* [Basics of Logic], Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań. Subsequent editions: 1994, 1999, 2003.

Bautro, Eugeniusz (1891–1982)

1934 – *De jurisprudentia symbolica*. Część I. *Prolegomena do logistyki prawnej* [De Jurisprudentia Symbolica. Part I: Prolegomena to Legal Logistics], Lwów, published by the author.

The first Polish textbook on legal logic.

Biegański, Władysław (1857–1917)

1903 – *Zasady logiki ogólnej* [Principles of General Logic], Wydawnictwo Kasy im. Mianowskiego, Warszawa.

1907 – *Podręcznik logiki i metodologii ogólnej dla szkół średnich i dla samouków* [Textbook of Logic and General Methodology for High Schools and Self-Taught Students], E. Wende, Warszawa. Subsequent edition: 1916.

1912 – *Teoria logiki* [Theory of Logic], E. Wende i S-ka, Warszawa.

1916 – *Podręcznik logiki ogólnej* [Textbook of General Logic], Warszawa, Lwów.

Bocheński, Józef Maria (1902–1995)

1942 – *Logika* [Logic], Edinburgh, script. Subsequent edition: Salwator, Kraków 2016.

Borkowski, Ludwik (1914–1993)

1970 – *Logika formalna* [Formal Logic], PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent edition: 1977.

1972 – *Elementy logiki formalnej* [Elements of Formal Logic], PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1974, 1976, 1977, 1980.

1991 – *Wprowadzenie do logiki i teorii mnogości* [Introduction to Logic and Set Theory], Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin.

Brzozowski, Stanisław (1878–1911)

1905 – *Logika* [Logic], M. Arct, Warszawa.

Chwistek, Leon (1893–1944)

1935 – *Granice nauki. Zarys logiki i metodologii nauk ścisłych*, Książnica-Atlas, Lwów. English translation: *The Limits of Science: Outline of Logic and of the Methodology of the Exact Sciences*, Kegan Paul, London.

Czeżowski, Tadeusz (1889–1981)

1949 – *Logika. Podręcznik dla studiujących nauki filozoficzne* [Logic: Textbook for Students of Philosophical Sciences], PZWS, Warszawa. Subsequent edition: 1968.

1952 – *Logika* [Logic], PWN, Łódź. Subsequent editions: Wydawnictwo UMK, Toruń 1957, 1958.

Gabryl, Franciszek (1866–1914)

1912 – *Logika ogólna* [General Logic], Kraków, published by the author.

Giedymin, Jerzy (1925–1993)

1966 (with: Jerzy Kmita (1931–2012)) – *Wykłady z logiki formalnej, teorii komunikacji i metodologii nauk* [Lectures on Formal Logic, Communication Theory and Methodology of Sciences], Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań.

Gregorowicz, Jan (1921–1998)

1953 – *Zarys logiki dla prawników* [Outline of Logic for Lawyers], Wydział Prawa UW, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1955–1958, 1962, 1975, 1977, 1980, 1995.

Greniewski, Henryk (1903–1972)

1955 – *Elementy logiki formalnej* [Elements of Formal Logic] PWN, Warszawa.

1955 – *Elementy logiki indukcji* [Elements of Logic of Induction], PWN, Warszawa.

Grzegorzczak, Andrzej (1922–2014)

1955 – *Logika popularna* [Popular Logic], PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1960, 1961, 2010. Czech translation: *Populární logika*, SNPL, Praha 1957. Russian translation: *Популярная логика*, Наука, Moskwa 1965.

1961 – *Zarys logiki matematycznej* [Outlines of Mathematical Logic], PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1969, 1973, 1965, 1981, 1984.

1997 – *Logic: A Human Affair*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa.

Gumański, Leon (1921–2014)

1967 – *Elementarny wstęp do logiki współczesnej* [Elementary Introduction to Modern Logic], Ośrodek Nauk Społecznych i Wojskowych, Bydgoszcz.

1969 – *Wstęp do logiki współczesnej* [Introduction to Modern Logic], Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu, Toruń.

1983 – *Wprowadzenie w logikę współczesną* [Introduction to Modern Logic], Wydawnictwo UMK, Toruń. Subsequent edition: 1990.

Guzicki, Wojciech (1947–)

1987 (with: Paweł Zbierski (1944–2002)) – *Podstawy teorii mnogości* [Basics of Set Theory], PWN, Warszawa.

Hołówka, Teresa (1944–)

1972 – *Teoria zbiorów i relacji. Wprowadzenie do matematyki współczesnej dla humanistów* [Theory of Sets and Relations: Introduction to Modern Mathematics for Humanities], Instytut Badań Literackich PAN, Warszawa.

Ingarden, Roman (1893–1970)

1972 – *Z teorii języka i filozoficznych podstaw logiki* [On the Theory of Language and Philosophical Foundation of Logic], PWN, Warszawa.

Jaśkowski, Stanisław (1906–1965)

1947 – *Elementy logiki matematycznej i metodologii nauk ścisłych* [Elements of Mathematical Logic and Methodology of Exact Sciences], Akademicka Księgarnia Spółdzielcza Skrypt, Toruń. Subsequent edition: 2018.

Kmita, Jerzy (1931–2012)

1975 – *Wykłady z logiki i metodologii nauk* [Lectures on Logic and Methodology of Science], PWN, Warszawa.

Kotarbiński, Tadeusz (1886–1981)

1924 – *Kurs logiki* [Course of Logic], Komisja Redakcyjna Koła Filozoficznego Studentów Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa.

1925 – *Logika* [Logic], KRSUW, Warszawa.

1926 – *Elementy logiki formalnej, teorii poznania i metodologii [nauk]*, WKFiKP, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1929, 1947, 1961, 1986. English translation: *Gnosiology: The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge*, Pergamon Press, Osolineum, Oxford, Wrocław.

1947 – *Kurs logiki dla prawników* [Course of Logic for Lawyers], Koło Prawników i Ekonomistów Studentów Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź. Subsequent editions: 1949–1951, 1953, 1955, 1960, 1961, 1963.

Kozłowski, Władysław Mieczysław (1858–1935)

1916 – *Podstawy logiki czyli zasady nauki* [Basics of Logic, or Principles of Science], Wydawnictwo M. Arcta, Warszawa.

1918 – *Krótki zarys logiki wraz z elementami ideografii logicznej* [Brief Outline of Logic with Elements of Logical Ideography], Wydawnictwo M. Arcta, Warszawa.

Kraszewski, Zdzisław (1925–2012)

1970 – *Główne zagadnienia logiki* [Main Issues of Logic], PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent edition: 1971.

1975 – *Logika – nauka rozumowania* [Logic – the Science of Reasoning], PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1977, 1981, 1984.

Kubiński, Tadeusz (1923–1991)

1971 – *Wstęp do logicznej teorii pytań* [Introduction to the Logical Theory of Questions], PWN, Warszawa.

1980 – *An Outline of the Logical Theory of Questions*, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin.

Kuratowski, Kazimierz (1896–1980)

1952 (with: Andrzej Mostowski (1913–1975)) – *Teoria mnogości* [Set Theory], PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1966, 1978. English translation: North-Holland Publishing Company, Polish Scientific Publishers, Amsterdam, Warszawa, 1967, 1976.

Lutosławski, Wincenty (1863–1954)

1906 – *Logika ogólna czyli teoria poznania i logika formalna* [General Logic, or Theory of Knowledge and Formal Logic], Wszechnica Mickiewicza, Londyn.

Łubnicki, Narcyz (1904–1988)

1963 – *Nauka poprawnego myślenia* [Science of Correct Thinking], PWN, Warszawa.

1964 – *Zarys logiki. Semantyka i logika formalne* [Outline of Logic: Formal Semantics and Logic], UMCS, Lublin.

Łukasiewicz, Jan (1878–1956)

1929 – *Elementy logiki matematycznej*, WKMF, Warszawa. Subsequent edition: 1958. English translation: *Elements of Mathematical Logic*, Pergamon Press, Ox-

ford 1977. Japanese translation: *Sūri ronrigaku genron*, Bunka Shobō Hakubunsha, Tokio 1992.

1947 – *Geneza logiki. 10 lekcji* [Genesis of Logic: 10 Lessons], Biuro Handlowo-Montażowe inż. M. Bizonia, Katowice.

Łukowski, Piotr (1961–)

1990 – *Ćwiczenia z logiki* [Exercises in Logic], Oddział Regionalny Ogólnopolskiej Fundacji Edukacji Komputerowej, Białystok, Łódź.

Malewski, Andrzej (1929–1963)

1957 – *ABC porządnego myślenia* [The ABC of Proper Thinking], PZWS, Warszawa.

Marciszewski, Witold (1930–)

1969 – *Sztuka dyskutowania* [The Art of Debating], Iskry, Warszawa.

1974 – *Zarys logiki dla bibliotekoznawców. Część II. Wybrane zagadnienia metodologii nauk i logicznej teorii języka* [Outline of Logic for Library Scientist. Part II: Selected Issues in the Methodology of Sciences and the Logical Theory of Language], Wydawnictwa UW, Warszawa.

1994 – *Sztuka rozumowania w świetle logiki* [The Art of Reasoning in the Light of Logic], Aleph, Warszawa.

Marek, Wiktor (1943–)

1972 (with: Janusz Onyszkiewicz (1937–)) – *Elementy logiki i teorii mnogości w zadaniach* [Elements of Logic and Set Theory in Problems], PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1975, 1977, 1978, 1991, 1996, 1998–2006, 2008, 2011, 2012.

Mortimer, Halina (1921–1984)

1974 – *Elementarne wiadomości z semantyki i metodologii logicznej* [Elementary Information from Semantics and Logical Methodology], Wydawnictwa UW, Warszawa.

Mostowski, Andrzej (1913–1975)

1948 – *Logika matematyczna* [Mathematical Logic], “Monografie matematyczne,” Instytut Matematyczny Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Warszawa, Wrocław.

Mostowski, Andrzej Włodzimierz (1931–2021)

1974 (with: Zdzisław Pawlak (1926–2006)) – *Logika dla inżynierów* [Logic for Engineers], PWN, Warszawa.

Nowaczyk, Adam (1936–)

1971 – *Wykłady z logicznych podstaw nauczania* [Lectures on the Logical Foundations of Teaching], Ośrodek Metodyczny przy Studium Nauczycielskim Średnich Szkół Medycznych, Warszawa.

1974 (with: Zenobiusz Żołnowski (1932–2018)) – *Logika i metodologia badań naukowych dla lekarzy* [Logic and Methodology of Scientific Research for Physicians], PZWL, Warszawa.

1985 – *Logiczne podstawy nauk ścisłych* [Logical Foundations of Exact Sciences], IFiS PAN, Warszawa.

1990 – *Wprowadzenie do logiki nauk ścisłych* [Introduction to the Logic of Exact Sciences], PWN, Warszawa.

Nuckowski, Jan (1867–1920)

1903 – *Początki logiki ogólnej dla szkół* [The Beginnings of General Logic for Schools], Drukarnia W.L. Anczyca, Kraków. Subsequent editions: 1906, 1920.

Olejniak, Roman M. (1953–2016)

1998 – *Ćwiczenia z logiki praktycznej: zbiór zadań dla studentów zarządzania i marketingu* [Exercises in Practical Logic: A Collection of Tasks for Management and Marketing Students], Wydawnictwo Politechniki Częstochowskiej, Częstochowa. Subsequent edition: 2002.

Omyła, Mieczysław (1941–)

1981 – *Logika: wybrane zagadnienia* [Logic: Selected Issues], Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, Warszawa. Subsequent edition: 1987.

1986 – *Zarys logiki* [Outline of Logic], Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, Warszawa. Subsequent edition: 1995.

1994 – *Wybrane zagadnienia logiki* [Selected Issues in Logic], Wyższa Szkoła Ubezpieczeń i Bankowości, Warszawa. Subsequent edition: 1998.

Pasenkiewicz, Kazimierz (1897–1995)

1963–1965 – *Logika ogólna*. T. I–II. [General Logic. Vols. I–II], PWN, Warszawa.
Subsequent editions: 1968, 1979, 1980, 1986.

Patryas, Wojciech (1949–)

1994 – *Elementy logiki dla prawników* [Elements of Logic for Lawyers], Ars boni et aequi, Poznań. Subsequent edition: 2002.

Pelc, Jerzy (1924–2017)

1982 – *Wstęp do semiotyki* [Introduction to Semiotics], Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa.

Pogorzelski, Witold Adam (1927–2018)

1969 – *Klasyczny rachunek zdań. Zarys teorii* [Classical Propositional Calculus: Outline of the Theory], PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1973, 1975.

1974 (with: Tadeusz Prucnal (1939–1998)) – *Wstęp do logiki matematycznej* [Introduction to Mathematical Logic], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice.

1981 – *Klasyczny rachunek kwantyfikatorów* [Classical Calculus of Quantifiers], PWN, Warszawa.

Porębska, Małgorzata (1947–)

1976 (with: Wojciech Suchoń (1949–) and Barbara Woźniakowska (1947–1998)) – *Logika. Materiały pomocnicze dla ćwiczeń dla słuchaczy kursu jednosemestralnego* [Logic: Supporting Materials for Exercises for Students of a One-Semester Course], Wydawnictwo UJ, Kraków. Subsequent edition: 1979.

1990 – *Elementy logiki formalnej dla studentów kierunków humanistycznych* [Elements of Formal Logic for Students of Humanities], Wydawnictwo UJ, Kraków.

1990 (with: Wojciech Suchoń (1949–)) – *Komputer uczy logiki. Cz. I. Rachunki zdaniowe* [The Computer Teaches Logic. Part I: Propositional Calculi], Wydawnictwo UJ, Kraków.

1991 (with: Wojciech Suchoń (1949–)) – *Elementarne wprowadzenie w logikę formalną* [Elementary Introduction to Formal Logic], PWN, Warszawa.

1993 (with: Wojciech Suchoń (1949–)) – *Logika & komputer* [Logic and Computer], Universitas, Kraków.

1996 (with: Wojciech Suchoń (1949–)) – *Elementarny wykład logiki formalnej z ćwiczeniami komputerowymi* [Elementary Lecture on Formal Logic with Computer Exercises], Universitas, Kraków. Subsequent edition: 1999.

Przybyłowski, Jan (1939–)

1995 – *Logika z ogólną metodologią nauk; podręcznik dla humanistów* [Logic with General Methodology of Sciences], Wydawnictwo UG, Gdańsk. Subsequent editions: 1995–1997, 1999–2003, 2005, 2006.

Rasiowa, Helena (1917–1994)

1966 – *Wstęp do logiki matematycznej i teorii mnogości* [Introduction to Mathematical Logic and Set Theory], Ossolineum, Wrocław.

1968 – *Wstęp do matematyki współczesnej*, PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1969, 1971, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1984, 1990, 1998, 1999, 2001–2005, 2007, 2009, 2012. English translation: *Introduction to Modern Mathematics*, North-Holland Publishing Company, PWN, Amsterdam, Warszawa 1973. Bulgarian translation: *Елементи на теорията на множествата и математическа логика*, Наука и Изкуство, Sofia 1973.

Regner, Leopold (1912–1997)

1973 – *Logika* [Logic], Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne, Kraków. Subsequent edition: 1995.

Sierpiński, Waław (1882–1969)

1912 – *Zarys teorii mnogości* [Outline of Set Theory], E. Wende, Lwów. Subsequent editions: 1923, 1928.

Słupecki, Jerzy (1904–1987)

1948 – *Czym jest logika* [What Is Logic], Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza Wiedza, Warszawa.

1948 – *Elementy logiki* [Elements of Logic], Akademicka Spółka Wydawnicza, Warszawa. Subsequent edition: 1949.

1963 (with: Ludwik Borowski (1914–1993)) – *Elementy logiki matematycznej i teorii mnogości*, PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1966, 1969, 1984, 1995. English translation: *Elements of Mathematical Logic and Set Theory*, Pergamon

Press, Oxford 1967. Russian translation: *Элементы математической логики и теории множеств*, Прорпесс, Moskwa 1965.

1973 (with: Katarzyna Hałkowska (1940–) and Krystyna Piróg-Rzepecka (1929–2023)) – *Elementy logiki matematycznej i teorii mnogości* [Elements of Mathematical Logic and Set Theory], Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna, Opole. Subsequent edition: 1975.

1976 (with: Katarzyna Hałkowska (1940–) and Krystyna Piróg-Rzepecka (1929–2023)) – *Logika matematyczna* [Mathematical Logic], PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent edition: 1994.

1978 (with: Katarzyna Hałkowska (1940–) and Krystyna Piróg-Rzepecka (1929–2023)) – *Logika i teoria mnogości* [Logic and Set Theory], PWN, Warszawa.

Sobiecki, Janusz (1948–)

1996 – *W kręgu logiki* [In the Circle of Logic], Wyższa Szkoła Społeczno-Gospodarcza, Tyczyn.

1998 (with: Henryk Cabak (1943–2002)) – *Wybrane zagadnienia z logiki: wykłady z semiotyki logicznej i logiki formalnej* [Selected Topics in Logic: Lectures on Logical Semiotics and Formal Logic], Wyższa Szkoła Zarządzania i Marketingu, Warszawa.

Sokołowski, Stanisław (1930–2008)

1967 – *Elementy logiki pragmatycznej* [Elements of Pragmatic Logic], Ośrodek Nauk Społecznych i Wojskowych, Warszawa.

1970 – *Zarys logiki pragmatycznej (dla humanistów)* [Outline of Pragmatic Logic (for Humanists)], Wojskowa Akademia Polityczna, Warszawa.

1972 – *Logika w dowodzeniu i kierowaniu* [Logic in Command and Management], Wydawnictwo MON, Warszawa.

1999 – *Logika dla menedżerów* [Logic for Managers], Wyższa Szkoła Zarządzania i Przedsiębiorczości, Warszawa.

Sośnicki, Kazimierz (1883–1976)

1923 – *Zarys logiki dla klas wyższych szkół średnich* [Outline of Logic for Upper High School Classes], Książnica Polska, Lwów, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1927, 1929.

1926 – *Wskazówki do rozwiązywania zadań logicznych zawartych w „Zarysie logiki”* [Guidelines for Solving Logical Problems Contained in the “Outline of Logic”], Książnica Polska, Lwów.

1948 – *Początki logiki. Książka dla miłośników rozrywek umysłowych* [First Steps in Logic: Book for Aficionados of Intellectual Entertainment], Księgarnia Naukowa T. Szczepny i S-ka, Toruń.

Stanosz, Barbara (1935–2014)

1969 – *Logika formalna* [Formal Logic], Szkoła Główna Planowania i Statystyki, Warszawa.

1970 – *Ćwiczenia z logiki* [Exercises in Logic], PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1971, 1975, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1998–2005, 2007, 2008, 2012.

1971 – *Zarys logiki dla bibliotekoznawców. Część I. Wybrane zagadnienia logiki formalnej* [Outline of Logic for Librarians. Part I: Selected Issues of Formal Logic], Wydawnictwa UW, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1972–1974, 1976.

1976 (with: Adam Nowaczyk (1936–)) – *Logiczne podstawy języka* [Logical Foundations of Language], Ossolineum, Wrocław.

1985 – *Wprowadzenie do logiki formalnej: podręcznik dla humanistów* [Introduction to Formal Logic: Humanities Textbook], PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1998–2002, 2004–2006, 2008, 2010, 2012.

1999 – *Logika języka naturalnego* [Logic of Natural Language], Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne, Warszawa.

Stonert, Henryk (1923–1992)

1964 – *Język i nauka* [Language and Science], Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa.

Struve, Henryk (1840–1912)

1907 – *Logika elementarna. Podręcznik dla szkół i samouków z dodaniem słownika terminów logicznych* [Elementary Logic: Textbook for Schools and Self-Learners with an Appendix of Logical Terms Dictionary], Wydawnictwo M. Arcta, Warszawa.

Suszek, Roman (1919–1979)

1965 – *Wykłady z logiki formalnej. Cz. 1. Wstęp do zagadnień logiki. Elementy teorii mnogości* [Lectures on Formal Logic. Part 1: Introduction to Logical Issues. The Elements of Set Theory], PWN, Warszawa.

Szumowski, Władysław (1875–1954)

1939 – *Logika dla medyków* [Logic for Medics], Gebethner i Wolff, Kraków.

Tarski, Alfred (1901–1983)

1936 – *O logice matematycznej i metodzie dedukcyjnej*, Książnica-Atlas Lwów, Warszawa. Subsequent edition as *Wprowadzenie do logiki i metodologii nauk dedukcyjnych*: 1994. German translation: *Einführung in die mathematische Logik und die Methodologie der Mathematik*, Springer, Wiedeń 1937. English translation: *Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences*, Oxford University Press, New York 1970.

Tokarz, Marek (1946–)

1984 – *Wprowadzenie do logiki. Skrypt dla studentów kierunków humanistycznych* [Introduction to Logic: Lecture Notes for Humanities Students], Uniwersytet Śląski, Katowice.

1993 – *Elementy pragmatyki logicznej* [Elements of Pragmatic Logic], PWN, Warszawa.

1994 – *Elementy formalnej teorii składni* [Elements of the Formal Theory of Syntax], Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne, Warszawa.

1998 – *Wykłady z logiki* [Lectures on Logic], Wyższa Szkoła Zarządzania i Nauk Społecznych, Tychy.

Trzęsicki, Kazimierz (1947–)

1994 – *Elementy logiki dla humanistów* [Elements of Logic for Humanities], Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne, Warszawa.

1995 – *Logika nieformalna. Zagadnienia wybrane* [Informal Logic: Selected Issues], Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne, Warszawa.

1995 – *Wybrane zagadnienia z logiki nieformalnej* [Selected Issues in Informal Logic], Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Zarządzania, Białystok.

1995 – *Logika: nauka i sztuka* [Logic: Science and Art], Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Zarządzania, Białystok. Subsequent edition: 2000.

Twardowski, Kazimierz (1866–1938)

Textbook published during his lifetime:

1901 – *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki i logiki do użytku w seminariach nauczycielskich i w nauce prywatnej* [Basic Concepts of Didactics and Logic for Use in Teacher Training Colleges and Private Study], Towarzystwo Pedagogiczne, Lwów.

Wajszczyk, Józef (1944–2006)

1997 – *Wprowadzenie w podstawowe zagadnienia logiki* [Introduction to Basic Issues of Logic], Wydawnictwo WSP, Olsztyn. Subsequent editions: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego, Olsztyn, 1999, 2000.

1997 (with: Maria Gruszycka-Glabas (n.d.)) – *Zbiór ćwiczeń z logiki* [Collection of Exercises in Logic], Wydawnictwo WSP, Olsztyn.

Wawrzyńczak, Ryszard (1943–?)

1977 – *Logika* [Logic], Wydawnictwa Politechniki Warszawskiej, Warszawa.

Wiegner, Adam (1889–1967)

1948 – *Elementy logiki formalnej* [Elements of Formal Logic], Księgarnia Akademicka, Poznań.

Wilkosz, Witold (1891–1941)

1925 – *Podstawy ogólnej teorii mnogości* [Foundations of General Set Theory], Trzaska, Evert i Michalski, Warszawa.

Wolter, Władysław (1897–1986)

1969 (with: Maria Lipczyńska (1916–1984)) – *Elementy logiki. Wykład dla prawników* [Elements of Logic: Lecture for Lawyers], Uniwersytet Wrocławski im. Bolesława Bieruta, Wrocław. Subsequent editions: 1973, 1976, 1980, PWN, Warszawa, Wrocław.

Wójcicki, Ryszard (1931–)

1974 – *Metodologia formalna nauk empirycznych: podstawowe pojęcia i zagadnienia* [Formal Methodology of Empirical Sciences: Basic Concepts and Issues], Ossolineum, Wrocław. English translation: *Topics in the Formal Methodology of Empirical Sciences*, Reidel, Ossolineum, Boston, Wrocław 1979.

1977 – *Wykłady z metodologii nauk* [Lectures on the Methodology of Sciences], Wydawnictwo Politechniki Wrocławskiej, Wrocław. Subsequent edition: PWN, Warszawa 1982.

Zawirski, Zygmunt (1882–1948)

1945 – *Logika teoretyczna* [Theoretical Logic], Koło Filozoficzne Studentów UJ, Kraków.

Ziemiński, Zygmunt (1920–1996)

1956 – *Logika praktyczna* [Practical Logic], Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza, Poznań. Subsequent editions: PWN, Łódź, Poznań 1958, PWN, Poznań 1959–1960, PWN, Warszawa 1963, 1965, 1969, 1971, 1973–1977, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1992–2002, 2004–2007, 2009, 2011–2014. English translation: *Practical Logic*, Reidel, PWN, Dordrecht, Warszawa 1976.

Żarnecka-Biały, Ewa (1930–2009)

1992 – *Mała logika. Podstawy logicznej analizy tekstów, wnioskowania i argumentacji* [Small Logic: Basics of Logical Text Analysis, Reasoning and Argumentation], Wydawnictwo UJ, Kraków. Subsequent editions: 1993, 1994, 1999, 2006.

Translations:

Arnauld, Antoine, Nicole, Pierre

1958 – *Logika, czyli sztuka myślenia* [Logic, or the Art of Thinking], PWN, Warszawa.

Bacon, Francis

1955 – *Novum organum*, PWN, Warszawa.

Jevons, William Stanley

1960 – *Zasady nauki* [The Principles of Science], PWN, Warszawa.

Kuźmin, Aleksandr F.

1951 (with: Siergiej N. Winogradow) – *Logika* [Logic], Nasza Księgarnia, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 1952–1953, 1955.

Mill, John Stuart

1962 – *System logiki dedukcyjnej i indukcyjnej*. T. I–II [A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. Vols. I–II], PWN, Warszawa.

Ockham, Wilhelm

1971 – *Suma logiczna* [Summa Logicae], PWN, Warszawa.

Piotr Hiszpan

1969 – *Traktaty logiczne* [Summaries of Logic], PWN, Warszawa.

Quine, Willard van Orman

1974 – *Logika matematyczna* [Mathematical Logic], PWN, Warszawa.

Schopenhauer, Arthur

1973 – *Erystyka czyli sztuka prowadzenia sporów* [Eristic Dialectics: The Art of Winning an Argument], Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków. Subsequent editions: 1976, 1983, 1986, 1993, 2002, 2003, 2006–2008, 2010, 2019, 2020.

21st Century

Bremer, Józef (1953–)

2004 – *Wprowadzenie do logiki* [Introduction to Logic], Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków.

Czubak-Scholle, Magdalena (1976–)

2007 – *Elementarz logiki* [Logic Primer], Wyższa Szkoła Ekonomiczno-Humanistyczna, Skierniewice.

Grobler, Adam (1949–)

2006 – *Metodologia nauk* [Methodology of Science], Wydawnictwo Aureus & Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków.

Gromski, Włodzimierz (1951–)

2015 (with: Paweł Jabłoński (1977–), Jacek Kaczor (1974–), Michał Paździora (1980–), Maciej Pichlak, Maciej (1980–)) – *Logika praktyczna z elementami argumentacji prawniczej* [Practical Logic with Elements of Legal Argumentation], Wydawnictwo Od.Nowa, Bielsko-Biała. Subsequent editions: 2016, 2021.

Hajduk, Zygmunt (1935–2025)

2000 – *Ogólna metodologia nauk* [General Methodology of Science], Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin. Subsequent editions: 2001, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2005, 2007, 2011, 2012.

2002 – *Metodologia nauk przyrodniczych* [Methodology of Natural Sciences], Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin.

Hołówka, Teresa (1944–)

2002 – *Kultura logiczna w ćwiczeniach. Z. 1* [Logical Culture in Exercises. Vol. 1], Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa.

2003 – *Kultura logiczna w ćwiczeniach. Z. 2* [Logical Culture in Exercises. Vol. 2], Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa.

2005 – *Kultura logiczna w przykładach* [Logical Culture in Examples], PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 2006, 2007, 2012.

Indrzejczak, Andrzej (1964–)

2004 – *Elementy logiki* [Elements of Logic], Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczno-Ekonomiczna, Łódź. Subsequent edition: 2005.

2016 (with: Wiktor Marek (1957–)) – *Metody logiki: dedukcja* [Methods of Logic: Deduction], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź.

Jadacki, Jacek (1946–)

2001 – *Spór o granice języka. Elementy semiotyki logicznej i metodologii* [The Dispute over the Limits of Language: Elements of Logical Semiotics and Methodology], Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 2002, 2005, 2010.

2004 – *Elementy semiotyki logicznej i metodologii w zadaniach* [Elements of Logical Semiotics and Methodology in Exercises], Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa.

Jonkisz, Adam (1953–)

2003 – *Logika ogólna* [General Logic], Wydawnictwo ATH, Bielsko-Biała.

2011 – *Elementy logiki stosowanej* [Elements of Applied Logic], Wyższa Szkoła Administracji, Bielsko-Biała. Subsequent edition: 2015.

2023 – *Zagadnienia semiotyki logicznej i ogólnej metodologii nauk* [Issues in Logical Semiotics and General Methodology of Science], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ignatianum, Kraków.

Kisielewicz, Andrzej (1953–)

2017 – *Logika i argumentacja: praktyczny kurs krytycznego myślenia* [Logic and Argumentation: A Practical Course in Critical Thinking], PWN, Warszawa.

Krynicky, Michał (1950–2011)

2002 – *Elementy logiki* [Elements of Logic], Wyższa Szkoła Ekonomiczno-Humanistyczna w Skierniewicach, Skierniewice.

Kwiatkowski, Tadeusz (1930–2022)

2003 – *Wykłady i szkice z logiki ogólnej* [Lectures and Sketches on General Logic], Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin.

Lechniak, Marek (1962–)

2012 – *Elementy logiki dla prawników* [Elements of Logic for Lawyers], Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin.

Łukowski, Piotr (1961–)

2012 – *Logika praktyczna z elementami wiedzy o manipulacji* [Practical Logic with Elements of Knowledge about Manipulation], Lex a Wolters Kluwer Business, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 2021, Wolters Kluwer Polska: 2022.

Malinowski, Grzegorz (1945–)

2007 – *Logika ogólna* [General Logic], Wydawnictwo UŁ, Łódź.

Murawski, Roman (1949–)

2016 (with: Kazimierz Świrydowicz (1951–)) – *Podstawy logiki i teorii mnogości* [Basics of Logic and Set Theory], Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań.

Nieznański, Edward (1938–2024)

2000 – *Logika. Podstawy – język – uzasadnianie* [Logic: Basics – Language – Justification], Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 2006, 2011.
2000 (with: Tomasz Chodkowski (1939–), Kordula Świątorzecka (1968–), Anna Wójtowicz (1966–)) – *Elementy logiki prawniczej* [Elements of Legal Logic], Iuris, Poznań.

Olejniak, Roman M. (1953–2016)

2002 – *Logika praktyczna w zarysie* [Practical Logic in Outline], Wydawnictwo Wydziału Zarządzania Politechniki Częstochowskiej, Częstochowa. Subsequent edition: 2003.

2004 – *Rachunek zdań* [Propositional Calculus], Calvarianum, Kalwaria Zebrzydowska.

2005 – *Logika formalna czyli wynikanie i wnioskowanie* [Formal Logic, or, Deduction and Reasoning], Calvarianum, Kalwaria Zebrzydowska.

Paprzycka-Hausman, Katarzyna (1967–)

2009 – *Logika nie gryzie. Część I. Samouczek logiki zdań* [Logic Does Not Bite. Part I: A Self-Study Guide to Propositional Logic], Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, Poznań.

Pawłowski, Kazimierz (1952–)

2016 – *Podstawy logiki ogólnej: skrypt dla studentów kierunków humanistycznych* [The Basics of General Logic: A Script for Humanities Students], Wydawnictwo UKSW, Warszawa.

Piotrowski, Robert (1965–2014)

2005 – *Logika elementarna dla szkół akademickich* [Elementary Logic for Academic Schools], Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, Warszawa.

Szymanek, Krzysztof (1962–)

2003 (with: Krzysztof A. Wieczorek (1968–) and Andrzej S. Wójcik (1958–2006)) – *Sztuka argumentacji. Ćwiczenia w badaniu argumentów* [The Art of Argumentation: Exercises in Evaluating Arguments], Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa. Subsequent editions: 2004, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2013.

2021 (with: Krzysztof A. Wieczorek (1968–)) – *Sztuka argumentacji. Rozszerzone ćwiczenia w badaniu argumentów* [The Art of Argumentation: Expanded Exercises in Evaluating Arguments], Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa.

Świrydowicz, Kazimierz (1951–)

2004 – *Podstawy logiki modalnej* [Basics of Modal Logic], Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań.

2017 – *Podstawy teorii znaku ikonического* [Basics of the Theory of Iconic Signs], Wydawnictwo Zys i S-ka, Poznań.

Tokarz, Marek (1946–)

2006 – *Argumentacja, perswazja, manipulacja* [Argumentation, Persuasion, Manipulation], Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne, Gdańsk. Subsequent editions: 2008, 2010.

2006 – *Ćwiczenia z wnioskowania i argumentacji: zbiór zadań i przykładów do podręcznika „Argumentacja, perswazja, manipulacja”* [Exercises in Reasoning and Argumentation: Exercise and Example Collection for the Textbook “Argumentation, Persuasion, Manipulation”], Śląskie Wydawnictwa Naukowe, Tychy.

Trzęsicki, Kazimierz (1947–2025)

2003 – *Logika i teoria mnogości. Ujęcie systematyczno-historyczne* [Logic and Set Theory: A Systematic-Historical Approach], Exit, Warszawa.

2004 – *Elementy logiki i teorii mnogości* [Elements of Logic and Set Theory], Wydawnictwo, Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Zarządzania, Białystok.

2009 – *Logika z elementami semiotyki i retoryki* [Logic with Elements of Semiotics and Rhetoric], Wyższa Szkoła Administracji Publicznej, Białystok.

2016 – *Semiotyka i logika dla kognitywistów* [Semiotics and Logic for Cognitive Scientists], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, Białystok.

2018 – *Wprowadzenie do metodologii nauk społecznych* [Introduction to the Methodology of Social Sciences], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, Białystok.

2020 – *Logika* [Logic], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, Białystok.

Twardowski, Kazimierz (1866–1938)

2023 – *Inedita, t. 1: Logika. Część I* [Inedita, Vol. 1: Logic. Part I], ed. Jacek Jadacki (1946–), Wydawnictwo Academicon, Lublin.

2023 – *Inedita, t. 3: Logika. Część II* [Inedita, Vol. 3: Logic. Part 2], ed. Aleksandra Horecka (1974–), Wydawnictwo Academicon, Lublin.

Wajszczyk, Józef (1944–2006)

2001 – *Wstęp do logiki z ćwiczeniami* [Introduction to Logic with Exercises], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego, Olsztyn. Subsequent editions: 2003, 2004.

Widła, Tadeusz (1951–2020)

2005 (with: Dorota Zienkiewicz (1966–)) – *Logika* [Logic], Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck, Warszawa.

Wieczorek, Krzysztof A. (1968–)

2005 – *Wprowadzenie do logiki* [Introduction to Logic], Wydawnictwo Skrypt, Warszawa.

2021 – *Logika w pigułce* [Logic in a Nutshell], Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck, Warszawa.

Witkowska-Maksimczuk, Beata (1961–)

2013 – *Podstawy logiki w przykładach i zadaniach* [The Basics of Logic in Examples and Exercises], Wyższa Szkoła Administracyjno-Społeczna i Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa.

2014 – *Elementy retoryki i erystyki w przykładach* [Elements of Rhetoric and Eristics in Examples], Wyższa Szkoła Administracyjno-Społeczna i Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa.

2021 – *Argumentacja erystyczna. Analiza logiczna wybranych sofizmów* [Eristic Argumentation: Logical Analysis of Selected Sophisms], Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Warszawskiej, Warszawa.

Wójcicki, Ryszard (1931–)

2000 – *Wykłady z logiki z elementami teorii wiedzy* [Lectures on Logic with Elements of Theory of Knowledge], Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa.

Żegleń, Urszula (1949–)

2000 – *Wprowadzenie do semiotyki teoretycznej i semiotyki kultury* [Introduction to Theoretical Semiotics and Semiotics of Culture], Wydawnictwo UMK, Toruń.

Draft of High School Curriculum for Teaching Propaedeutics of Philosophy*

Kazimierz Twardowski

A. Draft of High School Curriculum for Teaching Propaedeutics of Philosophy – First Version

FIRST GRADE

I. SUBJECTIVITY–OBJECTIVITY OF SENSORY COGNITION OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD

- A. Short introduction of the problem.
- B. Resources for the formulation of the problem and for the attempts to solve it:
 - 1. Sensory images (perceptive and derivative). Sensations (among other bodily sensations). A ratio of sensory stimulus to sensation (Müller's law, Weber's law, simultaneous and successive contrast, sensory adaptation).
 - 2. Sensual perception and its variations (refer briefly to different theories, among others, the theory of Gestalt qualities). Act, content, and object of perception. A convictional moment in perception. Discussion on cognition of space and time (?). The role of attention in perception. The influence of perception of one sense over perceptions of other senses. Sensory illusions (e.g., geometrical). Illusions. Hallucinations. Mutual control of the perceptions of different senses regarding the same object.
 - 3. The influence of feelings on images and perceptions.

* K. Twardowski, *Projekt programu propedeutyki filozofii dla liceów ogólnokształcących (1935)*, in: *Dydaktyka*, ed. A. Brożek, Wydawnictwo Academicon, Lublin 2023, pp. 251–256.

C. Formulating the problem of subjectivity vs objectivity of sensual cognition of the external world.

D. Some attempts to solve this problem (e.g., Democritus, Locke, Descartes, naïve realism and critical realism, epistemological idealism).

II. RATIONAL COGNITION

Comparing. Analysing. Abstracting. Concepts in psychology. Sign, word as an expression and consolidation of a concept. Judging, questioning, conjecturing, doubting, [reflecting, considering...]. Reasoning. The role of language in the process of abstract thinking.

Formation of convictions (perception, reasoning, tradition, suggestion, [association, intuition]). The strength and instability of convictions.

Intelligence (human and animal). Methods of intelligence testing.

The problem of rationalism and empiricism presented using cases from history of philosophy (Plato, Descartes, Leibniz – Locke, Hume, Mill).

III. THE QUESTION OF TRUTH

Concepts in a logical sense (nominal and functional). Content and extension of nominal concepts. Relations between the extensions of nominal concepts. The problem of universals.

Simple and complex sentences. Judgments in a logical sense. Truth and falsehood. The division of judgments. Logical division, definition. Fallacies of definition and of logical division.

The relationship between reason and consequent. Direct inference (square of opposition, contraposition of judgments). Indirect inference (categorical syllogisms, hypothetical syllogism, disjunctive syllogism). Deduction and reduction. Complete and incomplete induction. Critique of traditional logic and presentation of some theorems of modern formal logic. Logical fallacies.

IV. THE QUESTION OF SCIENCE

The concept of science. Classification of the sciences according to subject matter (natural sciences, humanities, mathematics) and their method (a priori and empirical sciences). Experience, observation, experiment. Induction. Mill's methods hypothesis. Scientific natural law. Mechanism and teleology (Aristotle). Vitalism.

SECOND GRADE

V. HUMANITIES

Mental and physical facts. Soul–body problem. Materialism, spiritualism, dualism, psychophysical parallelism (based on examples from the history of philosophy, e.g., French materialism of 18th c., Berkeley, Leibniz, Descartes, Spinoza, Fechner).

Learning about one's own and others' mental life (introspection, empathizing, “understanding of” a psychical individual and their psychophysical products). Psychology. History.

VI. THE QUESTION OF HUMAN PERSONALITY

Human individual (being) from a biological stance and as a subject of historical processes. The struggle for existence and adaptation to the environment. Biological functions of senses. Instincts (self-preservation and species instinct). Sublimation of instincts. Feelings. Affects. Desires (complexes, psychoanalysis). Will. Habit. Character. Temperament. Human types (some characterological issues).

VII. SOCIETY

Coexistence of human individuals and its varieties (social feelings, social contact, e.g., expressing feelings and thoughts, speech, writing, gestures, facial expressions). Influence of social environment on the development of an individual and their life (public opinion, tradition, upbringing). Types of social groups (crowd, family, lineage, nation). Social organizations, the state (realistic and idealistic theories of the state). The issue of work and cooperation (physical and spiritual work, exercise, practice, fatigue, work organization, psychotechnics). Products of social life: science, art, and economic goods.

VIII. THE QUESTION OF GOOD

Some views on the nature of good in the moral sense (hedonism, utilitarianism, ethical evolutionism [Spencer], ethical objectivism). The object of moral evaluation. Duty (Kant). Ethical character. Responsibility and freedom of the ethical subject.

IX. THE QUESTION OF BEAUTY

Aesthetic feelings. Aesthetic categories (comicality, grotesqueness, tragedy, sublimity, lyricism). Aesthetic values: beauty and ugliness. Types of works of art. Subjectivism and objectivism in aesthetics. The social role of beauty.

B. Draft of High School Curriculum for Teaching Propaedeutics of Philosophy – Second Version

FIRST GRADE

I. SENSORY COGNITION OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD

Sensory images (perceptive and derivative). Sensations (among others, also bodily sensations, heat and cold). A ratio of stimulus to sensation (Müller's law, Weber's law, simultaneous and successive contrast, sensory adaptation, colour blindness, hot and cold points).

Sensual perceptions and their variations (refer briefly to different theories, among others, theory of Gestalt qualities). Act, content, and object of perception. Imaginative and convictional moment in perception. The role of attention in perception. The influence of perception of one sense over perceptions of other senses. Sensory illusions. Illusions. Hallucinations. The role of attention in perception [...]. Mutual control of the perceptions of different senses regarding the same object.

Recollections. Associations of psychological facts. Memory and imagination as psychological dispositions. Types of imagination. The role of memory and imagination in perception. The influence of feelings on images and perceptions. The problem of subjectivity vs objectivity of sensual cognition of the external world. Some attempts to solve this problem (e.g., Democritus, Locke, Descartes, naïve realism and critical realism, epistemological idealism).

II. THINKING

Comparing. Analysing. Abstracting. Concepts in a psychological sense. Sign, word as an expression and consolidation of a concept. Judging, questioning, conjecturing, reflecting, considering, doubting. The strength and instability of convictions. Reasoning. Formation of convictions (perception, obviousness, reasoning, by association, by tradition, by suggestion). [...]

Intelligence. Some methods of intelligence testing.

III. THE QUESTION OF LOGIC

Language as a means of exchanging thoughts. Psychological and linguistic (interindividual) meaning of expressions. Types of expressions (sentences, names,

function words). Sentences and judgment in a logical sense. Truth and facts. Simple and complex sentences (negative, hypothetical, disjunctive, conjunctive).

The relationship between reason and consequent. Some rules of formal logic based on the meaning of intersentential conjunctions (e.g., law of contraposition, *modus ponens*, *tolens*, disjunctive syllogism [*tollendo ponens*], *dilemma*, De Morgan's law, etc.).

Categorical sentences, their kinds, and structure. Names and nominal concepts. Predicates. Conjunctions between names. Functional concepts. Classes and relations. Extension and content. Relations between the extensions. Logical division. Some laws of traditional logic (conversion, opposition, syllogism).

Disadvantages of language resulting from the methods of learning speech as a practical means of communication. Definition. Types of reasoning. Deduction and induction. Fallacies in reasoning (informal and formal fallacy, fallacy of begging the question, infinite regress fallacy).

The positions of scepticism, dogmatism, and criticism.

IV. THE QUESTION OF SCIENCE

[...] The classification of the sciences according to subject matter. A priori science (deductive system). Empirical sciences (observation, experiment, empirical law), hypothesis (theory) and explanation (functional, causal, purposeful/intentional). Methodological problem of rationalism and empiricism.

The value of science. Theoretical and practical sciences. Science and life.

SECOND GRADE

V. SPIRITUAL WORLD AND NATURAL WORLD

Division of empirical sciences according to their subject matter. Field of research in the natural sciences. Field of research in the humanities.

Mental and physical facts. Soul-body problem. Materialism, spiritualism, dualism, psychophysical parallelism (based on examples from the history of philosophy, e.g., French materialism of 18th c., Berkeley, Leibniz, Descartes, Spinoza, Fechner).

Difference in research methods in humanities and natural sciences. Research methods in psychology.

Learning about one's own and others' mental life (introspection, empathizing, behaviour, "understanding of" an individual and their psychophysical products). Research methods in historical sciences.

VI. HUMAN INDIVIDUAL

Human individual from a biological stance and as a subject of historical processes. The concept of self. The struggle for existence and adaptation to the environment. Biological functions of senses. Instincts (self-preservation, species-specific, and social instinct). Sublimation of instincts. Feelings and their types. Desires (complexes, psychoanalysis). Habit. Will. Character. Temperament. Psychological development of human beings. Types of human individuals (among others, egoistic and altruistic types).

VII. SOCIETY

Coexistence of human individuals and its varieties (social feelings, interpersonal communication, and social influence by, e.g., expressing feelings and thoughts, speech, writing, gestures, facial expressions). Influence of social environment on the development of an individual and their life (public opinion, tradition, upbringing).

Types of social groups (crowd, family, lineage, tribe, nation, social layers, social class). Social organizations (party, association, municipality), state (realistic and idealistic theories of the state). The issue of work and cooperation (physical and spiritual work, exercise, practice, fatigue, work organization, psychotechnics). Products of social life: science, art, and economic goods; custom, law, morality.

VIII. THE QUESTION OF GOOD

The object of moral evaluation. Some views on the nature of good in the moral sense (hedonism, utilitarianism, ethical evolutionism [Spencer], ethical objectivism). Moral relativism and ethical absolutism. Duty (Kant). The problem of determinism and indeterminism. Moral responsibility.

IX. THE QUESTION OF BEAUTY

Aesthetic feelings. Aesthetic categories (comicality, grotesqueness, tragedy, sublimity, lyricism). Values: beauty and ugliness. Beauty in nature, beauty in art. Types of works of art. Subjectivism and objectivism in aesthetics. The social role of beauty and art.

Translated by Ewelina Grądzka and Paweł Polak

Memorial of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov on the Guidelines of the Curriculum of Propaedeutics of Philosophy in High Schools*

Manuscript by Kazimierz Twardowski

Translator's Note

At the 31st Ordinary General Meeting of the members of the Polish Philosophical Society, held on 15 February 1936, in Lvov, it was announced that based on the conclusions prepared by a special commission established in 1932, the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov had submitted a memorial to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education (MWRiOP) in Warsaw in January 1935, relating to the implementation of the propaedeutics of philosophy programme in high schools.¹

Kazimierz Twardowski's materials deposited in the IFiS PAN Library in Warsaw include an envelope (T.16,56) with a handwritten annotation by Twardowski: "Protocols and materials (projects) of the commission and subcommittee selected for propaedeutics of philosophy in high schools" (letter, memorandum, and draft programme in files L. 4/935 of 5.I.935).

The envelope contains, among others: a sketch of the *Memorial*... handwritten by Twardowski. It fits on six A4 sheets, written on both sides with a pen (in places with a pencil), including one typewritten page. The draft contains several fragments, individual sentences, and words – underlined. For example, the entire page 6 was crossed out several times, and most of its content appeared on page 7, where the text is typewritten.

* K. Twardowski, *Memoriał Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie w sprawie wytycznych programu „propedeutyki filozofii” w liceach ogólnokształcących (rękopis Kazimierza Twardowskiego)*, ed. R. Jadczyk, "Edukacja Filozoficzna" 1988, Vol. 5, pp. 491–496.

This text deserves to be recalled. The form in which it has been preserved proves that it contains the views of Twardowski – the chairman of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov. The content of the *Memorial...* sketch once again highlights the elements of Twardowski's scientific and didactic programme, especially his views on the important role of philosophical education of young people, the method of teaching logic and psychology, and the need to be critical and at the same time cautious in propagating one's *worldview*.

Memorial of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov on the Guidelines of the Curriculum of Propaedeutics of Philosophy in High Schools

The programme of propaedeutics of philosophy in high school should take into account the keen philosophical interests of young people, taking into account, in addition to logic and psychology, the most critical issues from those fields of philosophy that are most closely related to the development of the so-called worldview, namely, the theory of knowledge, metaphysics, sociology, ethics and aesthetics.

The study of logic and psychology should form the core of philosophical education in high school.

The following reasons support the provision of logic to a fairly significant extent:

1. Through the teaching of logic, the student is acquainted with terms that are living components of the standard measure of intellectual generalities, such as, for example, *definition, scope of a concept, content of a concept, logical division, proof, deduction, conclusion, premises*, which correspond to concepts necessary for anyone who wants to discuss any intellectual product, whether it be a scientific dissertation, a political article, or generally an official one, etc. The ability to properly use these terms and concepts is needed in every intellectual profession.
2. Thanks to logical education, acquiring knowledge of the requirements of logical correctness will not replace a developed logical sense but will help sharpen it. It will be indispensable in doubtful and controversial cases, just like knowledge of grammar in cases where the linguistic sense fails.

3. Logic, and in particular methodology, namely the division of sciences, their foundations, their importance, and significance, seems quite essential for including logic among the sciences necessary for general education.
4. The conceptual apparatus of logic and its fundamental theorems constitute the basis on which many philosophical issues are based, and without knowledge of which, the assessment of these issues cannot be achieved.

Similar arguments support the inclusion of psychology in the compulsory propaedeutics course in high schools. Namely:

1. Psychological terms are an essential component of the vocabulary of an enlightened person.
2. Knowledge of the structure of mental life, the laws governing it, the wealth of possibilities inherent in the human psyche, mental types and differences corresponding to age differences, etc., is necessary in every profession (doctor, teacher, judge, priest, engineer, in social life and the private life of future fathers and mothers).
3. Psychology is one of the sciences that most actively engage young people.
4. The concepts and theorems of psychology provide an indispensable basis for addressing a wide range of issues related to the philosophical worldview.

The following arguments support the expansion of propaedeutics teaching beyond the fields of logic and psychology:

1. Young people's interests in matters belonging to the so-called worldview are very strong. Failure to satisfy their interests at school causes young people to look for philosophical nourishment elsewhere and – as experience shows – they often find inappropriate nourishment.
2. By familiarizing young people with metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical themes, we introduce them to concepts that play an important role in every field of cultural life. These include idealism, realism, rationalism, empiricism, materialism, monism, and utilitarianism.
3. Moreover, the importance of considering issues related to ethics and social life should be emphasized in education.
4. Aesthetic issues should also not be neglected since learning other subjects often leads to them.

However, although propaedeutics of philosophy should surpass logic and psychology, the emphasis in teaching this subject should not be transferred from

logic and psychology to other areas of philosophy. As already emphasized above, the study of logic and psychology should constitute the basis of the entire propaedeutics of philosophy course.

Such a programme of propaedeutics, in which worldview issues and discussions on them would constitute the central core of teaching, would require from the teacher both first-class qualifications in terms of scientific preparation, as well as a rare talent for facilitating the discussion, and, finally, remarkable pedagogical tact that would allow him to maintain discipline in the classroom.

In the absence of properly prepared teachers, a programme of propaedeutics, limited to worldview issues, could degenerate in the hands of an insufficiently qualified teacher and thus do more harm than good. It would also not provide young people with extremely important elements of general education inherent in logic and psychology.

Therefore, the following guidelines for the programme of propaedeutics in high school should be adopted: the core of teaching constitutes a systematic course in logic and psychology (and individual chapters from both of these sciences could be intertwined): from logical and psychological issues, one would occasionally move on to issues belonging to other branches of philosophy.

The attached programme draft, which contains a detailed material layout, can be an example of implementing these guidelines. This sketch may require, upon closer examination, some changes, taking into account, first of all, the amount of time devoted to propaedeutics of philosophy in high school.

In the form presented here, the programme will require an increase in the number of hours previously devoted to propaedeutics in gymnasium.

The programme of propaedeutics of philosophy should be the same in all types of high schools. It is impossible to strictly define which information from philosophy will be helpful in different professions. Moreover, philosophical issues concern themes that are important for every person, regardless of their profession and special studies. Finally, the task of propaedeutics should be to prevent one-sidedness, not to deepen it.

However, the teacher may be granted the liberty to place more emphasis on this or that side of the material, depending on the interest and preparation of the students. It is desirable that propaedeutics teachers who have studies in mathematics or natural sciences in addition to philosophy be sent to the mathematics and science high school; and to the humanities high school, humanities teachers.

Also, in antique languages high schools, the propaedeutics programme (if such a type exists) should not differ significantly from the programme in other types. In particular, the study of the history of ancient philosophy should not be introduced, if it would be done at the expense of time devoted to studying material common to all types of high school.

The teaching method should be mixed. Lecture, heuresis, discussion, depending on the subject and time available. The lecture method should be used when defining technical terms and when presenting philosophical positions related to the history of philosophy and some classical issues. Heuresis is suitable for teaching logical and psychological parts, but in psychology, it should be combined with experiments according to the time available. Discussion will be advisable, for example when discussing specific psychological, ethical, and sociological issues, etc. During the hours devoted to discussion, the teacher should teach students to logically correct and loyally deal with the opponent's opinion.

Reading together during lessons should be limited because the loss of time is disproportionate to the benefits. Only in exceptional cases excerpts from classic works can be used as texts for shared reading. Texts written by contemporary authors, especially for schools, are better suited for this purpose. Young people should read under the guidance and supervision of a teacher at meetings of philosophical clubs and as voluntary and obligatory reading at home.

Propaedeutics of philosophy should necessarily be the subject of the final exams (if the exams are to be held). Otherwise, students will treat propaedeutics as a secondary subject that does not require much attention. Philosophical preparation may also be one of a student's life and intellectual maturity tests. Finally, questions in the field of philosophy can largely contribute to the implementation of the requirement of accumulating questions in the final exam, mentioned by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education in the guide on teaching and upbringing.

Translated by Ewelina Grądzka

Translator's Endnote

In response to the *Memorial...* sent in January 1935, the MWRiOP replied that its demands "would be considered during programme work." However, since in the course of these works, the Ministry allocated only two hours a week for propae-

deutics in the second grade, instead of three hours in each of the two grades, as envisaged in the draft of the Polish Philosophical Society programme, the Society sent a second memorial to the Ministry in September 1935, demanding an appropriate multiplication of the hours dedicated for propaedeutics of philosophy. In response, the Ministry declared that “it would consider the issues raised in the memorial before finally establishing guidelines for programme authors.”

However, the issue of propaedeutics of philosophy in high schools, especially the programme and the number of hours allocated for teaching it, was not resolved at that time, and it was reconsidered in the next attempt to reform the last two grades of high school.

Kazimierz Twardowski’s materials deposited in the IFiS PAN Library include fragments of correspondence (K-19) indicating that, on 16 January 1936, the MWRiOP asked Twardowski to develop a philosophy teaching programme for high school. In a letter dated 21 January 1936, Twardowski replied, accepting the proposal to prepare, together with Prof. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, a philosophy programme for all high school departments.

The correspondence shows that the draft programme sent by the authors in April 1936 did not fully meet the Ministry’s desiderata, so it was decided to continue improving until the end of 1936. Unfortunately, there is no sufficient data on the further fate of these programme works.

Education in the Lvov-Warsaw School: Insights from Personal Recollections. Introduction to the Archival Compilation of Reminiscences

Krzysztof Nowicki
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The archival texts of reminiscences collected in this volume document the teaching activities of two prominent members of the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS) – Kazimierz Twardowski and Izydora Dąmbska. Translations¹ of these texts provide international access to unique firsthand accounts written by their pupils and students, offering valuable insights into the teaching service of the coryphaei of the LWS, their attitudes towards students, and their guiding ideals. However, it should not escape our attention that these texts were written under very different circumstances. Some were composed while their subjects were still alive, others immediately after their deaths, and still others many years later. Moreover, the perspectives of the writers vary: some accounts were written before, and others after, World War II – a conflict that not only wrought intellectual devastation but also led to the establishment of a communist system in Poland, which was often hostile to independent critical thought. All this, combined with the unique temperaments of the memoirists, means that even when they discuss similar subjects, they present markedly different perspectives on the activities of these two great philosophers.

Most of the collected memoirs concern Kazimierz Twardowski. This focus can be explained by two considerations. Firstly, it was Twardowski's activity that led

¹ The translations of these texts were prepared by the author of this introduction. The goal was to preserve the original tone and style while ensuring accessibility for an international scholarly audience.

to the formation of the LWS and its distinctive ethos, uniquely reflected in its approach to teaching. Secondly, although there were many eminent teachers in the School, it may be convincingly argued that Twardowski was the most outstanding among them. In his text, Zygmunt Łempicki even describes Twardowski as a “didactic genius,” a characterization hardly in excess given the nearly 50 doctorates he supervised.

The volume also includes two texts on Izydora Dąmbska, Twardowski’s student. These contributions vividly illustrate how she embodied the philosophical ideals inherited from her teacher, both in her approach to teaching and in her unwavering dedication to pedagogical service – first in the face of the German occupation, and later in response to the rigid constraints of the communist regime. Her natural intellectual inclinations further sharpened the existential significance of responsible and rigorous philosophizing, which she expressed in the maxim: *Non est necesse vivere, necesse est philosophari* (“It is not necessary to live, it is necessary to philosophize”).

What is particularly interesting about the presented reminiscences is that they convey a unique image of the model philosopher – researcher, activist, and educator. Even if these texts, given the context they were written in, may contain an admixture of idealization regarding the figures described, it is nevertheless significant that all the authors attribute to them a similar set of characteristics. This noteworthy agreement indicates that the authors shared a common set of values, values representative of the LWS. In short, these values can be encapsulated in the slogan: “scientific philosophy as a way of life.” From these reminiscences, Twardowski and Dąmbska emerge as philosophers who not only embody those virtues but also transmit this model of philosophizing to their students – both through the content of their teaching and by their personal example.

This system of values includes those often associated with the LWS: a characteristic care for clarity and precision in both speech and thought, a rigorous demand for adequate justification of proclaimed beliefs, and, above all, an uncompromising, methodical pursuit of truth. Such traits have led many scholars to regard the LWS as a distinct Polish strand of analytic philosophy, and they are richly evidenced in all reminiscences.

One can cite, for example, a passage from Dąmbska’s text in which she speaks of Twardowski in the following way:²

² All citations in this introduction refer to the texts published in this volume.

Putting forward the postulate of the scientific practice of philosophy, Twardowski fought for clarity and precision of philosophical statements and their proper justification. (I. Dąmbaska, *Kazimierz Twardowski: Masters of Our Time*)

One can also quote Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, who says the following about Twardowski's teaching style:

Twardowski's didactic work focused precisely on freeing oneself from haziness, to see through a transparent current whether the essence of the matter is depth or shallowness, and to instil in listeners the need for clear thinking and a disdain for platitudes disguised as profundity. (K. Ajdukiewicz, *Extra-Scientific Activity of Kazimierz Twardowski*)

In Dąmbaska's case, one can recall Krystyna Stamirowska's words about the course of Dąmbaska's seminars:

The aim was to reach the true meaning, to grasp the essential thought of the author; the evening meetings were a shared search for truth, not a display of erudition or rhetoric. This is how we learned to read and understand philosophical texts; this is how certain needs and habits were formed, which, I believe, remained equally important also for those of us who later moved away from philosophy. (K. Stamirowska, *The Essence of Teaching*)

This last remark also illuminates another crucial aspect of the LWS's educational ethos. It was a school of clear and exact thinking that extended far beyond academia. The members of the School applied critical thinking skills to both theoretical discussions and matters of everyday life. And this is exactly what they passed on to their students. As a result, those educated by Twardowski's School members were not only prepared for a potential academic career, but were also well equipped to handle all sorts of socially significant tasks.

The picture, however, would remain incomplete if one were to stop at this point. For what emerges from these texts is not only the image of a philosopher who is guided by clear and precise thinking, but also one who sets high moral standards for themselves and those around them. This is a person distinguished by conscientiousness, courage, and justice. These virtues were instilled in their students not only through the content of their teaching but, perhaps even more, through the way they lived their lives. One should, however, emphasize that this

high moral standard is not merely a manifestation of internalized moral rigorism. It rather flows from a sense of responsibility and a sincere concern for others, especially those over whom they had direct influence.

In Twardowski's case, this moral dimension is recognized by Dąmbska in the following words:

According to Twardowski, practising philosophy is not just about solving certain theoretical problems. It is also a path of deepening and improving moral character, a path to internal independence and self-mastery. To be a philosopher is not only to realize certain intellectual values but also moral ones. (I. Dąmbska, *Kazimierz Twardowski: Masters of Our Time*)

This model of philosophizing is also what Twardowski passed on to his students, as is pointed out by Tadeusz Czeżowski:

He educated, which means he shaped characters, instilling in his students ethical principles and dispositions of will. Ethical principles – faith in the existence of absolute values of truth and goodness as goals of selfless pursuit; dispositions of will – dutifulness, conscientiousness, thoroughness, reliability. (T. Czeżowski, *Kazimierz Twardowski as a Teacher*)

In a similar vein, Maria Oberc comments on Dąmbska:

I think she taught us much more than grammar and who wrote what. Then, and even today, I sometimes think: if I did this or that, what would she have said about it? I believe she taught us, above all, to distinguish good from evil, baseness from honesty, and not just to distinguish – but to persistently, stubbornly, defend the most valuable virtues inherent within a person – even at the cost of one's own life. (M. Oberc, *Professor Dr Izydora Dąmbska in Secret Teaching*)

But even this is not enough for a complete picture. The portraits that emerge from the memoirs are not merely of intellectual ascetics, fenced off from the world by the gates of the university, who only educate their students and then send them into the world. Rather, they depict people who use their acquired intellectual dispositions to actively shape their social and cultural environment, regardless of how difficult the external circumstances may be. In Twardowski's case, this refers to his organizational activities at all levels of education, popular-

izing science, as well as giving advice to people who were not directly connected with the university.

This is how Irena Pannenkowa writes about him:

Endowed with an inexhaustible sense of initiative and extraordinary organizational skills, he continually established new cultural and educational institutions or revived old ones. (I. Pannenkowa, *Kazimierz Twardowski of Blessed Memory: Philosopher and – “Happy Man”*)

She is echoed by Ajdukiewicz, who writes:

[H]is outstanding organizational talent earned him exceptional authority, both within the university and with the state authorities, who had a decisive voice in many university matters. (K. Ajdukiewicz, *Extra-Scientific Activity of Kazimierz Twardowski*)

Władysław Witwicki is similarly outspoken, drawing attention to Twardowski's extraordinary thoroughness in carrying out his duties:

As one of the founders and long-time patron of a girls' high school, he was concerned not only with the general direction and spirit of the studies at the institution but also knew about every detail in its life and did not overlook any, even if that detail did not align with the general approach. The same applied to his management of Lvov University, where he served as rector for three years. Then, for the first time since time immemorial, the queues of listeners in front of the ticket offices during registration disappeared. The same was true in the case of the Society of Teachers of Higher Schools, of which he was chairman for several years and which he elevated like no one before him. (W. Witwicki, *Kazimierz Twardowski*)

In Dąmbska's case, it is the organization of secret teaching during World War II, even despite the grave danger. As Oberc attests:

She was the first in Lvov to decide to organize secret teaching [...]. When in July 1941, the delegate Wycech came from Warsaw to Lvov to organize secret teaching, Ms Iza provided him with a complete roster of 20 study groups (each consisting of 4–6 people) at the secondary education level, already operating at full capacity. (M. Oberc, *Professor Dr Izydora Dąmbska in Secret Teaching*)

Unfortunately, the post-war reality significantly restricted Dąmbska's non-scientific activities. Her past as a soldier in the Home Army, as well as her uncompromising belief in the necessity of freedom in scientific research, made her an inconvenient figure for the communist authorities. As a result, she became a target of ideological attacks, which also significantly – though not entirely – limited her influence on younger generations of philosophers.

The qualities listed here form an important part of the ideal image of the philosopher as embodied by Dąmbska and Twardowski in their lives. While this is certainly not an exhaustive characterization, it offers insight into what they conveyed to their students through their teaching. This image, however, is not only a historical curiosity – or even a source of inspiration – but above all, I believe, a task for all those who wish to nurture the memory of the LWS. For, as the memoirs make clear, one teaches not only by what one says, but above all by how one lives. There is, therefore, no greater tribute to honour the tradition of the School than to strive to realize this model in one's life and teaching, even if one may never be considered a "didactic genius."

With this ideal in mind, let us now turn to a brief review of the recollections that bring these qualities to life. Since much of the specific information is repeated, I will mention only what is unique to the perspective offered by each text.

Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (*Extra-Scientific Activity of Kazimierz Twardowski*) focuses mainly on Twardowski's non-scientific activities. He describes Twardowski's organizational achievements, which include, among others, founding and directing the Polish Philosophical Society, founding and editing the journal "Ruch Filozoficzny" [Philosophical Movement], and his involvement in the Society of Teachers of Secondary and Higher Schools. In addition, Ajdukiewicz mentions Twardowski's role in popularizing science and founding the Common University Lectures, as well as his central role at the Jan Kazimierz University – just to name a few of the things Ajdukiewicz recalls.

Stefan Baley (*To Professor Kazimierz Twardowski on the 70th Anniversary of His Birth*), in turn, mentions Twardowski's role in the formation of scientific psychology in Lvov. He emphasizes both his role in teaching psychology in a strict and precise way and his role in establishing the Psychological Department at the Jan Kazimierz University. He also draws attention to Twardowski's particular gift for reading what the students wanted to say, making him appear almost clairvoyant in their eyes.

In his text (*Kazimierz Twardowski as a Teacher*), **Tadeusz Czeżowski** describes Twardowski's influence on philosophy in Poland, especially his role in giving Polish philosophy a kind of unity. Moreover, he lists the components that made up his teaching activity: the ideal of philosophical education, the teaching method, and its implementation. This portrait of the teacher concludes by pointing out that Twardowski valued the teaching vocation above all else.

In a similar vein, **Izydora Dąmbska** (*Kazimierz Twardowski: Masters of Our Time*) underscores Twardowski's contribution to the formation of a scientific style of philosophizing in Poland. She points out that this style was expressed through common methodological postulates rather than through any specific views. Furthermore, just like Czeżowski, she accentuates the ethical dimension of Twardowski's philosophizing, which brings to mind the figure of Socrates, and draws attention to the origins of his efforts – namely, his love of two ideals: objective truth and moral goodness.

In describing Twardowski, **Zygmunt Łempicki** (*In Memory of Kazimierz Twardowski*) talks about the deep respect Twardowski had for the individuality of his students and how he taught them responsibility for their words. Moreover, he highlights Twardowski's contribution to the development of Polish spiritual culture and his exemplary civic virtues. A unique element of Łempicki's text is his colourful description of Twardowski's appearance.

Irena Pannenkowa (*Kazimierz Twardowski of Blessed Memory: Philosopher and – “Happy Man”*) recalls Twardowski as an organizer of cultural and educational life in Lvov. She points out that, although Twardowski was initially sceptical of female students, over time he changed his attitude and even proudly referred to her as his first female doctor. Pannenkowa particularly remembered Twardowski's words from their last meeting, in which he described himself as a happy man.

In his reminiscences, **Władysław Witwicki** (*Kazimierz Twardowski*) draws out the cultural context in which Twardowski had to work. In particular, he points out that Twardowski's intelligible and clear style stood in stark contrast with the popular thought trends of the time, attracting whole crowds to him. Witwicki notes that, despite his rigorous attitude, Twardowski was sensitive to the emotional value and weight of words, and he mentions Twardowski's deep passion for music.

Similar remarks are also found in the text by **Zygmunt Zawirski** (*Kazimierz Twardowski [1866–1938]*), who further emphasizes that Twardowski's cold and stark demeanour contrasted with his warm devotion to his students. In particular, however, he draws our attention to the fact that Twardowski was an authority not only on academic matters, but also on ordinary human affairs. He recalls a number of stories in which people not normally associated with the university sought his advice.

In her reminiscences, **Maria Oberc** (*Professor Dr Izydora Dąmbska in Secret Teaching*) describes Dąmbska's involvement in underground teaching during World War II. She attributes this commitment to Dąmbska's belief in the fundamental importance of education – something worth pursuing and providing despite the risks. She also recalls Dąmbska's individualized approach to students, and how she treated them as equals.

The last text, by **Krystyna Stamirowska** (*The Essence of Teaching*), presents Dąmbska's philosophical attitude and her method of teaching at the university. In particular, Stamirowska discusses her seminars, which were distinguished by a unique atmosphere of engaging with something extraordinary. These seminars not only taught students how to read texts, but also how to understand them thoroughly. She also describes Dąmbska's uncompromising moral character, the way she taught by example, and how her authority endures in her students long after her death.

Perhaps the most fitting way to conclude this brief introduction – while also encouraging the reading of the recollections gathered here – is by recalling the words of Twardowski to his students, as mentioned in Dąmbska's text. These words can be considered both his pedagogical testament and a testimony to his deep devotion to his students:

I tried to instil in your souls what is the best part of my own soul: sincere love for work, ardent love of truth and earnest striving for justice. (I. Dąmbska, *Kazimierz Twardowski: Masters of Our Time*)

Extra-Scientific Activity of Kazimierz Twardowski*

Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz

Today marks 21 years since the death of Kazimierz Twardowski. These years were fraught with events that, through the most dreadful wartime upheavals, led to a complete change in the state of affairs that prevailed in our country during Twardowski's lifetime. These changes have had a particularly severe impact on the narrower and broader environment in which he worked and operated. This course of historical events has forced us, Twardowski's students, to pay tribute to his merits on the 21st anniversary of his death in a place different from where tradition preserves the memory of his deeds – those that did not perpetuate themselves in works lasting longer than a human lifespan.

In the lectures delivered here, Twardowski was primarily presented as a scholar. However, Twardowski was not just a scholar, nor was that his primary role. He was a man of immense knowledge, equipped with a splendid tool for scientific work, but he was not a prolific scientific creator with a rich legacy that dazzled with grand ideas and paved the way for further achievements. Therefore, it is difficult to speak of Twardowski as the founder of a specific philosophical school with distinctive theses. Thus, Twardowski's greatness lies not so much in his own scientific achievements. It lies rather in other areas of his activity, which were well known to his students, his colleagues, the professors of Lvov University, and also to the broad circles of society in his native city. They are less known here, where today's meeting dedicated to his memory is taking place. Therefore, as the last speaker, concluding today's Assembly, I believe I should draw attention to these wonderful aspects of Twardowski's character that are not immortalized in written works, which complement his characterization given in the already delivered papers. Stanisław Łempicki once spoke beautifully about this at an Academy organized

* K. Ajdukiewicz, *Poznanaukowa działalność Kazimierza Twardowskiego*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1959, Vol. 19, Nos. 1–2, pp. 29–35.

in Twardowski's honour shortly after his death by the Jan Kazimierz University and the Polish Philosophical Society, outlining Twardowski's character as a man and citizen and documenting it with a wealth of concrete facts. I will limit myself to general remarks, which I will illustrate with only a few concrete examples.

In the memory of all who remained in closer contact with the University of Lvov from 1895 to 1930, Twardowski's figure will remain central to this institution. The University of Lvov could boast in those times a magnificent array of scholars of great stature. Among them were historians: Oswald Balcer, Ludwik Finkel, Stanisław Zakrzewski, Jan Ptaśnik, Adam Szelągowski; Polish philologists: Roman Piłat, Konstanty Wojciechowski, Juliusz Kleiner, Eugeniusz Kucharski; anthropologist Jan Czekanowski; zoologists: Józef Nusbaum-Hilarowicz and Kazimierz Kwietniewski; botanists: Marian Raciborski, Seweryn Krzemieniewski; geologist Rudolf Zuber, petrographer Julian Tokarski; physicists: Marian Smoluchowski, Wojciech Rubinowicz, Stanisław Loria; mathematicians: Wacław Sierpiński, Stefan Banach, Hugo Steinhaus; biochemist Jakub Parnas, and many, many others who would have been assets to any university in the world. Although Twardowski may not have equalled the rank of his most outstanding colleagues in scientific achievements, he was, one might say, the backbone of this university. This central position of Twardowski stemmed, first and foremost, from his unyielding character, high sense of justice, noble understanding of the university's tasks and the calling of a professor at a higher education institution, his ability to deeply grasp and rationally resolve specific issues that university life presented; his outstanding organizational talent earned him exceptional authority, both within the university and with the state authorities, who had a decisive voice in many university matters. Twardowski also did not shy away from serving the university in matters of great importance, as well as in matters that may have seemed secondary. He considered service to the university beyond his teaching duties an important obligation and devoted a tremendous amount of his energy and time to this duty. The peak years of this service were the years in which he was elected rector three times; these were times of great trial, during World War I. In those years, when most professors and students were cut off from their university city, Twardowski continued the university's activities abroad in the form of organized academic courses and examination boards. At the same time, he excellently organized assistance for the academic youth, doubling and tripling efforts to raise funds for this purpose. After returning to Lvov, he worked tire-

lessly to reopen the university during the ongoing war, at a time when the city lay in the front-line zone, and the roar of cannons could be heard. But even before and after his rectorship period, that is, during the partition era and in the years of independent Poland, Twardowski's non-didactic service to the university was marked by outstanding achievements. Much of the credit for admitting women to university studies is due to him, and it is mainly thanks to him that high school graduates from the Congress Kingdom could study at the University of Lvov on equal terms with graduates of Galician schools. Twardowski also undertook, for the benefit of the University, tasks so mundane, yet still so immensely important, such as organizing university offices, study regulations, enrollment regulations, etc. This organization became a model adopted later by other Polish universities and which survived without major changes until World War II. Perhaps these details suffice, but it is impossible not to mention one more thing and of immense importance at that. Twardowski organized within the University and, in his many years of leadership, brought to full fruition the Common University Lectures, through which the University popularized science among the broad circles of Lvov society and even in the distant provinces. It was an institution with almost as wide a scope of action as today's Society for Common Knowledge. Twardowski was not only the longtime head of the Common Lectures but also one of the most devoted and eagerly listened-to lecturers.

I have spoken so far about Twardowski's great authority and his dedicated service to the University as one of the manifestations of his central position within this institution. But alongside this, there was another aspect of his activity that made him a central figure at the University of Lvov. It was his teaching and educational work. It placed Twardowski at the centre of the University because it reached a broader audience than the teaching activities of any other professor. His lectures were attended by all students of the philosophical faculty, which encompassed all fields of study conducted in today's universities, both humanities and mathematical and natural sciences, except legal studies. But even law students attended Twardowski's lectures. Twardowski lectured in the largest hall of the University, but even that proved too small to accommodate eager listeners, and the University had to rent the largest concert hall in the city for Twardowski's lectures. Besides lectures, Twardowski conducted seminars and proseminars, which were attended not only by philosophy students but also by students dedicated to the study of other sciences. Under Twardowski's guidance, one could gain foun-

dational knowledge from all philosophical disciplines because Twardowski devoted a one-year, and sometimes longer, course to each of them, except perhaps aesthetics. Under his supervision, one could become acquainted with the greatest works of the philosophical classics, which were read, interpreted, and critically analysed in seminars. However, one could also learn something more: a rigorous method of scientific work, whose chief commandments could be summarized in the following three postulates: think so that you know well what you are thinking about; speak so that not only do you know well what you are saying, but also so that you are sure that the person listening to you attentively will think about the same thing as you; and whatever you claim, assert it with the decisiveness that the logical strength of your argumentation allows. This was the ABC of solid thinking, and many might dismiss it as elementary schooling. But unfortunately, this elementary schooling is not often part of high students', or even university graduates', education. This scientific *Kinderstube* was also missing in many who achieved fame as great thinkers, obtaining it through exciting appearances of depth created by the murkiness of their thoughts. Twardowski's didactic work focused precisely on freeing oneself from haziness, to see through a transparent current whether the essence of the matter is depth or shallowness, and to instil in listeners the need for clear thinking and a disdain for platitudes disguised as profundity. This elementary school of integrity, this ABC of solid thinking, set as the main task of didactic activity, left a distinct mark on Twardowski's students, not only those dedicated to philosophy but also others. Whoever among Twardowski's students was marked by it belonged to his school, regardless of whether they were a philosopher, Polish philologist, historian, or naturalist.

I said above that Twardowski did not create a philosophical school that could be distinguished by its own characteristic propositions. Instead, he created a different kind of school, which cannot be called a philosophical school, as it was a school with a broader scope – a school of rigorous thinking. Lutosławski once accused Twardowski and his students of constantly sharpening knives that they cut nothing with. This accusation was not right; sharpened knives were used by Twardowski and his students to prepare clear and distinct concepts, especially those encountered in philosophy – but not only those. The same thing was and is being done by the school, contemporary to them, operating in England, called analytical philosophy, founded by G.E. Moore, and continued by Broad, Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, and others. It was precisely this English analytical philosophy that

was most similar to Twardowski's school. Discussing the role and significance of such concept sharpening or refining – the work of cleansing and ordering concepts in collaboration with those who extract them from empirically studied reality in a raw and often crude form – would require a separate presentation. I will only mention here that this work is appreciated by all those who consider conformity with the fundamental methodological postulates of Twardowski's school as the chief criterion of correctness in scientific work.

Much could be said about how Twardowski trained his students to think rigorously, and how much effort and time he devoted to his teaching duties; there is no time to delve into these matters here. However, it should be mentioned that Twardowski not only taught his students but also educated them, and not just them, but everyone he encountered. He saw the goals of this education clearly: his ideals were the cult of truth, the cult of justice, and placing social good over personal gain; as character traits necessary to approach these ideals, he considered self-control, conscientiousness, systematic and planned work, kindness towards others, maintaining one's dignity and the dignity of the social position one occupies. Twardowski educated primarily by the example of his own behaviour and by consistently and inexorably demanding from his students reliability, punctuality, conscientiousness, and systematicity: he was relentless on this point. A student who was late for a lecture would be sternly asked to leave the room. A student who missed two or three seminar sessions without justification would be removed from the class list. He himself never arrived late, never missed any lecture or meeting without a valid reason, was systematic to the point of pedantry, and every hour of the day had its purpose.

But this strict and demanding professor also set a vivid example of kindness towards others. How many people in difficult life situations did he serve with advice, comfort, and warm words, how many did he help materially! People from the city, and even from other places in the country where he was known, would seek him out for advice, much like they would go to a rabbi, seeking guidance on personal matters or more often on issues of a social nature, and Twardowski never refused to help. He ran his household in a Spartan manner and lived a remarkably modest life himself. His budget was not sufficient for more because, from the high professorial salaries at that time, enriched further by the per capita fee professors received for each student enrolled in their lecture during the Austrian times, a lion's share went to help those in need. It was sometimes temporary

help, but there were also unfortunate people whom Twardowski supported for many years along with their families. How many students Twardowski helped to obtain scholarships, how many to get a job, how many to secure a place in a sanatorium or clinic, cannot be counted. Students were afraid of the professor as a stern judge, whose reprimand felt like a reproach from their own conscience, and whose praise was an argument to lift their spirits. But fearing him, they also loved him at the same time because they knew that their well-being was dear to him and that they could turn to him as they would to a father. That there is no exaggeration or flattery in these words, will be unanimously attested by all who were students of the Professor. They will also attest that the Professor treated everyone equally. Among his listeners were Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians. Despite the spirit of the time, which was by no means favourable to this, Twardowski made no distinction between them. Students of all three nationalities reciprocated his respect and affection. In this way, primarily by leading through his own example, Twardowski cultivated his environment in the reverence of truth and justice, instilled a sense of duty, systematic work, and kindness towards others.

All that I have said above was meant to show what constituted Twardowski's exceptional position at the University. This could not be done without pointing out certain traits of his character to which he owed this position.

But Twardowski's university activities are only one aspect of his work. Twardowski was something more than just a university professor. He was a man of education in the broadest sense of the term. Therefore, to the matter of organizing lower and secondary education, to the matter of implementing appropriate educational and developmental content in these schools, he devoted many of his thoughts and organizational efforts. He did this mainly in the years when he was at the helm of the Society of Teachers of Secondary and Higher Schools, an organization that at that time encompassed the entire Polish teaching profession in Galicia. Professor Sośnicki has already discussed this aspect of Twardowski's activity, so I will limit myself only to this brief mention.

Yet another area of life to which Twardowski dedicated himself with full commitment was the organization of scientific life. In 1904, Twardowski founded the first philosophical society in Poland, which, although operating only in Lvov, was rightly named the Polish Philosophical Society. Because when later philosophical societies were established in Warsaw, Kraków, and other cities and there was no organization connecting them into one whole, the Polish Philosophical

Society in Lvov took over actions of general Polish significance. It organized the 1st Polish Philosophical Congress in 1923 and, above all, took care of the Polish representation at international congresses. Twardowski was the president of this society until his death and expanded its activities to the publishing sector, editing the “Biblioteka Wydawnictw Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego” [Library of Publications of the Polish Philosophical Society], which included dozens of volumes containing original Polish works and translations of classic philosophical texts. In addition to this, Twardowski, on behalf of the Polish Philosophical Society, published “Biblioteczka Filozoficzna” [Philosophical Library], containing mostly popular works of smaller size. At the end of his life, Twardowski became the head of the foreign-language organ of the society, which under the name “*Studia Philosophica*” went abroad and introduced the world to the achievements of Polish thinkers. Speaking of editorial and publishing work, it is impossible not to mention “*Ruch Filozoficzny*” [Philosophical Movement] edited by Twardowski, a journal published in ten issues annually. The majority of these issues consisted of a bibliography of philosophical novelties from around the world and a chronicle of philosophical life in the country and abroad. Twardowski personally developed this section with the assistance of Mrs Gromska, the then-secretary of the editorial office. Therefore, he was not only the editor but also the author of the majority of “Philosophical Movement.”

Directing the Philosophical Society, organizing congresses and conferences, and editing “Philosophical Movement” do not exhaust yet the list of Twardowski’s activities in the field of scientific organization. Active organizational participation in the Lvov Scientific Society, whose successor is today’s Wrocław Scientific Society, and activity within the Union of Polish Scientific Societies in Lvov, complement the list, and it should be closed with a reminder that Twardowski’s organizational activity also left its mark in Warsaw. From 1922 to 1932, he was the chairman of the Scientific Council of the Mianowski Fund. This institution was housed in the Staszic Palace, so Twardowski presided over meetings in the same hall where we are gathered today, beneath the portrait of Twardowski that hangs overhead.

His own scientific work, organizational, educational, and upbringing activities at the University, activities in the field of educational organization and upbringing at all levels, organizational activity in the field of scientific life, and editorial and publishing activities – does that cover everything? I am far from exhausting all that would be needed to outline the full profile of Kazimierz Twardowski. One

would like to also mention how he perceived the dignity of the university, and how nobly he understood the position of a professor at a higher education institution. One would like to complement his human profile, which has been depicted here as a stern image of a man of duty and work only. One would like to say what Twardowski was like in direct interaction. To paint his extraordinary personal charm, his tact and delicacy. One would like to say how deeply sensitive he was to beauty, how he loved music, of which he was a profound connoisseur, not only a connoisseur but also a performer and creator of musical works. One would like to say that although he officially renounced the issue of worldview because he saw not only no possibility of its scientific solution but even of responsibly formulating it, he nevertheless deeply experienced this issue and had his own position on it. However, he considered it his personal matter, too immature to proclaim with a sense of scientific responsibility and to win over others for it. He was also – as a rationalist – an enemy of any codified and dogmatized confession, and he considered it unworthy of a scientist to belong to any organization whose members were obliged to profess certain propositions regardless of whether they were justified or not.

I have attempted to give here an outline of Twardowski's personality and his actions. Many of his works, to which he devoted his zealous efforts, have ceased to exist. His Philosophical Department no longer exists, nor does the University of Jan Kazimierz. However, one of these works has survived all shocks and storms. The seeds he spread into the souls of his listeners survived, and they were passed on. The faithful adherence to the fundamental commandments of scientific integrity in philosophy and in every other science characterizes Twardowski's students and the students of his students. However, this beneficial influence of Twardowski's teaching radiates in Poland also beyond the circle of his spiritual descendants. It also influences representatives of various philosophical currents from other sources, which are flourishing to a greater or lesser extent in Poland, elevating these philosophical currents to a higher scientific level in Poland than is found elsewhere.

Instilling the habit of rigorous thinking into the souls of Polish philosophers is a lasting and invaluable contribution of Twardowski, which justifies the deep gratitude that all those practising philosophy in Poland, regardless of the position they occupy, feel for him.

To Professor Kazimierz Twardowski on the 70th Anniversary of His Birth*

Stefan Baley

Each one of us has had teachers, but only a few among them were such that their personality left an indelible mark of profound experiences in our memory. Perhaps there are even some who passed through all schools a long time ago, and for whom the phrase “true teacher” remained an empty sound because they had not encountered anyone deserving of that title. A good teacher is not easily found, although instinctively sought after and longed for during the younger years. Therefore, encountering one on the path of life is quite a significant fortune.

Today, I speak as one of those fortunate individuals who found a “good teacher” in the person of Professor Kazimierz Twardowski. It is not easy, even for those among his students who are “professional” psychologists, when they analyse their memories, to realize exactly the psychological peculiarity of educational contact with a good, Great teacher. Attempt at realization hits certain fragments, snippets that are difficult to piece together, but each of them in itself carries the significance of a profound experience.

Here I recall that for us, attending Professor Twardowski’s seminars as part of our university education, he sometimes seemed like a clairvoyant regarding our thoughts. Countless times have we awkwardly, in clumsy words, while discussing during seminars or when writing papers, tried to arduously develop our thoughts, having a feeling that they were so vaguely expressed that no one could grasp them properly. Moreover, we felt that the idea that was budding within us was not entirely clear to ourselves. And then it was he who unmistakably and perfectly penetrated our intentions. He always managed to discern what we wanted to say and formulated it in a clear and simple manner at the same time. Only then did

* S. Baley, *Prof. Kazimierzowi Twardowskiemu w 70-letnią rocznicę urodzin*, “Polskie Archiwum Psychologii” 1936/1937, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 66–67.

our thoughts become clear before our eyes. And when we sometimes tried to argue with him, attempting to oppose his views with ours, the first thing he did was not to fight our arguments, but make us aware of their value, whereby in our eyes their importance and persuasive power grew even more. The Professor presented objections and counterarguments only later, cautiously, without any special pressure, so that we felt as if it was not him who was speaking to us at that time, but the truth itself speaking through his mouth, which demands illumination of everything from all sides and consideration of all possible arguments for and against.

And thanks to Him, we had moments of joyful mental exertion. He knew how to intensify our thought so that it moved spontaneously along a straightforward path, always leading to some, even if minor, positive result that richly rewarded our arduous efforts. We made strange discoveries then. We became convinced of how just a simple summary of the theory and views of a researcher is a really difficult thing, but at the same time fascinating since the summary has to capture the essential content in an unclouded and concise manner. Under his wise guidance, we matured to understand that a single, clearly formulated and rich in content sentence can possess greater value than a long, murky treatise. Our “logical conscience” grew within us and became firmly entrenched forever.

In connection with the current jubilee, the celebrant’s merits as a philosophy professor have already been highlighted. In this publication, dedicated to issues of applied psychology, what concerns us most is the fact that he is also a professor of psychology. Reflections on abstract philosophical issues did not prevent him from appreciating the importance of experimental psychology. It is thanks to him that, within the walls of the Jan Kazimierz University, the Psychological Department emerged “out of nothing.” A cramped room in the basement and a few sheets of paper for recording observations – this was essentially all that the “experimental” department had when it first started. However, slowly, year after year, in a consistent and planned manner, its resources increased, and the number of students working there grew. Today, it is already a beautiful, large, well-equipped, and well-located department, which has trained a number of researchers currently occupying psychology chairs at universities in Poland.

But while Professor Twardowski perfectly understood the significance of experiments in psychology as a certain strict method of research, on the other hand, he constantly instilled in us, his students, an awareness that all psychological re-

search will only be valuable if it starts with clear mental assumptions, and ends with the proper interpretation of findings. Precision and accuracy are obligatory for a psychologist when conducting research, reporting it to others and drawing conclusions. Any vagueness, any superficiality is an offense against the principles of psychology as a science. When starting research, one must first and foremost understand clearly the purpose and the means to be applied. At the same time, one cannot ignore what others have already accomplished in this field. One must respect the efforts of others and conscientiously give an account of what one has accepted from them as established. And when you finally obtain results in your research, you have to be very cautious in drawing conclusions and not assert that it's one iota more than the research actually shows. These are the principles that Professor Twardowski persistently and consistently introduced to his students, so that they became lasting habits.

And one more thing. Anyone who has read even one of Professor Twardowski's beautiful treatises knows that it is difficult to find an author who would write in a clearer and more understandable manner. Abstruseness and heaviness of thought are as alien to all of Professor Twardowski's writings as they were to his university lectures. But this clarity of thought and transparent way of presentation never made his treatises, which were devoted to scientific issues, "popular" in the negative sense of the word. Professor Twardowski has always very firmly defended the prestige of psychology as an exact science. All concepts it uses and all the arguments it presents should be clear, but at the same time very precise. Psychology, precisely because its language is broadly shared with the language of everyday life and because it addresses a range of issues accessible and important to the "layman," is constantly in danger of running aground into shallow phrases, naïve generalizations, and empty rhetoric. This danger threatened psychology in Poland no less, and perhaps even more, than in other countries. Professor Twardowski was the one who steadfastly stood guard over psychology as true knowledge, knowledge that wants to be understandable to everyone, but not at the expense of precision. And if today this view has become almost universally solidified, if psychologists in Poland have the ambition to develop psychology as a true science, this is yet another merit of Professor Twardowski.

These are a few thoughts that I wanted to express now on the occasion of the tribute paid by the Polish science to Professor Twardowski on his 70th birthday. As an expression of our appreciation for him, let it be assured that "Polskie Archi-

wum Psychologii” [Polish Archives of Psychology], which is the organ of applied psychology, appreciates the value of the ideas that he has always advocated and will strive to embody them within its work.

Kazimierz Twardowski as a Teacher*

Tadeusz Czeżowski

Kazimierz Twardowski served at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Lvov for 35 years – from 1895 to 1930. To understand the results of his teaching activity, let's look at the image of philosophy in Poland at the end of the 19th century. It was developing in disconnected foci. The tradition of Romantic philosophy had died out, with no other emerging in its place. Polish philosophical workers, mostly educated in foreign environments, transplanted ideas taken from outside onto our soil; there was a lack of internal continuity in the development of philosophical research because there was no native philosophical school. Such a school was created by Twardowski. It was ready upon regaining independence and was so strong and healthy that it not only dominated the newly established philosophical institutions throughout Poland but also influenced philosophers not directly associated with it. Not because they abandoned their own views or changed their interest, but because the methodological requirements, the approach to philosophical issues that characterized Twardowski's school, became widespread in Polish philosophical works. Terminological precision, accuracy, clarity, one might even say sobriety of philosophical thinking, a unique kind of rationalism and realism typical of Twardowski's philosophical activity – all this became a requirement of correctness applied far beyond the reach of Twardowski's direct and indirect students.

Thus, the influence of Twardowski's philosophical activity expanded spatially across Poland, creating a certain style of philosophical work and thereby uniting the *disiecta membra* of philosophy in Poland. This influence also created unity over time. For over 20 years, Twardowski's students have been working in philosophy departments, almost for the duration of a human generation; conse-

* T. Czeżowski, *Kazimierz Twardowski jako nauczyciel*, in: *Kazimierz Twardowski. Nauczyciel, uczony, obywatel*, eds. S. Łempicki, R. Ingarden, T. Czeżowski, R. Longchamps de Berier, Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, Lwów 1938, pp. 7–12.

quently, a new generation of their students has undertaken philosophical work, and many of them are already working as academic teachers. They continue to foster the philosophical thought which Twardowski once instilled in the minds of their teachers and his students. This is undoubtedly not just a repetition of the Master's words. Twardowski's most outstanding students have gone their own ways, taking responsibility for the teachings they proclaim on their own shoulders. However, the continuity of development remained intact, along with the unity of philosophical work. No longer the unity of a school, but the unity of Polish philosophy with its own distinct character, standing on an equal footing with the philosophies of other European nations, internationally known and recognized, and confidently looking to the future, because it is based on solid foundations.

This is Twardowski's work as a teacher, but what was the activity that produced it?

Kazimierz Twardowski, according to his own words, considered himself primarily a teacher out of an inner vocation, and like every great teacher, he was creative in his teaching. There are three components of his creative teaching activity: the ideal of philosophical education, the teaching method, and its implementation.

A philosopher is, according to Twardowski's understanding, a person who strives for objective truth through scientific work in the field of philosophical sciences, free in their pursuit from the prejudices of everyday life, from the views imposed by the prevailing social and political trends, and controlling inclinations that could cloud scientific impartiality. In scientific research, strict and precise, they weigh every word, because they take responsibility for each one; they never lose sight of the connection between word and thing; always critical, they only consider statements to be important if they can clearly formulate and scientifically justify them. The knowledge constituting philosophical education, that is, knowledge of issues, understanding of their various solutions along with arguments *pro* and *contra*, and orientation in philosophical currents and directions, is distinguished from the philosophical view of the world, which in its scientific form cannot be finished as long as science develops. In the name of the scientific nature of philosophy, Twardowski condemned not only the lack of precision in philosophical work, but also symbolomania and pragmatophobia (i.e., the mistake one makes when seeing only symbols and not the things they signify), as well as the one-sidedness that comes from rejecting previous achievements of philosophical research and claiming sole possession of objective truth.

Such an ideal of a philosopher comprises both intellectual and moral elements. Twardowski demanded in philosophical work not only intellectual effort, but also integrity and sense of duty that one takes on and is responsible for fulfilling. While educating philosophical workers, he envisioned the spirit of the ancient sage as a model of both the strength of thought and the strength of character.

Pedagogical and didactic work aimed at such goals required a consistent teaching method. Here again, one must realize that the teaching methods we use today, as something ordinary, were received from him, and that he largely developed them himself. His meticulously prepared lectures, in both content and form, were excellently tailored to his pedagogical goals. He organized the first philosophical seminar and the first psychological laboratory in Polish lands; he quickly divided the seminar into two stages: preliminary exercises and the actual seminar. In seminar work, he introduced a system different from the generally accepted one; through oral and written exercises, he introduced participants to intensive and effective cooperation. Programmatic lectures and seminars were complemented by other forms of intellectual interaction with students, which – being an integral part of his teaching method – evoke vivid memories of the figure of Socrates. Similarly, he was always eager to converse with young people, knowing how to listen to what they came to him with, guide their thoughts without restricting them, and encourage them with apt remarks. This contact took on an organized form in a student philosophical circle, of which he was always the most diligent and active participant. He also remained a professor and intellectual leader for the members of the Polish Philosophical Society, mostly his former students. The founding of the Society and chairing it until the end of his life are also a part of Twardowski's teaching activity.

However, the most important component of Twardowski's teaching method was the example he set with his own life and work. All the elements that constituted the ideal of his pedagogical activity were combined and embodied in him, thereby exerting a tremendous suggestive influence on his surroundings – the power that a perfect example of achieving set goals possesses.

There was no discord in Twardowski's approach between the programme and its implementation, the method and its application in practice. Execution was inevitable – leaving no room for doubt, driven by exceptional pedagogical intuition, carried out with unwavering willpower. When we ponder upon the effectiveness of Twardowski's teaching activity, the influence he exerted on students, binding them to him with unbreakable bonds, the sources of this state of affairs

should be sought primarily in the suggestive power of his consistently firm personality and in the inevitable fate-like functioning of his teaching method. He was not a teacher who tried to win over his students with softness, leniency or flattery. Twardowski's school was a tough one, eliciting opposition and rebellion from many. But whoever did not falter, did not succumb to discouragement, and successfully endured the trials, remained faithful to the Master for life.

Twardowski's teaching activity points the way to solving one of the fundamental issues among the difficulties faced by today's education, namely the proper relationship between teaching and upbringing. Twardowski educated through teaching. He educated, which means he shaped characters, instilling in his students ethical principles and dispositions of will. Ethical principles – faith in the existence of absolute values of truth and goodness as goals of selfless pursuit; dispositions of will – dutifulness, conscientiousness, thoroughness, reliability. Twardowski proved through the results of his teaching work that this is the right way to solve the problem; and as long as there is no similar proof for any other way of solving this issue, we must assume that this is the only way.

I said at the beginning of my speech that we owe today's unity of Polish philosophy, despite its diverse currents, to Twardowski. If we inquire about the deeper reasons for this, we find that Twardowski's philosophy shares a common feature with the philosophy of the Śniadecki brothers, with our entire Romantic philosophy, and with the later endeavours of Polish positivists. This common feature is the connection of philosophy with life, considered by many to be a characteristic trait of Polish philosophical thought in general. Each of the aforementioned currents in Polish philosophy viewed the connection between philosophy and life in its own way. Twardowski contributed his own share to the legacy of his predecessors by shaping the ideal of a philosopher in the image of a Stoic sage, to whom reason and strength of character give mastery over life. We can therefore assume that Twardowski's influence in Polish philosophy is not a foreign or accidental factor, but harmoniously aligns with the old, though repeatedly disrupted tradition. This allows us to further conclude that this influence will prove lasting and fruitful.

Twardowski closed his teaching testament in the last speech he delivered in this hall, on the dignity of the University. In the speech, he stated that he valued his teaching vocation above all else. In other words, uttered earlier, he spoke of the happiness he experienced as a reward for his teaching activity. These human feelings bring him closer to us; and at the same time they complete his image for us – the image of a Man and a Teacher in the most beautiful sense of the word.

Kazimierz Twardowski: Masters of Our Time*

Izydora Dąmbska

I belong to a dying generation of direct students of Kazimierz Twardowski who, to the best of our abilities and capabilities, strive to continue a certain style of philosophizing and a certain style of work adopted from him. However, regardless of this, it seems to me that Twardowski's influence – so strong during his lifetime – still somehow persists in Poland. Perhaps through his students' students, or perhaps through a spiritual model preserved in what he created. Furthermore, I think we need this influence. But to notice and understand it, one has to know what Twardowski aimed for when in 1895, as a 28-year-old professor, he took over the Chair of Philosophy in Lvov, until he died in the same city in 1938.

Therefore, in these dozen or so minutes that the organizers of today's meeting have given us, I would like to recall certain aspects of Twardowski's activity that seem essential. Twardowski set himself the task of creating a scientific style of philosophizing in Poland by practising, with the help of rigorous research methods, those branches of philosophy that belong to science. He aimed to clearly delineate boundaries, through the application of the postulate of clarity and justifiability of claims, where in philosophical investigations scientific work ends and the profession of faith begins. This postulate of practising philosophy scientifically had nothing to do with the materialism popular in the second half of the 19th century in some circles of philosophizing natural scientists, and it also differed in many respects from the anti-metaphysical assumptions of positivism. Twardowski believed that metaphysical views and systems satisfy the deep need of the human mind for a comprehensive, coherent view of the world and man's place in the world. However, they cannot claim to be science. With the development of specific sciences, certain concepts taken by these sciences from meta-

* I. Dąmbska, *Kazimierz Twardowski. Mistrzowie naszego czasu*, "Znak" 1969, Vol. 27, Nos. 7/8, pp. 885–888.

physics are indeed scientifically elaborated, and thanks to this, the metaphysical view of the world will gradually come closer to the postulated scientific view of the world. But it will only ever get closer to it because such a developmental process will never come to an end. This results from both the nature of scientific cognition and the nature of our minds.

Putting forward the postulate of the scientific practice of philosophy, Twardowski fought for the clarity and precision of philosophical statements and their proper justification. He wanted to prepare researchers for this type of work by organizing philosophical studies appropriately. According to Twardowski, the study of philosophy should be preceded by "preparatory work consisting in acquiring knowledge of scientific methods in the field of special sciences," encompassing both empirical and a priori methods of science. "And whoever says – writes Twardowski – that this way demands too much from a philosopher, let him remember that philosophy gives man so much that it has the right to demand a lot from him, almost too much."¹

What are these gifts of philosophy? According to Twardowski, practising philosophy is not just about solving certain theoretical problems. It is also a path of deepening and improving moral character, a path to internal independence and self-mastery. To be a philosopher is not only to realize certain intellectual values but also moral ones. Twardowski had in mind the ideal of an ancient sage, modelled on the figure of Socrates. And he had something of Socrates in himself: in his passion for teaching, in his postulates of linguistic precision, in his fight against relativism, and in the uncompromisingly absolutist conception of ethics.

In the first period of his activity in Lvov, that is, until the outbreak of World War I, Twardowski created the organizational framework for his work at the University. He organized the first philosophical seminar in Poland, equipped with a beautiful library (incidentally, he moved his own library to the university and made it available to students), founded a laboratory of experimental psychology, and took care of the Philosophical Circle Academic Reading Room. During this period, he educated four generations of students, among whom were future professors of philosophical sciences at universities in Poland, such as Jan Łukasiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Władysław Witwicki, Tadeusz Kotarbiński,

¹ K. Twardowski, *O przygotowaniu naukowym do filozofii* [On Scientific Preparation for Philosophy], in: K. Twardowski, *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne*, Lwów 1927, pp. 194 f.

Stanisław Leśniewski, Zygmunt Łempicki, Stefan Błachowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Zygmunt Zawirski, to list just a few well-known names.

As philosophical life in Lvov developed, the need to expand his organizational framework grew. On the 100th anniversary of Kant's death, on 12 February 1904, the first Polish Philosophical Society began its activities, initiated by Twardowski and chaired by him until his death. In his inaugural speech, Twardowski expressed his philosophical attitude by saying: "The Polish Philosophical Society will not serve any philosophical position exclusively, as it wants to encompass all positions. It wants to be free from any one-sidedness, striving to be as comprehensive as possible. The only dogma of the Society will be the belief that dogmatism is the greatest enemy of all scientific work. We want all directions of work and philosophical views in our Society 'to aim toward one goal: to reveal the truth.' Towards this, the path is scientific criticism."² In 1911, Twardowski began to edit and publish "Ruch Filozoficzny" [Philosophical Movement], a journal informing about philosophical life in Poland and abroad. Both the Polish Philosophical Society and "Philosophical Movement," albeit to a limited extent, continue the tasks assigned to them by Twardowski to this day.

After the break caused by World War I, Twardowski resumed his philosophical activities at all the mentioned institutions and many others that were established thanks to Poland regaining independence. However, he always had the greatest concern for the university, defending its autonomy as a necessary guarantee of the independence of science. One of Twardowski's last publications, *O dostojęństwie Uniwersytetu* [On the Dignity of the University], a lecture delivered during the solemn ceremony of receiving an honorary doctorate from the University of Poznań in 1933, contains thoughts that, in light of the grim fate of science in the totalist states of the 20th century, are particularly meaningful. Speaking about the conditions for fulfilling the proper tasks of the university, which he considered to be "discovering ever new truths and scientific probabilities, as well as improving and spreading the methods that allow for their discovery," Twardowski said these significant words: "The possibility of fulfilling the tasks proper to the university is conditioned by its absolute spiritual independence... And even if the results of the university's scientific work were unpleasant to those to whom it owes its existence, this cannot be seen as the right to impose

² *Otwarcie Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie* [Opening of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov], "Przegląd Filozoficzny" 1904, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 241.

any restrictions on it. Because scientific research can develop and bear fruit only when it is neither constrained nor threatened by anything.”³ In the same publication, Twardowski once again summarized his view on philosophy and its tasks. “By making truth itself the subject of its research,” he said, “illuminating the paths leading to it, creating a theory of scientific knowledge, philosophy becomes the ally and guide of all those who, in any field of human inquiry, strive for truth. It arouses in us a criticism that protects us from blindly submitting to authorities, from comfortably settling for the intellectual habits we like, and from too much trust in our human, so greatly limited reason; it tells us to demand clarity and precision wherever scientific argumentation is concerned, and to combat all kinds of intellectual foggyiness...; it teaches us to scrutinize numerous concepts of specialized sciences, which do not delve deeper into them, and allows us to realize equally numerous assumptions that guide us in the reflections and actions of everyday life in its everyday practice.”

What was Kazimierz Twardowski’s educational influence on his students? What personal traits and what kind of behaviour made him create what was probably the first philosophical school in Poland? A school not in the sense of a group of advocates of a certain philosophical system (like phenomenologists or neo-Kantians), but in the sense of a community respecting certain methodological postulates and possessing a common scientific language. This question has been asked many times, but no answer seems exhaustive. There has been talk of his iron consistency with which he required students to perform their duties, of his gift for presenting philosophical issues clearly and precisely, of his excellent work organization, and of his ability to introduce students to systematic, persistent work focused solely on truth. There has been talk of how he influenced others with his own example. It’s all true. But something essential and difficult to name escapes from these descriptions, like everything that goes beyond the framework of a rational approach. The matter of love. Twardowski, in his actions, which were rationally thought-out and constantly guided and controlled by rational reflection, served the goals that he passionately loved. The love of two ideals: objective truth and moral goodness, went hand in hand with his love for the youth. “I tried to instil in your souls what is the best part of my own soul: sincere love

³ K. Twardowski, *O dostojęństwie Uniwersytetu* [On the Dignity of the University], in: *Lwowskie wykłady akademickie*, Vol. 1: *Wykłady o idei Uniwersytetu*, eds. R. Kuliniak, D. Leszczyna, M. Pandura, Ł. Ratajczak, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kraków 2018.

for work, ardent love of truth and earnest striving for justice.”⁴ He uttered these words in a speech thanking his students for the commemorative medal with the inscription “Discipulorum amor et pietas” given to him when he bid farewell to the university. A great heart, filled with passionate affection, from the fullness of which we all drew, made Twardowski a hunter of human souls of Socratic proportions. It was this heart that created an unbreakable bond connecting students with the master and students with each other, a bond of friendship. And perhaps, apart from other traits that I have tried to highlight, this is also a reason to call Twardowski the “master of our times.”

⁴ K. Twardowski, *Podziękowanie [...] w sali posiedzeń Seminarium Filozoficznego Uniwersytetu Jana Kazimierza na uroczystości wręczenia [...] medalu pamiątkowego wybitego staraniem byłych [...] uczniów* [Acknowledgement [...] in the meeting room of the Philosophical Seminary of Jan Kazimierz University at the ceremony of the presentation of [...] a commemorative medal minted through the efforts of former [...] students], in: *Myśl, mowa i czyn*, Vol. 2, eds. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2014.

In Memory of Kazimierz Twardowski*

Zygmunt Łempicki

When, in the early spring morning, the golden rays of the sun began to illuminate the old building of the Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov, one could see, before 7 o'clock, a characteristic figure approaching those former monastic walls. A man in a long navy-blue coat, military cut, with a black hat adorned with large bristles, and a red beard. It was Kazimierz Twardowski heading to his lecture. In the spring he started it at 7 a.m. In the fall and winter, he also lectured early, at 8 a.m. Yet despite the early hours, the lecture hall was always overcrowded. And when this impressive figure entered the lecture hall, with his long frock coat, tie and black plastron, giving him a peculiar appearance, everyone listened intently to his always clear, accessible and classically precise lectures.

Twardowski's teaching individuality and his – one could say without exaggeration – pedagogical genius, truly manifested itself during the seminar exercises when analysing texts of philosophical authors, when identifying and discussing problems. Soon after taking over the chair in Lvov, Twardowski organized the Philosophical Circle at the Academic Reading Room. This circle, of which the undersigned had the honour of also being president for a year, always held its meetings in the presence of Twardowski, and from this circle, that is, from its members who had completed their studies, emerged the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov. Its founder and creator was also Kazimierz Twardowski. He was also the founder of the journal "Ruch Filozoficzny" [Philosophical Movement] and one could say without exaggeration – a great organizer of the philosophical movement in Poland.

Kazimierz Twardowski studied in Vienna under the supervision of Franz Brentano, whose students included the greatest philosophers of the past era in

* Z. Łempicki, *Śp. Kazimierz Twardowski*, "Kurier Warszawski" 1938, Vol. 118, No. 45 of 15 February (evening edition), p. 4.

Germany. Of them, only one is alive today, the most famous one, Husserl. Twardowski's activity was analogous to Brentano's. Neither Brentano nor Twardowski created any system. However, they developed a certain method and a particular style of philosophical thinking. Franz Brentano's students, each in their own way, refined this method. It involved a thorough analysis of concepts and mental experiences.

Twardowski immediately, in one of his first works, entitled *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* [On the Content and Object of Presentations], provided a classic example of applying this method and, through this work, influenced the emergence of the phenomenological method that is so powerful today. His Polish works, such as one of the first ones, titled *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia* [Images and Concepts], analysing the essence of our representations, or other treatises, such as *O czynnościach i wytworach* [Actions and Products], were also examples of applying this method, employing subtle analysis of experiences and mental creations.

Each of Twardowski's works had an extremely clear and transparent disposition and, starting from facts and phenomena that were easily accessible and graspable, they gradually moved on to complex and intricate issues, revealing their structure and presenting the proper appearance and content of the problem.

It was classical philosophical style in the fullest sense of the word.

It's not the place here to list a whole range of his major and minor treatises and works. It is worth emphasizing that a man who thought so clearly and wrote so classically must have exerted an extraordinarily positive influence on the mentality of his students and – it must be stressed with all emphasis, that this is not a cliché – on the intellectual culture of his era. Twardowski was in every sense of the word a “praeceptor Poloniae” as a teacher of thinking.

He respected the individuality and passions of each of his students. He never imposed his own views on any of them. He only taught them to think, taught them to clearly articulate their views, to skillfully organize their arguments, and above all, he instilled in them a sense of responsibility for every word, of course, especially the printed word. And that is why out of the Twardowski School could come excellent logicians, and psychologists, and ethicists, and aestheticians, and representatives of all philosophical currents. They form the Twardowski School – and such a school undoubtedly exists – not because they profess similar views, as they are often very different individualities, [but because] they all think honestly in terms of logic and they express their thoughts clearly and orderly.

The history of spiritual culture in Poland will one day assess how much of Twardowski's most diligent pedagogical effort contributed to its content – or rather, to its form. Twardowski influenced his students not only as a philosopher but [also] as a professor and as a personality.

This man was the epitome of conscientious and punctual fulfilment of all duties – and he did not limit himself merely to those imposed by his profession. For many years, he served as the president of the Society of Teachers of Higher Schools in Lvov and in this position, he developed an immensely fruitful activity, almost epoch-making for the development of the Society. During the Russian occupation of Lvov, he organized something akin to the University of Lvov in Vienna, and when later, during the war, he assumed the position of rector in Lvov, he spared no effort to ensure that Polish youth could study and learn at the university even during wartime. Therefore, not only his students and listeners, but the entire society respected him as a true model of civic virtues. He, who set high standards for others, especially his students, was the most demanding and strict with himself.

And probably this heavy and strenuous way of life, full of toil and exertion, relatively early and in the prime of his strength, brought him to his sickbed and forced him to heroically struggle with a serious illness during the last years of his life.

The death that put an end to his suffering took from Polish life a great scholar: one of the greatest teachers in the field of philosophy known in the annals of this queen of sciences.

Kazimierz Twardowski of Blessed Memory: Philosopher and – “Happy Man”*

Irena Pannenkowa

With the passing of the late Kazimierz Twardowski, one of the strongest individuals of the pre-war generation departed from the world, and at the same time, one of the most characteristic figures of Lvov.

The brother of the well-known representative of Poland in Vienna, Minister Juliusz Twardowski, and the paternal cousin of the current Archbishop of Lvov, the late Kazimierz Twardowski grew up in Vienna, where he graduated with honours from the famous Theresianum and attended university there. He was a student of Franz Brentano, whose student was also the first president of Czechoslovakia, T.G. Masaryk. Brentano, a positive and critical mind, possessed by a passion for independent pursuit of truth, was an ex-Catholic priest. One could analyse the interesting and analogous influences that this Viennese scholar exerted on the views and philosophical direction of both Twardowski and Masaryk – however, due to lack of space, we will limit ourselves to highlighting only the fact itself.

After graduating, Twardowski became an assistant professor at the University of Vienna, but just a year later, he was transferred to Lvov, where he became an extraordinary and soon an ordinary professor of philosophy at the Jan Kazimierz University. He devoted intensive and rich activities of his entire life to this university and the Lvov region.

He left behind a rich legacy of scientific works in the fields of logic, psychology, and history of philosophy, as well as numerous valuable contributions to scientific terminology, on which he, with his characteristic passion for precision, placed special emphasis and to the establishment of which he made great contributions in the field of Polish philosophy.

* I. Pannenkowa, *Ś.p. Kazimierz Twardowski. Filozof i – “człowiek szczęśliwy”*, “Polonia” 1938, Vol. 15, No. 4801, pp. 8–9.

However, his main claim to glory lies not so much in his scientific work, but in his organizational and pedagogical activities.

Endowed with an inexhaustible sense of initiative and extraordinary organizational skills, he continually established new cultural and educational institutions or revived old ones that were fading away, as soon as he assumed leadership over them. Thus, his name is associated with the founding of the Słowacki Girls' Gymnasium, the Public University Courses, as well as the era of the flourishing of the Society of Teachers of Secondary and Higher Schools. He belonged to the group of initiators and workers to whom Lvov owed its pre-war intellectual renaissance and vibrant cultural life the most.

Famous, and stricter, was his philosophical seminary, access to which was difficult, and where he gathered only carefully selected students. Not limiting himself to the seminary, he also ran a voluntary Philosophical Circle at the Academic Reading Room. The level of this Circle is evidenced by the fact that the person writing these words, for example, gave a lecture there on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, based, of course, on the reading of the Greek original. The seminar involved reading and commenting on classics such as Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, and others.

These readings, summaries, and discussions under Twardowski's guidance were a first-rate school of rigorous thinking and expressing oneself, where every unnecessary or inadequate word was attacked, where the point was always to express every thought and only thoughts as faithfully, precisely and concisely as possible, without any rhetorical, poetic, or other effects.

Twardowski was an extraordinary educator. He was also the most kind-hearted guardian of youth, especially those students with whom he shared a common "love of wisdom" – which is exactly – philosophy.

After the meetings of the Philosophical Circle, everyone would gather at the Scottish Café, where over a coffee or perhaps a more substantial meal, discussions would continue more freely. Over time, the professor began to host social gatherings (evening teas) at his home for a closer circle of students. There, conversations and music flowed: Twardowski was musical and played the piano himself.

From this philosophical circle and these social gatherings emerged, founded by the late Twardowski, the Polish Philosophical Society, to which the undersigned had the honour of belonging.

It should be noted that Twardowski established also the first laboratory of experimental psychology in Poland, where I also worked from the very beginning.

Towards the female students, including myself in particular, he was initially rather sceptical and reluctant. However, over time, he changed and later treated me kindly, even encouraging me to pursue an academic path. Unfortunately, a series of circumstances prevented me from doing so.

Here is a detail typical of the university relations of that time in general, and of the late Twardowski in particular.

When, after the acceptance (and publication in “*Przegląd Filozoficzny*” [Philosophical Review]) of my doctoral thesis, I passed the so-called *rigorosum*, both in philosophy – the main one, and in mathematics – the additional one, I returned to Zakopane, where I had been staying for a few months. I did not buy out a doctoral diploma. I believed that I should meet the requirements, but that it would be beneath my dignity to apply for the title and pay for it! Besides, I had other things on my mind at that time! I was absorbed in work for the Union of Rebirth, and soon I was about to go to Warsaw in these matters.

However, the late Twardowski explained it to himself differently. He knew that I was acquiring an education while simultaneously working to support myself. He knew that I sometimes struggled, and he imagined that I simply ran out of money. He was mistaken: I was already earning enough, maybe even more than today. Nevertheless, about two weeks after passing the final exams, I received the following letter from Twardowski while I was in Zakopane: “Dear Madam! Assuming that it might be difficult for you to pay the fee for the doctoral diploma at the moment, I submitted a motion at the Senate meeting for your exemption from this fee. The motion was accepted. The diploma is available for collection at any time. Best regards, etc.”

In the face of such touching memory and concern, I naturally accepted the diploma.

It was only later that I realized that, alongside his undeniable kindness and goodwill, the late Twardowski had another motive here: I was the first woman to earn a doctorate in exact philosophy in Lvov, and it appears that this was also a first at Polish universities overall, particularly under Twardowski’s mentorship. Whenever we met thereafter, he would remind others of this, not without pride, stating, “Here is my first female doctor.”

A female doctor – it’s not much. Twardowski could boast of something much greater: at all Polish universities, in Warsaw, Poznań, Cracow, Lvov, and Vilnius, chairs of philosophical sciences are filled by his students, not to mention Polish philologists, Germanists, natural scientists, and other specialists who were also

his students. In Warsaw alone, as many as six university professors are recruited from his students and alumni.

This is exactly what I was telling him about when, finally, at the end of May of last year, I visited him, as usual, in Lvov. I expressed the belief that he could be proud of such an excellent result of his pedagogical efforts. He responded:

“Yes indeed! You see before you a happy man. I have achieved what I set out to do. I have created a spiritual family for myself from this large group of philosophers whom I have nurtured and with whom I am in constant contact. My daughters are married, and I have six grandchildren, healthy and well-developed. What more could a man want?”

Eight months later, he passed away.

Then, when I saw him for the last time, he was already very ill. Yet, he still got up every day, read and wrote. In the last months, he apparently couldn't get out of bed anymore. He suffered greatly before his death.

In my memory reside the last words I heard from him: “You see before you a happy man...”

That was the speech of a philosopher. Did it also once again precisely express the feelings of a man? I don't know. I doubt it...

The fact is, he accomplished a great deal in very difficult Polish conditions. Honour his memory.

Kazimierz Twardowski*

Władysław Witwicki

On 12 February 1938, his body ceased to live. He began his work in Poland in 1895. He was born in 1866. Thus, he was not yet 30 years old when he was already teaching philosophical sciences at the University of Lvov. At that time, there were no philosophical seminaries in Poland, that is, scientific schools educating future authors of works in the fields of logic, psychology, ethics, aesthetics, theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy. There was no scientific society bringing together people working in these fields, and there was no periodical dedicated to the publication of scholarly works in these fields. There were also no original Polish textbooks providing secondary school students with preliminary training in this area, aligned with the state of science at that time.

Philosophical needs existed. A few individuals, genuinely interested in these types of issues, referred to German, French, and English works. Taine and Nietzsche were read; in positivist circles, Spencer, Mill, and Comte were known. Kant was virtually inaccessible due to his dry prose with rococo syntax, and Spinoza was generally closed off with countless references and Latin. Descartes was walled off by medieval terminology, and only a very sparse and vague understanding of medieval philosophy was disseminated. Translations of Buchner and Darwin circulated, for which boys were expelled from secondary schools; Polish literature teachers mentioned Hegel in connection with Krasiński and discussed the Śniadecki brothers in relationship to Mickiewicz's *Romantyczność* [Romanticism]; funny terms from Trentowski were quoted but never entered common usage; Father Pawlicki was regarded as a physiologist, Father Morawski as a biologist, and the boundaries between science, poetry, and preaching were not clear. There was even talk of the "science" of Towiański and Wroński, of Swedenborg and Słowacki, who also wrote *Wykład nauki* [Exposition of Science].

* W. Witwicki, *Kazimierz Twardowski*, "Wiadomości Literackie" 1938, Vol. 15, No. 18 (757), p. 1.

People read more than they do today; they did not play bridge, there were no sports columns in newspapers, and intelligent conversations were not rare among the intelligentsia of the time. Sometimes, they even enjoyed reading together. There was no radio and no cinemas. People had time for meaningful conversations. Secular viewpoints, the discussion of which might have been considered inappropriate, were not imposed by anyone. From abroad, from the Czech Republic, Tyrol, France, and Germany, echoes of struggles for independence in scientific research and freedom of thought reached Poland. Nowhere were books being burned in public squares yet.

A young person typically formed their view of the world and life through reading poets and novels. One might stick with the family of Połaniecki and *Wieczory nad Lemanem* [Evenings on Lake Geneva] by Father Załęski,¹ while another would turn to Anatole France and Gabriele D'Annunzio. Soon, some would be mesmerized by Przybyszewski, others by Żeromski, and still others by Brzozowski – yet all of them lacked a clear and precise method of thinking. It seemed to many people that there were as many truths as there were poets, that there were old truths and new, conflicting ones – class truths, national truths, religious and worldly truths, and it seemed that all of these could be contradictory to one another. It seemed that what is true today and here, might not be true elsewhere and at another time. It was not very difficult “to subscribe” to a general viewpoint, to lean towards it, sympathize with it, or to pretend to hold it; it was harder to truly possess and profess it, especially if one was not naturally narrow-minded and dogmatic. It was difficult to firmly stand on the mists.

Systematic engagement with philosophical issues was deterred by both the obscurity of these issues and the incomprehensibility of positions, often expressed in foreign, difficult, and unsettled terms. Philosophy lectures at universities did not attract large audiences, and lessons in philosophical propaedeutics in secondary schools, if not devoted to other subjects, were dull. However, the genuine humour of Count Wojciech Dzieduszycki's lectures, who as a professor at the University of Lvov devoted his free time to philosophical talks in a quiet café and at the hotel where he resided, breathed fresh air into the field.

¹ [Translator's note] This is probably a mistake on Witwicki's part. The author of *Wieczory nad Lemanem* is Father Marian Ignacy Morawski, but Witwicki attributes this work to Father Załęski and probably had Stanisław Załęski in mind, who was working in Lvov at the turn of the 20th century. The fact that both Morawski and Załęski were well-known Jesuits could have led to this confusion.

Against this backdrop, the young Kazimierz Twardowski appeared at the Department of Philosophy in Lvov. He began giving lectures, conducting exercises, and leading discussions in youth scientific circles. Immediately, an incredible rumour began circulating in the city that in these lectures and exercises, everything that was heard and discussed could be understood. There was no fluff or insider jargon. Every term was explained, and it was always clear what was being discussed, even when it involved difficult and unpopular issues. This attracted increasingly larger crowds to his lectures. Some attended out of curiosity, wondering whether it was even possible to understand philosophical issues without being a specialist and whether one could speak clearly about these matters while being a specialist. Both turned out to be possible because it was true. For the first time in Poland, philosophical issues began to interest such large crowds – not in churches. Eventually, even the largest lecture halls became insufficient. A separate building had to be constructed to accommodate the audience.

The popularity of Twardowski's lectures was rather strange because he did not use flowery or dazzling language. These were not prose poems; he did not sprinkle his speeches with metaphors, did not engage in rhetoric, did not make dramatic pauses or modulations, did not insert smiling apostrophes in parentheses, did not pretend to understand what an intelligent listener might also struggle to understand, did not play with ambiguities, and did not fill the room with a roar like those who usually captivate crowds. He spoke clearly and straightforwardly, was accountable for every word, and explained every new or unclear term and phrase before moving on. When asked why he spoke so unusually clearly, he replied that otherwise, he himself would not understand what he was saying. He did not try to influence his listeners with his personal views or impose anything; he merely described, analysed, and proved. He did not hypnotize anyone but woke many up. He always allowed his words to be scrutinized and welcomed opponents in discussions. It was not that he wanted an easy triumph but rather to search for truth from both sides. In his speeches and writings, philosophy was not a form of fine literature, nor was it free creation in the mists, but science. This was his goal. And it was new to us.

He came from the school of Brentano, whose lectures he had attended in Vienna. He focused mostly on issues at the intersection of psychology and theory of knowledge, the relationship between thought and speech, ethical and epistemological issues, and the history of philosophy. He lectured on psychology,

logic, ethics, theory of knowledge, aesthetic issues, and the history of philosophy – from ancient India to contemporary times. His teacher, Brentano, a former Dominican, was in close intellectual contact with Thomas Aquinas, who in turn was connected to Aristotle, and thus to Plato and Socrates. Through Brentano, Twardowski joined the long chain of minds that, over the past 2,000 years, have separated science from poetry, clarified truth from confusion and ambiguity, from daydreams, irresponsible metaphors, apparent mysteries, and clichés. This task is incomparably more challenging than waking a human being from sleep, but it is also about transitioning human thought from a state of sleep to a state of wakefulness.

His early scholarly works were published in German, which had an impact on philosophical thought beyond Poland's borders. The concept of ideas and perception in Descartes was the subject of his doctoral thesis. Later, he published a work in German on the content and object of presentations. Shortly after arriving in Lvov, he wrote a paper titled *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia* [Images and Concepts], which he then published in German. These are descriptions, analyses, and psychological and epistemological distinctions, as well as certain definitions of scientific terms, which proved to be useful and productive. It is not the place to discuss them here.

In the early years of his time in Lvov, his work titled *O tak zwanych prawdach względnych* [On So-Called Relative Truths] was published. It is a refutation of relativism in the theory of knowledge. Twardowski rightly argues that there are no relative truths at all. There are only poorly formulated expressions that sometimes appear true and sometimes erroneous. If they are formulated precisely and clearly, they turn out to be absolute truths or absolute falsehoods, not "relative truths." Clearly, this provides guidance for anyone engaged in science and for anyone who desires to be close to the truth in any field – indeed, the absolute truth, as there is no other – by formulating clearly and precisely what seems to be a disputable truth. Unambiguity of words, clearly defined terms, and formal correctness of logical steps are essential and irreplaceable beacons on the path to understanding the truth in every domain. Without them, there is no philosophy – only, at best, poetry, and at worst, graphomania. This already is the attitude of Socrates and the position of Plato.

Twardowski held very high standards for the scientific character of work, both for others and, above all, for himself. Formal standards. It cannot be ruled out that this is why, in later years, he taught more and created less. He would never

have published anything that was not properly formulated and methodically carried out from start to finish. It was not fitting for him to approach unknown truths blindly, in darkness, in the mist of premonitions and vague words, since he was himself a beacon, a proponent, and a teacher of clarity and correctness of thought at any cost. It was as if he had lost the courage to err. He respected this in poets, as long as they did not pretend to be philosophers. There was a poet in Lvov who did not pretend to be a philosopher and did not engage in science, and who did not have much to live on: Jan Kasprowicz. Under Twardowski's influence, he embarked on doctoral and habilitation work and became a professor of literature. He would never have become an assistant professor of philosophy in Lvov; when it came to literature – Twardowski's conscience was clear. In Kasprowicz, he had a friend whom he esteemed – and did not impose his own spiritual stance on him.

Moreover, Twardowski was by no means a dry pedant who constantly focused on formal correctness in everything and always. He had a remarkable sensitivity to the emotional value and weight of words and phrases and needed music in his life as much as salt. He played the piano and composed songs. Bach, Handel, Beethoven, Brahms, and Wagner were probably as close to him as Brentano, Thomas Aquinas, or Plato. He was both a philosopher and a musician but at different times. Not everyone can do that.

Twardowski took his teaching vocation as deeply as possible. He immersed himself in it. He started from the basics. If teaching, then teach from the very beginning. He thus taught in secondary schools for a time to closely understand the mindset of the growing youth and wrote a textbook on logic and didactics for secondary schools and teacher training colleges. Today, this textbook is out of print, but it was accessible and understandable to anyone who knew Polish. It was a book from which not only mathematicians and specialists in logic could benefit, but also natural scientists, lawyers, and humanists. Twardowski often quoted with laughter a definition of philosophy he found in one of the German humorous journals: "Philosophy is the systematic confusion of terminology, intentionally invented for that purpose." He did not want that. He was the first in Poland to teach about algebraic logic but always wrote in plain Polish, the everyday language we speak. Only more precisely. He greatly respected algebra – in others.

Wishing to apply the method of clear analysis to ethical issues, he wrote a treatise on whether every person acts selfishly. Contrary to the prevailing view,

he argued that not everyone acts this way, as not everyone pursues their future personal pleasure as their goal – some people, at times, undoubtedly aim for the pleasure of others rather than their own. This is undoubtedly the case when it comes to conscious goals – Twardowski did not address subconscious or unconscious goals.

Two years before the Great War, he published a work on the borderline of grammar and general theory of objects titled *O czynnościach i wytworach* [Actions and Products]. It contained certain definitions and distinctions significant for the vocabulary of psychology and beyond.

He published a series of lectures on medieval philosophy, considering that this period was neither sufficiently known nor properly appreciated in Poland, even though it was not as unproductive as it was thought to be. Anyone who wanted to understand modern philosophy had to first grapple with the issues of medieval philosophy – hence this foundational work by Twardowski.

He wrote a number of shorter papers, articles, speeches, and reviews, which were published together in the *Collected Works*. In the final years of his life, he published a work titled *O dostojęństwie Uniwersytetu* [On the Dignity of the University]. It has become clear in recent years how important it is to remember this work.

In an effort to make classical philosophy accessible to students, he collaborated on some translations, edited and revised others, and encouraged and urged others to write new ones. He approached this task with the same diligence he applied to everything he undertook.

In addition to his lectures and exercises at the university, which he never missed, he was the permanent head of the Philosophy Circle of the Lvov University Students. Every Friday, young people from all university faculties gathered there to present both newer and older papers, discuss, and bring their own works and ideas. There, the professor gained direct contact with the youth and often found his future students. He guided young natural scientists, lawyers, and medical students – not only humanists in the strictest sense – along philosophical paths. He guided and accompanied them – not only in the lecture hall but also in everyday friendly interactions.

He established the first philosophy seminar in Poland. The best works produced and discussed there were published through his efforts at the Warsaw “Przegląd Filozoficzny” [Philosophical Review], which he co-edited for many years with the late Weryho.

He established the first experimental psychology laboratory in Poland and directed it until the last years of his career at the university.

He founded and led the first philosophical society in Lvov so that the scholars he had nurtured would not lose intellectual contact with each other and could publish philosophical works in Polish and foreign languages. The society now bears his name.

He established and edited the scientific journal “*Ruch Filozoficzny*” [Philosophical Movement] in Lvov, which served as a detailed record of everything related to philosophy that had taken place and was happening in contemporary Poland, both in print and in public oral discussions. The journal functioned both as a protocol and oversight body, with an extensive review section that was neither aimed at mutual admiration among specialists nor at undermining competitors, but rather at a substantive, objective, and impersonal analysis of the works discussed. It didn’t matter whether the work was written by a close relative or a personal enemy. Most of those who currently teach philosophical subjects at Polish universities are Twardowski’s students. This holds true for universities in Lvov, Warsaw, Poznań, and Vilnius.

Many of his students are now prepared to teach propaedeutics of philosophy in secondary schools. Some of them actually teach it, despite the fact that current times are not particularly conducive to philosophical thinking.

Twardowski was not only a born scholar and teacher but also an unmatched organizer. As one of the founders and long-time patron of a girls’ high school, he was concerned not only with the general direction and spirit of the studies at the institution but also knew about every detail in its life and did not overlook any, even if that detail did not align with the general approach. The same applied to his management of Lvov University, where he served as rector for three years. Then, for the first time since time immemorial, the queues of listeners in front of the ticket offices during registration disappeared. The same was true in the case of the Society of Teachers of Higher Schools, of which he was chairman for several years and which he elevated like no one before him. He organized philosophical conferences and was their driving spirit.

Always active and never tired, always helpful to everyone, he consistently met all deadlines, promises, and obligations, and demanded the same from others. He taught this. And he was so unusual in public life that, while holding managerial positions, he adhered to the rules and regulations just as he demanded

from his subordinates. He wanted, in a somewhat old-fashioned way, for both the managers and those being managed to be governed by principles, norms, laws, and rational regulations, rather than by the arbitrariness of some and the fear of others, mixed with falsehood, hypocrisy, and forced flattery. He could not tolerate the sight of a policeman talking to a streetcar driver under a sign prohibiting conversations with the driver. He even knew how to politely point out to the city mayor the impropriety of his behaviour if the mayor publicly smoked cigarettes in a room where a no-smoking sign was posted on the wall. He had the right to do so as a citizen and had enough civil courage. He involved himself in life.

He did not involve himself in politics or run for legislative bodies – the natural governance over souls was enough for him and provided an open field for public activity. During his time as a rector, he managed to save Lvov University from utraquisation by the Austrian government. That was his political act. It was clear that he would not have delivered programmatic speeches to voters – he was responsible for every word and phrase.

No political party could say of him: “He is one of us.” But every enlightened Pole must say this about him. Besides the enlightened Poles, everyone who serves the truth and seeks it with open eyes, regardless of the language they speak or write, and who collects taxes from them, must say this about him.

Twardowski will be remembered in the history of Polish intellectual life not as a minister of enlightenment, but as a creator and organizer of enlightenment in his field over the last 40 years, as one of the links connecting Polish thought with the thought of contemporary humanity, both past and future.

Both in his lifetime and today, Twardowski, both himself and through his students, spoke, speaks, and will speak to anyone in Poland who wishes to publish something about the human spirit, its creations, the world, and life, and who claims a scientific character for what they write. Twardowski would ask everyone: What exactly do you want to say? Can you summarize it in honest, simple words? Explain what you mean by each vague and contentious term you use, and if you do not understand it, do not pretend that you do. And consider what you want to do: to teach, to awaken, and to enlighten, or to lull, entertain, and move? Are you seeking truth or seeking yourself? Do you truly believe in what you write, or are you just pretending? And what arguments do you have to support your position? Put your arguments on the table. We will weigh them in silence, in the clear light of reason and conscience. An argument is not a shout, not a smile, not a tear, not

pathos, and not a pose, but a visible, clear truth. One for all adults. There is also a place for those things. But not in science.

A similar spiritual stance once dawned on Słowacki when he noted on a piece of paper in his diary a quatrain:

By the monastery, my duck,
Sanctity, adoration, self-importance.
By the little cross, on the little table,
Facts. Two acts.

Only, unlike Słowacki, this factual stance in Twardowski had neither tuberculosis nor penance for the sin of pride in the background but was a manifestation of his health, diligence, and courage. He could look truth in the eye – that was a sign of spiritual health. He considered it his duty to serve and enhance its brilliance; he swore an oath to this when he received his doctorate. He was also able to speak and write the truth where necessary; he had the courage.

This is how he gave himself to others and this is how he will remain in the memory of all who came into contact with him during his life. A scholar, a teacher, an organizer, a human being – as everyone should be if only they can.

Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938)*

Zygmunt Zawirski

The ranks of pre-war professors at Lesser Poland universities are gradually beginning to thin out, and it should not be forgotten that the posts they held were exceptionally important, considering that Lvov and Cracow had the only Polish higher education institutions before the war. The deceased was one of the most outstanding figures among those people who are now leaving the historical stage, not only as a professor of philosophy, but also as one of the organizers and creators of our contemporary philosophical culture and an educator of many philosophers of the new generation. He was born in Vienna, received both his secondary and higher education there, and habilitated as an assistant professor of philosophy in 1894. But after only a year of activity as an assistant professor, he was appointed as a professor of philosophy at the University of Lvov, where for 35 years, from 1895 to 1930, he developed his incredibly lively activity. From the first years of his activity, he exerted a fascinating influence on his surroundings. A tall, robust man, with a majestic posture, as a professor, he astonished everyone with the exceptional clarity of his lectures, and as an educator and organizer of philosophical studies, he impressed everyone with his unrelenting rigorism, decisiveness and consistency in action.

In his philosophical publications, the same clarity and simplicity of style strike as in his delivered lectures; the number of these publications is small, they could all be contained in one volume. However, their value should not be judged by the quantity. Neither in his books, nor in his lectures did he impose any system, nor did he try to create one. He only cared about the clarity and precision of the method, about instilling minds with correct thinking, which is indispensable not only in scientific work, but also in practical life. His works concern issues on the border of psychology, logic and epistemology. Such works include *Wyobrażenia*

* Z. Zawirski, *Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938)*, "Biblioteczka Czasu" 1938, Vol. 6, pp. 3–6.

i pojęcia [Images and Concepts], *O czynnościach i wytworach* [Actions and Products], as well as his habilitation thesis, printed still in Vienna, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* [On the Content and Object of Presentations]. He was an opponent of all relativism, both philosophical and physical. Dedicated to the fight against relativism in philosophy is his work *O tak zwanych prawdach względnych* [On So-Called Relative Truths], which was translated into German.

His stiff and seemingly cold demeanour, however, attracted listeners. People standing by could not always understand it; they would sometimes ask in surprise how his listeners, young philosophers, could feel comfortable dealing with such a cold, strict professor. But the youth, working under the guidance of their professor in seminars, soon found out that the professor desired their good, that the professor loved the youth and devoted more time to them than anyone else could. When reading the classics of philosophy at seminar meetings, the professor demanded from each listener to provide him with a logical summary of a given chapter several days before the session, and all these summaries, the number of which sometimes amounted to 40 or more, he meticulously read and monitored, devoting to it every week several hours of hard work. I do not know a professor who burdens himself with as much work.

The professor, however, was not always cold and stern and liked to have fun with youth. Sometimes, however, he was unpleasant. And more than one older listener, even valued by the professor, received sometimes a cool attitude and reception. But it was known that the professor was demanding primarily of himself; consistency and compliance with his principles, he demanded from himself, so all the more from others; his own daughter, who, as a university student, found herself at the seminar under the guidance of her father, did not always feel comfortable.

The severity and rigour of the professor had something of German systematicity. His mother was, by the way, German; the late deceased received upbringing in a German environment, but interestingly, he did not like German philosophy. He did not admire Kant or post-Kantians. When during the doctoral rigorosum, I stated that I had chosen Kant as a philosopher to elaborate, he was almost surprised and could not help remarking that the contrast between the critique of practical reason and the critique of pure reason in Kant resembles the doctrine of double truth in medieval philosophy. He valued French and English philosophers much more highly, especially the latter, for their clear and accessible way of writing. It is not a coincidence that he dedicated his doctoral thesis to Descartes and his criterion of truth as clear and distinct knowledge.

He was the founder of the Polish Philosophical Society, which was established in Lvov on the anniversary of Kant's death (1904), the founder of the journal "Ruch Filozoficzny" [Philosophical Movement] in 1911, and also the chief editor of the "Studia Philosophica" yearbooks, two volumes of which have already been published. No one was as familiar with university life matters as he was; he served twice as dean and three times as rector, during the most difficult war years, 1914–1917. The treatises *O patriotyzmie* [On Patriotism] and *O dostojęństwie Uniwersytetu* [On the Dignity of the University] indicate how keenly he was interested in the matters of the reborn homeland and matters of collective life, because he understood philosophy as the *magistra vitae*. He provided advice to everyone, even on matters far from science and philosophy. An interesting example of this I once saw in the premises of the Philosophical Seminar. Once Highlanders from Poronin, where he often spent vacations, came to him asking for advice on their problems, certainly not philosophical ones. They deliberately travelled from Poronin to Lvov for this purpose! The extent to which wide circles felt grateful for his work for the good of society is finally evidenced by the fact that the industrial city of Łódź awarded him a scientific prize a few years ago. Until the last moments of his life, despite a long-term illness, he was interested in the progress of scientific-philosophical work, and, as far as he could, actively participated in it. He felt happy with the fruits of his labour, although physical suffering increasingly troubled him and disturbed this happiness.

In religious matters, he distinguished the essence of religiosity common to all religions from their unimportant details. He believed in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, as evidenced by the translation of Fechner's work *Das Büchlein vom Leben nach dem Tode* [English: The Little Book of Life after Death; Polish: Książeczka o życiu po śmierci] executed under his direction. However, he rejected freedom of will and was a resolute determinist. Lectures on this topic, delivered during one of the summer semesters, were among the best-prepared ones I have ever heard. When, after passing the colloquium in this course, as one of the advanced students, I talked to the professor about this topic and asked how determinism could be reconciled with a religious view of the world, he replied: "To thoughts of hell, you must of course bid farewell, and the relationship of human souls to God must be understood somewhat differently, than is typically done in religious beliefs..." He was also an advocate of building ethics independently of religious beliefs.

Professor Dr Izydora Dąmbska in Secret Teaching*

Maria Oberc

I met Professor Dr I. Dąmbska sometime around the summer of 1941. She hasn't changed since then. Apparently, there are people who remain unchanged over time and space, always the same – though this has nothing to do with the liveliness of the mind, which is eager and engaged. Ms Iza's unchanging nature is the steadfastness of her attitude and character, is something akin to the Envoy in Zbigniew Herbert's volume *Pan Cogito* [Mr Cogito]:

Go where those others went to the dark boundary
for the golden fleece of nothingness your last prize
Go upright among those who are on their knees
among those with their backs turned and those toppled in the dust
.....
repeat old incantations of humanity fables and legends
because this is how you will attain the good you will not attain
repeat great words repeat them stubbornly
like those crossing the desert who perished in the sand
and they will reward you with what they have at hand
with the whip of laughter with murder on a garbage heap
go because only in this way will you be admitted to the company of cold
skulls
to the company of your ancestors: Gilgamesh Hector Roland
the defenders of kingdom without limit and the city of ashes
Be faithful Go¹

* M. Oberc, *Profesor dr Izydora Dąmbska w tajnym nauczaniu*, "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1978, Vol. 36, Nos. 2–4, pp. 121–126.

¹ English translation: Z. Herbert, *Mr Cogito*, trans. J. Carpenter, B. Carpenter, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1993, pp. 61–62.

She is indeed stubborn, but not with that inert stubbornness in a pejorative sense – as Professor Czeżowski recently described stubbornness in contrast to perseverance during a lecture at the Philosophical Society. She is stubborn because she is faithful – faithful to those eternal moral values that remain unchanged in distinguishing between good and evil, a sense of honour and servility, courage and cowardice. And it was necessary to be not only perseverant in those times, but also stubborn, just as it is now often required, even against rationalistic premises that we tend to identify, in the colloquial sense, with common sense and considering possibilities and situations.

What reasonable premises could have justified organizing secret education almost immediately after the entry of the Hitlerite army? The need to create secret military organizations was much more appealing to reason and imagination. But to teach Polish grammar at that very moment?

My friend, only a 14-year-old at the time (I don't remember his name, and I don't know what happened to him) – also widened his eyes in surprise when having made it to Ms Iza (Ms Iza doesn't remember who sent him or where he came from), and upon requesting – because he had heard that Ms Iza was hiding one of our wounded senior officers – that the officer teaches them, the 14-year-olds, how to fight, she responded, "There will be time for that too. Do you know *Reduta Ordon* [Ordon's Redoubt]? And the third part of *Dziady* [Forefathers' Eve]?" And that's how – as she says – it began. From the experiences of our past, from the Romantics.

She was the first in Lvov to decide to organize secret teaching – initially in Polish language and history, and later in all subjects, because, as she used to say, "An ignorant slave is a double slave; a corrupted slave is a quadruple one." So – what can I say: Philomaths and Philarets! And apparently, it was no coincidence that the first emerging groups took on names like Plater (after the Emilia who preferred to die rather than surrender) – I was fortunate to belong to this group – as well as Skłodowska, a romantic from a different era and field, and Staszic, who was primarily concerned with preserving human thought during times of political danger.

When in July 1941, the delegate Wycech came from Warsaw to Lvov to organize secret teaching, Ms Iza provided him with a complete roster of 20 study groups (each consisting of four to six people) at the secondary education level, already operating at full capacity. These groups were divided into two tracks:

mathematics with natural sciences and humanities. Professor Dr I. Dąmbska, then Dr Dąmbska, together with Dr Fryderyka Jarzębińska, headed these groups until July 1944. At the same time, before the formal organization of the secret university began, she spontaneously started giving philosophy lectures to students in the secret university-level groups.

How much perseverance and stubbornness did it take to keep going? How much faith was required in the belief that educating kids, giving them the opportunity to complete high school, and at a very high level, was a fundamental value that needed to be nurtured? After all, I was just a kid back then – one of the youngest members of the Union of Armed Struggle in Lvov – when the chief (as in Różewicz's *Zaraz skoczę szefie* [In a Moment I Will Jump, Chief]) told me, “You must stop your studies. You can't do both. You'll get caught because of some grammar lesson and drag us all down with you. The war will end soon... how long can it last? Six months? A year? You'll catch up! You'll make up for it!”

But Ms Iza said, “We can't afford to waste time, no matter how long it takes, and who knows?” – she always took a sceptical view of overly optimistic predictions, those written with the finger in the air – “we can't waste any time.” And she infected us, the kids, with her sombre enthusiasm, her refusal to offer consolation, her inspiration to endure and strive, even if the golden fleece turned out to be nothingness, even if we perished in the sands while crossing the desert. So I stayed in the organization – after all, Ms Iza was also in it and wasn't just teaching – and I didn't stop my studies. In 1943, I completed my *matura* exams in those very secret groups and enrolled in the secret university philosophy programme. But I only managed to attend a few lectures by Professor Ajdukiewicz before the Gestapo arrested me... and not for grammar. It so happened that when I was arrested, I had notes from the secret lectures in my briefcase... but no one, neither from the organization nor from the secret education, got caught because of me.

I remember when they brought me back from that first interrogation on Pełczyńska Street, along with my mother and father, and how in the *Geschäftszimmer* on Łącki Street, my father – evidently not having much faith in the endurance or stubbornness of his teenage daughter – whispered to me: “Did you say anything about Dąmbska and Szumska [Dr Urszula Szumska taught us history]?” – as if there was nothing else, neither the weapons under the bed, nor the secret mail, nor the pamphlets – and how the alert Gestapo officer immediately asked, “Was hat er gesagt, was hat er gesagt?” [What did he say, what did he say?].

And my quick, though awkward, response in German was: “Er will ein Glas Wasser bekommen... er will trinken...” [He wants to get a glass of water... he wants to drink...], and the Gestapo officer’s loud laughter followed: “Sofort, sofort, sie werden viel trinken in unserem Hotel...” [Right away, right away, they will drink a lot in our hotel...] and my father’s astonished gaze, through which I saw tenderness and something like pride, relaxation, relief. So, for my father, this was also the most important thing: the groups of children learning and those who risked their lives every day to teach them.

And our *matura* exams! I now look at the documents – greyed out, faded sheets from those days, recently sent to me from Bytom by Dr Urszula Szumska. They have survived all these years. On each one, written in neat, bold handwriting: Dr Izydora Dąbska – Chair of the National Examination Board; and then: members of the Examination Board: Polish language – Dr Dąbska Izydora, German language – Burzyńska Anna, history and topics – Dr Chmielowska Maria.

Or: Chair of the National Examination Board – Dr Szumska Urszula; members: Polish language – Dr Dąbska Izydora, mathematics, physics, chemistry – Dr Puchalik Marian.

Or: Chair of the National Examination Board – Cyganowa Teresa. Members: Dr I. Dąbska, Burzyńska, Chmielowska.

The names of our professors appear: Maria Homme – French language, Ludmiła Madlerowa – Polish language, Helena Sawczyńska – mathematics, physics, chemistry, Anula Majerska – chemistry, Helena Słoniewska – biology, Tadeusz Lewicki, Teresa Cyganowa, Stanisław Cygan – Latin, Anna Nikliburcowa – French language, Fryderyka Jarzębińska – Polish language, Fr Marian Rechowicz – religion, Professor Halaubrenner – physics, Stefania Des Loges – French language, Maria Kruczkiewicz – history; but always, on every document – Dr Izydora Dąbska. And I have these graduation certificates in front of me – that’s how many survived – 40 pieces!

The certificates are backdated, for example, from 1934 (understood as 1943), with the last one from July 1944. Memories come back – faded memories – how fortunate that they are confirmed by authentic documents. How much perseverance and stubbornness it must have taken to preserve them, to save these certificates from Lvov instead of a dining set or clothes, something which at the time – as rational considerations would suggest – seemed more useful and sensible to save.

But what can I say? I remember my graduation exam as if through a fog – so much has happened in my life since then. A small room in some district of Lvov, a candle on the table, someone whispering that “...the Gestapo is in the neighbouring villa”... and the calm voice of Ms Iza: “Please do not disturb, the arbiturient is writing.” I was writing my Polish language graduation essay. I know I wrote 16 pages on office paper, but if it weren’t for the surviving documents, I wouldn’t even remember what topic I wrote about, but here it is – first the report: at the top, it says “Plater” – that’s us, our group, and then:

On 7 August 1934, at 4:00 p.m., the candidate B.M. [that is, me] was dictated the topics for the German language:

Das *Nibelungenlied* als Ausdruck germanischer Denkungsart [The *Nibelungenlied* as an expression of Germanic thought].

Schiller als Stürmer und Dränger [Schiller as a Sturm und Drang writer].

Wie kann ein jeder Nutzen bringen? [How can everyone contribute?]

The candidate chose the second topic. The dictation of the topic lasted until 4:05 p.m. The candidate submitted the essay at 8:05 p.m. There were no irregularities during the exam.

She was under surveillance from 4:00 p.m. to 8:05 p.m. – I.b.

On 10 August 1934, at 1:00 p.m., the candidate B.M. was dictated the topics for the Polish language:

1. Echa klasyczne w twórczości Kochanowskiego [Classical echoes in the works of Kochanowski].

2. Pesymizm i drogi jego przezwyciężenia w twórczości Słowackiego i Krasińskiego [Pessimism and ways to overcome it in the works of Słowacki and Krasiński].

3. Legiony Dąbrowskiego i Piłsudskiego w pieśni i powieści [Dąbrowski’s and Piłsudski’s legions in song and novel].

The candidate chose the second topic. The dictation of the topic lasted until 1:02 p.m. The candidate submitted the essay at 5:30 p.m. There were no irregularities during the exam.

She was under surveillance from 1:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. – [no signature].

And now in the table:

WRITTEN EXAM

Polish language 10 August 1934	Pesymizm i drogi jego przezwyciężenia w twórczości Słowackiego i Krasińskiego [Pessimism and ways to overcome it in the works of Słowacki and Krasiński]
German language 7 August 1934	Schiller als Stürmer und Dränger [Schiller as a Sturm und Drang writer]

ORAL EXAM 12 August 1934

Religion	Exempted
Polish language	Text: Wyspiański, <i>Wesele</i> [The Wedding] (Act I, Sc. 1) The depiction of society in <i>Wesele</i> and the Polish cause in Wyspiański's work – accurate and comprehensive answers Polish political writing in the 18th century against the background of the Age of Enlightenment Folk dialects and their literary significance. For 2 and 3, the answers were accurate
German language	Joseph Görres, <i>Die deutschen Volksbücher</i> Goethe, <i>Faust</i> Allg. Charakteristik des positivistischen Zeitalters [General characteristics of the positivists era] Very good answers
History and top-ics	The Acropolis in Athens (topography, examples of particular styles) – good Conquests of Charlemagne – comprehensive and intelligent response Kościuszko and the Legion based on readings – accurate, detailed, and comprehensive analysis The idea of federation in Poland and in Europe – very good

And finally, the summary of grades:

From the first and second years of high school: religion, Polish, Latin, German, history, topics, mathematics, physics, chemistry, propaedeutics, biology.

Grades from the written and oral exams...

Final grade...

She passed the matriculation exam at the general humanities high school of the humanities type, with a very good result.

Chairwoman of the National Examination Board – Cyganowa Teresa.

Members of the Examination Board: Polish language – Dąbmska Izydora, German language – Burzyńska Anna, history and topics – Chmielowska Maria.

This is the protocol from my matriculation exam and my *matura* certificate. There are 40 such protocols and diplomas – the wording of every question, the assessment of each answer, the solemn phrase: “No irregularities occurred during the exam” – as if we would even dare! In those times...? “Under surveillance from... to...” – just like in the good old days.

The memory returns: the Gestapo in the neighbouring villa and the calm voice: “Please do not disturb, the arbiturient is writing.”

And those precise questions, often related to the candidate’s interests. I browse through them:

Fastnacht Helena. – Polish language: 1. Chopin in Polish poetry; 2. Music and poetry – a comparison of these art forms and their interplay in religious, folk, and military songs; 3. The highland dialect and its literary significance.

Helena Fastnacht was the one who saw nothing beyond music, the one who also attended the conservatory – of course, the secret one.

Kubisty Jadwiga. – Polish language: 1. The Philomaths and Philarets (history, ideals, influence on the spiritual development and works of Mickiewicz).

She was the one with a historical inclination. And so on.

Ms Iza knew us well. Her lessons stimulated thinking, encouraged discussion..., sometimes extending almost until curfew. If any of us managed to stay late, they would walk her home, and along the way, we could discuss anything – the meaning of existence and death, happiness, faith, and its collapse. One could forget that she was a professor. She talked with everyone as an equal – she was the one who seemed shy, questioning, allowing us to believe that we were the ones discovering new lands, that we – not she – were the wise philosophers. She didn’t convince, she didn’t impose..., she waited for us to reach conclusions on our own. In Polish class she would sometimes read excerpts of poems – quietly, calmly, and in a way that often made us cry, and then we were ready to shoot and die, even though she never said: shoot, fight, die with honour! She never used grand words, she couldn’t stand pathos.

I think she taught us much more than grammar and who wrote what. Then, and even today, I sometimes think: if I did this or that, what would she have said about it? I believe she taught us, above all, to distinguish good from evil, baseness from honesty, and not just to distinguish – but to persistently, stubbornly, defend the most valuable virtues inherent within a person – even at the cost of one’s own life.

The Essence of Teaching*

Krystyna Stamirowska

In response to the question posed by the editors of “Znak” [Sign]: “What is the philosophy that I practice?,” Izydora Dąmbska wrote, among other things:

Philosophy, for me, is an essential existential function – a constant search, despite the uncertainty of outcomes, for an order of truth that transcends human life, which is subject to passing and death, and for the duties prescribed by it.¹

In an acknowledgement directed to colleagues and students on the occasion of her jubilee celebrations in 1974, she expressed significant words:

Whenever I had the opportunity [...] to help young people on their path to philosophy, I felt it as the most important task, and at the same time, as a great personal value.²

It would not be difficult to find more similar statements; however, it is worth recalling that Izydora Dąmbska was very restrained in her choice of words, especially when they concerned herself. The statements quoted above, I believe, accurately reflect her attitude and help to understand what was widely perceived as her exceptional authority and influence. Practising philosophy was a fundamental content of her life; being a university professor was an obligation: it was both a challenge and a task that allowed her to embody the values she cherished the most while also passing them on to her students.

* K. Stamirowska, *Sedno nauczania*, in: *Izydora Dąmbska 1904–1983. Materiały z sympozjum „Non est necesse vivere, necesse est philosophari” Kraków, 18–19 grudnia 1998 r.*, ed. J. Perzanowski, Polska Akademia Umiejętności, Kraków 2001, pp. 125–129.

¹ I. Dąmbska, *Czym jest filozofia, którą uprawiam* [What Is the Philosophy that I Practice], “Znak” 1977, No. 281/82, p. 1335.

² I. Dąmbska, *Podziękowanie* [Acknowledgement], “Ruch Filozoficzny” 1978, Vol. 36, Nos. 2–3, p. 128.

My first memories are connected with the beginning of my philosophical studies and the lectures on the history of philosophy conducted by Izydora Dąmbska, and later with her seminars. These seminars were different from the university classes I had known before: they were characterized by focus and a lack of haste; there was no reason to impose any particular pace on reading or discussion. Unlike routine exercises, they were an end in themselves. The aim was to reach the true meaning, to grasp the essential thought of the author; the evening meetings were a shared search for truth, not a display of erudition or rhetoric. This is how we learned to read and understand philosophical texts; this is how certain needs and habits were formed, which, I believe, remained equally important also for those of us who later moved away from philosophy.

The seminars, and later the meetings and conversations at the Professor's apartment – although quite regular – were always extraordinary events, not because they were spectacular, but because they deviated from the banality and monotony of practical activities. These were extraordinary occasions due to the atmosphere of focus and the selflessness of the content filling them. Detached for a few hours from the pace dictated by everyday life, and also from the pressure of our other field of study (which, in most cases, was of a more practical nature), and immersed in a different reality, free from the atmosphere of haste, we valued this special experience, the essence of which can be captured in the words of the English poet: "It is the journey, not the arrival that matters." What mattered most were the cognitive experiences and the satisfaction of shared inquiry.

Although we were aware that we were participating in something exceptional, we perhaps did not fully realize the extent to which the content and style of these meetings would remain an unparalleled experience, nor, even more so, how quickly the circumstances in which we were fortunate to study would undergo a fundamental change.

The quality of the Professor that may have struck one the most was what she herself, in her reflections on freedom, referred to as "what is called the authenticity or moral integrity of a human person," that is, "the consistency between what is on the outside and what is on the inside, as Plato says in the *Phaedrus*."³ Professor Dąmbska was always herself; she never pretended anything: there was an obvious consistency between what she thought and said and her actions.

³ I. Dąmbska, *Gdy myślę o słowie "wolność"* [When I Think about the Word "Freedom"], "Znak" 1981, No. 325, p. 855.

She was a true authority, not an apparent one, invented for immediate needs. Opportunism and creating appearances were foreign to her; she was principled, and for this, she was criticized. She neither knew how to, nor wanted to, adapt to situations she did not approve of. She was just – her sympathies or lack thereof never influenced her judgments of others, which were balanced and cautious but clear and distinct. She could separate judgment from emotion, and her voice always sounded the same: it was the voice of conscience and the voice of truth, commanding respect even from her opponents.

In her treatise *Sceptycyzm francuski XVI i XVII wieku* [French Scepticism of the 16th and 17th Centuries], while discussing Pascal's views, Dąmbska lists among the factors that hinder the distinction between truth and falsehood – imagination and self-love:

All the theatrical apparatus of ceremonies and costumes, rituals created by people to impress others, appeals to our imagination. It dictates assessments and rules of beauty, goodness, and righteousness. No less dangerous a deceiving force is a person's self-love. It makes us want to appear better, wiser, and more beautiful than we are. And not just to others, but also to ourselves. That is why it compels us to wear masks and pretend.⁴

These very practices – putting on a mask and creating false impressions – were profoundly alien to her; they carried intellectual and moral risks and also raised aesthetic objections.

Izydora Dąmbska was exceptional also because she was free from the weakness, so common even in academic circles, of self-love and vanity. While valuing the opinions of people she respected, she was infinitely distant from the vanity fair, incapable of doing anything for show, devoid of any desire to impress, as only someone who serves absolute values and is fully aware of this fact can be.

If she strived perfection, she was genuinely close to it; perhaps that is why she was criticized for her lack of compromise. But if she had acted differently, if she had agreed to pay the price demanded to remain at the university, she would have ceased to be herself – and would not have become a role model for others.

In the times of the harsh “little stabilization” and minimalism, she was a guidepost and a model, something that the passage of time did not change; on

⁴ I. Dąmbska, *Sceptycyzm francuski XVI i XVII wieku* [French Scepticism of the 16th and 17th Centuries], Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu, Toruń 1958, p. 65.

the contrary, everything that happened after her death confirmed the correctness of her stance and the accuracy of her judgments. As Jerzy Perzanowski wrote in an essay dedicated to Izydora Dąmbska, her merit does not fade but shines ever brighter and for more and more people.⁵

There was something different in her behaviour and words, indicating that she lived in a slightly different dimension, one where there was no room for falsehood, commonness, or banality. She imposed this way of being on others – it was not only respect, but something more; in her presence, one weighed words, and even thoughts, more carefully. Every interaction was not only an experience of encountering something extraordinary but also left an indelible mark on memory. Perhaps for these reasons, in the eyes of the party officials, who harboured illusions about their ability to shape attitudes, she was considered a highly dangerous person: unintentionally, she became a benchmark, setting the standard, someone perfect in a world full of imperfections. Perhaps her hierarchy of life needs, expressed in the saying she often quoted: “Non est necesse vivere, necesse est philosophari” [It is not necessary to live, it is necessary to philosophize], implemented quite literally, despite adversity, was the explanation for her extraordinary power of influence.

She was characterized by a sense of responsibility towards her discipline, for the results of her research that she published, as well as towards and for her students. She was a living example of what a scholar and philosopher can and should be; an example undoubtedly difficult to follow, unattainable, but – paradoxically – alive and close, because she was accessible every day, revealing herself in specific situations, always giving the impression of an encounter with something lofty and noble, yet very close – there was no trace of arrogance in her, though she could impose a sense of distance. She was demanding, sometimes strict, yet also kind and full of warmth. She was truly deeply loved and admired by her students – and the passage of time, rather than distancing her, made her even closer and clearer. Individual and social experience confirmed the righteousness of her choices and behaviour. The past 15 years, during which there were no shortages of critical situations, frequently brought her to mind along with the question: “What would Professor Dąmbska say?”

⁵ J. Perzanowski, *Głos prawdy. O Pani Profesor Izydorze Dąmbskiej* [The Voice of Truth: About Professor Izydora Dąmbska], “Znak” 1986, No. 1(374), p. 17.

She did not live to see the year 1989 – she only witnessed the rise of Solidarity and later the imposition of martial law. She passed away in the difficult year of 1983, during the Pope's pilgrimage to Poland.

Although aware of her deteriorating health, we did not believe that we could be so quickly deprived of her presence, or that the doors of the apartment at Podwale 1 could one day be closed. Behind those doors remained an important part of our lives and experiences – both scientific and personal – which, without her, would not have been part of our lives and which we would have been poorer without. This is a debt difficult to repay. She showed and exemplified what a university professor and a professor of philosophy can and should be – as a scholar, as a human being, and as a follower of philosophy, one who proclaims truth – not merely with words but with life, confirming the choice of life's path. To say that she lived in harmony with herself is to also realize that the condition for such a life is knowing who you truly are. Contrary to appearances, this is not always easy or obvious knowledge.

Izydora Dąmbska grew out of the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School, in which, as she wrote:

a distinctive feature of metaphilosophical reflection [...] was the emphasis placed, either explicitly or implicitly, on axiological moments: on the moral values that the practice of philosophy presupposes and at the same time generates – on its unique ethos that shapes the meaning of a philosopher's life.⁶

For her, philosophy was not only a field of study but also a source of values: it was from this understanding of philosophy's role that her life stance emerged, one that demanded fidelity to principles and convictions, freedom from external compulsion, freedom from erroneous beliefs, and the consistency of thoughts and actions. She adhered to the interconnected principles of living in truth and living freely.

Her life was authentic at a time when pretence had become a widespread practice and conformity almost a norm. Her rigorism was an exception at a time when many justified compromises by the need to survive. She understood the weight of words when words were commonly abused. She defended immutable values in times of devaluation; she was genuinely creative, resisting the pressure

⁶ I. Dąmbska, *Podziękowanie*, op. cit., p. 128.

of mediocrity and not succumbing to influences; she was full of seriousness when the convenient mask of a jester became commonplace.

It is, in fact, a peculiar paradox that those tendencies, dangerous to both science and social life, which were then generally imposed, are now often the result of choices, or perhaps only apparent choices.

Zbigniew Herbert called Dąmbska an example of courage, perseverance, and fidelity. He expressed what everyone who interacted with her felt. These traits – coexisting to such a high degree – were not often encountered in times when the phrase “one has to live somehow” was used to justify oneself and others, even though these were merely superficial justifications that did not relieve the feeling of unease, or at least distaste.


Without meeting her and without the experiences and reflections that arose from these encounters, there would perhaps not have been born the full awareness of attitudes and values that exist and are implemented in concrete terms, not in the realm of abstraction. She embodied what we generally believe to exist only in an ideal form: in her case, these values were as concrete as possible. Her life was proof that it can be so in everyday life.

The university is – or at least should be – a school of intellect and a school of values. One can complete university studies while experiencing mainly various forms of ersatz. Our privilege was the opportunity to genuinely study and develop under the guidance of a philosopher who, by her example, truly taught not only how to philosophize but also how to live. That extraordinary philosopher was Professor Izydora Dąmbska.

Group Pictures of the Lvov-Warsaw School Members



Lwów, 1910. Standing from the left: Kazimierz Twardowski (1), Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (2), Rudolf Nałęcki (3), Daniela Tennerówna-Gromska (4), Mieczysław Treter (5), Józef Sandel (6), Anna? Jakubowska (7), Stefan Dańcewicz (8), Władysław Tatarkiewicz (9), Zofia Paławska-Drexlerowa (10), Henryk Świerczewski (11), Tadeusz Kotarbiński (12), Alfons Baron (13).



Lwów, circa 1910. Sitting from the left: Alfons Baron (1), Daniela Tennerówna-Gromska (2), Tadeusz Kotarbiński (3), Kazimierz Twardowski (4), Zofia Paławska-Drexlerowa (5), Władysław Tatarkiewicz (6), Anna? Jakubowska (7). Standing from the left: Mieczysław Treter (1), Stefan Dańcewicz (2), Henryk Świerczewski (3), Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (4), Rudolf Nałęcki (5), Józef Sandel (6), Seweryn Stark (7).



Lwów, circa 1910. Sitting from the left: Stefan Dańcewicz? (1), Helena Dubieńska-Witwicka (2), Mieczysław Treter (3), Kazimierz Twardowski (5), Daniela Tennerówna-Gromska (6), Alfons Baron (7) and Tadeusz Czeżowski (8). Standing from the left: Tomasz Sobolewski? (1), Juliusz Kleiner (2), Franciszek Jaroszyński (3), Józef Bednarski (4), Józef Sander (5), Tadeusz Kotarbiński (6).



Lwów, circa 1910. Sitting from the left: Zygmunt Łempicki (1), Jan Łukasiewicz (3), Kazimierz Twardowski (4), Władysław Witwicki (5), Helena Dubieńska-Witwicka (6). Standing in the second row from the left: Halina Słoniewska (1) and Zygmunt Zawirski (4). Standing in the third row from the left: Roman Ingarden (1), Alfons Baron (5), Stanisław Kaczorowski (7).



Lwów, circa 1912. Sitting from the left: Maria Fränkel (2), Seweryn Stark (4), Kazimierz Twardowski (5), Zygmunt Łempicki (6), Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (7), Zofia Paśławska-Drexlerowa (8). Standing from the left: Maria Kuryś-Krupkowska (3), Stefania Borkowska (6), Bronisław Biegeleisen (7), Irena Jawicówna-Pannenkowa (9), Stanisław Leśniewski (11), Daniela Tennerówna-Gromska (14) and Tadeusz Kotarbiński (15).



Lwów, 1913. Sitting from the left: Feliks Kierski (1), Tadeusz Olejniczak (2), Zofia Paśławska-Drexlerowa (3), Mściśław Wartenberg (4), Kazimierz Twardowski (5), Daniela Tennerówna-Gromska (6), Jan Łukasiewicz (7), Maria Fränkel (8). Standing from the left: Marian Borowski (1), Edmund Gromski (2), Józef Brokman (3), Jan Ihnatowicz (4), Bronisław Bandrowski (5), Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (5), Zygmunt Łempicki (6), Stanisław Leśniewski (7), Alfons Baron (8).



Lwów, 16 December 1925. Sitting from the left: Joachim Knossow (1), Eugenia Ginsberżanka-Blausteinowa (2), Roman Ingarden (3), Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (4), Kazimierz Twardowski (5), Józefina Spinnerówna-Mehlbergowa (6), Maria Kokoszyńska-Lutmanowa (7). Standing from the left: Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (2), Izydora Dąmbska (3), Maria Jędrzejewska (4), Jerzy Kirchner (5), Halina Słoniewska (6), Adam Bardecki (7), Walter Auerbach (8) Leopold Blaustein (9), Henryk Mehlberg (10).



Lwów, 11 October 1926. Sitting from the left in the first row: Eugenia Ginsberżanka-Blausteinowa (1), Halina Słoniewska (2), Józefina Spinnerówna-Mehlbergowa (3). Sitting from the left in the second row: Leopold Blaustein (1), Maria Kokoszyńska-Lutmanowa (2), Kazimierz Twardowski (3), Izydora Dąmbska (4), Tadeusz Witwicki (5), Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (6). Standing from the left: Henryk Mehlberg (1), Irena Krampnerówna-Fischbeinowa (2), Jerzy Kirchner (3), Maria Jędrzejewska (4), Walter Auerbach (5).



Zimna Woda near Lwów, 1927. Standing in the first row, from the left: Eugenia Ginsberżanka-Blausteinowa (1), Irena Krampnerówna-Fischbeinowa (2), Halina Słoniewska (3), Kazimierz Twardowski (5), Izydora Dąmbska (6). From the left between the first and top row: Leopold Blaustein.



Zimna Woda near Lwów, 1927. Outdoor meeting. Sitting from the left: Eugenia Ginsberżanka-Blausteinowa (2), Joachim Knossow (3), Izydora Dąmbska (4), Kazimierz Twardowski (5).



Lwów, 1936. Former students of Twardowski. Sitting from the left: Bronisława Wójcikowna (1), Leon Heller (2), Eugenia Ginsberżanka-Blausteinowa (3), Leon Blaustein (4), Tadeusz Witwicki (5), Maria Jędrzejewska (6), Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (7), Izydora Dąmbska (8), Helena Słoniewska (9). Standing: Irena Krampnerówna-Fischbeinowa.



Poznań, 1936. Zygmunt Zawirski's seminar. From the left: Franciszek Zeidler? (2), Zygmunt Spira? (4), Zygmunt Zawirski (6).



Wilno, 19 June 1933. Philosophical Circle of Stefan Batory University in Wilno. Sitting from the right: Tadeusz Czeżowski (2). Standing from the left: Stefan Błachowski (2).



Sociable Philosophical Congress in Wilno, 1937. Over 30 participants from Kraków, Lwów, Warsaw, and Wilno. Sitting from the left in the first row from the bottom: Tadeusz Kotarbiński (6), Tadeusz Czeżowski (7), Franciszek Smolka (8). Standing from the left in the first row from the bottom: Eugenia Ginsbergówna-Blausteinowa (2), Lidia Łosiówna-Wołoszynowa? (5), Janina Budkiewicz? (9), Irena Druhowinówna-Mokrzecka? (10), Bohdan Zawadzki (11). Standing from the left in the second row from the bottom: Saul Sarnaker? (1), Aleksandra Zajkowska-Znamierowska? (2), Janina Adolphówna-Borecka? (3), Adam Łysakowski (7), Mieczysław Wallis (10), Walter Auerbach (11).



Kraków, 1960s. Izydora Dąmbska's seminar at Jagiellonian University. Sitting from the left: Leopold Zgoda? (2), Izydora Dąmbska (3).

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